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ABSTRACT
Economists have always been concerned with analyz-
ing and explaining the general level and the structure of-
wage rates. At times, economists have been reasonably
well satisfied that some particular theory of wages provided
an adequate explanation. But this is not one of those
times. Taking as a point of reference the fact that we
do not now have a generalized statement of how wage rates
are determined and how they are related to other major
economic variables, recent efforts have been directed toward
a more thorough understanding of union and business behavior
in the hope of developing generalizations which fit present-
day circumstances. The purpose of this study is to contri-
bute toward that understanding and that development by
analyzing one, admittedly small, segment of our economy and
by comparing the generalizations which seem to grow out of
such analysis with generalizations put forth by others.
The area chosen for this study, that surrounding
Brockton, Massachusetts, is one in which most manufacturing
is specialized on men t s dress shoes. In this area an inde-
pendent union represents the shoeworkers and most of the
companies involved have joined, for collective bargaining
purposes, a Manufacturers' Association. The research has
been concentrated on the actions of these groups, as they
have reacted to the problems arising from their own his-
torical background as well as from industry-wide influences
felt in the product market.
Principal reliance has been placed on four sources of
data, three of them more or less formal. First, access
was obtained to the records of the Brockton Manufacturerst
Association, in which are included summaries of meetings
held by the Manufacturerst separately and in conjunction
with Union representatives. Second, memoranda were made
available relative to the weekly meetings of all the Union's
governing Boards. Both the Union and Association records
are regarded by the parties as confidential and are, in no
sense, public attitudes of the parties, adopted with an
eye to their possible effect. A third source of data is
more suspect from this point of view: statements by the
parties and reports on events made in the local newspapers.
Finally, and by all odds the most important as a source of
information and as a means by which to evaluate material
gathered elsewhere, extensive, informal discussions have
been held with past and present principals in the Union
and Manufacturer groups.
Resulting from this intensive study of a particular
collective bargaining relationship, six conclusions, which
may possibly have more general validity, stood out.
1. The important forces conditioning wages in a
given situation cannot usually be determined from
the study of general wage movements alone. In this
situation, certainly, adjustments made through a so-
called Grade System have been quantitatively significant
and have tended to reflect different pressures from those
felt at the level of general wage changes,
2. General wage movements, however, may be the
principal point of reference for satisfaction of the
"political" pressures which emanate from the fraction-
alized nature of the American labor movement, from
rivalries within particular unions, and from comparisons
with the achievements of ,Tothern employee groups. Again
and again, general wage changes have been directed toward
an unstable political situation in Brockton.
3. Even at the level of general wage movements,
however, the possible effect upon output and employment
of any given settlement may be an important pressure in
the bargaining process. Consciousness of this "employ-
ment effect" has been most apparent when the inter-union
rivalry in Brockton has been relatively quiescent.
4. When all of the areas of wage activity are
considered, the employment side of the wage bargain
may become a dominant, motivating force--such that the
union may consciously try to adjust the level of
employment through changes in wages. Using the
mechanism of the Grade System, in fact, the Brother-
hood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen has made many ex-
plicit wage-employment bargains: a specific labor-cost
concession granted in return for a guaranteed rate of
production from the company. This conclusion is notably
different from the observations of Ross and Reynolds, who
feel that wage changes and the level of employment in an
individual firm are unrelated, at least in the short-run.
5. Underemployment and unemployment may become an
effective determinant of wage act-ivity through the crea-
tion of a demand by the rank and file for action which
will increase the volume of work. In the Brockton case,
then, the cause of more "shoes" has at times been more
potent politically than easier promises of wage increases.
6. The benefits from small technological changes in
piece-work industries tend to be captured by the workers
directly concerned with the change, thus altering the
intra-plant wage structure. This seems to have taken
place in Brockton since (1) workers on the old job have
asserted a prior claim to the new one and (2) bargaining
on the new rate has consequently taken as a point of
reference the rate on the old job.
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Finally, this case throws some light on the classi-
fication of union objectives as proposed by Ross: union
behavior as motivated by (a) institutional survival, (b)
personal achievement on the part of the leaders, and (c)
increased benefits for the rank and file. This classi-
fication does seem to fit, in a general way, the Brother-
hood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen; but, perhaps, the most
important question concerns the relative potency of these
objectives, rather than their mere existence. The Brother-
hood supplanted an organization which placed the interests
of institutional survival and personal ambition above the
wishes of the rank and file. As a consequence, the
Brotherhood has been characterized by democratic procedures,
designed to assure the membership of an organization respon-
sive to its demands. As such, union activity in the
Brockton district has survived the most taxing circumstances.
Perhaps, then, vigilant emphasis on the interests of the rank
and file, despite conflict with short-run institutional and
personal needs, is the means for stable trade union opera-
tions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economists have always been concerned with analyzing
and explaining the general level and? the structure of wage
rates. At times, economists have been reasonably well
satisfied that some particular theory of wages provided an
adequate explanation. But this is not one of those times.
Taking as a point of reference the fact that we do not now
have a generalized statement of how wage rates are determined
and how they are related to other major economic variables,
recent efforts1 have been directed toward a more thorough
understanding of union and business behavior in the hope of
developing generalizations which fit present-day circumstances.
The purpose of this study is to contribute toward that under-
standing and that development by analyzing one, admittedly
small, segment of our economy and by contrasting the generali-
zations which seem to grow out of such analysis with generali-
zations put forth by others.
In the years immediately following World War II, the
wage changes have been most spectacular in industries which
are dominated by large unions and large companies and which
have not been able to supply the quantities of'goods demanded
at the asking prices. However, a few industries have already,
1. For example, see Arthur M. Rass, Trade-.Union Wage Policy,
University of California Press, 1948, and Lloyd G. Reynolds,
"Toward a Short-Run Theory of Wages", American Economic Review,
June 1948, pp. 289-308.
even in this period of "full employment1, experienced a
shift from a "seller's" to a "buyer's" market, with the
attendant price and employment problems which such a shift
involves. Further, the extent of unionization is not
uniform in all sectors of our economy. Such is the case
in the men's shoe industry, to which this study is directed.
The scope of the inquiry, furthermore, includes, insofar as
possible, all phases of wage activity, rather than simply
general wage movements.
The group of manufacturers and the Union to which the
following material and conclusions pertain are located in
and around the shoe-producing center, Brockton, Massachu-
setts. Here, over thirty companies, about two-thirds of
which belong to a Manufacturers t Association, deal with an
independent union, the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Crafts-
men. Though the shoeworkers in Brockton have been unionized
since the turn of the twentieth century, the present Brother-
hood has been in existence only since 1933; and it is the
period from that date through 1947 that is analyzed here.1
The period includes, of course, a range of economic circum-
stances from very bad to very good; however, the men's shoe
industry in Brockton must be generally characterized as
1. For an analysis of this district during a previous
period, see Thomas L. Norton, Trade-Union Policies in the
Massachusetts Shoe Industry, 1919-1929, Columbia, 1932,pp. 99-171.
declining. In contrast to studies of highly-unionized
industries operating under conditions such that wage
increases could be passed on in the form of price increases,
then, this study is focused on a long-established union-
management relationship, operating in an industry which is
only partially unionized and which has chronically been
faced with "texcess" capacity.
The exposition which follows is divided roughly into
two sections: (a) conditioning forces which have been
generally operative upon all wage activity in the Brockton
area, and (b) specific reactions of the parties to particular
situations and problems. The generally operative forces are
treated here in three groups. First, the economic charac-
teristics of the industry are discussed, especially the
competitive nature of the product market, the structure of
costs, and the trends of prices, wages, and productivity in
the industry. Second, the nature and development of the
manufacturing process itself seems to have influenced the
form of the union organization and the structure of wages
within the factory. In addition, some knowledge of the
manufacturing process is essential for an understanding of
the type of mass-production economies available in the shoe
industry and for an understanding of the manufacturing
differences between high and low grade shoes. Both these
areas of knowledge will be helpful in analyzing the
difficulties of the Brockton district and the adjustments
which have been made. Third, since the district is bound
by long-standing traditions of the past, the growth and
the structure of the Manufacturer and Union institutions,
which reflect that past, must be described.
With the immediately relevant environment thus defined,
specific areas of wage activityl can be.discussed. These
areas, too, are treated in three sections. First, the
general wage movements which have occurred in the district
between 1933 and 1947 are described and analyzed. However,
these general wage movements, taken by themselves, present
a deceptive and incomplete picture of Brockton wage activity.
The district has used as a primary means of adjustment a so-
called Grade System, by which piece prices are made dependent
on the selling price of the shoe. Analysis of this System,
therefore, forms the second section on specific wage activity.
Finally, the administration of piece rates is discussed.
1. The phrase "wage activity"' seems most appropriate to
events which have transpired in Brockton. The more generally
used term, ?Tpolicy", usually implies both conscious planning
and action according to plan, and the principals in Brockton
area events do not seem to have behaved that way. They have
made immediate adjustments to particular situations, acting,
in most cases, without any generally-planned framework.
The fact that actions in Brockton are not generally guided
by overall policies is apparently not an unusual condition in
this world. On the contrary, it has been described in a more
famous context as "muddling through".
For another point of view on this question, see John T.
Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, Macmillan,
1944, p. 45.
Following this expository material, wage determination
in the Brockton men ts shoe industry is summarized in two
forms. The material is presented in terms of the approach
of the Manufacturers and of the Union to their wage problems.
Especial effort is made to focus attention on the types of
pressures to which the parties seemed most sensitive and most
likely to respond. Then, the material is presented in terms
of generalizations which seem to grow out of the data, .and
these generalizations are compared with those advanced in
other studies.
The material for this study has been gathered in the
course of a full-time research year, the major proportion
of which was spent in the Brockton district. Reliance has
been placed on four sources of data, three of them more or
less formal. First, access was obtained to the records of
the Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association. These records
include either minutes or summaries of what transpired when
the Manufacturers' group met either with Union representa-
tives or by themselves. These notes on meetings exist, in
varying detail, for the years from 1903 on. Second,
memoranda were available relative to the meetings of all
the Brotherhood's governing Boards from 1933 to the present.
These memoranda, typewritten and entered in the Union's formal
records each week, cover the business that came before the
Boards and the disposition made of particular items. On
some issues, the specific discussions which took place have
been recorded.. Both the Union and Asse-ciation records are
regarded by the parties as confidential and are, in no sense,
public attitudes of the parties, adopted with an eye for their
possible effect. A third source of data is more suspect from
this point of view: statements by the parties. and reports on
events made in the local newspapers. Nevertheless, these
statements and reports have been useful in compiling a chro-
naolgy of the more highly-publicized of Brockton's wage
disputes and problems.
Finally, and by all odds the most important as a source
of information and. as a means by which to evaluate material
gathered elsewhere, extensive discussions have been held with
past and present principals in the Union and Manufacturer
groups. Insofar as possible, these have been discussions--
not interviews. The basic research approach.has been one
of getting to know the parties through day-to-day informal
contacts. In this way, an attempt has been made to see
problems and lines of thought in a realistic frame of
reference--to see through the eyes of the parties them-
selves the pressures they feel in the conduct of their jobs..
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SHOE INDUSTRY
Of what relevance to wage determination are an indus-
tryts economic characteristics? Some observers of the post-
war United States have concluded that the connection is in-
direct at best; and they feel that study of the politics and
strategy of particular bargains will prove more fruitful.
One student of this problem, for example, has made this
statement: "The volume of employment associated with a given
wage rate is unpredictable before the fact and the effect of
a given rate upon employment is undecipherable after the fact.
The employment effect cannot normally be the subject of ra-
tional calculation and prediction at the time the bargain is
made; and union officials are normally in no position to
assume responsibility for it. "l
But, where fairly "workable competition" is combined
with proportionately significant labor costs, such an extreme
position may not be warranted. This appears to be the case
in the shoe industry. Here, labor costs and wages do feel
the impact not only of competition in the product market,
1. Arthur M. Ross, tWhat is Responsible Wage Policy?",
The Southern Economic Journal, January 1948, p. 270. This
quotation represents the most extreme position taken by
Mr. Ross. In the introduction to his book, Trade Union Wage
Policy, which includes the article referred to above, he grants
that "the economic environment is important to unions at the
second remove: because it generates political pressures which
have to be reckoned with by the union leader" (p. 14).
but, in addition, of such industry characteristics as the
ease with which production facilities may be acquired and
moved. The probability that these and other economic
factors condition wages and employment in Brockton-area
shoe concerns makes understanding of these factors neces-
sary to understanding of Brockton's wage activity. The
purpose of this chapter is, then, examination of those
characteristics of the shoe industry most relevant to wage
determination.
This chapter will start with discussion of the
"product" under consideration here; then the firms in the
industry will be described and compared. Next, the ele-
ments of cost in a-. mants shoe will be examined, from the
individual company point of view and from that of the
industry as a whole. The conditions of entry into shoe
manufacture and the relative ease with which production
facilities may be moved both influence the determination
of wages in established shoe centers; a section is devoted
to discussion of these two influences. Finally, shoe-
industry wage levels and labor productivity are described
and analyzed.
The "Products" of the Shoe Industry
The shoe industry is generally considered to be
"competitive".1  Now, one of the conditions which makes
for competition in the market is a standardized product;
'out a walk through the average shopping center will dis-
close wide variation between what are generally called
"shoes". Differences are most obvious when the "product"
is compared as to type of consumer: infants, children,
boys, girls, women, or men; but shoes may also be differ-
entiated by construction, quality, material used, stylistic
novelty, skilled workmanship required, and in many other
ways. For the most part, factories specialize on one
fairly narrowly defined field such as "women's noveltiesn
or "men's fine welts".2  However, practically the same
basic machinery is used on all types of footwear,3 and
operations are similar enough to break down technical
1. For instance, see TNEC, Monograph No. 21, Competition
and Monopoly in American Industry, pp. 45-46.
2. This type of specialization is generally true of fac-
tories; however, many of the larger firms produce in a
variety of fields, with each of their factories specialized.
The International Shoe Company, for instance, produces shoes
in almost every footwear classification.
3. Different types of construction, of course, require
particular machinery at various stages in the production
process. However, the bulk of the equipment used in one
shoe factory is adaptable to use in/alm ost any other factory.
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boundary lines between related product classifications.1
As a result, though the "product" is not standard, the
potential competition for any single type of shoe is
broader than the limits of its own particularly defined
group might suggest. But it is within a classification
like "men's dress shoes" that price, quality, and cost
comp risons are closest, and the more direct forces of
product-market competition are brought to focus.
This "ments dress shoe" grouping,2 which is the one
most relevant to analysis of the Brockton area, is some-
thing of a puzzle itself. The advertising copy used by
one well-known retailing chain, for instance, asks the
consumer to compare this "hand-maden shoe worth $75.00
with the "machine reproduction" which "wet, offer for $8.95.
In the show case, at least, the shoes look about the same;
in fact, the 1947 window-shopper had a hard time distin-
guishing the $5.95 model displayed on "Main Street", from
others selling for anything up to $25.00. While differ-
ences do appear between the extremes after a few weeks of
1. For instance, workmen in a menTs welt factory could
probably produce boys' shoes or the staple types of women's
shoes. In general, a quality shift is much more difficult
when the direction is up than when the line of shoes in-
volved is cheapened. Most manufacturers, however, seem to
consider production of widely divergent types of shoes under
the same roof as impractical, even though it might be possible
to switch from one type to another if that became necessary.
2. This classification includes all footwear worn by men,
except for the heavy "work" shoes. In 1939, three-fourths of
the men's shoes produced were "dress" and the other one-
fourth were "work" shoes.
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wear, the differences become harder to find as price
intervals become smaller. Though a wide quality range
of men's shoes is on the market, their outward appearance
is quite homogeneous. As a result, consumers make value
comparisons not only inside price ranges, but, especially
in times of "price resistance", between them as well.
How has the consumer chosen as among the various
price grades and how has his choice varied over time?
The most detailed information on the shoe consumer's choice
covers only certain periods during World War II; but, the
wartime experience illustrates adequately the range and
importance of various price categories.1  For the six
months between the beginning of September, 1944, and the
end of February, 1945, the median wholesale price was
slightly under $3.50, with a range-running from $1.00 to
"$12.00 and up". Only 12% of the total pairs produced,
however, fell in the so-called high grades, above $6.00
at wholesale (the "pre-war" $10.00 retailer). The great
bulk of production, 70%, sold at the factory for from $2.50
to $4.50.2  While the greatest volume of shoe business was
1. The question of shifts in demand will be discussed
subsequently; however, the wartime consumption pattern was
not markedly different from the one which existed just
previous to the outbreak of hostilities.
2. The relative importance of the various price groups
during the war period is presented in detail by U.S. Dept.
of Commerce, Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics, May 1946,
p. 12.
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concentrated in the lowest grades, the number of firms
reporting sales in the various price categories was rather
evenly distributed. This is to be explained in part by
the fact that many firms apparently produced in more than
one price group, I and in part by the concentration of the
larger firms on shoes selling in the low price ranges.
Two principal advantages accrue to firms which spread
their output over a range of quality rather than specialize
on one narrowly defined "product". First, efficiences in
the utilization of material may be obtained by grading
leather into the most appropriate quality classification.
But, second, sales are hedged against shifts in the com-
position of consumer demand--that is, against price-
preference changes which exceed movement of individual
shoe prices. The extent of such shifts is difficult to
demonstrate in an exact sense; but manufacturers, especial-
ly those in the higher quality brackets, do feel that these
changes take place: "Some former consumers in this makes-
no-difference-what price group have found it necessary to
grade down....They must...buy in a price bracket which
1. The extent to which this is the case is indicated
by the fact that the total of firms, when added price
group by price group, was 480, while the actual total
was only 169.
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today represents the price existing in the quality brackets
of yesterday."l
The available statistical evidence is summarized on
Charts 1 and 2, where index numbers of shoe prices are
compared with average prices. 2  Presumably, deviations
between an index and an average should indicate a shift
in the relative importance of the various price brackets:3
a shift down when the average drops in relation to the
index, and up when the reverse occurs. The figures on
which these comparisons are based unfortunately contain
a diverse product-mix, in which the relative importance
of various kinds of shoes can and does change; neverthe-
less, the comparisons which are made are so sharp that
they may be considered as meaningful. Chart 1, for
example., discloses that a rather drastic shift toward
the lower price brackets occurred for tall shoes-" between
1. B. Harrison Cort, as quoted in the Boot and Shoe
Recorder Daily, October 28, 1947, p. 25. Even the Inter-
national Shoe Company, primarily manufacturers of low-priced
shoes, noted the "public demand for lower grades in all types
of merchandise" in the early thirties. International Shoe
Company,, Annual Report, 1932.
2.. The author is indebted to Dr. John H. Patterson,
Economist for the National Shoe Manufacturers Association,
for pointing out the applicability of this type of analysis
to the data available on the shoe industry.
3. Shoe prices in the inter-war period fell into somewhat
inflexible grooves. Presumably, the index should represent
the price tags on these grooves and deviations from the index
by the average price should indicate changes in the price-
quality preference of consumers.
Chart 1
Average Prices Compared With Index Numbers For All Shoes
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Average Prices Compared With Index Numbers For Men' s Shoes
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1•930 and 19,33, and that no substantial recovery had been
effected by the end of the decade. In 1946, however,
some upgrading did take place. Chart 2 indicates that,
in the men's shoe field, toe, there has been a long-run
tendeney for consumers to shift toward lower grades of
merchandise. This trend has been effective throughout
the period between World Wars, though it was particularly
strong in the depression years of the early thirties.
Available data on men t s dress'. shoes. cover only a five
year period, but., especially between 1937 and 1939, a
shift toward the lower price brackets apparently occurred.
These two: facts, the similar appearance made by all
quality grades. of men'us shoes and the way in which consumer
preferences have slowly moved toward the'lower price
brackets, both indicate that demand for ments shoes may
f be primarily oriented toward price. Nevertheless, some
effort and money is .spednt' in trying. to establish and
differentiate particular brand names -- in fact,, the
National Shoe Manufacturers Association has estimated that
78% of all shoes sold carry some brand name.2  There is
S1 . While. the shoe industry"s advertising outlay is only
a fraction of 1% of total consumer expenditures on shoes,
this advertising is apparently fairly well concentrated. For
instance, all the national-magazine advertising on shoes during
1946 was:- done, by- 289 (about 23%) of the shae manufacturers.
I 2. fational Shoe Manufacturers Association, Facts and
Figures on Footwear, p. 16. Many of these brands are, of
course, nothing more than the name of a retail store stamped on
the sole of the shoe, and, as such, have only a local appeal.
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no way of telling, of course, just how much advertising
and branding has changed the demand curves for various
individual shoes. In a recent survey conducted by Elmo
Roper,l 68.8% of the men questioned about their last
purchase said that they "just went into a store and asked
for shoes", although 41.9% named a brand in answer to the
inquiry, "What brand or make will you probably get when
you buy your next pair of shoes?" Of course, adherence to
a particular make of shoe induced through advertising does
not necessarily mean that the consumer disregards price,
since the advertising is often aimed primarily at his
billford.2  Further, though most men have no way of judg-
ing the inherent quality of a shoe at the point of purchase,
they do buy shoes frequently enough so that proven or dis-
proven wearing qualities can influence a subsequent choice.3
1. Elmo Roper, A Survey on Shoes Covering Purchase Habits,
Use Customs, and Attitudes of Consumers, prepared under thejoint sponsorship of the National Shoe Manufacturers Associa-
tion and the National Shoe Retailers Association. See es-
pecially Table 11, p. 14 and Table 18, p. 16. While the men
"who just went into a store" were apparently uninfluenced by
advertising, neither did their action express price-conscious-
ness.
2. For instance, Thorn McAn advertisements stress their low
price, and even in the so-called quality brackets, emphasis
is often on extra wear and consequent low price in the long run.
3. From 1922 up until the ration-stamp days of World War II,
consumption of men ts shoes averaged 2.08 pairs per capita. U.S.
Department of Commerce, Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics,
May 1946, p. 28.
Ias shoes is difficult to define, since footwear is made:
in many types of construction and for a. wide range of
consumers. Nevertheless, equip~ment and production tech-
niques are similar% enough to prevent these variants from
resulting in absolutely separate competitive compartments.
Within a classification like, "ment's. dress shoes.:, brand
names do command the allegiance of some consumers; but
similarity of appearance makes :this. product. hard to
differentiate. The facts that the majority of men:s
shoes are sold in the low-price brackets and that a
steady shift toward. these brackets has been in evidence
during the entire inter-war period seenm to. indicate that
this. product is standard enough to. permit a workable
degree of price competition.
Firms in the Shoe Industry
The fact that the "product" of an industry is
standard enough to allow price competition does not, of
ir course, mean that such competition exists. That evalua-
tion depends partly on the answers to these questions
about individual, firms in the shoe industry.:, How many
F 2.8
Probably then, a few brand names do command a certain
following, but even their price-quality position must be
reasonably well maintained.
All -1n all +1-1 AMiI 4-h mLen J.S& d n a. e -P4 class i _ 4io k Wn w
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shoe companies are there, and what is their relative size?
Is any particular segment of the industry dominated more
than others by large producers? How profitable are shoe
concerns in relation to sales, to net worth, and to size?
What selling methods prevail in the industry? These are
the questions which will be discussed in this section.
No single company or small group of companies domi-
nates the shoe industry. The five largest firms together
produce only about 30% of the total output, and their
"sharen of the market has shown no marked tendency to
increase during the last fifteen years.I  The most spec-
tacular recent record of growth among larger firms has
been that of the General Shoe Corporation, which has
tripled in size since 1938; but here the case has not
been one of increased importance of a dominant concern,
for this companyts output is still under one-third that
of the largest producer. Although the International
Shoe Company has for many years turned out more shoes
than any other firm, this company's share of the market
has recently ranged from 10% to 12%, a drop from the 13%
to 15% level of the twenties and early thirties. On the
other hand, the number of pairs produced per firm in-
creased steadily throughout the fifteen years preceding
1. Table 1 summarizes data on the number of shoe
manufacturing establishments and the share of the largest
firms in the total industry output.I
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r World War II. Nevertheless, the number of corporations
in the shoe industry is still large, ranging above 1,000,
although here, too, a definite downward trend has been. in
evidence during the last two decades.1  Of the total number
of firms in the industry, 95% are relatively small, stating
their capacity to be 10,000 pairs per day and. under, as
compared with approximately 220,000 for International.2
Though no breakdown of actual production aecording to size
of establishment is available, these relatively small
concerns apparently account for over half the total output,
if listed capacity is even a rough indication of perform-
ance.3
The influence of the larger concerns, however, is
not spread evenly through all the shoe sub-classifications-.
As might be expected, these companies have concentrated
primarily on the more staple lines, leaving such specialties
1. The trend was reversed in 1940 with the start of war-
time shoe orders; but, by the end, of 1947, the downtrend
was once again in evidence.
2. William A. Rossi, nBigger and Fewer Shoe Firms, A
Trend?W, Hide and Leather and Shoes, October 4, 1947, p.
17. Mr. Rossits estimates are compilations from state-
ments of capacity made in shoe trade directories. As such,
they represent a reasonably accurate, though rough index of
size distribution in the shoe indlustry.
3. Ibid. -r. Rossi does not make this point, as he is
discussing the trend toward larger and fewer shoe firms;
'however, the conclusion is easily deducible from facts which
he presents.
as high style woments shoes to smaller concerns. In the
"ments" field, the leading producers are particularly
important, especially since the major proportion of their
output goes on the market in the low price ranges, where
total demand is largest. In 1937, according to the TNEC
study, "Concentration of Production in Manufacturing" by
Walter F. Crowder, the four principal companies making
men-s dress shoes accounted for 43.4% of those made by the
Goodyear welt process, (85 out of 100 ments dress shoes
are constructed this way) 67.4% of the "McKay's", and 91.1%
of the "tStitchdownms".1 Both of the latter two types of
ments shoe construction are found almost exclusively in the
lowest price ranges. Since the men.ts "welts" made by the
top four concerns had. a value per pair 12% under the average
for the industry,2 there is little doubt that the impact of
these concerns is concentrated on the so-called "popular"
grades. If the men!s shoe output of all five of the large
companies were added together, the total would represent
about 70% of the country's production in the low-price
1. Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation
of the Concentration of Economic Power, Monograph No. 27,
The Structure of Industry, p. 448.
2. Ibid. This figure was computed by the author by
comparing the percentage of total production for the four
leading concerns with their percentage of total value.
Both these percentages are stated by Mr. Crowder.
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field.1  This fact indicates that the definite downward
shift in consumer preferences which occurred during the
inter-war period has been provided for primarily by the
output of the large concerns.2 The approximately 1653
smaller companies which make men ts shoes have been forced
more and more to rely on the buyert s desire for a "better
product", but at a higher price. Nevertheless, these
companies, because of their flexibility in manufacturing,
represent strong potential competition in all quality
grades, even though the lowest grade is presently dominated
by five large concerns.
1. This figure is only an approximation, but it is
believed to be reasonably correct. If the four leading
companies produce 47% of all ments dress shoes and if
their output is concentrated entirely in the low-price
ranges, which account for 71% of the production, then it
follows that these companies produce 66% of the total low-
priced output. Of course, their production is not concen-
trated entirely in the low brackets; but the small error
thus introduced should more than be outweighed by addition
of the fifth large concern (General) to the other four
(International, Endicott-Johnson, Brown, and Melville).
2. The relative advantages obtained by large companies
in this industry will be discussed in connection with shoe
costs.
3. Ibid. Mr. Crowder found that 170 firms produced
ments dress shoes in 1937. In May 1946 the Leather Unit
of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce found 165
companies engaged in the manufacture of men's foootwear.
U.S. Department of Commerce, op. cit., p. 5.
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Now, through what sort of market mechanism do these
-sellers", meet the "buyers" of shoes? Starting from the
manufacturer, shoes move toward the consumer through four
principal channels. In 1939, 21.7% of the total went to
manufacturers' wholesale branches and 4.3% to retail outlets
which they controlled; 19.0% went to independent wholesalers
and jobbers, but the largest portion, 53.4-, was sold directly
to independent and chain retail outlets.1  Looking at these
selling organizations from the ultimate consumer's point of
view, in 1939 there were 13,215 independent shoe stores doing
41.2% of the business, 5,721 chain stores doing 49.7% of the
business, and 1,522 leased departments with 8.5% of the total
sales.2  Since 1929 the proportionate importance of chain
stores has increased by about 12 percentage points, though
their gain was concentrated in the years between 1929 and
1935. Travelling salesmen employed by individual manu-
facturers are the principal medium through which the "sellers"
contact and transact business with shoe buyers. However,
even though the "market-place" is thus not geographically
defined, the number of contacts available to any single
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 16th
Census of the United States, 1940, Census of Business:
1939, Volume V, Distribution of Manufacturers ' Sales,
p. 117.
2. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 16t h
Census of the United States, 1940, Census of Business:
1939, Volume 1, Retail Trade, Part 1, p. 63.
d
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buyer or seller is large. Further, the several "TShoe
Fairs?" held during the course of the year do provide an
opportunity for direct comparison of products and prices.
In this industry where the number of significant
buyers and sellers both are fairly large, what percentage
of the manufacturers' sales dollar can be retained as
operating profit, and what is the relationship of profit
after taxes to net worth? Do the larger companies fare
better than, worse, or about the same as the smaller ones?
Is this one of those t"sick industries" commonly associated
with the competitive sector of our economy?
Shoe companies are "sick?•, indeed, if the ratio of
the number of companies showing losses to the total number
of firms in the industry is any index of illness. As
shown in Table 2, this ratio never once dropped below 40%
in the fifteen years between 1926 and 1940; and, in every
year between 1930 and 1938, at least half the companies
engaged in shoe manufacturing lost money.1
Partly responsible for the high number of firms
showing losses is the relationship between productive
capacity and consumption in the shoe industry. In 1899,
the Census of Manufactures reported that 'The machinery
1. These figures and others on profits in the shoe
industry may be found on Tables 2, 3, and 4, which follow.
FYe ar
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1.
2.
p. 40.
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TABLE 2
LOSSES IN THE SHOE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY1
No.Companies % of % of Sales No.
Filing Returns No.Companies Companies by Companies Failur
with Bureau of Showing Showing Showing in Sho,
Internal Revenue Losses Losses Losses factur:
1280 611 48 NA NA
1253 512 41 NA 72
1229 534 43 NA 54
1258 547 43 NA 31
1254 72.5 58 NA 38
1165 708 61 38 67
1127 829 74 48 71
1140 634 55 2-7 38
1124 642, 57 26 52
1096 591 59 19 51
1098 555 51 19 36
1086 601 55 20 36
814 455 56 24 36
790 403 41 21 47
972 480 49 19 59
984 286 29 8 26
940 190 20 3 NA
918 97 11 MA NA
NA NA. NA TA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NSMA., op. cit., p. 14. NA signifies that data was not available.
U.S. Dept. of Commeroe, Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics, May 1946,
es
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capacity employed...was sufficient to produce in seven
months of the year all the boots and shoes for the normal
annual consumption".1  Nourse and his Associates writing
in 1934, have concluded that this is too drastic a state-
ment. They estimated that machine equipment has been
used at an 85% to 90% rate, though their rate for floor
space and other incidental equipment was only 70%. 2
Figures compiled in 1947 indicate that productive facili-
ties could have turned out at least 800,000,000 pairs of
shoes, as against an actual 1947 output of 468,000,000.'.
However, this estimate is based on an assumption of steady
operation throughout the year, a condition difficult to
attain in those branches of the industry where styles are
changeable and consumption is seasonal. At any rate,
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
12th Census of the United States, 1900, Vol. VII,
Manufactures, Part I, p. exxxiv.
2. Nourse and Associates, Americats Capacity to Produce,
Brookings, 1934, p. 225.
3. Rossi, op. cit., p. 17. Mr. Rossi does not make an
estimate of total capacity, but this conclusion can be drawn
from the figures he presents. In attempting to demonstrate
a trend toward larger shoe firms, he estimates that 146
companies have a 400,000,000 pair annual capacity as compared
with a possible output level of 500,000,000 pairs; and he
then states that "this leaves only 100,000,000 pairs to be
divided among the remaining 1,219 firms." But 400,000,000
pairs is not the actual production of the 146 largest
companies; it is a liberal estimate of their capacity. What
his figures do show, then, is an excess of productive capacity
in the shoe industry.
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whatever excess capacity exists is not held out of operation
by voluntary restriction of output, since the number of firms
is so large.
But the picture is not nearly so f"red" as the figures
on capacity and incomes might indicate; the losses were
heavily concentrated among the smallest firms in the industry.
For instance, in one bad year, 1932, 74% of the firms showed
losses, but the sales of these companies amounted to only
48% of the total for the industry; and, in a good year,
1936, the 51% who lost money represented 19% of the sales.
The largest shoe manufacturing concerns have consistently
F• earned money; not one ran at a loss even at the bottom of
the depression in 1932.1 Within this group, however, the
rate of return on operations has not been uniform. In 1937,
for example, when the largest company, International, made
a net income before taxes and reserves. of 11.7% of its
sales, Endicott-Johnson, the second largest manufacturer,
made only 2.5%. Return (after taxes) on tNet Worthn also
varied considerably among the big companies. Melville,
makers and sellers of "Thom McAn" shoes, consistently
obtained a return on investment ranging between 15% and
20%f during the five years preceding World War II, while
1.. Endicott-Johnson and Brown did come very close to
operating at a deficit in 1938.
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International averaged a little over 7% and Endicott-
Johnson about 4% during the same period.
Further evidence that profitability is not strictly
proportional to size in this industry is provided by the
rates of return reported for all eompanies showing gains
and for the 193 firms surveyed by the OPA Eeonomic Data
Analysis Branch. In both these cases,, the Net Income
before taxes as a percent of Sales during the pre-war
years ran at approximately the.same rate as the, average
foit the five largest manufacturers. The return (after
taxes) on Net Worth for the firms covered in the OPA
survey equalled or exceeded that of the biggest concerns,
reaching a pinnacle- of 26.3%. in 1943. Apparently, then,
profits and size-of-company are related in the sense that
losses are concentrated on, the small companies; however,
beyond that, the relationship does not hold. For the
industry-. as a whole, some return on investment was obtained
in every year but one during the period from 1926 to 1943.
Does this rate of profit belie the contention that
shoe manufacturing is a Wcompetitive" industry?t Presumably,
an over-abundance of productive capacity coupled with a
market where many buyers and sellers deal in a fairly
standardized product should drive price down, making it
difficult for manufacturers to recapture their full costs.
How, then, the profits? Two conditions permit "cut-throat"
9I
.;I
-
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competition in the product market and, at the same time,
net income for many firms in the industry: (1) a range
in efficiency as between companies of, perhaps, 10%; 1
and (2) extremely small fixed costs for all concerns engaged
in shoe manufacturing. 2  Thus, the fixed costs possibly
tlost" by the less efficient firms can be more than offset
by operating economies obtained by more efficient firms. 3
Given this possibility, the industryts rate of return before
taxes, which ranged close to the average of 2.58% of sales
through the fifteen years from 1926 through 1941,4 seems
low enough to be consistent with "workablett competition.
1. This is just a rough estimate, based, primarily,
on comparison of the average rate of return on sales
with the range in return indicated for the industry.
The conclusion is further supported, however, by examina-
tion of shoe costs, especially with reference to the high
proportion fixed for all firms by industry conditions.
2. The nature and breakdown of shoe costs to an indi-
vidual manufacturer will be discussed in the following
section.
3. This could not be true where fixed costs are
relatively high--as, for example, in the steel industry.
Here the fixed costs which are, in effect, "lost" to
everyone, could not be offset without tremendous effi-
ciency differentials.
4. The consistency of this average is attested by the
facts that losses were recorded in only one year, and that
the highest figure attained was 4.79% in 1927.
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Shoe Costs
A predictable diversity of opinion seems to develop
whenever shoe prices are unsettled. On a rising market,
buyers argue for "firm" prices and manufacturers become
1
..
a
I
,1
-1
a
I,
r
a
j
acutely conscious of the possibilities latent in their
raw material costs. But, when the tables are turned,
all talk of lower shoe prices is belayed by manufacturers:
they argue that the high level of costs prohibits any re-
duction by them and that, therefore, "you might as well
buy now before the seasonal rush." Of course, both
parties are arguing on the side of their own best interests,
but the nub of the argument, often obscured, is this: costs
to the individual firm are by no means identical with costs
to the industry as a whole. Accordingly, this section will
treat them separately and in the order named.
Two aspects of the composition of costs as seen by
the firm are important here: (1) the extent of variation
with respect to time, and (2) the possibilities for differ-
ence as between firms. Table 5 discloses the basic ele-
ments of cost in 1947 for a firm making medium-grade men ts
dress shoes. These figures are stated as relatives to
manufacturing costs and to total costs, including selling
expenses; and each element is designated as variable or
fixed with respect to changes in output over a period of
one week. The composition of costs shown in Table 6
Il
7 or T or: Verixabe (V) Total Fixed
Mg. Total or Fixed (F) Costs in
Itaem Co st Cost in Short Run Short Run
Mfs. Coats
Upper Stock 290: 25.0 V
Linings & Trinmings 6.6 5.7 V
Bottom Stook 23.5 20.0 V
Findings 4.0 3.6 V
Pieoe Labor 21.0 19.7 V
Day Labor 4.0 2.3 F 2.3
MIg. Exp. Fixed 4.5 4.1 F 4.1
Meg. Exp. Variable 2.5 2.2 V
Royalties &• Rents 1.5 1.3 V
Lasts, Patterns,
& Dies 0.9 0.8 F 0,8
A Soci~l Security 0.6 0.5 V
Vacation Pay 0.9 0.8 F 0.8
Cases and Cartons 1.0 0.9 V
Commission 5.5 V
Selling Expense 2.7 F 2.7
Advertising 3.4 F 3.4
Bad Debts 0.5 V
Returns & Allowanoes 0.7 V
Sample a 0.3 F 0.3
Total 100.0 15.0
1. These figures were derived from the finanoial statements
of a medium-sized shoe manufacturing company. At the company's
request, its name is withheld.
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TABLE 5
COST SCHEDULE OF A MANUFACTURER OF MEDIUM GRADE
BRANDED =IEN'S SHOES, 19471
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is less detailed, but the coverage includes approximately
20% of all ments dress shoe output in the years designated.
These tables disclose that as much as 85% of all shoe costs
are completely variable in the very short run, even over
small changes in the level of output. Further, with each
six-month selling season, almost all costs can be changed.
For instance, the quantity of raw materials purchased
depends, of course, on actual or anticipated orders. Even
if these orders do not materialize, inventories of leather
and "findings, can be adjusted to a lower output level
without much difficulty.1  The principal machine costs
are royalties paid on a "per-pair" basis to the United
Shoe Machinery Corporation, which controls the basic shoe-
making equipment used by all manufacturing companies. Of
the labor costs, about 85% are paid on a piece-work basis
and so vary almost directly with output.2  The day-labor
expense is here designated as fixed; but, if the level of
production were to change by 10%, this could probably be
adjusted accordingly. The importance of variability in
1. A leather purchase without a covering order for shoes
is a "long" commitment, and liquidation of such an inventory
could take place at a loss. There is always a question as
to whether that kind,of t"anticipation" is the act of a
speculator or a manufacturer; however, in this case, pur-
chases should be adjustable to reasonable output changes
in a weekts time.
2. While minimum wage legislation places some limit on
the variability of piece-work earnings, hourly production
rates should not fall off drastically when output changes
occur.
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shoe costs to explanation of. the nature of. competition in
this industry has already been indicated;, but there is
further and direet relevance to' wage determination. For
instance., the high' proportion. of.f variable costs appears
to. min-i ze the penalties conneetede with such. .inefficien-
cies: as seasonal production,, .which, in turny• affets. the
yearly pay envelope.
But .how may the elements in ,thits cost structure vary
as .between . firms, especially with respect to possible
economies; obtained from size? First of all, machine
expenses are not redueed. as a. result of size, stnce all
companies . pay identica royalties to the United :Shoe
Machinery Corporation no matter: -how many" pairsa o-f•: shoes
they- preduce. 1 .The largest element of eost, leather: is
pirced' to shoe manufacturers in a ?acompetitive "market,
uerr conditions, such.ý that, as: one eobserver expressed it,.
"there is- no., evidence:: of.- collusi-on in. prite policy nor
does.: there seen to be any- possibility, of successful prtce
contrl".,2 - Now, it is true that the largest shoe companies
1. A few of the machines are on a time-rental basis and
so the cost per pair` would change withs l, mall short-rtun
changes. in output level. In addition, minimum royalties may
mean increased. machine, costs when-. a firm.. operate"s considera-
bly below capacity. The author"ts understanding from people
in. the industry is- that-•neithe.r of these influences, is of
great impodrta•nce.. •
2: l. LC.I Brown, S. J.., Unio e 1 iici s••e in the Leather
ndustr, Harvard, 1947, p. 29.
operate or control their own tanneries; and they may derive
some advantages thereby, especially in times of extreme raw
material scarcity. For leather tanning companies during
the five years immediately preceding World War II, however,
the ratio of profits before taxes to sales was far from
excessive, averaging only about 2%.l Further, approxi-
mately half the total cost of leather is made up of hide
prices, which are quoted on an organized exchange, where
one buyer is no different from the next.
Of course, one firm may utilize material purchased
more effectively than another; but, in shoe manufacture,
such efficiency does not depend so much on the size of the
company as on the skill of the management and of those
craftsmen who cut the leather. A firm can gain a possible
advantage in material utilization by producing in more than
one price classification of shoes, thus affording itself an
opportunity to grade sole leather according to quality
desired; but even the smaller firms apparently can diversify
the quality of their output.
The only remaining major element of manufacturing cost
is labor; and here large, multi-factory firms appear to have
some advantage over smaller concerns. Large orders for a
1. Office of Price Administration, Economic Data Analysis
Branch, Survey of Leather Tanners, Shoe Manufacturers., and
Wholesale and Retail Shoe Distributors, May 1947, p. 2.
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few standardized styles of shoe generate economies of mass
production in the factory, and these :econemies show up in
reduced man-hour requirements per pair. The firm which
has apparently made the mthe ost of:-this opportunity is the
i :F.. McElwain Shoe Company (wholly owned manufactur ing
subbsidiary of the Relville-Shee Corporation),.
- 
makers of
the...Thon MeAn line. Here the:r. essential conditi•,..
standardization of product in the factory, is obtained
from operatio: of over 500 retail outlets -- providing a
large volumee oforders,:: but for an identical. and restriet-
ed. number of styles. Thus, a.. small: firm,. whe orders
from:independent retail stores generally are. for- a: full
line-L, may, have as. grea• or. greater variation of style -
w.thin 500,000 pairs per year as, M.EElwain has,. within 11-1/2
millioew: pairs. One eperation- is essentially•, a, joh-leot
propositieon and the other a case of mass. producrtion.- Oný
the other hand, small total- vol.ume does not. necessarily
imply a wide variation in shoes proedced.. If a company
i.s willing tot: become dependent on a, feww large buyers,, close
1. The number of retail outlets owned by the Mlelville
Shoe Corporation was 519 in 1946, a reduction fro ialmost
700 in the middle thirties. Melville Shoe Corporation,
Ann. l R:epor .. 19 46.
2. The way" in which standardizatforn of product generates
manufacturing economies despite use of identical machinery
by all: conce will be dews-eribed in the: followlng chapter.
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cooperation between principals can create in a single-
factory firm the basic condition of standardization which
permits lower labor costs, with given hourly wage rates.
Of course, the number of small companies to which this
opportunity is open is restricted by the small number of
large buyers; and, in addition, the initial volume of bigger
manufacturing firms makes the problem of standardization
easier for- them.
But there is another labor-cost advantage available
to multi-plant companies. Though the optimum size plant
is not large, operation of several plants makes possible.
the movement of existing facilities or the establishment
of new factories in low-wage areas, where no trained labor
force exists. When a small company stops operations in
one locality and opens in another where the labor force
must be trained from the beginning, sales outlets must seek
other sources of supply. Further, the lower quality of the
product which must be produced at first in a new location
may necessitate a difficult reorientation in. company stan-
dards and in sales policies. On the other hand, a large
concern, with productive facilities and market outlets in
a range of quality grades, can more easily fit a new factory
into its total operations. From the financial point of
view, furthermore, the losses incurred while training "Tgreen"
help, though not great for a large concern, may be more than
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the typical smalllcompany can stand. At any rate, the:
bigger concerns, principally International, Brown, and
General, have led in the movement of the shoe industry to
new, low-wage areas.
The analysis of individual firm operations: discloses,
then, that total shoe costs are largely variable even over
small ranges of output and that the advantages from large-
scale operation are not great. Since the prices of machinery
are the same for all shoe companies and the prices of leather
do not vary greatly as between firms, the focus of competi-
tion falls on labor costs. Here, large . companies have.° some
advantage as a result of large volume operation and from
their ability to operate braneh plants in low-wage areas.
The mobility of shoemaking equipment will be discussed
further in the following section; but, first., examination
of these shoe costs from the industrytls point of view may
yield important conelusions for wage determination.o
.The factor prices which the industry draws from common
markets are those for machinery and for leather. Notice
has already been taken of the United Shoe Machinery Corpora-
tionts uniform royalty policy in the leasing of shoemaking
equipment. This Corporation enjoys an extremely favorable
position with respect to the bulk of this equipment; and,
as a result, it can and does administer prices so that
42
industry machine costs per pair are no different from those
of the individual firm: the supply curve to both is perfectly
elastic.1
However, for the largest single element of shoe cost,
leather, the respective supply eurves look more like oppo-
sites: the firm,'s, extremely elastic but the industry's,
relatively inelastic..* The explanation for this contrast
lies in two factors conditioning the supply curve- of leather:
(1) no company or group of companies can administer hide and
leather prices over any length of time; and -(2) the quantity
of hides produced is for the most part., independent of the
price.2
Incomeý from, the sale of hides makes. up less than. 5%
of the revenue obtained from the sale of animal products.3
1. This is another way of saying that, the United Shoe
Machinery Corporationts administered prices: do not vary with
changes in the level of shoe production. Since the total
machine royalties amount to less than 2% Vof~ the retail price
per pair of shoes, negligible demand stimulation would result
from royalty reductions in depression years.
2. The term: Chidest is used here in the general sense. In
more precise nomenclature, "hidesf refer to large animals
such as cattle and horses, tkipsW to. undersized or immature
animals, and "skins" to small animals such as calves, sheep,
and goats.l
3. U.S. Bureau of Census, 16th Census of the United States,
1940, Census of Manufacturers: 1939, Vol. II, Part I, p. 57.
The dollar revenues from sales of hides and skins as a per-
eentage of aggregate wholesale value of all "meat packing"
products was as follows: 1929, 3_.5%; 1937, 5%; 1939, 4%.
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As a result, the level of hide prices does not influence
the rate of slaughter appreciably; conditions in the cattle
and food markets determine the number of hides produced.
This fact, taken by itself would indicate that the supply
curve of hides is almost perfectly inelastic; however, such
an extreme position is not warranted, since the quantity
produced in the United States is not usually equal to the
quantity supplied. Brown has estimated that 14 per cent
of this countrys supply of hides in 1935 were net imports,
and he concludes that "the hide market is, basically, a
world market".1  Of course, the rate of production in other
countries is, like that in the United States, controlled by
a rate of slaughter oriented toward the food market; never-
theless, the, American leather industry must bid for raw
materials against tanners in other countries. Presumably,
a shift down in this country's demand schedule for hides
would similarly shift the total world schedule, and, acting
against a relatively inelastic supply curve, would result in
a, lower world price. But the share of world production used
in the United States would also be reduced; thus, the supply
curve to this country is more elastic than the conditions of
production might indicate. This tendency toward greater
elasticity is further augmented since high prices may induce
1. Brown, op. cit., p. 20.
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better eare in Trtake-off -ff of country hides and greater
effort in recovery of hides from fallen animals. 1
On the other hand, hides. are not a homogeneous con-
modity;" and, apparently, United StatesV imports are heavily
weighted by various special categories within the- general
product classification. For example, in the: perieo 1938-
1940, this country produced. al neg.igible:ý proportion of the
goat and kid skins consumed here, only .half the sheep and
lamb skins, and 75 -of the calf and. kip skins.2  Even
though 15-% of the cattle hides were. imported,' these imports
were- apparently, concentrated in the- higher grades3- Through-
aout:: the 1930: ts, furthermore, domestic,- cattle hides were..
Trproteteed" by a 10% tarxff ; so that, in reality, tis.
classific'ation., which accounted for about 60% of the total
value of all hides and skins: consumed in. the United States, 5
L. Ibid., p. 22. Both these factors are considered: "minor"
in a. 14 7t.. S.. Tariff Commission Report, U.-S. . Tariff Commtssion,
Hides and Skinsa and. Leather., 1946, p., 3.
2.. Ibid., p.* 22, The discrepancy between these- figue.s and_
the estimate, made- by Brown is attributable to t he different years
covered.• .
3. Ibid 6, p. 1.
4. Ibd., p. 37. Effective November 15, 1941, the duty was
reduc.eUo 5%o ad. valorem.-
5. Ibld-., p.- 23. Cattle hides averaged 62% of the total
value, of hides- and skins in the period 193 8-1940.
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may have been practically removed from the world market over
relevant price ranges.
Under these circumstances and espeeially considering
the nature of hide production, the supply curve to this
countrys leather industry is undoubtedly quite inelastic.2
Now the objection may be entered that production and supply
may not be equal, even with reference to conditions within
the United States. Since hides can be stored, couldnt the
IBig Five" packers, who control about one-third' of- the total
production,3 adjust the flow of this by-product to the market?
Brown raises and discusses this question at some length. His
analysis is that Tthese five packers, if they constituted one
company or acted in concert', could cause stringencies in
certain sectors of the hide market and possibly profit there-
from", but that such conerted- action "postulates too much
1. Probably, this difference between various categories of
hides and skins is what Mr. L.B. Sheppard, President of the
National Shoe Manufacturers Association, had- in mind- when he
stated: nAt one time hides and skins may have been commodities
whose prices were determined in world markets,' but- I personally
doubt very much if this has been true since' 1914." L.B.
Sheppard, Address Befdre the Tanners , Council of America, Chicago,
Illinois, December 5', 1947, as reported by the National Shoe Manu-
facturers Association, News of Shoes (undated).
2. Others have alsa reached this conclusion. U.S. Tariff Com-
mission,. ~. ., p. 3.P Brownt's conclusion seems to be the same,
though the emphasis of his argument is on the fact that the supply
of hides, is not perfectly inelastic. Brown, op. cit., p. 22.
The inelasticity of the supply of hides is further indicated by
the violent reactions of price to changes in demand. For example,
the price of Green Salted Packers' Native Cowhides at Chicago fell
from 25.37 cents per pound in January 1928, to 5.13 cents in
January 1933.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
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foreknowledge and restraint on the part of competitors to
be realistic in the hide market"'.1  The conclusion follows
that Nthe large packers, no matter what sales policies they
may adopt, cannot support hide prices for long periods [itore
than six months] of timetr. 2
Assuming hide and, consequently, leather supplies to
be relatively inelastic with respect to price,.3 costs of
this raw material to the shoe industry, which consumes 80%
to 85% of the total,4 should-vary- considerably with changes
in demand for hides. This raw material price, fixed to the
individual firm, is,. then, variable to the industry as a
whole. But, for wage determination,, what is the meaning
of this conclusion? The relevance concerns the possible
adjustment of shoe output and employment to an industry-wide
1. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Direct material costs to leather tanners, consisting
principally of hides, accounted for about 55% of net sales in
the periad. 1936-1945, PA, op. cit., p. 2. Elasticity could
be introduced in the supply of leather at very low prices
even with an inelastic supply of hides. However,.. over the
relevant price ranges the respective demand schedules should
have similar properties.
4. U.S. Tariff Commission, op. cit., p. 26. The percentage
used by the shoe industry varies with the type of leather
under consideration, as follows: cattle hides, 85%; calf
and kip skins, 90%; goat and kid skins, 95%; and sheep and
lamb skins, 30%. Ibid., p. 5.
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increase in labor cost, resulting, say, from general accept-
ance of vacations with pay or from a "round*t of wage in-
creases. Under these circumstances, assume an increment
was added to the price of shoes with a resultant reduction
in unit sales and output.1  Purchase of leather would
decrease and the lower demand for leather and for hides
would lower raw material costs to the shoe industry. Re-
duced raw material costs to the individual firms would
finally allow reduction in prices and a compensating restor-
ation of output.2  The cost increase, if industry-wide,
would be at least partially passed back to the producers of
raw materials, and employment of shoeworkers would not suffer
to the extent that product-demand considerations might
1. Alternatively, the reduction of output might come
about directly, with no initial product-price reaction
necessary. This might occur when "marginal" firms found
their average variable costs higher than their average
price.
2. If this process worked out in the sequence described,
definite leads and lags in price and output fluctuations
of the commodities involved might be expected. Research
on this point, however, indicates that "hide marketing,
leather tanning, shoe production and retailing all seem to
reach peaks or troughs more or less together Vt and that no
"clear temporal sequence in the vertical succession of
processes" exists. National Bureau of Economic Affairs,
Annual Report,, 1948, p. 42. Lack of, a temporal sequence
does not, of course, mean. that the process described does
not work itself out, though it would be comforting if such
a sequence could be found. But the basic economic factors
indicate definitely that hide prices are primarily demand-
governed in any given period, even though "expectations",
for example, may cloud empirical evidence of this relation-
ship.
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indicate. Thus, though the competitive nature of the
industry may make an individual firm's demand curve for
labor elastic, the industry's demand curve may be rela-
tively inelastic.
The inelastic nature of the industry's demand curve
for labor stems primarily from that property of the supply
curve of hides. If the latter schedule were perfectly
vertical, the former would be too. Since the quantity of
hides on the market is relatively independent of price,
there is an opportunity present for shoeworkers to cut into
this economic rent.1  But the supply curve of hides does
have some elasticity, and, to that extent, the elasticity
of shoe demand and its relationship to that for shoeworkers
must be studied.
First of all, of course, the demand for shoeworkers
is considerably less elastic than that for shoes, from which
it is derived, since labor costs make up only about 20% of
wholesale price. But second, some evidence exists that
demand for shoes is, itself, of somewhat less than unit
elasticity. The data upon which any conclusion must be
1. This opportunity is also open to leather workers;
and, further, the existence of this economic rent may
partly account for the United Shoe Machinery Corporation's
strong position. The amount of rent, of course, varies
with the times, so that the "employment effect" of high-
shoe-worker wages might be greater in depression than in
"normalt" or "boom" periods.
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based are, unfortunately, quite inexact; however, statis-
tical analysis may have at least some meaning. Von Szeliski
and Paradiso applied such analysis and found the demand to
be quite inelastic: "a price increase of 50 percent would
then force a decrease of 20 percent in the number of pairs".1
Altogether, then, the demand curve for the labor of
shoeworkers as a group is undoubtedly quite inelastic. This
conclusion follows from (a) the inelasticity of the supply
schedule for hides, (b) the inelasticity of the demand curve
for shoes, and (c) the fact that the demand for shoeworkers
is derived from that for shoes. Under these circumstances,
an increase in the wages of shoeworkers, if it were made
industry-wide, could take place with no appreciable effect
on employment opportunities in the industry.
1. Victor S. Von Szeliski and L. J., Paradiso, "Demand
for Boots and Shoes As Affected By Price Levels and
National Income", Econometrica, October 1936, p. 346.
The 20 percent decrease occurs after the authors have
"adjusted" for quality variations. On an unadjusted per
pair basis, the decrease would be only 7 per cent.
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Shoe Factory Location and Movement
"The most serious danger faced by shoeworkers as a
group is that of becoming strandedt, states one recent
analysis of the industry.1  If this conclusion is correct,
then a pronounced and identifiable "employment effect?" has
been found, at least insofar as individual shoeworkers are
concerned. But before the reasons behind these shifts in
the location of production facilities can be examined, some
attention should be given to the evidence that such shifts
have in fact taken place. Table 7 discloses considerable
change in the share of total shoe output manufactured in
the most important producing states; and, since total output
has not been subject to spectacular growth, relative decline,
has often meant absolute decline as well. Massachusetts
has been most affected, especially in the period preceding
and immediately following World War I. While the shift
has at least partially resulted from loss of business by
firms in Massachusetts and growth of those located in other
areas, actual migrations have also been a contributing
factor. For example, Davis has estimated that, between
January, 1930 and December, 1938, 79 firms left the state,
1. Horace B. Davis, Shoes, The Workers and the Industry,
International Publishers, 1940, p. 9. Mr. Davist book
appears to have been written from the ,left-wing" point
of view. Despitel this bias, however, the volume includes
an impressive amount of information relative to shoe-
workers' problems.
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and that migrations into the state:7 wereý almost completely
balanced by the number of firms which went out of business
during the period. l  InI the years preceding, World War I,
the- inter-regional aspect o.f this shift is most pronounced;
in fact, Dr.. HoQver a: s concluded that ,there seems: to be
a long-run tendeney toward a more equal distribution of the
industry relative to population,.2
On the other hand., and.. especiallyv. in more recent years,
an intraregional movement. has apparently taken place. This
aspect of the problem. is emphasized . by.. the: decline- ina. impor-
tance of all the major shoe~ producing centers ever since
1923;13 apparently, recent .mvement has been primarily a
process of .dec:entralization. .Eplamation. of the, extent
and nature, of these changes in.. location may best beý-divided
in two sections: .(1) the permissive conditions, which allow
movement of production facilities;. and (2) the possible.
reasons which lead., to actual shifts. of these. facilities..
The first of the permissive conditions may be obtained
from analysis of the asset structure of almost, any shoee
company, large, medium, or small. Such analysis: reveals
1. Ibid.,t p. 13.
2. Edgar M. Hoover, Lecation Theory and the, Shoe and
Leather: Industries, Harvard, 1937, p. 182..
3. Ibid., Table 58, p. 253. Hr. Hover states (p. 243)
that "plainly...there has been a dispersion to satellite
towns in recent years from all the larger cities."
53
the great bulk of assets to be "current", consisting
primarily of Cash, Accounts Receivable, and Inventories.
For example, in 1946, the balance sheet of the Brown Shoe
Company, one of the largest, listed 89% of all assets as
"current" for the medium-sized W. L. Douglas Company,
the figure was 92%, and for a small firm such as A. Freedman
and Sons, Inc., 80 .1 Since many- communities appear willing
to subsidize shoe factories to the extent of "free taxes and
free rent"2 the remaining assets are pseldom invested in real
estate or factory buildings, which would hold a company to
some specific locality,. For example, the attorney for the
International Shoe Company has stated that, "The decen-
tralizing of manufacturing... was carried on principally
through the activitiesk of local business groups whose desire
1. Figures for the Brown Shoe Company and the W. L.
Douglas Shoe Company were taken from Company Annual Reports
for the year 1946. Figures for A. Freedman and Sons, Inc.
are as filed with the Commissioner of Corporations, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, December 16, 1947.
2. One government committee which studied the "important
faaters.....contributing to migrationt found that inducements
were Itoffered by cities and towns in other states to Massa-
chusetts manufacturers to move to their localities. ..These
inducements usually vary in form, but comprise, among others,
free taxes, free rent, donations of factory sites and/or
property, and frequently outright cash subsidies. The
Committee did not believe this to be -Mvery significant when
viewing the ind-stry as a whole". National Recovery Admin-
istration., Division of Review, Report f the Survey Committee
on the Operation of the Code for the Boot and Shoe Manufac-
turing Industy, Final Report, July 16, 1935, P. 89.
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to promote business: in their, communites.- caused them to-
offer inducements to- the Intern•ttonal Shoe Company". t
No appreciable amount of machinery va-luation appears in
the asset structure, since. specialized shoemaking equ~p-
ment is, for the most part,: rented from :the United Shoe
Machinery' Corporation,. IMost concerns• do own their owl
siewing machines, but these represent only a. small capital
outlay and-:are, themselves, a resalable: commodity.
The: second important permissive, coendition concerns
the naturex of the equipment used tinshoe manufacturing.
Like sewing machines, most of the  speeit eb de equipment
iis lightand easy to truck from one tlo e a lity to another,
so easy, in fact, that labor union offie-als eeommeonly
refer to "factories on wheels". Thus, neither financial
commitments nor immbile physical machinery held- manufac-
turing: facilities to any given location.
But what about the skilled workmen necessary to-
produce. a. salable shoe? Can their kills be taught
q4ickly to -greenff hands or does such' acquisition- require
I Richard. V,. Brewer, Address Before emibers of th.e.
Saint• L. ouis. Stock Exchange,. January 12, 1940, published.
by the.. Saint, Lenis Stock .xchange:,. Karch 1940. The
General Shoe'Corporation his stated that Wall other (80%)
shoe manufacturing facilities. in Tennessee are locatred on,
tracts and.. in buildings: leased.- from-. the respeative. munici-
palities for a nominaLirental ia .mast cse . General
Shoe Corporation, Preferred Stock Prospectus, dated June
II, 1946.
a long period of apprenticeship at the trade? The ease
and speed with which tfarmersrt can be taught the "arts"
of shoemaking depends directly on the quality and style of
shoe desired. High quality footwear can be produced only
by experienced workmen, but a satisfactory ,'work" shoe,
for example, can probably be turned out by a 1"green" crew
after several weeks of training.1  Between these possible
extremes exists a wide range of style and quality, with
correspondingly varied training requirements.
The meaning of these requirements is as follows:.
(1) fairly low-grade, standardized footwear can be produced
with inexperienced help without great difficulty; but (2)
the costs of training and risks of failure2 are large enough
to keep the smallest firms located near sources of skilled
1. Of course, training time will vary, depending upon
both the trainee and the teacher. Unfortunately, little
published information exists on the difficulty of turning
a new site into a going shoe factory; however, the author
has talked with several practioners of this art and their
testimony is the basis for the discussion above. In addi-
tion, the author has been through a factory which, after
four months of operation, was producing a salable, low-
grade men's dress shoe, though the rate of production was
not high in relation to the superintendentts estimate of'
potential capacity. On the other hand,, a large buyer of
medium and low-grade footwear told the author that he would
not purchase men's dress shoes from a factory location with
less than a yearts experience behind-it.
2. The risks, of course, are not confined to training
difficulties. For example, a severe sales slump after a
training investment, which was high for a small company,
might prove disastrous.
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labor; and (3) for production of high quality or high
style footwear even the largest firms must either locate
near shoe "centers" or gradually up-grade their existing
rural plants. On the other hand, even those firms
specializing in quality and style have some choice in
location, since under employment is more or less chronic
in all the shoe centers.
A fourth permissive condition results from the
relatively small size of the average and, no doubt, of
the "optimum" shoe factory. The manufacture of footwear
is really an assembly line operation, and the line can
apparently be balanced on a relatively low output level;1
in fact, even the largest concerns do not concentrate their
production in one factory:
"The shoe business is readily adaptable to
decentralization, as manufacturing can be
done economically in small units employing
300 to 1,000 people, in buildings of light
construction, and by use of light machinery.
As arranged by the International Shoe Company,
each factory is a specialty unit, making a
certain kind and grade of shoes." 2
1. Table 2 shows that the average production for all
firms in the industry was about 400,000 pairs per year, or,
on a 250-day year, 1600 pairs per day. A balanced production
line can be achieved even below this low level of output,
though minimum requirements will vary according to the type
of shoe being produced. Probably, the lowest economical
operating volume is governed more by financial considerations
(such as the necessity of spreading a minimumi overhead")
than by the technical problems of production efficiency.
2. Brewer, op. cit.
57
The conditions of small manufacturing units, a high propor-
tion of liquid assets, many possible buyers of the product,
and machine costs (and most labor costs)• on a. per pair basis,
all combine to make both entry. and exitin she ..manufacturing
relatively easy.. Altogether, then, neither shoe factories
nor firms, are, strongly tied to..- any. given location; a. gentle
shove should, be enough to get them. moving. What sort. of
propellent forces do appear, to be, important? ..
Hoover has concluded that "no other element of pro-
duction, cost can have an effect. comparable. to that of labor
costs, though some of them may occasionally influence
location"?.2  The truth of this conclusion is. derived not
so. much from any overwhelming percentage importance of labor
as from the locational similarity of all other cost elements.
Transportation costs, which may partially explain pre-World
War I movement of the industry, are apparently of negligible
importance today;3 in fact, as early as 1925, a group of shoe
1. Hoover (op. cit., pp. 175-198) has added a possible
"restrictive. conditiona, "-: :, the importance.e ot.. "nearness-: to
markets,. Incidentally, this is more of a convenience than
a cost factor. and -.woulhe Wrestrictive only•• for . inter,
not intra-regional shifts.
22. Ibid. ,p. 17.
3. Heoveer ap it.,170 17) has estimated that a labor
cost differential. of 10% would pay for the "transporting of
shoes 1,e000. miles;, leather 1,500 mies, or' coal 6,000 miles".
These are conservative estimates under 1947 conditions.
manufacturers stated that "'...the largest item in the cost
of a shoe is material, but the variation in costs of similar
materials in different parts of the country is so slight
that it can be neglected as a variable factor-tl The
conclusion that transportation costs cannot explain recent
movement of the shoe industry is further strengthened by
the nature of that movement, a process of decentralization
which can only add to total shipping distance for both raw
materials and finished products.
Other elements of cost which may influence~ location
are those- connected with the inducements often tendered to
shoe companies by small towns anxious to obtain or enlarge
manufacturing payrolls. The effect of specific items like
otfree taxes" and "'free rent" is difficult to separate from
labor cost aspects of small town operation, since the "invi-
tations"t may contain a reference to low wage levels or imply
"tprotectionU from unions. 2  While the non-labor inducements
are not generally thought to be important cost considera-
tions, by themselves,3 they do contribute to a companyt's
bargaining power in a given community, since no fixed
1. Boston Chamber of Commerce, The Shoe danufacturing
Industry of Yew England, Boston, 1925, p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 255, and Davis, op. cit., pp. 19-29.
3. National Recovery Administration, op . cit., p. 89.
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assets restrain movement from that community. Of course,
inducements are a resource open to any region or town.
Though they are usually associated with "country" locations,
shoe centers have themselves sometimes entered in this com-
petition for ,'businessat.1
Analysis of labor costs as a propellent location
factor is most meaningful if the conception of those costs
is relatively broad, extending beyond the "facts" of dollars
and cents to the various penalties and rewards which accom-
pany the work force associated with- any given community.
This total conception includes- within it at least four
factors which apparently motivate manufacturers to estab-
lish plants or move, especially to small towns in low wage
areas. Probably of first importance is the prospect of
actual savings on labor cost. Most observers feel that
differentials in wage costs do exist between the Mcitiest'
and the Ittowns", and that these differentials provide a
principal stimulus to the decentralizing movement. For
example, a National Recovery Administration survey2 found
"the necessity to reduce manufacturing expenses and obtain
1. For example, Davis states (op. cit., p. 23) that "The
city of Haverhill, entering the field rather late, began
actively soliciting outside firms at the end of 1935 with
the aid of a slush fund of $3,500 raised by 'popularl
subscription.
2. NRA, op. cit., p. 885.
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lower labor costs, in order to meet severe price competi-
tion" to be a prime reason for movement of shoe companies.1
But cold dollar savings are inextricably mixed as a
motivating factor with three other aspects of the labor-
management relationship. Many shoe manufacturers have
been and apparently still are decidedly anti-•union. Thus,
the movement away from high labor costs has been and is,
at the same time,- a movement away from the industry' s
unionized centers. Hoover, for example, has found "abun-
dant evidence of the effect of organization in driving
factories out of the larger localized centers,n2 and he
has labelled the principal effect of unions a "diseconomy
of location".3  Lest this aversion to unionization be
I. Hoover-ts emphasis on this fact has already been
noted. Davis' (op. cit., pp. 15-16) description of "Why
Shoe Plants Migrate" is more colorful: "'A lower labor cost
is what the manufacturers chiefly seek in their migrations.
In the old-established centers an outright wage cut or
lengthening of hours is apt to be met with resistance. So
one fine day the boss sends for half a dozen trucks, loads
his machinery onto .them, fires a parting shot at the union
which has tried to enforce standards for his workers and sets
off for which ever non-union town has bid the highest for the
privilege of having him".
Personal observation corroborates these impressions
that (1) labor cost differentials exist and (2) the location
of many plants has been oriented toward low labor cost.
2. Hoover, op. cit., p. 242, For further- evidence,
see also Davis, op. cit., pp. 15-19.
3. Hoover, op. cit., p. 254.
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considered a phenomenon of the past, note should be taken
of the General Shoe Corporationts attitude in a 1948 NLRB
representation election. Here, the results were set aside
by the Board, on the grounds that the company s campaign
against the union "created an atmosphere calculated to
prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the employees,,"
and the Board questioned particularly "the method selected
by the Company-s president to express his anti-union views". 1
Along with employee organization have come union
bargaining tactics, which sometimes have meant "strikes
without warning when the factory is full of shoes".2 Manu-
facturers apparently feel that. such ?'disturbancesy" affect
their future sales, since customers may come to regard the
afflicted firm's delivery promises as unreliable°. At any
rate, "flight from labor; disturbances.',. may be a contribut-
ing cause of shoe factory movement~3
A fourth propellent aspect of labor costs, broadly
defined, may be the prospective stability of operation
outside of recognized shoe production centers. This
long-run ability to control wage costs stems partly,
1. Bureau of National Affair,,. Labor Relations Reporter,
Decisions of National Labor Relations Board and: State Boards,
April 26, 1948, Vol. 21, No. 51, p. 1340.
2. NRA, op. cit., p. 87.
3. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
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of course, from the strong bargaining position of the
dominant or sole company located in a particular small
town. However, a relative degree of control results,
as well, from operation in an area isolated from other
shoe companies, and thus comparatively free of the
minute wage rate comparisons, which may disrupt closely
grouped plants.
Of course, the cost advantages of operation in
established production centers must not be overlooked.
The convenience in emergencies and the savings in train-
ing expenses available in localities where a pool of
skilled labor exists are especially important to the
newer, small firms and to manufacturers of high style
or high quality footwear. Nevertheless, the long-run
record of migrations seems to indicate that the strongest
forces are those which draw factories to the outlying,
rural communities. Added to a set of "tpermissive"t
conditions, then, are propellent forces, particularly
labor costs and conditions, which are apparently re-
sponsible for the considerable "employment effectI" noted
at the start of this section.
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Labor' s Wages and Productivity
The lrcation and the potential mo:bilityr of shoe
factories indicate that wage levels. are probably low and
geographically variable:. What are the facts? Table 8
diseloeses that, in general terms, shoeworkers have fared
consistently worse. than workers in other. manufacturing
industries. Though the deviation was narrowed greatly
.in the middle thirties,1 this spread is new greater both
absolutely and percentage-wise• than in•!;any. year from. 1920
up to World War II. In 1946, a good year for the shoe
industry, the National Industrial Conference Boardts.
-figures show that average hourly and weekly earnings of
.shoeworkers; were lower than those.. of any of the other.
twenty-fve industry groups surveyeed.2  Further, NICB
compilations for February 1948, for example, show that...
in only one industry out of twenty-four did "unskilled"
labor. earn less in ; an hour, than $1.07:, unskilled" shoe-
workers averaged 690. In the "skilled" and "semi-skilled"
1. The narrowing of this differential may possibly be
explained by the :.greater tipact.t o•IF RA code wage standards
on a low-wage: indstry t .han: on indstry. in- general and the
widening after 19,35 may represent departures from theose
standards in the shoe industry due to relatively weak:
unions. For a comparison, of wages in 193.9- with NR~R. code
minima, see Bureao•ELabor Statisties ...Earnings and Hors
in Shoe and. Allied Industies. During the First Quarter of
1939, Bulletin No. 6780, pp. 25-26.
2. National Industrial Conference Board, The Economic
Almanac for 1948, pp. 109-112.
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classifications, shoeworkers once again were the lowest,
their average of $1.25 per hour exceeding by only 4+ the
average "unskilled" rate for the other industries.1  No
other conclusion is possiblei than that this is a low-wage
industry. But what variations exist within the industry
and what feasible explanations are there for these varia-
tions?
The most comprehensive examination of shoe-industry
wages as of any given period of time was that made by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics covering the first quarter of
1939. The data contained in this study: spplemented by
information drawn from a 19%45 wage structure survey by the
BLS form the primary basis for the discussion below. 2
Probably most relevant here is the influence on wages of
these six factors: (1) geographic region;. (2) kind of
shoe; (3) size of company; (4) size of community; (5)
unionization; and (6) price-grade of shoe.
In 1939, considerable variations existed as: between
wage rates in different geographic locations. The range
of average hourly earnings as between regions ran from
42.71 for the "Southern States" to 52.50 for the I"iddle
1. NICB, Management Record, April 1948, p. 237.
2. Internal plant wage structure will not be discussed
here, but will be examined in some detail in the following
chapter, which covers the shoe manufacturing process.
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Atlantic" group; and, as between states, from 37.9$. for
Maryland: to 60.4$ for California and: 58$ for New York. 1
Iowever, within regions anid, even- wvithin sta-tes: the, di se
persi•n .- was,.so, greE~at that these, averages, cannot be co-n-
siered ast representative of:mogeneu:wa• eo~ ge areas.. For
exatmpe, the dispersien in the most imp.ortant; states•. was:
Massachusetts, 35!. . to 63.6; Newr York, 35.1: to 90:,80;
and Missueri, 26,.6$< to• 65.0O4.Z
-These variations are not explained h: the "kind" of
shoea pre uced. Although- worker•s producing: &;gir•s' and
is;sestk childrenets and infants" footw•ear did average
less- per hour::than'those making :ffwoment:•o s•t"and thent s
shoes, the ..range -here. is from 41.6. to i.6: nowhere
near. the dispersion- fuond:.within. states.. Neither: ca.
the variations be. explained by "size of company••-fo r
inm 1939, this, factoer ",didnta  seem- to affec-t to any extent
average hauomy earningsin the indtustry"..4  If the varia-
tionasa.. shbmearkers earnings canmot be-e eorrelated w:ith..
region, state,2ind. of shae, or s .ie of company, can, they
be corrleated with size f, o commuritty unionization, or:
price grade?
1. Bureau of Labor Statistics, op,. cit*.rp 17,
2. -aIbid p. 16.
3. Ibid .pp.- 38-40 .
4. Ibid., p. 41.
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In 1939, wage levels were found to vary directly
with each of the latter three influences,. Average hourly
earnings were lowest in rural areas where the population
concentration was "under 2,500", and these earnings in-
creased with. each of nine classifications of "size of
community".. The same tendency was marked for the sub-
groups, "lmalef"-1ftemale", and "unskilled"-" semi-skilledtt-
rTskilled". 1  The range of variation for all workers was
from 37.30 per hour, to 56.54. Unionization, as well,.
was uniformly correlated with wage level. Although the
deviation for all workers was only 8s, running from 46.4~
for the non-union group to 54 for union workers, the
differential prevailed within the various sub-groups noted
above.2  Variations by retail price of shoe ranged from
1. Ibid.,, pp. 19-23. Of further interest is the fact
that the proportion of males to the total work force also
varied with the size of the community; the larger the
community the greater the proportion of males.. The varia-
tions in wage level were found also in 1945- BLS, ge
Structure, 1945, p. 7. Further support for this conclusion
may be derived from BLS, Average Weekly Hours and Average
Hourly Earnings in The Boot and Shoe Industry for Selected
States and Metropolitan Areas (mimeographed). In January,
196, for example, a 12ý spread existed between "St. Louis
Metropolitan area"~ and "Missouri, excluding St. Louis•r , a
290 spread between "Chicago" and "Illinois, excluding
Chicago", and a 6- spread between "Milwaukee" and ,Wisconsin,
excluding Milwaukee".
2. BLS, Earnings and Hours, pp. 26-27. While the differ-
ential existed within all the sub-groups, the amount was less
for "unskilled" workers and for females. This conclusion also
is corroborated by the study made in 1945+. BLS, ag
Structure, p. 7.
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44.1o for the "under $2.51" classification to 58.74 where
prices were "over $7.50". Once again, the variation
occurred uniformly within the sub-groups of the working
force.l
The difficulty with separate treatment of each of
these influences is that no one of them operates indepen-
dently of the other two. Thus, high-grade shoes are made
in large communities by unionized workmen. On the other
hand, analysis of the data simultaneously by size of com-
munity, unionization, and retail price of shoes discloses
that each of the three factors may be presumed to have
some independent correlation with wage levels:
"With but few exceptions, the average hourly
earnings of either union or non-union plants
in each size of community varied directly with
retail price of shoes. Likewise, in most
instances, the averages for either union or
non-union establishments in each retail-price
class increased with size of community. More-
over, with some exceptions, the average for
each comparable retail-price range and size of
community was higher in union as compared with
non-union plants. T2
These conclusions with respect to wage levels seem about
what might be expected, given the potential mobility and
present location of shoe factories as discussed in the
previous section.
1. BLS, Earnings and Hours, pp. 28-30. The 1945 study
made no attempt to measure variations by price grades.
2. Ibid., p. 33.
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It is not possible to explain these low wage levels
by pointing to a lack of progress in man-hour requirements
per pair of shoes. On a gross, over-all basis, a steady
and pronounced trend of rising output per man-hour has been
in evidence throughout the entire period from 1919 through
World War II. From 1919-1940, the index of man-hour pro-
duction rose by 63%1 , and from 1939-1945, by another 10%. 2
Of course, these figures include a tremendous range of
footwear classifications, so that change in the Wproduct
mix" could account for part of the change in productivity.
However, the rising trend in man-hour output of shoeS
appears strongly in specific slb-classifications: between
1923 and 1936, the increase was 56% for men t s ?thigh-medium
grade" shoes, 39% for men ts "medium grade", and 35% for
1. BLS, Productivity and Unit Labor Cost in Selected
Manufacturing rndustries, 1919-1940, February, 1942, p. 4.
On the other hand, output per wage earner increased by only
27%, less than half the man-hour increase. The difference
is probably attributable, at least partially, to a shorter
work -week and to the difficulty of reducing the number of
workers attached to an industry during periods of general
underemployment. This conclusion is further supported by
the fact that, between 1929 and 1935, while man-hour output
increased by 25%, output per wage earner increased by only
5.; that is, the disparity in movement was most noticeable
during the depression years.
2. BLS, Trends in Man-Hours Expended Per Unit. Selected
Footwear, 1939-1945, March 1948, p. 12. In this study,
the increase in productivity is attributed primarily to
these three factors: (1) larger orders, .(2) reduction of
styling, and (3) increased utilization of plant capacities.
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men's "low grade" shoes. 1  During the period 1939-1945,
slight increases of about 5% on the average were recorded
for men t s dress shoes. 2
Information on man-hour requirements by region is not
available for pre-Worl& War II years; and, for the years,
1939-1945, for which data have been published by BLS., the
dispersion of the data within regions makes interpretation
of the averages difficult. For the period in question,
however, the greatest gains in productivity in the men's
shoe classification were recorded in New England and an
actual decline occurred in the Middle West and Great Lakes
region. 3  In the BLIS study, this difference is reasonably
attributed to two factors: (1) lower level of capacity
utilization in New England before the War, and (2) the fact
that, before the war, "the greater proportion of New England
factories could be characterized as producers to customerst
orders, while the western shoe companies appeared to engage
to a greater extent in production for stock and sale from
the warehouse".4
1. Boris Stern, "Labor Productivity in the Boot and Shoe
Industry", Monthly Labor Review, February 1939, p. 281.
2. BLS, Trends in Man-Hours, p. 17.
3. Ibid., p. 35.
4. Ibid., p. 34.
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Perhaps of more significance are the BLS findings as
to the relation between Rsize of factory" and man-hours
expended per pair of shoes. During the 1939-1945 period,
the small plants reduced their requirements by about 10%
while the larger factories showed slight increases in per-
pair requirements. 1  Though no explanatory comment is
made in the- study, the reasons given above for New England's
productivity gains probably apply equally here. Speaking
in terms of pre-war operations, then, the larger factories
(and, therefore, generally the larger - firms) may have used
their labor-hours more effectively than small plants, the
reasons being related more to merchandising than to tech-
nical production advantages.
The variations in man-hour requirements as between
price grades of shoes is of interest here, since note has
already been taken of the long-run shift to lower grades,
produced on low wage levels. The data provided by BLS for
1945 show clearly that man-hour requirements per pair
increase in direct proportion with the grade of shoe pro-
duced. The requirements for a low-priced men's dress shoe
(under $3.25 at the factory) were .79, and for a high-
medium priced shoe ($5.25 and under $7.50), 1.73, or over
twice as many man-hours. 2
1. Ibid., p. 35.
2. Ibid., p. 42.
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Neaw all these wage and producti vity "ifacts" taken
together: seemn to indicate these- conclusions: (1) shoes-
are: produced on low wage levels; .-(2) considerable variation
in average. hourly earnings by plants exists; (3) these varia-
tions_. are closely, correlated with grade of- shoe, unionihation,
and_.- size of community; (4) along with low wages, the indtstry
ha.s been charact-erized by steadily increasing output per man-
hour; (5) merchandising advantages: may aecount f.r more.
efficient utilization. off labor hours by large firms than by
small companies;• and (6) man-hour requirementse per- pair of
menUsai shoes increase directly with the: grade- of shoe, produced.
These. oonclusions may now: be combined with others drawn from
earlier. sections, forming a summary of the' points in this
chapter most. relevant: to. wage,: determination.
Summary
The shoe industry's economic characteristics illustrate
one way in which the wages paid in an industry may be condi-
tioned by economic forces. These conditions do seem to
indicate limits within which wage bargains must fall, if
definite "employment effects" are to be avoided. The follow-
ing factors seem most relevant to the qualitative definition
of these limits.
1. This is a competitive industry. Although some
concentration exists in the ments low-priced shoe field,
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potential competition is ever present there; and, in general,
many buyers and sellers are characteristic of the market.
Similarity of production techniques checks any tendency for
hard and fast boundary lines to develop between the various
kinds of shoes; and, within product classifications such as
?"ments dress shoes"t, the commodity is homogeneous enough to
allow "tworkable" price comparisons as between brands.
2. Production of shoes is heavily concentrated in the
low-priced grades. Over the period between World Wars, a
pronounced downward shift in consumer grade preferences has
occurred, being most marked in the depression period of the
early thirties. This shift took place in the field of men's
shoes as well as in the general footwear classification.
3. The industry has not been particularly profitable
on the average, over half the firms in each year from 1930-
1938 having made losses. Although these losses are concen-
trated among the smallest firms in the industry, profitability
does not seem otherwise to be related to size.
4. Total,ecosts to the individual firm are largely
variable with output, a condition which permits considerable
fluctuations in output levels, down to and including the
points of exit and entry. The advantages which may accrue
to large firms are not great, but they do appear particularly
in the labor costs. Since other costs are fairly well fixed
74
as between firms, this labor cost becomes the focus of com-
petitive pressures.
5. The largest factor cost to the industry as a whole
is that for leather, a commodity derived from a by-product
and characterized by inelasticity of supply.. Thus, while
the demand for labor in any single firm is elastic with
respect to price, the demand curve for shoeworkers as a
group is probably quite inelastie: the general wage level
could be raised without serious employment effects.
6.. In recent years, the industry has been charac-
terized by decentralization, a movement into low-wage,
rural areas where shoes have not previously been produced.
This movement is easiest for large firms, making staple,
" popular-priced" shoes; but, coupled with the shift in
consumer preferences toward these lines, the trend toward
decentralization places great pressure on the competitive
position of all firms in the industry. The consequence
would appear to be generally low wages.
7. This is, in fact, a low-wage industry. Despite
considerable gains in man-hour output, average hourly
earnings did not rise during the inter-War period. How-
ever, sizable variations in wage levels do exist. These
variations are positively correlated with size of community,
grade of shoe, and unionization.I aftosaepstv~$ cr~td wt feo Oll~llitp
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While these economic characteristics impose limita-
tions, especially on wage levels and general wage movements,
they imply very little as to an individual shoeworker's
particular wage rate. However, the development and present
status of shoemaking techniques does provide a necessary
frame of reference for analysis of this important phase of
wage activity. The next chapter deals with relevant aspects
of the shoe manufacturing process.
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CHAPTER III
MANUFACTURING MEN •S SHOE&'
The Process, the Jobs, and the Structure of Wages
Some. knowledge of' how men s sho•• eI ar e now made and
how this p:ro•ess developed fom- a h'and to: a ma• chin .lopera-
tioný will contribut e to understanding wage dietermination
in Brekton f• r at least fu r asons: (I1).. Such knowledge-
should point.- up diastinguishing:: characteri stics of. tb.eha various
shoemaking Jobs and subprocesses which have lent themselves
to the craft form of union organization; (2) This industryts
wage structure and the relationship existing between important
shoemaking occupations should be clarified; as should (3). The
1way in which economies of mass production are felt by workmen
at the bench; and (4) The process and job content differences
involved in making expensive as opposed to low-priced shoes
should be indicated. Describing the manufacture of menls
shoes in such a way as to allow elaboration of the four
concepts above is the purpose of this chapter.
This description and elaboration may be conveniently
divided into four categories. First, perspective may be
gained by comparing the type of construction commonly used
for men ts shoes with those types provided today for other
consum-ing groups. Following that will be a description
in general terms. f the Goodyear-welt manufacturing process.
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and of its historical development. The process will then
be examined in some detail with attention devoted to manu-
facturing differences between expensive and low-priced
shoes and between volume and small-order production, to
specific Jobs performed, and to craft groupings around
those jobs. Finally, the wage structure into which those
Jobs fall will be discussed and the average relationships
for the United States compared with those of the Brockton
area.
Types of Shoe Construction
No matter what type of shoe he may be making, the
shoemaker must perform a considerable number of operations
in a similar way. Aside from '"sticking to his last' t , he
must cut out and stitch together the upper leather outside
pieces and cloth or leather linings, he must cut out the
sole, trim and set its edge, and clean up, dress, and pack
the completed shoe. There are important variations in
the way a shoe is built, but these are really variations
in the way the upper is attached to the sole.
The three basic methods of doing this, cementing,
stitching and nailing or pegging the upper to the sole,
are used, for the most part, on shoes designed for quite
different purposes. The cement process, unimportant until
1933, was used on 57% of all woments shoes by 1942,
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but, in that same year, on only 3% of. mens shoes. I
Nailed or pegged construction seems more suitable to the
heavy and relatively crude workshoes, so that in 1939,
half of all the workshoes produced were of -this type; but,
with the exception of about 20% of the "Youths and Boys",
this construction attracted no: other% group of fooatwear
consumers. 2  Stitching is by far the most popular of the
three methods of attaching the upper and the sole (it was
used on.almost 60% of all footwear in 19423), but meaning-
ful analysis demands differentiation between the "Stiteh-
down,, the "McKay" and the "TGoodyear-welt" type of stitch-
ing process.4
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Domestic Commerce,
Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics, May 1946, p. 20. Among
the reasons for use of this process on woment s but not men t's
shoes, the operational difference between light, flexible
soles and heavy, stiff ones is important. Perhaps more impor-
tant, though, is the stylistic demand of men for a sole which
extends out from the upper. Since a cement process sole is
"squeezedn on, extensions are likely to curl up and ruin the
looks of the shoe. A variation of the cement process known as
the "Silhouwelt" shoe requires the same preparatory operations
as the Goodyear-welt method, but then sticks instead of stitches
the sole to the welt. Even here the amount of extension is
limited, and, further, no operational savings are involved. The
result. is. simply a light, delicate ;:shoe favored by only a small
number of men.
2. Ibid.,~ p. 20.
3. Ibid., p. 20.
4. For-more details on all these types of shoe construe-
tion, see U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards,
Shoe Constructions, March 1938; alse, United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, How Modern Shoes Are. ade, 1939.
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Most popular with the nationts youth, the "Stitchdown"
shoe was made in 1942 for 43% of our "TYouths and Boyst1 , 70%
of our "Misses and Children", and 53% of our "Infants", so
that, all in all, it was used on 20% of total footwear
production-l In its simplest form, this shoets upper is
pulled over the last, then turned out and stitched down to
the sole.2  Though not an especially durable type of con-
struction, it is a simple one and one which leaves the shoe
flexible, with no uncomfortable stitching on its inside.
In contrast, stitches do appear inside the McKay shoe,
though only to the curious who lift up its "sock lining".
Here the upper is pulled over the last and fastened to the
innersole by tacks.3  After the last is withdrawn from the
shoe, the outsole is sewed on by stitching through the upper
and innersole. In 1942, 18% of the "Youths and Boys"!, 12%
of the "Women's", and 10% of the t Men's" shoes produced
were of this type. 4
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Domestic Commerce,
op. cit., p. 20.
2. Other forms of the "Stitchdownt shoe are more compli-
cated,, but of the same general characteristics. By the
use of two or three "soles", the quality, repairability
(and the cost) of the shoes is raised.
3. The ITLittlewayft variation on this process staples
the upper to the innersole in such a way that no metal
appears on the inside of the shoe.
4. Ibid., p . 20.
But the shoe constructions described so far have
accounted for only 15 out of every 100 pairs of men's
dress shoes. What happened to the ether 85? In 1942,
a representative year in this. respect at least, they
were made by the Goodyear-welt process.1  Here a rib is
turned up on the bottom of the innersole. This rib is
indented slightly from the innersolets edge and runs.
around the shanks and forepart of the shoe. After the
innersole.is tacked to the last and -the upper pJulled
over, a strip of' leather, . the welt, is i sewed to the
upper and rib of the innersole in such a way that no
stitching appears inside the shoe. When the outsole
is attached, it is stitched., not to. the upper or the.
innersele, but to the' welt. 2  So, if the sole wears
out, you can sew a new: one to the:welt; or, if the
exposed part of the welt deteriorates tooe, another welt
may be attached to the innersole rib. 3 These possibili-
ties for repair, the comfort of a smoothz inside surface
1. Ibid., p. 20.
2. If you look at the edge of the sole- of your shoe,
you will see that it consists of' two or three layers.
The top layer - the one you see when you look down on
the shoe - is the welt.
3. Adding another jifff to this series, the trade
has a saying that "the shoe is no better than its
ihnersole". If the rib of your innerselea gives way,
you need a new pair of shoes--and probably a new supplier.
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and of flexibility on the foot are apparently the factors
which make this shoe so.: popular.1
There is no telling, of course, how long the Goodyear
process will predominate in the ments field. Apparently,
it is not too well adapted to -close-edgeds shoes, 2 for
which the cement process is so well suited. This being
the case, a change in style could hurt its relative posi-
tion, even if no new methods appear. But, for the years
under discussion here, men!s shoes have been welt shoes.
The jobs and wage structure which belong to this process,
then, are the ones which must be examined if the men's shoe
industry is to be understood. But a prerequisite to such
1. The author questioned a number of people in, the shoe
business as to why the Goodyear-welt shoe is preferred by
men. They all stressed:: the importance of the. fact, that it
could be resoled with relative ease. On the other hand,
the National Bureau. of Standards concluded:
"An old argument in favor of the Goodyear-welt type'
of construction has been that it can be repaired
readily. This is still true but, aside from single-
soled shoes, it is believed that modern, methods per-
mit the repair of other types with equal facility.
Here again,- hawever,. the questionr of the quality of
materials arises. A certain grade of a possibly less
desirable construction might be repaired more. readily
than a Goodyear-welt made of low quality materials".:
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce,. National Bureau f: Standards, •-.
cit., p. 12.) Of course, the repair problem to the consumer
19 partly a problem of what shoes the cobblers are equipped
to handle. Long time predominance of the Goodyear-welt gives
it an advantage in this respect.
2.. As the needle joins the welt. and. the outsale on a "close-
edged" shoe, it is not far from the thread joining: the welti
7upper and; innersole ribj thus, it may.: e:ut that thread. For a
critical discussion of the Goodyear-welt proaess see L. H.
LaRouche, MShall We Retain the Goodyear Welt?", Hide and
Leather and Shoes, December 7, 1946, p. 13.
examination is a general statement of shoemakingts historical
development and of work flow in today's shoe factory.
Historical Development and Work Flow
Up until the last half of the nineteenth century, a
shoeworker was a man who could start with pieces of leather
and end up with a pair of shoes. Now, with a well-made
Goodyear-welt requiring 170 operations and use of 140
machines,1 the shoeworker has become a specialist, perform-
ing over and over again a minute part of his former task.
Despite the machines and the specialization, though, many
of the operations still require the attention of skilled
workmen.2  Most of the "revolutionary" machine develop-
ments occurred before the first World War; in fact, the
job titles used in a 1910 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey
appear again in that agencyts 1945 study of the shoe indus-
try's wage structure. But, despite this apparent stagna-
tion of the process, labor productivity in medium grade
ments shoes, fori~  example, increased by about 30. percentage
points between 1923 and 1936. 3
1. The relatively plain Navy shoe requires about 140
operations.
2. In a 1939 survey of the ments shoe industry, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics classified a little over one-third of the
workers as "skilled". U, S. Dept. of- Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics,. Earnings and Hours in Shoe and Allied Industries,
During the First Quarter of 1939, Table 17, p. 39.
3. Boris Stern, "Labor Productivity in the Boot and Shoe
Industry", Monthly Labor Review, February 1939, p. 281.
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Why should this industry's work be so simplified
and yet require such a large proportion of skilled and
semi-skilled workers? What kind of technological change
is it that leaves each operator's effect on the shoe the
same and raises productivity to such an extent? Part of
the answer to these questions must lie in the conception
of the machines that have been developed--they are conceived
as substitutes for particular hand operations.1  For instance,
a pair of pliers supplemented by the workman's strong right
arm once pulled the upper over the last. Now a machine,
"draws the sides and toe into place with pincers which work
like fingers". 2  While this innovation enables a man to
"don more shoes in a given space of time, it does not change
the number of operations which go into a shoe. Further,
and perhaps more significant, the majority of the machines
are not automatic--the operator is not a machine-tender.
1. It seems to the author that the process of work simpli-
fication (and shoe machine development is that sort of thing)
almost inevitably chains itself to the "old method". Indeed,
todays formal work simplification instruction teaches you to
start by thorough description of the job as "now" performed
and then to proceed by questioning "every detail". Thus, all
the thinking is oriented toward the original method. Shoe
machinery, ingenious as it is, seems to have been developed
this way.
2. Frederick J. Allen, The Shoe Industry, Vocational
Bureau of Boston, 1916, p. 61. According to Mr. Allen,
"The old lasters say that this machine sung to them as it
worked, 'I've got your job! I've got your jobl"
$4
Largely responsible for this fact are two non-homogeneous
items: at one end, the raw material, leather and, at the
other, the product, finished in many styles, each with a
range of lengths and widths.
For pieces of leather are very much like fingerprints:
they all have the same general characteristics, yet each is
ju.st. a little: different. Aside from, natural variations in
stretch, grain, and color, chance placement of the rancher's
brand,. a barbed-wire scratch, or a tick mark on the animal's
hide. all distinguish one piece of leather from the next.
These differences require handling in a manner flexible
enough for appropriate adjustment, shoe by shoe, a difficult
task for attomatic machinery. Then,- too.,. the many shapes
and sizes of the product call for adjustments even in the type
of machinery now in use--a problem which would be magnified
if the personal flexibility of the workman were removed from
the process. Of course, all this is not to rule out perform-
ance of many large: segments of. the shoemaking process by auto-
matic machines, but just to focus on two important facts about
the shoemaking process. These facts are (1) despite mechaniza-
tion, shoemaking requires many skilled operators and (2) while
machine development has often changed job content for the
worker,, it has seldom changed job content for the shoe.
But what about the flow of work necessary for a piece
of leather to become a shoe? In this connection, the author
studied the departmental distribution of employees and labor
cost in one factory and a list of piece and day work opera-
tions performed in that factory on a medium grade, straight-
tip, black oxford--a fairly standard and very popular style
of shoe. While no contention is made that this plant is
"typical" in such respects as percent of day work, the
groupings or departments of work and their relative impor-
tance in terms of operations and cost are felt to be repre-
sentative of the Goodyear-welt process.1  Chart 3 shows
for each department the percent of total operations on a
particular shoe, the percent of total labor cost, and the
distribution of employees during a production season, and,
for the process as a whole, the flow of work from one "room"
to the next.
A glance at this chart discloses the main functions
of each department and, in a general sense, the value of
groups of operators to the manufacturer. For example, sole
leather and heel workers make up 13% of the employees but get
1. Lists of operations performed in making a shoe are
apt to vary considerably depending on the amount of work
contracted for outside the factory and the interpretation
given to day work jobs. In this plant, the company cuts
its own soles and makes its own heels, counters and box
toes. Further, the list of operations includes such jobs
as "die boy" and "sweeper,' in the cutting room or "machinist,"
in the stitching room. VWhile the result here is magnifica-
tion of the number of operations, their distribution should
not be affected, except in the case of the sole leather and
heel room. A variation would occur there if a company
purchased outsoles, innersoles, heels, counters and box toes
from an outside concern.
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CHART 3
THE PROCESS FLOW OF MEN'S GOODYEAR WELT SHOES
CUTTING ROOM
16 operations
% of total
operations
9,4
% of total % of tktal
labor cost employees
14.4 14
(leather and cloth pieces
for the upper)
SOLE LEATHER AND
.HEEL ROOM
26 operations
STITCHING ROOM
48 operations
(fitted uppers)
irnnersoles
counters
& box toe s 7i
SASTING ROOM
14 operations
(las ed shoes)
MAKING ROOM
32 operations
(bottomed shoes)
(shoes with
finished soles)
DRESSING ANDD
PACKING ROOM
17 operations
15.3 7.1 13.4
283.2 25.9
8.2 13, 7 11.7
outsoles
& heels
18.8 22.,8 17.7
6.9 6.6
9.3 10.5
- -
I m
87
only 7% of the labor dollars for their efforts; whereas
making. room employees, 18% of the total number, get 23%
of labor's "share". But each, department has within it a
wide range of skills and, types of operation; so, before:
further generalizations on rates of pay can be made, a closer
look at particular jobs within rooms is in order.
Shoemakers' Jobs
Three important influences felt on jobs throughout
the factory should be mentioned before any jobs are examined
in detail. The first of these influences is the method of
wage payment: the piece price system. Of the plants studied
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in October 1945, 88% were
classified as "predomihantly piece rate" establishments, and
the Bureau found that 69% of all the workers studied were
"paid on an incentive basis".1  A piece price is, of course,
a bargain to exchange a specified amount of money for a
specified type and amount of work, known as the "Job content".
When this job content changes, there should be a change in the
piece price. Three important ways in which shoe factory jobs
can change are these: (1) The introduction of new styles means
that- Stitchers join parts of the upper together by travelling
over new distances and by contending with a new set of hardships
1.. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Footwear
Wage Structure, October 1945, p. 24.
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(curves, stops and so forth). This type of style change
is frequent enough to force almost continuous rate-setting
activity in the Stitching Room; (2) The introduction of new
methods and new materials changes job content for the worker.
While these innovations are not so frequent, the way in which
they have come about (noted in the previous section) has
apparently affected the piece prices; and (3) The great number
of styles going through most Brockton factories at any one time
creates so many different "jobs" that piece prices have tended
to cover "the average run of work". Since some shoes are
"hard" and others "easy", opportunities for discrimination
between workers exist. Further, a change in the proportions
of what the "average runn includes raises piece rate questions.
Such changes are bound to occur and they bring with them a
perpetual basis for dissatisfaction.
The second of these important influences is the rate of
production per variation in style and size of shoe. This is
nothing more than one of the well-known "economies of mass
production". Since variation spells delay to the worker,
there is justification for lowering the piece price of the
"same" job when management introduces "block sizes" and re-
stricts the number of styles. The description of shoemaking
operations below will provide many examples of the way varia-
tion can slow up the worker. The third influence is the
grade of shoe produced. The most important difference
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between high and low-priced shoes is the quality of material
used; but there are significant process. differences too.
These are the principal sources of this extra labor cost on
high grade shoes: (1) the additional operations usually
performed, (2) the increased care necessary on the same
operations (though this condition is, by no means, applicable
to all jobs), and (3) the tendency for volume of production
to be lower the higher the grade of shoe, since the number of
potential consumers is relatively small.
With the piece rate method of wage payment, the volume
of production per style and size variation, and the grade of
shoe produced in mind, examples of the types of jobs performed
in the shoe factory may be examined, 1 starting, naturally,
with the Cutting Room. Shoe manufacturers will generally
agree that the "Cutters can make you or break you", since
they are the ones who convert the expensive raw material,
leather, into the component parts of the upper. 2  What is
1. The author is indebted to Mr. John Regas of the W.L.
Douglas Shoe Company for his careful explanations of shoe-
making jobs and for the time he spent taking the author
through the Douglas factory.
2. Skilled workmen like to use the amount they are "saving"
the company as a Justification for increasing their wages.
"With the work we are doing, you are getting your shoes cut
for nothing".
Brockton manufacturers apparently feel that an out and
out bonus for saving leather would pose too great a quality
problem, since the cutter might then find it advantageous to
slip in imperfections where he felt he could get away with
it. However, this type of bonus is used effectively in many
shoe factories.
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the nature of their skill? By the widely used "Krippendorf"
system, the manufacturer can estimate the "average" footage
of leather necessary to obtain a pair of shoes in the grade
he desires, 1 and so he can put up "jobs" for his Cutters:
so many pairs of this style of shoe from so many feet of
leather. With the price agreed on (roughly according to
the number of pieces to be cut), this "aristocrat of the
shoe factory ,2 goes to work. He lays out the skin, locates
the good quality sections and bad, and spots the tick marks
and briar scratches which almost always appear. From this
analysis, he must plan out the way he will fit his patterns
together so as to maximize utilization of the skin: a pro-
cess not unlike putting together a jig-saw puzzle. When
he starts to cut, he takes the vamp, which receives great
wear, from the best material, and he is careful that the
tips, which show, match up in pairs and have no imperfec-
tions in them. Poorer material will do for the quarters
and, for the tongue, almost any part of the skin is satis-
factory. The actual cut is made today by a die forced
1. Leather is sold to the manufacturers by grades,
which vary in relation to the number of imperfections in
the skin. Thus the number of pairs per square foot would
be higher, the better the grade of leather.
2. Recognition of the Cutters? high estate appears when,
in a crowd of shoeworkers, someone carelessly drops a coin
on the floor. "The cutters are here," they say.
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through the leather when a "clicking" machine's heavy
beam comes down on it. Hand cutting, still used in some
high-grade, low-volume shops, requires the craftsmen to
follow around the edge of his pattern with a Cutter's knife.1
A number of observations can be made from this brief
description of what a cutter does. First, it should be
apparent that the high grade manufacturer, who will accept
no imperfections at all in his upper leather pieces, must
expect the workman to use more leather per pair of shoes.
Further, since this workman must match up pairs very care-
fully (more difficult for browns than blacks), take time
to select perfect tcuts" and so handle more skins per pair,
his piece price should exceed that of a worker on lower
grades. Second, opportunities for favoritism appear since
some batches of leather will have more imperfections per
foot than will others. Not only will the worker getting
the poor batch need more time to cut a given number of
shoes, but his record of leather utilization, on which
his standing as a Cutter depends, will suffer. Third,
the more styles and sizes required in a t"jobt", the more
dies the Cutter must use; the more dies he must use, the
more time it takes him to cut the pairage specified.
Thus, lower piece prices should go to manufacturers who
1. No doubt these quality manufacturers feel that
hand cutting yields a better product. But perhaps a
more important consideration is the cost of the die
necessary for machine cutting. When volume in a style
is low, the die may not be a profitable investment.
92
provide large "jobs" in single styles and single sizes.
Fourth, the relationship between earnings in hand cutting
and machine cutting may provide an example of the "hangover"
problem in an old shoe center. Work by hand requires all
the skill of the machine operator plus ability to use the
Cuttert s knife, a fact indicated by the Bureau of Labor
Statistiest 1945 finding that, throughout the United States,
this additional skill was accompanied by higher hourly earn-
ings. This earnings relationship held in all sections of
the country except New England, a shoemaking center when
the machine was first introduced.1  It is quite possible
that operators and manufacturers oriented toward the "old
method" worked out relative piece prices that later yielded
more earnings for less skill. 2
But what other jobs are there in the Cutting Room?
A regular hierarchy exists, ranging down from the "shoe
cutter" to the die boy. An important stepping-stone job
is that of lining cutter, either leather or cloth. Here
the operator may accustom himself to the use of dies and
1. Ibid., p. 22. In the United States the relationship
was $1.29 for hand cutters to $1.22 for machine; whereas
in New England it was $1.13 to $1.34. In Brockton this
reverse relationship was even more noticeable: $1.14 for
hand to $1.55 for machine.
2. This is not to imply either that machine cutting
earnings in New England are too high or that those for
hand cutting are too low. The question is one of relation-
ships rather than of level. This relationship will be dis-
cussed in detail in the chapter on the problems of setting
individual piece rates.
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the "clicking" machine, but, especially in the case of
cloth linings, relatively homogeneous material largely
eliminates the skill of placing patterns and selecting
cuts. In a high grade factory, a "sorterU may be employed
to cheek on the matching and quality of outside leather
pieces; whereas, the "popular"' priced manufacturer may call
the Cutterts judgment good enough and so save a little on
his labor cost. All of these jobs are concerned with con-
verting various raw materials into the pieces necessary to
make an upper. Also often found in the Cutting Room,1
though, are skiving operations--necessary steps in prepar-
ing work for the stitchers.
These jobs, generally performed by women,2 contrast
with the more skilled men's cutting operations. Skivers
feed specified edges of the leather pieces to a sharp
revolving disk, which cuts those edges down to the desired
bevel. Such a bevel means that edges may be sewn together
without creating a bulky seam, and it permits folding over
so that exposed edges will present a smooth, finished
1. Sometimes these operations are performed in the "Pre-
Fitting Room" and in other places, the markers, at least,
are included with the stitchers.
2. Women predominate in this job in all sections of the
country, but, in the extent to which they do so, there are
interesting variations. The ratio in ments shoes for the
United States was found by the BLS to be 10 women to every
man, but in New England that ratio was only 5 : 1 and in
Brockton, 2 : 1. Ibid., p. 22.
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appearance. The operator ts skill lies mainly in ability
to move rapidly through the work, work which varies little
between high and low quality shoes. Differences in labor
cost would show up on this operation, though, since better
shoes will generally have more skived edges. Now, it is
apparent. that, while skivers may work in the same depart-
ment as cutters, they are distinctly differentiated by sex
and type of skill. No surprise, then, should be the
formation of a separate Skiverts Local in craft-conscious
Brockton to give "their problems" attention not provided
by Cutter-oriented business agents.
Other miscellaneous pre-stitching operations in the
Cutting Room are match-marking leather pieces and perforat-
ing fancy patterns on them, jobs usually done by women.,
Machines help accomplish both of these tasks, but the
possibilities in perforating provide us with an interesting
example of economies accruing to large scale production.
When a plant makes many pairs of a certain style shoe, a
die is made to cut out the holes and do the pinking too,
all in one blow. Smaller volume means use of a machine
more flexible patternwise, but which cuts out the perfora-
tions one by one. In this case, furthermore, the volume
method may actually perform a more uniform and better job.
The Stitching Room itself provides the biggest volume
of rate setting problems, since here the twists of style
95
are worked into the shoe. New patterns bring variation in
the number of turns, stops, and the total distance to be
stitched, as well as the number of stitches to the inch; and
each of these variations may alter the piece price. Where
manufacturer and worker agree on the earnings which the job
should yield, they may clash on the piece price, even (or
perhaps, especially) if that price is set "scientifically T".
But, when one of the parties feels the estimated earnings
are "out of line", style changes may become the vehicle for
bargaining, not so much over work standards as over job
worth. This problem is multiplied by the number of sepa-
rate operations in the Stitching Room.
Linings must be attached to outside pieces, fancy
stitches put in and the completed upper components brought
together. Most of these operations may be done as flat
work on machines which look much like those used in private
homes. When the completed fore and rear sections of the
upper are brought together for final assembly, though, the
operator must work in three dimensions. Instead of using
a flat surface, he holds the leather over a wheel, as his
stitches finish what is virtually a shoe without a sole.
This job, known as vamping, is apparently one of the most
difficult in the Stitching Room and is, as well, crucial
for proper performance of subsequent operations: a sloppy
vamping job makes it impossible to line the shoe up on its
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last. Vampers may consider themselves, then, as set apart
from the other stitchers, with the special features of their
work meriting separate union representation. Such a tendency
may be augmented when many of the vampers are men, working in
this relatively large and overwhelmingly female Stitching
Department. Thus, while the BLS found in the United States
4.5 female vampers to every male, the ratio was 2 : 1 in New
England and 0.44 : 1 (the men outnumbered the women) in the
Brockton district,l1 where a strong Vamperst Local exists.
While the upper is being formed in the Cutting and
Stitching Rooms, the Sole Leather (or Stock-Fitting) Depart-
ment workers are preparing what will be the shoets bottom.
Here the outsole is 'dinked" out when a heavy beam presses a
die through the "bend" of leather. To cut for quality, the
craftsman must know his material and must place his die in
such a way as to exclude bad spots from his soles but, at
the same time, maximize utilization of the leather. Though
he has the same type of problem here as does the "Shoe
Cutter", his earnings may be 15% to 20% lower. 2  Generally
1. Ibid., p. 22.
2. People working in the Sole Leather Department are apt
to think this earnings relationship should be reversed.
"The outsole cutter must have all the skill of the shoe
cutter, but, in addition, his work requires more effort:
the die he handles weighs a ton." Part of the explanation
may lie in the fact that in the Brockton district, at least,
he is a day worker. Apparently, it is easy to speed up on
this job, but to the detriment of quality; and the extra
soles produced by the piece worker are not worth the conse-
quent loss in the average value of those soles.
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less skilled are the operations which prepare the inner-
sole for the Goodyear-welt process.
The job of rounding provides an example of an opera-
tion which does not vary between grades and which shows some
little economy to high volume production. Here the operator
places the innersole on a flat piece of wood conforming
exactly to the shape of the bottom of the last. Upon release,
a knife guides along the wooden contour, cutting the innersole
as it goes. In this case, the operator feeds in the work and
changes wooden patterns when that is necessary. No matter
what the grade, the job is the same; and the number of soles
a given operator can do is determined by the number of times
the pattern must be changed.1  Again, the "tskilled" operator
who channels the innersole can describe his job as one which
may require more work per piece on low grades than on high.
His machine slashes the leather in such a way that it can
later be turned up to form. an all-important rib, the strength
of which determines the durability of the shoe. Here, the
relatively thin, fleshy innersoles used for inexpensive shoes
are naturally harder to work with than the thick, firm material
which goes into the top grades. Other jobs necessary in the
1. This analysis assumes that the number of soles cut at
one sweep of the knife is the same. Thus, assuming "x t' number
of soles per cut, a given operator's production depends on the
frequency of pattern changes. Generally speaking, the high-
quality, thick innersoles will be cut one by one; but cheap,
thin soles may be done four at a time. Here again, the labor
price per pair would be greater in the top grade factory.
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preparation of innersoles for the laster are cementing and
turning up this rib, then reinforcing it with a strip of
strong "Gem Duck." cloth. 1
By this time the upper is probably being "mulled" 2
and the specified style and size of last assembled on a
'
track", now usually built to hold twelve pairs of shoes.
This job, known as "last pickings, provides a dramatic
example of the savings which develop when a plant produces
in blocks of single styles and sizes. If all twelve pair
are the same, the last picker may go to one bin and there
find the lasts he needs.3  If the style or sizes vary,
the worker must hunt longer and take more time to fill his
Itracka.. Here the manufacturer calling for a "run of sizes"
gets no extra quality for the extra money he must spend; in
fact, he complicates the Job and so increases the chance for
error.
1. Other jobs in the Stock Fitting Room revolve around
preparation of the heel. In a great many cases, this part
of the work is eliminated by purchasing component parts of
the heel from companies specializing in their preparation.
However, the stock fitting jobs in the process flow chart
included the miscellaneous operations performed in making up
the heels.
2. For the lasters to work the leather down tight over
the last, it must be as pliable as possible. Addition of
moisture in mulling gives the laster what he needs in this
respect.
3. In some high volume factories, the lasts turn over
so regularly that they are never even removed from the
rack.
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After it is picked, the last has the innersole
tacked to its bottom and the upper assembled over its
top, a job which requires insertion of the counter (to
keep the rear of the shoe from breaking down). Next in
line, the skilled pull-over operator must insert the box
toe, line the shoe up, and stretch the leather down tight
to the last. Six tacks inserted simultaneously by his
machine hold the upper in place, after he has pulled it
into the right position. The side laster then staples
along the shank of the shoe, drawing this part of the
upper snug to the innersole rib. While an automatic
machine is used to wipe the leather in smoothly around
the heel seat and tack it in place, finishing the toe
requires a well-trained worker. This "fBed Machine
Operator" lays his shoe in a jig (the "bed") and, by
manipulating "wipers" (which, incidentally, must be
changed with every change in style of last), he smooths
the leather around the toe and wires it in place. Like
many others in the Lasting Room, this is a hard job, one
which requires strength as well as skill: "After a day
of this work, you don't need nobody to rock you to sleep".
But if the heel can be lasted on an automatic machine,
why cantt the toe? The answer is that it can be. In shoe
centers all over the country, even in non-union shops, "Bed
Machine Operators" have been resisting introduction of a
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machine which takes away much of their skill, their back-
ache, and about half their jobs. While some managements
may negotiate rates for the new toe laster so that they
yield the same earnings as were received on the old
skilled operation, others in a locality new to the shoe
industry may have a "green" operator lasting toes for
earnings down in the "semi-skilled" section of the wage
structure. Indeed, these automatic heel and toe lasting
machines provide clear examples of technological develop-
ments which change the worker's job content while leaving
his jobts effect on the shoe unchanged. A plant must still
employ heel and toe lasters; but the number and skill of
those employed may be decreased. While a new shoe manufac-
turing area may base expected earnings on the new skill, an
old area's earning potential for that job is apt to be based
on the old skill.
By the time the shoe is through the Lasting Room, all
except three of the parts are on it. These three, the welt,
the sole, and the heel, are attached and shaped in the Making
Room by a series of operations, many of which are highly
skilled. The first group of these jobs has to do with
fastening on the outersole. First, the welt is sewed to
the upper and innersole rib. Then, follow several mis-
cellaneous jobs which vary little from one grade of shoe
to the next: after excess upper material has been removed
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by the inseam trimmer, the welt is beveled off at the shank
("butt weltsi") and beaten so that it will lie flat, in the
same plane as the shoe's bottom ("beat weltsn). Then the
shank is "tarred in" and the unfilled space between ribs
filled with cork composition material ("bottom filling").
With the aid of a little cement, the sole is "laid,!, a
machine pressing it up into the contour of the last. After
the Heel Seat Nailers have performed their work, the sole
is given its preliminary shape by "rough rounding., an
operation important to the shoe's final appearance.1
Finally, the welt and bottom are sewed together by a "Good-
year Stitcher" and the sole is forced into the last's con-
tour by automatic movement of heavy rollers over the shoe's
bottom surface. Here, all told, are about 15 jobs,
grouped around the sole-attaching process; but, of these
jobs, three, "Welter", "Rough Rounder" and "Goodyear
Stitcher,", are particularly skilled. A union organizing
on craft lines might well, then, call these three jobs a
"Jurisdiction,. In Brockton, the name is Goodyear Opera-
tors Local, with those who perform operations around this
skilled group joining the Mixed Local.
1. Manufacturers of high quality shoes often add an
expensive edge trimming operation here, so that the
Goodyear Stitcher may have a more perfect guide-line
as he sews.
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The final assembly operation, heeling, requires use
of what is really two machines combined in one. First,
an automatic device feeds nails into a jig and holds them
in readiness for the Heeler. Second, positioning guides
hold the shoe and the heel in place and, upon release,
drive the nails through the heel and sole, thus holding
these parts together. Operation of this machine may be
divided into unskilled elements such as putting the heel's
parts in place and swinging the nail holder into position,
and the skilled element of lining up the shoe and heel
properly. While one man may do all parts of this job,
production can be increased considerably by having a helper
perform unskilled elements for the skilled Heeler., Thus,
where the piece price is set for the whole operation and
where the manufacturer needs greater output per machine
(say "to get out production for the war t ), circumstances
set the stage for high Heelers earnings.
From this point on in the shoemaking process, work
is devoted to shaping and finishing the product. Rough
parts of the heel must be shaved off and, if that heel is
of leather, a row of wear-resistant "slugs" punched in.
But also crucial to a finished appearance is the shape of
the sole, one of the primary sources of shoe "personality'".
To smooth this edge down to specifications, the Edge
Trimmer uses a rapidly revolving wheel made up of a series
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of blades. With his eye for a guide, he must hold the
sole to this wheel till its edge is smooth and its exten-
sions and bevel correct. If the shoes are of high quality,
he must be careful that they "look like pairs", but on the
cheaper grades, he may find "close enough to be good enough".
Here, of course, is real justification for a ttgraded" piece
price, though operators may often complain of a foreman who
tries to get a "first grade edge on a sixth grade shoe".
Despite these occasional complaints, Edgetrimmers seem to
earn, on the average, a little more than any other group
of craftsmen in our countryts shoe factories.1  In fact,
some manufacturers (and other shoeworkers, too) claim that
Edgetrimmers' earnings are too high; and these objectors
explain their position by pointing to the way Edgetrimming
machinery has developed. Improvement has come by eliminat-
ing machine vibration and by speeding up the blade's revo-
lutions per minute; but, while the three decade total has
been quite significant, these changes have come slowly
and, at any one time, have been relatively small adjust-
ments. In many cases, apparently, these adjustments have
not been bargained into the piece prices.
But whatever the grade, shaped and smooth, the edge
is now ready for its polish. Employed in this process
1. See the section on Wage Structure which follows.
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is a heated, vibrating piece of metal, the "iron,, which
literally rubs into the leather a hard and shiny appear-
ance. This operation consists of two elements: painting
a liquid on the edge of the sole and "setting" that liquid
by holding edge against "ironyt, as you revolve the shoe
through its outside circumference. If the shoe is of high
quality, the operator will perform the whole operation
twice, once with a liquid filler and once with a dye; but
on a low grade shoe, none set" application of the color
will suffice. Now in the Brockton district, the skilled
Edgesetter performs all elements of this job; but, if
additional output per machine were desired, a helper could
paint on the liquid. I
With its edge shaped and polished, the shoe now goes
from the Making Room to the Finishing Room, where the
heel's outside circumference and the bottom of the sole
are treated. These surfaces are first smoothed when work-
men hold them against rapidly revolving rolls of successively
finer and finer sandpaper. 2  After the heel has been stained
1. Old time Edgesetters would probably object and say that
this preparatory operation is ran art in itself". Neverthe-
less, the author is personally acquainted with several plants
where the operation is split, and these plants apparently
manage to sell their shoes.
2. The public's demand for a smooth and highly polished
sole is very discouraging to gaod shoemakers, for the polish
makes it almost impossible to tell good material from bad.
And, from the consumer's own point of view, this demand seems
the height of folly. The process may take a week's wear off
the sole; yet a few steps on the average sidewalk leave the
shoe's bottom rough and dirty.
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r. and polished, the sole may be bleached, stained and
brushed up to a high lustre. These various scouring,
buffing and polishing jobs are semi-skilled machine opera-
tions which are certainly no more difficult on the high
than on the low grade shoes. In fact, for many types of
finish, the cheaper the sole, the more time the worker must
spend before that sole takes on a presentable appearance.
As one Finishing Room foreman put it, "Good material sells
itself, but when we get this cheaper stuff, we have to do
a lot of fixing up before the public will go for it".
The final shoemaking operations take place in the
Dressing and Packing Room, where the upper is finished and
the shoe inspected and placed in the proper box. Usually
first in this department is a cleaning job called "Treeingt .
There are two methods now in use for getting this work done.
The older Hand Treer puts the shoe on an appropriate form
(the "tree"), then brushes and cleans it, smooths out
wrinkles in the upper by rubbing them over with a hot iron,
and applies stain or bleach to any blemished spots which he
may find. Faster, but perhaps not so selective, is the
Brush Treer, who applies a cleaning fluid, then holds the
shoe up to a rapidly revolving brush, so as to rub off any
dirt that may have accumulated on the upper. In either
case, the amount of work the Treer must do is determined
by management's standards of workmanship and by the condition
106
of the shoe when the Treer gets it. So, while he may have
a "fussyt foreman in a high grade factory, this same operator
may have less dirt and fewer blemishes to contend with, since
costly shoes are apt to get more careful handling as they go
through other parts of the plant.
Quite often another coat of dressing will be applied,
either by hand or by spray gun, over that already put on by
the Treer. Then, after the heel pod has been glued to the
innersole and the laces inserted, one workman feels inside
the shoe for stray tacks and another gives it a last general
inspection. Finally, the shoe is packed away in its box,
ready for shipment.
This completes the sampling of shoemaking jobs, but,
even from such brief treatment, some of the problems implicit
in setting piece rates for them can be seen. Possibly the
most significant of these revolves around the way economies
of mass production have expressed themselves. In this
normally "competitive" men ts shoe industry, prices of essen-
tially identical products tend to be the same. Yet, two
similar shoes may justifiably carry quite different labor
costs, despite the fact that the same operations are per-
formed on each of them. The all-important variable is
contained in the question, "Does the flow of work include a
wide range of styles and sizes or is it scheduled in uniform
tblocks'?'" Where management must meet a specified price
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if itts shoe is to sell, attention may focus on getting
"competitive" piece rates. At the same time, if mer-
chandising seems to demand a diversity of small orders,
workers may find "noen-competitive'!: rates necessary to
adequate earnings. Such a situation may pose virtually
perpetual wage problems.
Another question which Jab description raises is that
of working out appropriate piece price and labor cost
differentials for various quality grades of shoe. Of
course, extra operations which makers of high-priced shoes
require of their factory explain part of the added cost.
But what about variations in the rates for jobs performed
on all shoes? In general, small orders make it difficult
for quality manufacturers to take advantage of economies
from scheduling production in ,blocks". Nevertheless, of
the operations examined above, many seem to carry the same
"job specification", whatever the grade. There are others,
of course, where workmanship demanded (and, consequently,
piece price justified) shows considerable variation between
grades. In the wage activity chapters which follow, atten-
tion must be given to this problem: How to explain price
lists graded by the same percentage for every Job when
analysis of Job requirements shows that differentials
should not be the same.
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The description of shoemaking operations should also
provide a means of identifying the craft groups which are
present in any shoe factory and which may form the unit of
union organization. In the Brockton area these units of
organization, by department, are as follows:
Cutting Room: Cutters Local and Skivers Local
Stitching Room: Stitchers Local and Vampers Local
Sole Leather Room: Sole Leather Local
Lasting Room: Lasters Local
Making Room: Goodyear Operators Local, Edge-
trimmers Local, Edgesetters Local,
Heelers Local and Mixed Local
Finishing Room: Finishers Local
Dressing and
Packing Room: Treers Local and Dressers and
Packers Local.
Some indication of the relative earnings and skills among
these groups has been given in the pages above, but, so far,
there has been no direct discussion of the wage structure,
its range or its comparability as between sections of the
country. This is the purpose of the discussion which follows.
The Structure of Wages
When the structure of wages in an industry is examined
and compared with the relationships that appear in various
sections of the country, really the study and comparison
concern rates of pay on a number of specific occupations.
Thus, when job "X" is related to job "Y" in area A and that
relationship contrasted with the one for those jobs in Area
B, the presumption is that these occupations are the same in
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both places. If they are not the same, the comparison
would be like saying that the price of apples is to the
price of oranges as the price of pears is to that of grapes.
It would not make any sense. What assumptions must be made
if occupational relationships are to have real meaning?
Any comparison of the wages paid to specified "job
titles" assumes first of all, that these titles include the
same type and amount of work. The Wage Structure Division
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics recognizes this fact by
basing its wage rate studies on fairly detailed (10 to 12
lines) job descriptions; but, even in such descriptions,
jobs are identified as including 1most of the following",
and no attempt is made to put limits on such things as the
number and difficulty of "pick-ups" and "put-aways" or the
condition of the product when it gets to the operator. We
hope (and assume) that these minor job elements are adjusted
"automatically" by a day worker's rate of production and an
incentive workerts piece price. Of course, such assumptions
are made through necessity, not through choice, for it would
be difficult to find workers performing the "same job", minor
element by minor element, in one plant, let alone in a whole
industry.
In addition, consideration of the rate of production
points up a third assumption. After the piece price (or
productivity, if a day worker) has "adjusted" for minor
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variations in job elements, we must assume that, on the
average, the workers compared put out the "same" amount of
effort and command the "same" degree of skill. If they do
not, then the "jobs" being performed are not the same. Alto-
gether then, when we say that occupation X "pays" $1.50 in
area A and $1.30 in area B, the statement has in it at least
these assumptions: (1) the job contains the same major
elements of skill, in the sense that, if a worker can do the
job in one area, he can, with a little adaptation to local
conditions, do the job in the other area; (2) minor varia-
tions in job elements are taken into account by the rate of
production in a day work industry or the piece price in an
incentive industry; and (3) the workers compared have the
same skill and expend the same effort.
Are these assumptions acceptable in an examination of
the wage structure in the ments shoe industry? Since all
manufacturers of Goodyear-welt shoes lease similar machinery
from the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, there is a ten-
dency for job descriptions to include similar basic skills.
Nevertheless, there are important variables not included in
the Bureau of Labor Statistics descriptions--for instance,
the grade of shoe and the diversity of styles and sizes
produced per operator. Workers might find it difficult to
shift from cutting leather in "bulk" for cheap shoes to the
Tpick and choose" process necessary to the manufacture of a
high quality product. Further, in the Brockton area, the
tendency is for all piece prices to show the same differential
between grades even though jQb requirements show that differ-
entials should not be the same. In this case, then, piece
rates are oriented, at least partially, toward some other
objective than that of adjusting for minor variations in job
elements. Insofar as the assumption of similar effort and
skill is concerned, it, too, may be open to some question.
For instance, the high average age (estimated at about 52
years) of Brockton workers may slow them down. On the other
hand, through their experience, they may have developed a
degree of skill higher than that found. in other sections of
the country. All in all, then, job rate comparisons must
be made with caution and findings about the wage structure
regarded as, perhaps, useful indications.1  Although state-
ments are made in "dollars and cents", they do not represent
necessarily conclusive "facts".
1. Added to these reservations are others of a statis-
tical nature. For instance, the United States occupational
earnings are averages of the various regions; but the rela-
tive importance of each region is not uniform for all jobs.
On most jobs, the Brockton area's workers make up between
5% and 10% of the total; however, for occupations like male
skiver, male treer,or male vamper, this region's relative
importance may reach 25%. Naturally, such variations have
an effect on the correlation of Brockton's rates with those
of the United States average, and such effects limit the
applicability of statistical correlation techniques to this
data.
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Table 9 lists in the order of their average hourly
(straight time) earnings in the United States eighteen
men's shoe jobs, and shows for each.of them the earnings
found in various shoe producing localities. All figures
refer exclusively to "ments shoes," with the exception of
the "Southeast", where 6 out of the 14 establishments
studied produced other kinds of footwear. TablelQ shows
the ranking of Jobs according to average hourly earnings,
broken down, once again,. into figures for the country's
principal men's shoe areas. A glance down any one of
these columns will indicate that there is a definite,
though by no means perfect, conformity to the United
States rankings. Further evidence of conformity appears
in Table 11, where the average deviation from the country's
average is found to vary from only .82 ranks to 1.66. The
average deviation for Brockton is 1.53. The scatter of
rankings for the Brockton area around those for the United
States is shown in Chart 4, which provides a graphic indica-
tion of this locality's relationship to average. Here, the
so-called "out-of-line" jobs, particularly "Hand Cuttern,
stand out clearly.
But consideration of rankings by themselves leaves
out cents per hour differentials, and the variation in the
range of earnings (Table 11) from 500 in the MidWest to
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Rank of Average Hourly Earnings on
Particular Jobs: Brockton As Com-
pared with the United States Average
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Average Hourly Earnings on
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TABLE II
DEVIATIONS FROM UNITED STATES JOB RANKINGS FOR
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN TEE MEN'S SHOE
INDUSTRY, OCTOBER 19451
Number of
Jobs in-
cluded
18
18
Total
Deviation
0
2,6
Average
Deviation
0
1.44
1.50Mid. Atl.
Gr. Lakes
MidWest
S.East
Brockton
Milwaukee
.82
1.71
1.56
1.53
1.86
Low(j) High(/) Range ()
.60
.63
.63
.60
.52
.49
.62
.60
1.32
1.50
1.342
1.27
1.02
1.28
1.58
1.34
.72
.97
.71
.67
.50
.79
.96
.74
1. Compiled from Tables 9 and 10, above.
2. The highest paying job in the Middle Atlantic states showed
an average hourly earning of $1.82. Since it was so far above all
the rest and since it represented a relatively minor job insofar as
numbers of workers were concerned, this rate did not seem appropriate
as a determinant of the range in the area.
Area
U. S.
N. E.
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97ý in New England indicates that these differentials may
be significant. On Chart 5, earnings are plotted against
jobs for the United States and for Brockton and lines are
drawn (freehand) to fit these points. Although some of
the Brockton points vary considerably from the line, it
does seem possible to draw a "wage curve" for this area
which makes some sense. In order to find out how much
sense, statistically, the data are plotted against each
other on average hourly earnings scales (Chart 6).1  Since
the relationship between U. S-. and Brockton rates appeared
to be linear, a least-squares line was computed and is
shown on the Chart. The coefficient of correlation is
.948 and the standard deviation 8.7. There is no question
that from a statistical point of view, then, the Brockton
wage structure is closely related to the average for the
United States. But, to the practical man, this statis-
tical victory is a little hollow, for one-third of the
cases lie outside of even an 18ý wage band. If, for
instance, a wage administrator decided to use the United
States averages and their least squares relationship to.
Brockton rates as a guide to "rationalizationt" of the
1. Statistical techniques did not seem applicable to
Chart 5, since no valid way could be found of numbering
the horizontal (job) axis, i.e., 1, 2, 3, etc. makes no
more sense than 1, 4, 11, 12, etc. The job of Hand
Cutter seemed so far "out of line" with respect to the
other occupations that it was not included in the calcu-
lation of the least squares line or the measures of
correlation.
Chart 6
Average Hourly Earnings on Particular
Jobs: Brockton Averages Plotted Against
United States Averages
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Brockton wage structure (this is not a suggestion), he
would find little comfort in the high coefficient of
correlation. Even if he decided on the relatively wide
wage band. of 100 per hour, he would find, half his cases
calling for adjustment.
What can be concluded from this analysis of wage
structure? The following observations seem appropriate:
(1) Assumptions implicit in these Job rate comparisons
limit the conclusiveness of the data; (2) There is a
tendency for relative rankings of jobs to be similar in
all shoemaking areas; (3) However, the cents per hour
range of the wage structure varies considerably from one
area to another; (4) Job rankings in Brockton tend to
conform with those of the United States; (5) There is a
high statistical correlation between the average hourly
earnings in Brockton and in the United States; and (6)
This statistical excellence represents too wide a wage
band to be useful in practical wage administration.
Summary
First of all, in this chapter, the dominant process
in the field of ments shoemaking has been identified. But
what can description of the Goodyear-welt process tell us
about the problems of wage determination in this industry?
Following are the considerations which seem most significant.
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1. Shoe factory Jobs are predominantly skilled and
semi-skilled (are for the most part performed on non-
automatic: machinery) and are located in natural craft
groupings, groupings which may form the basis of union
jurisdictions.
2. Historically, improvement of the process has been
gradual and has been expressed in changes on already exist-
ing jobs rather than more sweeping technological advances.
New machines have tended to imitate, to do better and faster,
the motions formerly done by hand.
3. Mass production does not change the content or
number of operations as far as one shoe is concerned; but,
in the course of a dayts work, standardization of product
means increased productivity to the bench worker, with no
extra effort on his part.
4.. On some operations, the worker must spend more
time on a high grade shoe than on one made in a lower grade;
however, this condition is not felt uniformly throughout the
factory. In fact, on a few jobs, the lower grade of shoe
may require more, not less, of the operator's time.
5. The structure of wages is similar throughout the
country, with the Brockton area no exception to this fact.
There is a high coefficient of correlation between hourly
iearnings in United States and those in Brockton, but the
r122
cents per hour deviations from the line which fits these
rates best are too large for the demands of practical
wage administration.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BROCKTON AREA'S CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT
Wage decisions result from the reactions of people to
the "total situation" of which they are a part. Any such
"situation" includes a "past" as well as a "present"; conse-
quently, for full understanding, exploration of this context
is necessary. That kind of exploration, the purpose of this
chapter, is particularly important here; for Brockton is a
city with a past. Shoeworkers there have been organized in
labor unions since 1898 at least,1 and manufacturers in the
district have an Association which dates back to 1903.2 But
even before the turn of the century, the area was famous for
its men's shoes.3  Tucked away in this long history of
employer-employee relationships are the sources of many
present wage problems and the explanations for wage rates
which might otherwise appear inexplicable.
1. In that year the W.L. Douglas Shoe Company of Brockton
and the Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AF of L, signed a closed
shop contract.
2. The first Association Constitution located by the author
was dated June 18, 1903. According to the Brockton Enterprise,
(Feb. 14, 1940, p. 1) the Brockton Shoe Manufacturers Associa-
tion, Inc. started officially on January 2, 1903. The manufac-
turers had probably worked together informally for several years
before that.
3. For instance, the George E. Keith Company, makers of the
,Walk-Over" shoe, have been in business since 1874 and manufac-
ture of the "W.L. Douglas Shoe" started in 1876.
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While Brockton ts past is expressed in present-day
characteristics, description of these characteristics as
they stand now, without development of historical material,
would leave out part of the "total situation" within which
wages are determined. For instance, the strength of the
craft autonomy feeling among the shoe workers affects both
the individual rate-setting process and bargaining over
general wage movements; however, a simple statement of what
each craft's prerogatives are would only present part of
this feeling's effect. The basis for more complete under-
standing must include knowledge of the circumstances which
shaped the unients structure. Therefore, the significance
of the Brockton areats characteristics lies not only in what
they are but also in how they got that way.
Such a "what" and "how" approach is used in this
chapter to treat material arranged in the following groups:
(1) Definition of the geographical area most appropriate as
a unit for discussion; (2) Statistical summary of past and
present employment conditions in the area; (3) Description
of the districtfs shoe firms, their size, ownership, and age,
and the price ranges in which they sell their product; (4)
The activities and scope of the Manufacturers' Association;
and (5) Activities of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union (AF of
L) and the chain of events which led to rebellion against
that organization and formation of the Brotherhood of Shoe
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and Allied Craftsmen. The structure and operation of the
Brotherhood will be discussed in the chapter following this
one.
Definition of the Area
Any investigation of the forces at work in the process
of wage determination must start by justifying the unit
chosen for study. The range of choice is almost infinite.
Starting with an individual worker and his motivation, the
possibilities include work groups of various sizes, whole
factories, firms, unions, geographical areas, industries,
or the economy as a whole. But this does not mean that one
designated area (geographic, economic, or social) is as good
as another for purposes of wage research. For study of
general wage movements, for instance, small groups may not
include the forces that are decisive. On the other hand,
indiscriminantly chosen geographic areas (Mlabor marketst')
or artificially defined industry groups may complicate the
problem of identifying wage determining forces without
yielding any compensating result. The problem, then, is
to find the groups within which identifiable decisions are
made. This section will define and attempt to justify the
selection of the area under study here.
A circle of ten-mile radius drawn around the city of
Brockton, Massachusetts would include some thirty shoe
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companies, almost two-thirds of which are located in the
city itself.1  If the area is extended to include Middle-
boro and New Bedford,2 another five firms would be added to
the total. Of the estimated daily capacity of all these
companies, about 75%3 is apparently devoted to making men's
welt shoes; in fact, Brockton has traditionally been iden-
tified as a production center for men's high quality foot-
wear. This industry has been developed almost to the ex-
l 4 fP +th 4-U 4 19 5 -4 1 f h i+'
i ~ ~ ~ •.TLA./usJ on. o o ers-, so.• ta ¢., n.A J.7,5, 5 o eJ cA ,y,..,-
manufacturing payroll was received by employees of factories
making "Boots and Shoes"t. If the percentage made up by the
1. These figures were compiled from Shoe and Leather
Reporter Company, Directory of Shoe Manufacturers, 1946
edition. Firms stating a daily capacity of less than 500
pairs were not included.
2. Such extension would make the area correspond to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' "Fall River-New Bedford" labor
market, about which certain wage information relative to the
shoe industry is available.
3. This percentage was computed from figures appearing in
the Directory of Shoe Manufacturers referred to above. The
Directory states for each firm the type of product (men's
shoes, woments, children's, boys', and so on) and the estimated
daily capacity of the factory. These estimates are only approxi-
mate, since they must be based on certain assumptions about the
way the factory is being operated. The capacity of given
shoemaking resources (space, machines, workmen, and so on) rises
as the number of styles declines. Shortly after the War's end
many new styles were introduced in men's shoe factories; in
addition, post-war uncertainty about orders made block schedul-
ing of production more difficult, especially for companies
operating without assured retail outlets. Nevertheless, the
author believes that his computations represent a reasonable
though rough estimate of the proportion of men'ts shoes to the
total produced in the Brockton district.
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closely related "Boot and Shoe Cut Stock and Findings 1
industry is added, the two together make up 71% of the 1945
manufacturing payroll.1  Of the 8,711 wage earners employed,
4,678 worked on "Boots and Shoes" and an additional 1,501 on
"Cut Stock and Findings". 2  Similar data on towns surround-
ing Brockton, is not available; however, with the exception
of the area to the north, sheemaking is apparently the
dominant industry* 3
This shoemaking area is bounded by territory differen-
tiated rather sharply with respect to principal community
erientation. Movement clockwise on a circle around Brockton
1. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of'Labor and
Industries, Division of Statistics. Census of Manufactures,
1945,3 City of Brockton. Mass., "Principal Data for All Manufac-
turing Industries 19/5", p. 2., Table 1. Other industries
significant enough to be listed include "Bread and other bakery
products" (363 employees), "Foundry and machine-shop products,
including electrical machinery apparatus and supplies" (375
employees)ý, "Men's and woments clothing". (475 employees),
"Printing and publishing (161 employees), and WBlacking, stains,
and dressings" (284 employees). "Knit goodsl. "Models and
patterns" and "Paper boxes" were lumped togekher to avoid dis-
closure oa the operations of individual establishments. These
three industries employed a total of 1,130 wage earners. The
"Boot and Shoe" industry's payroll as a percentage of the total
for "All Industries, is shown below for the decade preceding 1945.
Year: 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
: 63 57 60 55 57 51 52 55 54 53
2. Ibid.
3. This conclusion was formed from listings in the Directory
of New England Manufactures, 1947, personal observation, and
discussions with local people.
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encounters- (1) the residential suburbs of metropolitan Boston;
(2) shipyards in Quincy and Hingham; (3) seaside resorts along
the ,South Shore" andmi. on Cape -Cod.; (4) the textile industry
of Fall River and New Bedford&, and (5).. the metropolitan areas
of Providence, Rhode Island, and Worcester, Massachusetts.,
located from.30 to 40 miles away from Brockton and in which
the, amount of shoe manufacturing is insignificant.- Between
Broa•kton and these metropolitan areas, industry is scattered
and diversified. There- is no evidence of heavy wage earner
commuting traffic into oBrockton- from these. W.,outside, areas;
as-a matter of fact, a recent survey shoved that the city and
surrounding towns were net exporters of labor. 1  Though there
are two other shoemaking centers in Massachusetts,. LIynn and
Haverhill, both of these cities are well to the north of Boston
(Brockton is to the south).; and, in addition, they are pri-
marily producers of woments novelty shoes.
The Brockton district is, then, dominated by one in-
dustry and, from this manufacturing standpoint, is fairly well
define& and differentiate& geographically. Do, these facts make
1. This question has not been studied intensively. How-
ever, the conclusion t•s indicated by checks of bus and train
traffid' a-nd by personal-I observation o±r principal highways
during .arshi hours. Inh addition, a survey made by. Homer
5eyt, Associates for the Brockton Committee for Economic Devel-
opmentt shows-. that the- overwhelnming ma jorit-yrf people who work
in the. Brockton area also 1 lte there, and that, of those who
"registered.- for- unemployment comzpensation in 1946, only 18% of
the• men and'8.6%• of the women had last been employed' outside
the Bracktan area. Brockton Enterprise, May 17, 1948, p. 3.
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it an appropriate point of reference for discussion of wage
activity? Ross maintains that the concept of geographical
labor markets does not lend itself to explanation of present-
day wage activity. He prefers to think in terms of ncoercive
comparisons" between union groups which have no particular
mileage dimension.1  In this case, however, it may be
possible to have it both ways: the factors which differen-
tiate the area geographically also tend to create wage com-
parisons which are "coercive,.
That these factors, concentration and specialization
of industry, are coercive has been recognized by the growth
and supplemented by the existence of employee and employer
organizations. On April 1, 1946, an independent union had
what amounted to the closed shop in 70% of the district's
shoe factories and had 7,318 of the area's shoeworkers as
the nucleus of an 8,427-member organization.2  Of the
unionized firms, 80% were members of the Associated Shoe
1. A.. Ross, "Wage Determination under Collective
Bargaining", American Economic Review, December 1947,
pp. 801-812.
2. These records were compiled from the unionts
records of dues collection and, in the authorts opinion,
represent a reliable index of membership. The 1,109
members not in the Brockton shoeworker group were re-
cruited from the local Cut Sole industry employees, from
the Herman Shoe Company in Millis, Mass. (about 30 miles
from Brockton), and from the Gardiner, Maine plant of the
Commonwealth Shoe and Leather Company, which has its
headquarters in the Brockton district.
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Industries of Southeastern Massachusetts, Inc., a manufac-
turers' group which included, in addition to shoe companies,
many unionized employers in the Cut Stock industry. Even
in the 1930ts, when the Association was apparently not as
strong as it now is, the bargain between these two groups
was the point of reference for other bargains in the area.
This is no argument, of course, that Brockton area
wage activity takes place without reference to outside
influences. The highly competitive nature of the shoe
industry makes relative labor costs extremely important.
Further, while Brockton people must make some adjustment
to product-market competition, they undoubtedly react, as
well, to the decisions of outside shoe unions and to the
general tenor of the country's economic activity. Never-
theless, even in general wage movement decisions (that
phase of wage activity most likely to reflect outside in-
fluences), they do not follow any particular leader or
await establishment of an industry pattern.
About the Brockton district, then, the following
observations are warranted: (1) the area is dominated
industrially by a concentration of firms producing ments
shoes; (2) locally oriented employer and employee decision-
making groups exist there; (3) these groups are large enough
so that their broad decisions become effective throughout
the area; and (4) the decisions are independent, in the
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sense that they lack special reference to any particular
outside influence. These facts led to selection of the
Brockton district as an appropriate unit for study of wage
determining forces. The district's past and present charac-
teristics most relevant in the background of wage decisions
will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
The Statistics of Employment Conditions
"Brockton people think they are the only ones in the
country who know how to make a real men's shoe. This may
have been true once; but now, we are selling our shoes to
their old customers. If the trend continues much longer,
they will be more of a curiosity than a competitor". This
statement is a typical first reaction to the subject of
"Brockton" by an "outside" manufacturer. Even within the
district, people seem to feel that "something is wrong".1
Are these sentiments borne out by the local statistics of
employment, wages, and production? How has Brockton's
experience compared with that of the men's shoe industry?
Data on the Brockton shoe industry are available from
the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries for
all the years from 1907 to the present. These figures are
summarized in Table 11 and various computations from them
1. For example, on June 26, 1947, a Chamber of Commerce
sponsored committee proposed "an industrial survey to find
a cure for Brockton's industrial ills". Brockton Enterprise,
June 27, 1947, p. 1.
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TABLE 12
PRINCIPAL DATA ON "BOOTS AND SHOES, OTHER THAN RUBBER"
FOR BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS1
Year
18992
19042
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1954
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor and Industries,
Division of Statistics, Census of Manufactures, for the years in question.
2. U.S. Bureau of Census as quoted by Thomas L. Norton, Trade-Union
Policies in the Massachusetts Shoe Industry, 1919-1929, Columbia, 1932,
p. 102 NA signifies that the data is unavailable.
Number
of Es-
tab-
lish-
ments
521
44
33
33
35
32
32
33
33
36
33
33
33
34
39
44
51
59
58
55
46
39
38
35
35
36
34
31
27
28
26
26
23
21
22
22
22
21
20
20
21
Capital
Invested
(nearest
ooo000)
3
NA
NA
5,104
5,125
11,864
13,611
13,701
14,712
15,769
18,841
19,574
22,331
28,590
31,089
36,063
34,797
NA
31,820
NA
27,111
NA
24,498
NA
21,001
NA
19,618
NA
10,852
NA
12,034
NA
14,541
NA
11,025
NA
10,703
12,656
12,928
13,833
12,899
13,921
Value of
Stock and
Materials
Used
(nearest 000)
12,500
17,998
28,530
21,675
20,457
22,021
21,446
20,986
23,593
21,566
23,849
29,712
34,286
45,020
52,595
50,831
27,267
27,610
28,258
22,319
21,556
19,839
19,666
21,195
21,073
17,464
12,404
7,317
8,437
9,721
9,890
8,694
9,683
7,193
7,857
7,365
13,121
20,793
22,116
21,076
20,858
Amount
of Wages
Paid in
the Year
(nearest 000)
4,857
7,384
10,364
8,554
6,965
8,409
8,210
7,976
8,596
8,084
7,776
8,895
9,024
10,879
15,558
14,525
12,653
14,072
13,810
12,044
10,825
10,426
9,987
9,863
10,470
9,181
7,044
4,695
4,864
5,619
5,874
5,344
5,205
4,182
4,469
3,829
5,590
8,143
8,534
8,486
9,464
Average
Number
of Wage
Earners
Enployed
8,498
11,188
15,173
13,078
10,942
12,174
12,344
11,931
12,236
12,115
11,602
11,779
11,294
11,849
12,878
10,957
10,768
11,410
10,704
9,798
9,117
8,696
8,238
8,184
8,612
8,069
7,447
5,152
5,874
6,531
6,304
5,820
5,380
4,857
4,742
4,245
4,795
5,269
4,929
4,641
4,678
Value
of
Products
(nearest
000)
19,844
30,073
44,012
35,277
32,464
34,782
34,975
34,244
37,602
35,033
37,830
45,308
50,562
62,336
81,544
82,538
51,195
52,056
52,619
44,273
41,783
39,196
38,027
39,375
39,445
35,322
24,717
16,370
17,370
19,324
19,569
18,765
18,749
14,340
15,366
14,174
22,722
33,269
36,300
34,300
35,487
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are shown in Table 13. Unfortunately, similar statistics
on the surrounding towns are not published, since that might
disclose the operations of individual firms. However, -un
official production totals and field study in the district
both indicate that conditions in the City of Brockton are
generally representative of those in the area as a whole.
Table 12 contains these unofficial production totals for the
di. trict along wi th the Department of Commerce figures on
different classifications of men's-shoes.,
Probably the most striking fact revealed by the
Brockton statistics is-the prolonged and drastic decline
in employments a rn hich has continued almost without
interruption ever since the 1907 peak of 15.,173. BY 1945j,
when anvthine produe ed, could. be sold averaze emiyloyment
stood at /,678. What statistical "explanations"are there
for this decline?
L During the decade preceding the first World War,
improvements in technology without corresponding increases
in production contributed heavily to the trend. Between
1907 and 1916, output per worker increased. by 27%1 and
1. For the production figurea used in this computation see
Norton, ..cSit.,. p. 102. He concludes that the figures "give
an approximation of production" and are "indicative of broad
movements". They were "compiled by the Brockton Enterprise
from reports of freight and express offices plus a semi-annual
sample of parcel post shipments and reports from manufacturers
of shoes shipped by trucks'. Norton found that "the shoe editor
of the Brockton Enterprise believes that the average number of
pairs of shoes per ecase has remained about the same during the
entire period". The figures, then, must be used with some
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TABLE 13
PRODUCTION OF SHOES
City of
Year Brockton
Towns Surround-
ing Brockton2
Total in
Brockton District
All Men's
Shoes3
Men t s
Dress Shoes
10,799,250
9,655,899
10,735,285
10,993,216
8,996,618
8,357,638
7,921,127
8,472,065
8,875,583
8,992,152
8,158,299
6,494,614
5,618,700
6,212,895
6,287,601
6,335,694
5,616,205
5,613,238
4,670,387
4,948,942
4,766,623
7,249,018
9,007,552
8,870,096
8,065,162
8,059,274
7,714,147
9,531,897
9,545,587
9,877,721
11,087,523
8,084,603
7,810,184
8,089,826
7,819,032
7,373,725
7,799,300
6,304,107
4,704,476
4,094,214
5,575,512
5,501,896
4, 768,415
5,454,011
4,979,900
5,413,989
5,348,746
4,890,000
6,452,696
7,363,031
6,919,217
6,190,498
6,078,422
7,141,163
20,331,147
19,201,486
20,613,006
22,080,739
17,081,221
15,967,822
16,010,953
16,291,097
16,249,308
16,791,452
14,462,406
11,199,090
9,712,914
11,788,407
11,789,497
11 ,104,109
11,070,216
10,593,138
10,084,376
10,297,688
9,656,623
13,701,714
16,370,583
15,789,313
14,255,660
14,13 7,696
14,855,310
1. Unofficial figures released to the author by the Southeastern
Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.
2. Ibid. This figure includes the towns of Abington, Braintree,
Bridgewater, Middlebero, Rockland, Stoughton, Weymouth, and Whitman.
3. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics,
May 1946, p. 19. The figires for 1946 and 1947 were taken from U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Facts for Industry, Shoes and Slippers, June 4,
1948. All figures are rounded to the nearest lUU,uUu.
4. Ibid. This figure includes military shoe production in the
years 1941-1945, inclusive. All figures are rounded to the nearest
100,000.
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
19353
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
69.5
90.0
100.3
84.7
86.586 w5686.6
95.3
91.0
94.8
77.2
77.4
74.5
88.5
91.4
99.5
103.8
102.9
96.7
103.8
102.4
135.8
143.0
129.3
112.4
107.6
129.7
121.0
51.6
63.8
63.9
73.4
77.7
77.4
71.8
76.4
72.7
104.0
115.2
107.3
95.9
94.0
77.6
84.2
13:5
invested capital per worker by 40%0. The increase in pro-
duction was concentrated in the period from 1907 to 1909,
by which time employment had dropped to 10,942, a figure
which was maintained or bettered throughout the next 13
years. On the other hand, invested capital continued its
increase to a 1919 peak of 36 million dollars, possibly
reflecting more a rise in prices for leather and shoes,
thoug•h. than a "Substitutionl of capital for labor.
The shoe editor of the Brockton Enterprise, summariz-
ing the year 1919, pointed to "the multiplicity of new firms
that had entered business", a condition ,Inever been known
beforet, and he commented that "shoe values skyrocketed
during the year" and "factories...(were) running to capa-
city".1  Production dropped off sharply in 1920 andi, after
a partial recovery, broke again in 1924. It remained at
about the 1924 level for the rest of the 1920's. Employ-
ment fell suddenly along with production in 1920, but there-
after adjusted slowly downward to-the new lower output level.
caution.. However,- the increase in productivity which use of
them indicates is also indicated by the movements of invested
.apital per worker and of v:lue added per worker. In this
light, the conclusion seems justified that marked advance in
output per worker occurred.
1. Brockton Enterprise, December 27, 1919, p. 1, as
quoted by Norton,:: op Cit., p.- 104.
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This gradual movement probably reflected more the decline
in number of establishments (from 59 in 1922 to 25 in
1929)1 than reductions in the work force of individual firms.
The Great Depression did not hit Brockton so quickly
as the rest of the men ts shoe industry, but eventually the
impact on Brockton was greater. Furthermore, local produc-
tion did not recover to the same extent as did that for men's
shoes generally. With the exception of 1933-35, Brockton
employment during the 1930's continued to decline, reaching
a low of 4,245 by the time the decade was over. Once again
the apparent elimination of Job opportunities was accom-
panied by a drop in the number of Boot and Shoe establish-
ments in the City.
During World War II employment recovered moderately,
while production advanced by about 70%. The 54% increase
in output per wage earner probably resulted both from under-
employment in the base year (1940) and from the economies
almost inevitably generated by a steady stream of standard-
ized production. This period from 1907 to 1945, then, may
be characterized as one of dwindling job opportunities: a
reflection, at the start, of increased output per worker
but, for the most part, of a decline in physical volume.
1. The number of establishments increased by 25 between
1918 and 1922. Inspection of trade directories indicates
that many of these small concerns, which rode in on the war
and post-war boom, rode out again during the "competitive"
middle twenties.
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The drop in production was not gradual, but was concentrated
in three relatively short periods: 1919-1920, 1923-1924, and
1929-1932.
But the secular downward movement of Job opportunities
was not the only employment problem faced by the Brockton
shoeworker. Both employment and payrolls exhibited a marked
degree of seasonality, as shown on Chart 7. The union
policy of "share the work" may partially explain the rela-
tive stability of employment, though, even here, the high
index number was 140% of the low. The fluctuations in
payrolls were twice as great as were those for employment.
Further, on the assumption that the fluctuations in money
paid to wage earners is a fairly accurate index of output,2
seasonal variations of production in Brockton were twice
as severe as the average in the men's dress shoe industry.3
1. The index was constructed by averaging the employment
and payroll for each year and then expressing the months as
a percentage of the average. Finally, the index numbers for
each month were averaged to get a composite index for the
period from 1934-1940. 1937 was omitted from the final com-
putation since a wage increase early in the year and a decrease
toward the end distorted the seasonal pattern.
2. This index of payroll is slightly more variable than
Nortonts index of shoes shipped from Brockton from 1923-1929(Ibid., p. 111).
3. The index for the men's dress shoe industry is taken
from NSMA, op. cit., p. 6. The index is based on the period,
1936-1940.
Chart 7
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It is undoubtedly true that some companies in the district
have been able to control the seasonal nature of their
production. But Norton states that
"The experience of the Commonwealth Shoe and
Leather Company of Boston [main plant in
Whitman] and E..T. Wright and: Company, Inc.,
of Rockland, Massachusetts, of ,practically
steady operation through the yeart by the use
of an in-stock department and stock manufac-
turing programs has certainly- not been the
exper1i ne of shoe manufa turers in Massahu-i
setts in general. The: W.L. Douglas Company,
for example, states 'that it is a question
whether the extra. cost of handling, the storage
required, interest on money and risk, of making
styles which may not sell, are eompensated for
by the extra orders which having an in-stock
department makes it possible for them to get',. 1
Of the companies1 (all in the district) mentioned above:,.
only Douglas is in the City of Brockton, to which the.
indices on Chart 7.refer. The ments dress shoe industry
may not be strictly comparable with Brockton since some
women's and children's shoes are produced there; however,
these shoes were of the 'staple variety, not the type that
would aggravate particularly the seasonal pattern of the
Cityls men' s shoe factories. The conclusion seems fair,
therefore, that the Job opportunities and income of Brockton
shoeworkers have been relatively unstable during the "typical"
year, a problem added to that of the long run decline in
employment.
1. Ibid.,. p. 85. Norton's quotations are from E.S.
Smith, Reducing Seasonal Employment, MeGraw-Hill, 1931,
pp. 44, 222 and 231-2.
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What happened to the incomes of Brockton shoeworkers
as their employment opportunities decreased? The computa-
tions in Table 13 indicate that the take-home pay of those
employed generally increased and that labor's "share" of
"Value Added" and "Value of Product" both were maintained
throughout the period.1  Average annual income increased
very slowly in the decade preceding World War I and then
rose rapidly so that by 1919 it was almost double the
average for 1915. Then, despite a decline in employment
and a union policy of "share the work", incomes of those
employed remained almost at this wartime level throughout
the 1920's. There were no general wage increases during
the period; rather the manufacturers constantly sought and
eventually obtained reductions.2  The explanation for this
1. The tables for annual and weekly wages result from
division of the Amount of Wages Paid by the Average Number
of Wage Earners Employed. Dollars of payroll is a total
of what was paid out during the year. Average number employed,
is computed as follows; (1) a questionnaire obtains the "number
of production and related workers employed during the normal
payroll period ended nearest the 15th of each month"; (2) the
arithmetic means for these 12 periods is the "Average number
employed". Periods when "labor disputes", "shortage of mate-
rials", "vacations", or "other causes" have caused "shut-
downs" are not included.
2. Ibid., pp. 145-148 and pp. 155-157. Norton summarized
"the attempts of the Brockton manufacturers to get lower labor
costs" on p. 157 follows: We find that it was not until early
1925 that any permanent reduction in wage rates on the standard
Brockton grade was obtained; and that it was not until 1926 and
1927 that lower grade prices were secured".
141
~BLE 14
BROGCKTON SHOE INDUSTRY WAGE COMPUT&TIONS
Average
Annual
Year wage($)2
1899
1904
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
2934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
573
661
683
655
636
693
665
668
701
665
668
755
800
917
1210
1329
1175
1230
1290
1230
1180
1201
1211
1205
1215
1138
945
910
830
848
931
917
970
860
1060
903
1166
1542
1730
1828
2013
Average
Weekly
Wage(S) 3
11.00
13.00
13.15
12.60
12.25
13.30
12.80
12.85
13.49
12.88
12.85
14.50
15.38
17.60
23.15
25.50
22.60
23.65
24.90
23.65
22.75
23.07
23.16
23.20
23.40
21.85
18.20
17.50
15.90
16.30
17.91
17.60
18.62
16.50
19.20
17.37
22.40
29.70
33.25
35.19
38.63
Wages as a
% of Value
of Products4
24.5
24.0
23.5
24.2
21.4
24.2
23.5
23.2
22.8
23.0
20.5
19.6
17.8
17.4
19.1
17.6
24.7T
27.0
26.3
27.2
26.0
26.7
26.2
25.1
26.6
26.0
28.5
28.6
28.1
Z9 .0
30.0
28.4
27.8
29.2
29.1
27.0
29.6
24.4
23.5
24.7
25.9
Wages as a
% of Value
Added in Mfg.
66.3
61.2
67.0
63.0
54.0
66.0
60.7
60.1
61.1
60.0
55.5
57.0
59.0
62.5
53.6
45.9
52.9
57.5
56.9
55.0
53.5
54.0
54.3
54.3
57.0
51.4
57.0
51.8
55,1
58.5
60.7
49.7
65.0
58.5
59.5
57.0
58.0
65.3
60.2
64.0
64.6
Weekly earnings
of all shoe
workers ( )6
22.31
22.26
21.78
21.63
18.87
17.60
14.94
15.21
17.22
17.96
17.37
18.57
16.98
17.835
17.85
21.72
25.25
28.18
31.16
33.44
1. The computations were made from the figures presented in Table 11.
2. (Amount of Wages Paid During the Year) / (Average Number of Wage
Earners Employed).
3. (Average Annual Wage) / 52.
4. (Amount of Wages Paid During the Year) / (Value of Products).
5. (Amount of Wages Paid During the Year)/ (Value of Products - Value
of Stock and Materials Used).
6. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Boot and Shoe Industry Statistics, May 1946,
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seemingly contradictory state of affairs, must: lie inr. the
fact that employment and production declined through the
elimination of firms, not general reductions spread through
all companies in the district. The Great Depression hit
Brockton incomes (along with those of everyone else) by
curtailment of production and by wage reductions; but,
starting from 1933 and helped along by wage increases,
incomes rose almost to the 1920's level by the end of the
decade. During World War II, as in World War I, incomes
increased by almost 100%, a movement apparently explained
primarily by expanded output per worker and by general wage
increases.
A number of conclusions, then, are suggested by the
statistics of employment conditions. First, Brockton
experienced a gradual reduction in job opportunities mostly
as'an adjustment to three periods of sharp decline in physical
volume. Second, employment and, to an even greater extent,
payroll exhibited a marked degree of seasonality during the
average year. The fluctuations in production were twice as
severe as the average for the ment s dress shoe industry7
Third, annual incomes of those employed rose sharply during
both World Wars and were maintained during the 1920's in the
face of curtailment in employment and production. Incomes
dropped in the early thirties but recovered by the end of
the decade almost to their pre-depression level. Within
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this statistical frame of reference, now, the kind of firms
and the kind of employee groups which developed may be
examined.
The Districts Shoe Manufacturers
Brocktont's shoe firms cannot be characterized by
general statements. In fact, some of the problems which
these companies have in common arise out of their dis-
similarities. Nevertheless, they are similar in several
important respects. In almost every ease, the men who
run the firms are the men who own them. Typically, con-
trolling interest has remained in the hands of one family,
that of the founder; and, in some cases, the business has
been passed on through three generations. Further, with
no Tmanagerial caste" separating "capital" from "labor"
in Brockton, everything that happens-is personalized. The
company doesntt make money; rather, "That's him, over there.
See? The guy getting into the Cadillac. The company
doesntt lose money either; instead, "If I stay in this town
much longer, theyt re going to ruin me".
While the older businesses have stayed "in the family",
most of them have also stayed small. None of the shoe
industry's Itbig five" is in Brockton, and, out of 35 firms
in the district, only five stated their capitalization to
be over $1,000,000.00 in 1946. On the other hand, these
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companies are not the "fly by night" type of concern so
generally associated with the shoe industry.1  Quite the
contrary; a large proportion of Brockton companies have
done business there for a great many years--seventy per
cent of the firms listed in the district in 1946 were also
listed in 1922.2 This record of long life compares rather
dramatically with the rest of the shoe industry, where the
average firm lasts only six years.3 Of course, the fact
that firms now located in Brockton are themselves old does
not necessarily mean that stability dominates the back-
ground of the district's shoe industry. As was pointed
out in the preceding section, the period surrounding World
War I encompassed a sharp rise and then decline in the
total number of establishments; and, even since 1932, the
1. The women ts cheap novelty shoe industry, where a
premium is placed on fast-changing styles, apparently
has in it many ftsst-ehanging" companies. For instance,
in Lynn, Massachusetts, a center for this type of shoe,
only 12 of the 68 companies listed there in 1933 were
still there in 1939. (See Shoe and Leather Reporter,
Directory of Shoe Manufacturers. 1933 and 1939).
2. These calculations were- made from the Shoe and
Leather Reporter,. Directorr of Shoe Manufacturers for
the years in question..n
3. Horace B.. Davis, Business Mortality: The Shoe
Manufacturing Industry", Harvard Business Review,-, Spring,
1939, p. 332. Mr. -Davis states that "The average life
of all firms that did business in the period 1905 through
1935 was only about six years. Approximately half of the
shoe firms. that started business in any year had gone out
of business by the end of the third year thereafter."
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number of firms operating in Brockton has dwindled slowly
downward. In many cases, furthermore, the remaining
companies are smaller now than they were a quarter century
I
ago.
While the Brockton firms are all small relative to
major concerns in the shoe industry, they do vary con-
siderably in the scale of their operations. Estimated
plant capacities range all the way from 7,000 pairs per
day for the George E. Keith Company down to a few hundred
per day for some of the smaller manufacturers. Along
with this variation in size, there are variations in
methods of merchandising the product. The largest
concerns (Keith, Douglas, Commonwealth, and Regal) operate
chains of retail stores through which part of their output
is sold; in addition, these companies and others in the
district brand their shoes with widely advertised names.2
Two firms in the area make use of house-to-house mail-
1. Outstanding examples of such a decline are two of
the biggest manufacturers in the district. In 1922 the
George E. Keith Company stated a capitalization of
$9,273,000.00 as compared with $4,299,878.00 in 1946;
the figures for the W.L. Douglas Company were 1922,
$10,000,000.00 and 1946, $2,550,O00.00. (Shoe and
Leather Reporter, op. it.)
2. Some of these widely advertised names are "Bostonian",
"The Douglas Shoet, "Elevators", "The Etonic Arch", "Walk-
Over", and "Wright Arch-Preservers".
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order selling;1 some work directly with independent retail
stores, and others market their shoes principally through
larger wholesale and chain-store "volume" buyers. Each
merchandising method implies some difference in factory
operations. For instance, the seasonal problem is apt
to be most acute for firms which concentrate on selling
unbranded shoes to independent retail stores; and produc-
tion for "volume" accounts generates economies in the plant,
which are lost when a firm schedules small lots for specific
orders.
Added to differences between the type of outlet used
by Brockton manufacturers are wide variations in the
quality of shoe produced. Companies such as Commonwealth,
Field and Flint, Stacy-Adams, Stetson, Thompson Brothers,
and E.T. Wright all devote a sizable proportion of their
output to a "nothing but the best" category, where perfec-
tion is the production objective. "There is only one way
to make shoes", an executive of one of these concerns told
the author, "and that is the right way". His product cost
the consumer about twenty dollars in 1947. Manufacturers
1. This method of selling involves printing a catalogue
and providing many part-time salesmen with small display
kits. The salesman measures your foot for size and sends
your order in to the "factory". He also relieves you of
a small downpayment (his commission). You pay the balance
after receipt of the shoes. Using this method, the company,
to a large degree, puts its selling costs on a per pair basis.
147
below this top grade all must make some compromise between
quality and price, however slight they may claim that
quality compromise to be. The innersoles may be a little
thinner, leather may not be used for the counters, the
edges may not be trimmed in pairs, and so on. The range
of this compromise in the Brockton district reaches down
all the way to a 1947 $6.50 retailer (almost the cheapest
"footcover" on the market in that year), and some shoes
were made in all the intervening price grades. 1
Along with the variation in quality of product, a
method of relating labor cost to wholesale price has grown
up in the Brockton district. Conceptually, this method,
called the Grade System, is based on establishment of a
standard piece rate differential between price brackets
amounting to from 10% to 12%. Use of the system involves
many administrative problems and compromises, with atten-
dant difficulties almost inevitable; as a result, its
operation has become an important phase of the area's wage
activity. Description of the way graded labor costs came
into being and analysis of the problems consequent to use
of this system will form the basis for a later chapter.
Here the system is simply noted, as are the previously
mentioned characteristics of Brockton district shoe
1. Approximately twenty percent of Brocktonts shoe-
workers produce the so-called high-grade shoes, and the
remaining eighty percent are divided about equally between
the Tthigh-medium" and the "tlow-medium" priced lines.
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companies. Despite their differences, a majority of these
concerns have joined together in an Association. The
background and activities of this organization are discussed
below.
The Manufacturers' Association
Three fair presumptions about group activity are:
(1) people turn toward collective action when they have
goals in common but may prefer to act individually if their
interests are not the same; (2) groups will function most
effectively in those areas where members have similar objec-
tives; and (3) a group will attract and hold members only
when the advantages of belonging outweigh the disadvantages.
Use of these presumptions as a guide to analysis prompts
this sort of question about actual and potential members
of the Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association. What
are the problems and objectives which the district's com-
panies have in common and to what extent are their aims
in conflict? How have these motivating forces varied
during the life-span of the Association? What are this
group's principal activities?
Shoe companies in the Brockton area have formed an
Association primarily in response to union organization
of district employees. Their common goal is effective
dealing with this union, and their Association functions
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principally as the focal point of union-management rela-
tions. The records of manufacturers' meetings show that,
from the very beginning, this group has been concerned
primarily with the controversies surrounding wage rate
adjustments;1 and the Constitution adopted as long ago as
June 18, 1903 declares that "It shall assume the responsi-
bility in all matters in controversy between any labor
union and its (the Associationts) members". 2
Underlying this disposition toward collective action
is the fact that operations in a shoe factory are similar
enough to make individual piece rates as well as operator
earnings subject to comparison. The union has argued
that "If Company A can pay this much to get their inner-
soles tacked to the last, you should be able to pay the
same amount", and manufacturers have asked the union,
1. For instance, the Association Secretary's Report
for the Year 1926 summarized the "Routine Business of
Office" as follows:
"There were presented to this office for adjustment
402 cases involving 6,927 items as compared with 548
cases involving 5,571 items last year!.
He added that he had "found a large majority of the
Business Agents more reasonable in their attitudes,
possibly due to the condition of business [bad] in the
city". Each of the "cases" referred to was a dispute
between one of the craft locals and one or more of the
manufacturers and each of the "items" is a piece price
on a particular operation.
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Consti-
tution, adopted June 18, 1903, Article 11.
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"Why are you holding me up for a price like this when no
one else in the district pays it?" For unassociated
concerns, there are obvious dangers implicit in this
comparison method of setting piece prices. An executive
of one company told this story:
"The union asks us why we joined the Associa-
tion. We tell them that they drove us into
it. Here's what was happening. We or one
of the other companies might have several
items in dispute, some of them important for
us and some relatively insignificant. Often,
if we could win our important points by losing
the others, we would take that course of action
as the most expedient. However, differences in
the type of styles being manufactured might make
the piece price concession which was insignifi-
cant to us very important to the other fellow.
Each of us was giving away the other guy's shirt.
We had to get together in self defense; what else
could we do?"
Further, even though firms might make widely different
grades of shoe, the actions of each may ultimately affect
all the others since, sooner or later, there would be
pressure to "maintain established differentials".
But individual piece price settlement is not the
only phase of union-management relations in which Brockton
district companies have similar objectives. General wage
movements agreed on between the Association and the Union
have tended to set a pattern for all companies in the
district, whether or not the employees of these companies
were union members. Obviously, each firm has a stake in
the timing and amount of the settlement; and, therefore,
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may join the Association in order to have some influence
on these decisions. Possibly the strongest motivation
for group action, however, has arisen out of infrequent
but important crisis situations, such as the district-wide
strikes in 1923 and 1933 and the large and frequent wage
demands made in the period immediately following World
War II.
In these instances, the outcome of the "crisis" took
on such potency for all the members that individual dif-
ferences were lost in the common goal, making possible a
relatively well-coordinated effort on the part of the
manufacturers. But when the important common problem
was "solved", in the past at least, the high level of
group motivation subsided, the differences between members
became relatively more potent, and the strength of the
Association waned.1  What are these differences which
have' lead to sporadic membership and interest in the
Association?
Before 1933., almost all companies in the district
were operated under closed shop contracts with the Boot
and Shoe Workers union, AF of L; however, each of the
1. A manufacturer summed up this tendency for interest
in group action to subside after a strong motivating
crisis had passed as follows: "Everybody wants an
umbrella when its raining, but surprisingly few people
will invest in one while the sun is shining."
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smaller towns around Brockton had its own local affiliate
of the parent organization. The declared policy of the
parent union was to give each local control of its own
negotiations for wages and working conditions. 2  Under
such circumstances of union organization, companies located
in towns around Brockton worked out most of their problems
with the employee group in their own locality, even though
major settlements apparently became district-wide. The
net result was that, except for a few crisis situations,
Association membership was drawn almost entirely from firms
located in the City of Brockton. However, most of the
important concerns in the area joined in trying to work
out of the 1933 strike; and, when the strike result was
formation of the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen
as a district-wide employee organization, the Association
membership base was automatically broadened.
1. A list of local secretaries published by the Boot and
Shoe Workers Union in 1930 shows that there was one "Mixed
Union" in each of the following Brockton area towns: Bridge-
water, Holbrook, Middleboro, Randolph, Rockland, and South
Braintree. In Whitman, only five miles from Brockton, there
was a local each for Lasters, Treers, Stitchers, Edgemakers,
and Cutters, in addition to the Mixed Union; and in Brockton
itself there were twelve of these craft groups.
2. Although General Officials of the Boot and Shoe Workers
Union said they respected the autonomy of local groups in
wage matters, they did interfere on certain occasions. Never-
theless, no particular attempt was made by them to coordinate
the activities of locals in the Brockton district. The poli-
cies and actions of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union will be
discussed in more detail in the section following this one.
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But even since 1933, interest in the activities of
the Association has been uneven. First of all, not all
companies in the district were organized by the new inde-
pendent union; and, of course, these concerns lacked the
primary motive for joining forces with unionized manufac-
turers. Within the latter group, however, differences
in objective have arisen and have tended to weaken the
Association's common front. Possibly the most important
of these differences originated with conditions existing
in the past. Some of the "outsideff concerns felt that
they had been "table to make a little better bargain on
piece pricest", through steadier and more standard produc-
tion and other improvements in conditions of work. Natur-
ally, under the new Association-Brotherhood regime, they
wished to maintain these differentials. On the other hand,
less fortunate companies apparently felt that "the same
labor cost conditions should be available to all": the
differential should be removed. The inevitable occurred
during 1935 and 1936 when eight companies resigned from the
Association. One of the remaining members commented on
these withdrawals as follows:1
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Minutes
of a meeting held January 26, 1937. Three of the
resignations referred to above resulted from removal
of the firm involved to another locality, and so were
not associated with the "differential" problem.
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"If all manufacturers did this, there would be
no Association, and then where would we be?
No place for information, no one to sit in with
price committees, everybody making his own prices,
and the Union representatives using one manufac-
turer against the other to boost prices. What a
situation we would be in. I can imagine it for
some of us have lived through periods when there
was no Association and no basis upon which to
work....However, we have some loyal members left
to carry on; the Association is no different than
many others: we do the work and others pay no
fare whatever, but receive the benefits.,
The past is not the only source of individual company
goals which conflict with those of the general group.
Several times since 1933 one company or another has felt
the need for making a "special arrangement" with the Union.
In some of these cases, the concern involved apparently
believed that success was dependent on differentiating
itself from other firms in the district. 1What the Union
could not grant to all, might be granted to one, given a
reasonable chance that the "arrangement, would not snow-
ball into a district-wide concession.1  Still another
source of dissimilar company objectives is wide variation
in the type of shoe produced. Factories producing a
women's novelty line use a set of piece prices almost
completely unrelated to those used by makers of men's
1. The most recent example of a company's withdrawing
from the Association in an attempt to work out an indi-
vidual problem was that of the Regal Shoe Company in
late 1947. The company's objective was an "adjustmentt
in labor costs to bring them in line with comparable price
grades in the Brockton district. This interesting case
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.
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welts. Since the former type of product is in the definite
minority, the firms involved would have relatively less to
gain from Association membership.
Even within the Association, furthermore, pressures
work in more than one direction during debate over issues
like a general wage movement. The wide range of shoe price
grades produced in the Brockton district means that any
given decision will have diverse effects on the "competitive
position?! of each price group. In addition, financial
strength and ability to "take a strike" varies considerably
from one company to another, thus creating the real problem
of "keeping everyone in line".
All in all, then, Brockton area shoe manufacturers
have strong goals in common, but these goals exist side by
side with variant, sometimes conflicting objectives. The
relative potency for each company of these divergent pres-
sures changes from one situation to the next and depends,
to a considerable extent, on the particular function to
which the Association group addresses itself. In explaining
his own position, one manufacturer summed up the situation
this way: "We don't figure that we're well off being in
the Association; but we're better off in it than we are
out of it".
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The Boot and Shoe Workers Union in Brockton
Today, as union and management representatives work
out piece rates and wage changes in Brockton, they do so
through the mechanism and within the mores of their re-
spective organizations. For this reason, the form and
the characteristics of these organizations are important:
the machinery provided may be smooth or cumbersome; those
involved may feel themselves part of the decision-making
process or they may feel dominated by it; decisions may be
acceptable or distasteful to the people affected, depending
partly on the process through which the decisions were made.
The structure of the Brockton shoeworkers' union, the
Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen, was formed during
the 1933 rebellion from the Boot and Shoe Workers Union
AF of L. Explanation of this structure, then, is to be
found in the exposition of the methods and activities against
which the rebellion was directed. What were these methods
and activities? They are discussed below in terms of their
appearance first in the "Boot and Shoe" approach to wage
problems and second in that Union's internal government and
procedures; then the events leading up to formation of the
Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen are described.
nIt is impossible to permanently and radically raise
wages in one shoe city, regardless of wage conditions in
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competing cities", declares an article in a 1910 Shoe
Workers' Journal.1 This rather plausible assumption
formed the basis of "Boot and Shoe" wage activity: keep
the horse before the cart; organize the industry first
and then raise wages. The "organizing instrument" was
the Union Stamp Contract "issued in shoe factories under
existing wages, especially in the lower wage factories,
leaving the higher wage factories to work out their own
salvation"n. 2  The contract, in some cases, apparently,
a sort of "sweet-heart agreement", provided for the
closed shop, arbitration of all disputes, and no strikes.
In addition, the union accepted the wage rates existing
in the plant at the time of signing and allowed the
employer to mark his product with the Union Stamp.
After the contract was signed, necessary wage adjustments
1. Shoe Workers' Journal, August 1910, p. 18, as quoted
by Norton, on. cit., p. 124. For material on the Boot
and Shoe Workers Union during the period up to 1929, the
author has drawn extensively from Norton's thorough in-
vestigation and analysis.
2. Boot and Shoe Workers Union, Proceedings of the
1907 Convention, p. 23, as quoted by Norton, op. cit.,
p. 123.
3. Copies of the "Union Stamp Contract" were printed
in the Shoe Workers' Journal each month up until August
1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act necessitated some changes
in it.
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were to be handled by local people,1 acting, of course,
within the Union's "no strike" policy. Locals could
discuss and arbitrate wage issues; but, unless the employer
violated his contract, they could not call a strike. But
for locals in the "high-wage" areas of Brockton, these
policies were apparently frustrating: all their union's
efforts were directed at organizing an elusive, low-wage
frontier, which was never brought under control& their own
hands were tied by the "arbitration" contract; and even the
organizing methods were calculated more for manufacturer
appeal than they were for the rank and filer who wanted.
more pay.2
1. The union's policy of "local autonomy" was stated by
the General President in his Report to the 1925 Convention
(Proceedings, p. 15):
"Our constitution gives complete control of wage and
labor conditions to the Local Unions and Joint
Councils....This means the local body is supreme
in negotiating for their wages and working condi-
tions. They have the power, and upon them is the
responsibility".
As will be brought out subsequently, the General Officers
did not always adhere to this principle of autonomy in the
case of their Brockton locals.
2. The union was apparently quite frank about the nature
of this appeal. Norton, p. it., p. 121, summarized the
Union Stamp policy in this way:
"The Union must first attempt to organize factories and
eventually, of course, the whole industry by showing
manufacturers that it is to their advantage to have the
Union stamp on their products and be free from strikes."
In all fairness to the union, note should be taken that its
activities did not have the protection and encouragement of
the Wagner Act; they were conducted in an overwhelmingly
"open shop" environment.
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The conception and method of action on wages outlined
above were not part of the Union's constitution; they were
developed by the General Officers. For those who wanted
to change these methods, the way was clear--elect another
set of officials. Apparently, this was attempted in the
referendum election of 1907. Considerable evidence existed
that the Presidential candidate who favored a change in
policies was actually elected; however, the election was
contested and he was found guilty of corruption.1  In
1909 the decision was made that general officers should
be elected by convention only, despite the argument that
this method was unfair: 2 convention representation was on
the basis of "one delegate for each union and one addi-
tional delegate for each two hundred members or majority
fraction thereof",3 and a union could be as small as "seven
or more bona fide shoeworkers".4 Obviously, the convention
1. Ibid., p. 125.
2. Ibid., p. 126, as quoted from Boot and Shoe Workers
Union, Proceedings of the 1909 Convention, p. 113. A
Brockton delegate stated that his area contained 14,000
of the 27,000 members, but had only 68 of 243 delegates.
3. Boot and Shoe Workers Union, Constitution (as
approved by the 1925 Convention) pp. 52-54.
4. Ibid., p. 20.
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would not represent the membership'ts majority opinion; in
fact, the general officers were charged with creating small
locals specifically in order to control conventions. At
any rate, they did not agree with and could not change the
parent union's methods: they had only "quarter" representa-
tion.
But, for the conduct of their own affairs, how were
the Brockton shoeworkers organized? The 1890's and early
1900's were formative years for unionization of the dis-
trict's shoeworkers; they were also years when the propor-
tion of skilled hand work in a shoe was relatively great.
Though current factory organization still divides employees
into fairly distinct craft groups, these divisions were
even more pronounced in the "old days?. The tendency was
natural for union jurisdictional lines to fall around work
skills rather than factories.1  Even though the towns
surrounding Brockton had only one "Mixed" local apiece,
the General Constitution provided that their executive
boards should "be so chosen as to represent as nearly as
possible all parts of the Craft represented".2  In
I. The author is not arguing, of course, that factory
organization was the only reason for craft allegiances.
No doubt small, highly skilled groups were organized first
and found their bargaining power enhanced by being small
in numbers but of crucial importance to production.
2. Boot and Shoe Workers Union, Constitution (as
approved by the 1925 Convention), p. 34.
Brockton itself, however, the workers belonged to one of
twelve craft locals, each presumably autonomous insofar
as wage rate setting was concerned,1 though limited as
to action by the contract provisions of "arbitration"
and "no strikes". The attention of these local unions
was focused, then, not so much on the problems of the
factory as a whole as on the problems of a skill-group,
with boundaries cutting across factory lines.
Within the factory, workers had no immediate and
direct representation. There could be no grievance
procedure starting from the shop steward and foreman
level because there were no shop stewards. Instead,
one of the duties of the local craft union's executive
board was to "consider all grievances and endeavor to
settle same".2  The aggrieved worker had to wait for a
meeting of this group before he could even present his
1. There was also in Brockton a Joint Shoe Council
to which each local sent three delegates. In case of a
strike threat, the Council could make a binding decision,
pending appeal to the General Executive Board; however,
it had no authority to force locals into coordinated
action in such matters as wage requests. The Council
was apparently used to some extent, though, in dealing
with the Manufacturers' Association over general matters.
2. Ibid., p. 33.
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case, a procedure which apparently was not satisfactory.1
With sources of discontent ranging all the way from'
organizing methods of the parent union to grievance pro-
cedure in the shop, sooner or later conflict was bound
to break into the open.
A major outbreak occurred in 1923. The immediate
issue was a wage dispute. In March 1922 the Massachusetts
State Board of Arbitration had granted the manufacturers
a ten per cent reduction in wage rates,2 over the protests
of the Brockton locals. When the efforts of the Dressers
and Packers local to "get the ten per cent back" were
thwarted by another State Board decision, that group
I. The Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen, suc-
cessor organization to the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union,
included in their Constitution a section entitled "Birth
of the Brotherhood". The old grievance procedure is
commented on as follows:
"If a worker complained to the foreman, he was told
to take his complaints to the Union. If he did,
he was set down as an agitator, and the boss soon
knew of any complaints taken to the Union."
Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen, Consti-
tution (original), p. 4.
This comment probably takes as its primary point of refer-
ence the "last days" of the "Boot and Shoe", during which
the parent union apparently controlled local activities.
In any case, it is hard to see how such a grievance proced-
ure could operate effectively.
2. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor
and Industries, Report of the Board of Conciliation and
Arbitration Year Ending November 30. 1922, pp. 25-30.
These decisions were rendered separately for each local
and the group of manufacturing firms; however, all the
decisions were the same.
3. Ibid., Year Ending November 30, 1923, pp. 40-41. The
Board awarded "no change" except for a few minor adjustments.
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went on strike. The General Officers of the Boot and
Shoe Workers Union immediately declared this action to
be an illegal violation of the Union Stamp Contract;
they ordered the strikers back to work and revoked the
local's charter. A few days later, the Heelers and the
Treers also voted to "leave work, and their charters were
revoked.1  But, despite such open opposition from the
parent union, the papers reported "manufacturing at a
standstill"t in Brockton by May 19, four days after the
strike's start.2  By May 22, some shoeworkers in the
surrounding towns had "quit in sympathy",3 and a new
Brockton District Shoe Workers' Union had been formed.
Norton analyzed the situation in this way:4
"From the author's careful day-by-day observa-
tion of this strike, it would seem that the
essential issue was not over wages....The
strike developed into what was essentially a
revolt against the Union itself....All of the
cumulative grievances against the general
officers and their policies emerged into the
foreground. The method of electing general
officers, the method of representation at the
convention, and the wage policy of the general
officers in placing a contract in a factory at
the existing scale of wages, all played an
important part in the strike."
1. Ibid., p. 2. In their report the Board included
a short description of events which took place during
the strike.
2. Brockton Enterprise, May 18, 1923.
3. Ibid., May 22, 1923, p. 1.
4. Norton, oD. cit., pp. 152-153.
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He also reported that the "bitterest denunciations at
strike meetings were directed against the general officers
of the Union, not against the principle of arbitration nor
the manufacturers in general".1  However, after ten weeks
of mass meetings, strikebreakers (but very little violence),
and full-page advertisements, the strike was broken. The
manufacturers had declared themselves as standing "un-
alterably" by their contracts with the Boot and Shoe Workers'
Union and had stated firmly that they would not deal with
Independent Unions. 2  The general officers of the Boot and
Shoe Workers' Union had opposed the strike with all their
force. Brockton district workers had lost the battle;
open conflict subsided.
Trouble broke out again in 1933. Although the parties
differed on the "right" and "wrong, of the issues involved,
they agreed substantially on the chain of events.3  Here
1. Ibid., p. 15Z (footnote).
2. "Independent" meant unaffiliated with the Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union. The manufacturers were probably influenced
by Lynn's experience with "undisciplined" workers and "petty
walkouts" which made continuous production impossible. As
a matter of fact, in the middle of the Brockton strike, a
news story from Lynn reported that the President of the Amal-
gamated Joint Council there had quit, since he could not bring
about "peace and uninterrupted production". (Brockton
Enterprise, June 13, 1923, p. 1).
3. The author has had access to the files of the Manufac-
turers' Association, the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied
Craftsmen, and the local newspapers. The Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union set forth their point of view in great detail
in the columns of the Brockton Times. No real differences
arise as to the chain of events which occurred, though,
naturally, emphasis and explanation differ.
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is the outline of what happened. Depression conditions
weakened the union position; the burden of dues was
heavier and the benefits doubtful; production, employment,
payrolls, and piece prices all moved down. Biennial Union
conventions scheduled for 1930 and 1932 were postponed due
to lack of funds. 1  In towns surrounding Brockton, fac-
tories apparently operated under what amounted to open
shop conditions. 2  To maintain their competitive position,
Brockton manufacturers felt the need for reduction of exist-
ing piece price scales and for creation of a new lower
scale on which they could produce the cheaper shoes demanded
by the times.3  Manufacturers also felt that the multi-
craft union organizational structure was too cumbersome
and made negotiations too slow. The General Officers of
the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union agreed with them on both
counts. Some of the locals may have adopted dilatory
1. Newspaper reports indicate that many Brockton shoe-
workers felt these postponements were made to assure the
General Officials of staying in office.
2. All indications are that the Mixed Locals in these
towns were not operating effectively; business was appa-
rently bad enough so that companies could move ten or
twelve miles out from Brockton and secure lower labor
costs without effective union opposition.
3. According to the union, both these requests had been
made. Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, "Brief Submitted to
the NRA Labor Board", The Brockton Times, September 21,
1933, p. 6.
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tactics; at any rate, a great many decisions were forced
through the slow machinery of arbitration.1  In January
1932, the Joseph E. Corcoran Shoe Company of Brockton
unilaterally instituted a 10% reduction in wages, which
the parent and local unions denounced as a violation of
the contract.2  The wage cut was restored and negotia-
tions started on a new lower grade piece price list;
however, no agreement was reached. The Company moved
six miles to the town of Stoughton, out of the Brockton
locals' jurisdiction, and, on November 17, 1932, got an
award from the State Board of Arbitration specifying a
complete list of rates for the proposed new shoe.3  In
the meantime and despite a general ten percent reduction
granted by the State Board on March 9, 1932,4 the Conrad
Shoe Company moved to North Abington and the E.J. Givren
Shoe Company to Rockland, both out of Brockton but neither
out of the district. General Officers of the parent union
1. During the year ending November 30, 1932, the State
Board of Arbitration handled a total of 234 arbitration
cases affecting the Brockton shoe industry. Even such
backers of arbitration as the General Officers of the Boot
and Shoe Workers' Union called this a "tremendous number".
Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor and
Industries, Report of the Board of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion, Year Ending November 30, 1932, pp. 44-47.
4. Ibid., pp. 12-17.
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were impressed. Apparently they felt that "We must adopt
more business-like methods in which dealings shall be more
direct and quicker, and resorts to arbitration shall be
far less frequent."l  On December 12, 1932, the parent
union's General Executive Board voted,
"to make a change which would permit the placing
of the several local unions on a sound financial
basis and which would permit manufacturers desir-
ing to secure business on the lower grade shoes
to compete with other centers making this grade
of shoe."2
The charters of Brockton locals were revoked and a "com-
mission" of three was appointed to "take care of all
matters dealing with wages and working conditions".3  The
low grade price list which the Brockton locals had refused
to grant was "quickly" negotiated. In April, May, June,
and July, usually "off-season" months for district shoe
production, business appeared to recover from depression
lows: payrolls turned up, instead of down.4  The General
Officials felt that they had "saved" the situation; their
opposition thought that these orders would have come anyway,
1. Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, op. cit., p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor
and Industries, Division of Statistics, Employment and
Payroll Earnings in Manufacturing, January-December, 1933.
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and that, if the union had held off a little longer, the
"wage cut money" would have been in the workerst pockets
instead of the manufacturers'.
But even before the improvement of general business
conditions,. craft groups had formed "Mutual Benefit Asso-
ciations". For what reason? Put recent actions of the
parent union into the backdrop of previous conflict over
its policies and conduct. Brockton locals did not agree
with the Boot and Shoe's wage activities and organizing
methods; they were thwarted in their attempts to institute
changes and felt the Union to be run autocratically.
Though they contributed a large share of the general
treasury, they could not get effective representation
in the Union's ruling councils. Even within the shop,
the local organizational structure designated by the
parent union was not effective for handling individual
grievances.1 In 1923, open revolt had been checked by
united action on the part of the General Officers and
the manufacturers. Now, on the pretext that locals were
not "self-sustaining" financially, the last area of
autonomy was removed:
I. The locals themselves must have been at least
partly to blame for this ineffectiveness, though the
structure of grievance procedure specified in the Con-
stitution did make for slow and cumbersome operation.
Of course, after the "commission" took over local affairs,
employees lost confidence in what grievance procedure they
had.
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"Somewhere about last December, the locals were
not agreeing to pay cuts fast enough to suit
the manufacturers, and they called in the
President of the union and he revoked the
charters of all the locals; established a
dictatorship and, in effect, took over all
powers to himself. He did this under a provi-
sion of the Constitution which allows him to
revoke charters where locals are refractory
or inactive, and they were only refractory or
inactive because of the fact that they did not
exercise the right that they had on matters
concerning wages and conditions fast enough
to suit the employers".1
Surprisingly enough, the Mutual Benefit Associa-
tions had as their original objective nothing more revo-
lutionary than an "investigation" of the General Office.2
But, the movement thrived on reaction against and dissatis-
faction with the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union; workers were
urged to cease paying their dues. On May 15, 1933 the
parent union requested wage increases "ranging from five
to twenty percent", and on July 1 the new low grade piece
prices were raised "selectively" as requested. Nevertheless,
1. Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen, Brief
Submitted to the NRA Labor Board, p. 3. This brief may
be found in the present files of the Brotherhood of Shoe
and Allied Craftsmen.
2. In a letter dated May 31, 1933 and sent to Mr. Frank
A.,.Goodwin, an attorney, the leader of the Associations
set forth their position and stated, "we feel that a
general investigation is in order, but it must be an in-
vestigation, and not a whitewash." A copy of this letter
is in the present files of the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied
Craftsmen.
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the "'Mutual's" claimed gains in membership, and, on July
26, all the dissident elements joined in formation of a
new union, the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen.1
The BSAC pointed to the "representatives of their
own choosing" section of the National Industrial Recovery
Act and circulated notices to the effect that "when a
majority in any factory signs petitions it will be all
over". The Boot and Shoe Workers' Union claimed their
contracts to be binding and demanded the discharge of
those who refused to pay dues. The Manufacturers ob-
tained and published this statement by Donald Rickberg,
General Counsel for the NRA: "the signing of the Presi-
dent's reemployment agreement does not abrogate any union
contracts or any other bona fide contracts". 2  Finally,
on August 28, the Manufacturers fired a group of the
workers not in good standing with the Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union. According to the BSAC, "These discharges
took place in practically every factory in Brockton, and,
in every case, the other workers, by common agreement,
refused to work unless these men were restored to their
I. BSAC, Constitution, (original), p. 6.
2. Brockton Enterprise, August 23, p. 1.
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positions?.' The Manufacturers stated that
"they discharged employees who refused to pay
their Boot and Shoe Workers' Union dues. Some
other employees quit in sympathy. Others quit
to avoid trouble. Large groups remained at work.
Factories are closing because their operations
are successive and the defection of a few paralyzes
the plant in a few days?,.2
At any rate, the factories were closed and the strike was
on.
Everyone, the National Labor Board, local members
of the clergy, and civic leaders, tried to mediate the
strike, but with no success. On September 5, the objec-
tionable "Commission" was abolished and the Boot and Shoe
Workers t Union granted charters to five Jurisdictions
carved from the previous twelve locals;3 however, this
token to the principle of self-rule came too late to be
effective. By September 25, the Manufacturers could tell
the workers and the local merchants that payroll losses
already amounted to from $600,000 to $750,000; and, in the
same statement, that the "caliber of the group which has
brought the present situation about" was questionable.4
The "adviser" to the BSAC, Mr. Frank A. Goodwin, Chief
1. BSAC, op. cit., p. 4.
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Brief
Submitted to the NRA Labor Board, p. 4.
3. Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, op. cit., p. 6.
4. Brockton Enterprise, September 25, p. 1.
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of the Boston Finance Commission, was ousted from his job
by Governor Ely, on September 29, after an insistent letter
to the Governor sent by the Brockton Shoe Manufacturers'
Association.1  The Association stood four-square for the
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and the Union Stamp Contract.
Goodwin countered with the question, "Isn't it a strange
spectacle to see manufacturers fighting for a closed shop?
I wonder why"?2
The National Labor Board had conducted an "investiga-
tion" of the dispute early in September and, in the middle
of that month, their temporary "peace" proposal almost
ended the strike.3  As the Board procrastinated in making
1. Boston Traveler, September 29, p. 17. The letter said
in part, "It occurs to us as strange that Mr. Goodwin as a
prominent state official should be permitted to engage his
energies in what is unquestionably at this time an attempt
to negate the purpose of the administration at Washington in
seeking to bring about national recovery from the depression...
..Should he continue to persist in his efforts, we ask that
he be removed from office as chairman of the Boston Finance
Commission."'
2. Brockton Enterprise, August 10, 1933.
3. The proposal, known locally as "status quo ante and
escrow", was that all employees should go back to work and
that those who had refused to pay dues to the Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union should have 350 per week deducted from their
pay and held in escrow, pending a decision of the Labor
Board. The BSAC agreed to this, thinking that the escrow
provision applied only to those who had refused to pay dues
on the date the work stoppage began. When the Brotherhood
Control Board discovered that the escrow provisions applied
to every one, they voted unanimously against accepting the
recommendation. BSAC Files, Letter from John Murphy to the
National Labor Board, dated September 15, 1933.
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any out-and-out decision, however, factories remained
closed. Finally, on October 3, the Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation published a notice that their factories would
open the following day, with no requirement that workers
pay dues to any organization. The Brotherhood advised
caution; the factories stayed closed. On the fifth of
October, a committee from the Association conferred with
representatives of the BSAC, and an agreement was reached:
employees went back to work on Monday October ninth. The
Manufacturers had recognized the new Union and had given
up their old closed shop contracts. The rebellion was a
success.
What was the rebellion against? Apparently, the
wage reductions were objectionable to Brockton people;
but even more offensive were the methods used to bring
about those reductions. Attention was focused primarily
on four points of disagreement with the parent union:
(1) autocratic procedures used to control the General
Union; (2) interference by the General Officers in Brockton
wage negotiations, where the locals presumably were autono-
mous; (3) centralized administration of local wage problems
by the "commission" form of government; and (4) the passive
attitude of the parent union toward improving conditions
"now" in organized centers.
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These four points of disagreement acted as strong
conditioning forces while the structure of the new union
and the concepts of its operation were formulated. The
resulting internal organization of the Brotherhood and
the procedures developed for handling wage problems and
other grievances are the subject matter of the following
chapter. At the end of that chapter, this discussion of
the Brockton area will be summarized.
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CHAPTER V
THE BROTHERHOOD OF SHOE AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN
The Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen was started
in an environment of rebellion against the autocratic pro-
cedures and policies followed by its predecessor, the Boot
and Shoe Workers' Union, AF of L. Correction of the objec-
tionable practices was a natural point of orientation around
which to build the Brotherhood's organization; but that such
correction was really a basic objective is implied by the
"builders'' judgment of their work: "The shoe workers are
now free not only from the tyranny of the manufacturers but
1
also from the tyranny of labor politicians". As a reaction
against what Brockton shoeworkers felt to be a "dictatorship",
their leaders naturally tried to make the new organization a
"democracy??, complete with checks on any authority, and in
which each man would have a voice. 2  This chapter's purpose
is to describe that "democracy", providing an exposition and
analysis of the union's general nature and methods of opera-
tion. The relevance of this purpose to wage determination
1. BSAC, Constitution (original), p. 6. The Constitu-
tion goes on to say that "all of the abuses possible under
the Boot and Shoe are now not possiblet'.
2. The union's Secretary stated this purpose as follows:
"Having experienced for many years the evil of autocratic
control of unions, the framers of the Constitution of this
union worked with only one thought in mind; that the rank
and file of its membership would have the directing force
in its policies." Brockton Enterprise, January 27, 1937.
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is two-fold: institutional description forms a sort of
"program" for the "play" which follows; but, more important
in this case, the nature of the union itself affects wage
decisions, by affecting the process of making those decisions.
This description of the Brotherhood has for a central
objective, then, analysis of the process through which the
union reaches its conclusions and of the internal context
within which those conclusions are made effective. The
first two sections deal with the BSAC organization as an
operating unit, discussing specifically, the union's struc-
ture, then the individual member's protection from arbitrary
action by his officials. The next two sections survey (1)
the craft versus industrial union question as it has appeared
within the Brotherhood, and (2) the resulting methods of
making wage decisions. Following, these considerations of
context are raised: the attitude toward use of the strike
weapon,-and the average age of the union's membership group.
A final section summarizes, with an analysis of the Brother-
hood as a decision-making agency.
The BSAC Organizational Structure
Description of the union's organizational structure
may be divided roughly into three parts: one dealing with
the locus of control in matters of general interest to the
entire membership; another with the scope of local activi-
ties; and a third with the Brotherhood's appearance within
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the factory. Now, in certain respects, the Union's form
of government was modelled after that provided by our Federal
Constitution.1  The General Officials represent an "executive
branch", charged with carrying out the will of the Union's
policy-making group, the General Board of Directors. At the
same time, a Control Board acts as a court of last resort in
disputes within the Union and as a "watchdog", especially over
financial affairs, where it has the "final say" on "any
assessment levied by the General Board".2  Of the men and
women serving in this level of union government, only the
General Officials work at their jobs on a full-time basis;
the representatives on the governing Boards meet to transact
their regular business on one evening each week.3
All these representatives are elected to their posts
by secret ballot, but the electorate is not the same in all
cases. The General Officials are chosen in a referendum
vote of the entire membership for a two-year term of office.4
1. This and other information presented here is derived
from discussions with people active in the Union and from
memoranda located in Union files. Where ever possible,
specific sources of information, such as the Constitution,
are cited.
2. BSAC, Constitution (original), p. 11.
3. The original Constitution provided that "twhenever any
member of the Control Board or General Board becomes a paid
employee of the Brotherhood, he shall resign at once and his
place be filled as provided herein". Ibid., p. 14.
4. Griginally the term of office was one year; but this was
changed in 1945, primarily to save on the sizable expense of
annual elections. BSAC, [emo of Control Board Meeting, March
26, 1945.
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In these carefully supervised elections, the incumbent
President has been upset once and the Secretary-Treasurer,
twice.1  On the other hand, each local chooses one of its
number as member of the General Board and two for the
Control Board. Voting strength in these two governing
bodies is the same, then, for each local, despite the fact
that there are great variations in size. Though a minimum
membership of 100 is required for representation on these
Boards, additional membership is not rewarded proportionately;
thus, 134 Edgesetters and 1,77J Stitchers may offset each
other.
As the functions of the governing officials and groups
have evolved in actual operation, the General Board has
become the center of activity.2  Contrary to the experience
and expectations in other industries and localities,3 the
1. There have been three Presidents, one of whom resigned
to take a job with the Federal Government. Of Secretary-
Treasurers, one resigned in favor of a job with the Govern-
ment, and one has held the office twice, having been elected,
then defeated, and then re-elected.
2. This has not always been the case. In the first year of
operation, the Control Board was the center of activity, as
might be expected from the initial emphasis on "protection".
After the internal workings of the Union had more or less
settled into place, though, the Control Board's activity
declined in importance.
3. For example, in "surveying trade-union history t, Will
Herberg, Research and Educational Director of the New York
Dressmakers' Union, IL~W, has noted this "striking shift in
the seat of effective power"tt: "tThe legislative power gradually
passed from the membership meeting, first to the executive
board, and then by a further remove, to the paid officials
('the office t)". Will Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in
Labor Unions"', The Antioch Review, Fall, 1943, pp. 407-8.
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full-time officers of the Union have not usurped power, nor
have they had power thrust upon them. For example, these
officials cannot call strikes, formulate wage demands, or
sign collective bargaining contracts on their own initiative.
Of course, their position as members of the governing Boards
and as spokesmen for the Union in the press and in negotia-
tions gives them both influence and the opportunity to- lead
in the decision-making processes. But they must lead, not
dictate. That the General Board is no "rubber stamp" is
borne out, for instance, in the wage bargaining which took
place in late 1945.
After a negotiating committee had reached agreement
on a 12-1/2g increase, the General Officials prematurely
signed an agreement to that effect with the manufacturers.
But the "sense" of the General Board was that this increase
should have been stated on a percentage basis. The officials
were repudiated and sent back to try again.1  Further evidence
may be drawn from the wording of the original Constitution and
the way in which that wording has been changed. An original
clause stated that "the General Board of Directors, by a two-
thirds vote, may advise or control the course of action of
1. This was apparently no bargaining trick. A difference
of opinion existed within the Union as to whether the
increase should be on a cents per hour or percentage basis.
After the negotiators were persuaded to accept a cents per
hour settlement, they were surprised and chagrined at being
reversed by the General Board. This settlement will be dis-
cussed in more detail in a later chapter. For a newspaper
account of the "reversal", see Brockton Enterprise, November
14, 1945, p. 1.
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any or all the General Officers";l but this was amended in
1938 to read that by a majority vote, the Board could "advise
or dictate" the actions of these men.2
Three factors which have at least contributed to reten-
tion of control by the General Board are these. First, the
membership group had personally felt the abuses of dicta-
torial power; thus, both their disposition and the mores of
the organization they created were attuned to check repetition
of those abuses. This disposition remains effective even
today, since the core of the present membership was involved
in the Brotherhood ts formation.3  Second, the organization
began and has remained local in character, making government
by men actively working at their trade feasible in a physical
sense. They meet, not infrequently and "on call", but
regularly, once each week. Further, the prestige and
importance of this Board makes interest in its functions
and attendance at its meetings far more faithful than is the
case at the usual routine union membership meeting.4  Third,
the provisions of the Constitution actually place responsibility
1. BSAC, Constitution (original), p. 9.
2. BSAC, Constitution (as amended by the Constitutional
Convention, May 1938), p. 13.
3. This stability of the membership group is probably more
a characteristic of the declining industry than of the
Brotherhood itself.
4. As will be noted again below, the Brotherhood has in
common with most other unions the problem of poor attendance
at local membership meetings.
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for the important decisions in the hands of the General
Board. Theirs is the power, for example, to "authorize
strikes? and "make general price contracts with the manu-
facturerst . Now, of course, at various times in the past,
one official or another may have been able to get his way
consistently or persuade the Board to grant him. a free hand
in certain specific circumstances.1 Nevertheless, after
fifteen years of operation, a "majority vote" of the Board
is still recognized as the active- and unquestioned source
of authority over the general affairs of the Union.
But the BSAC does not operate as one unit on all
questions. It is really more of a "federation". The
Mutual Benefit Associations, which had joined together in
formation of the Brotherhood, became the natural units of
fourteen local jurisdictions, following well-defined craft
lines. The Brotherhood has also organize& Brockton's "Cut
Sole" workers, whose industry is closely allied to shoe
manufacturing, and, for a number of years, had a "Rubber
Sole and Heel" Local recruited from. a nearby rubber-proces-
sing plant. In addition, shoeworkers in the Gardiner, Maine,
branch factory of the district's Commonwealth Shoe and Leather
Company belong to the BSAC. By secret ballot each of these
1. The point to be noted here is that the Board did not
give away its authority over a general area of activity, while
authorizing the President, for instance, to use his own judg-
ment in a specific case.
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organizations chooses its own officers and Board of Directors,
who are charged with supervision of "the interests of the
local unit".1  Specifically, the crafts control such matters
as admission to membership, or working rules, so long as these
are not inconsistent with the General Constitution. In
addition, delegates to the Control or General Board may be
"instructed to vote in a specified manner",2 thus the local
may decide its position relative to issues of a general nature
as well as to problems which affect only the particular
jurisdiction.
But possibly the most important function of the locals
concerns the setting of individual piece prices. The Consti-
tution clearly gives each craft this power:
"If the contract concerns local prices for
individual operations..., it need have the
approval only of a majority of the local
price committee involved present and voting
at any meeting called for that purpose."3
The committee mentioned above consists of five members of
craft, appointed by the local Board of Directors. The
committee chairman, called the Price Expert, is a full-time
1. Seven members of the Board of Directors are elected
by the local voting as a group. In addition, the craft
stewards elected in each factory automatically become
members of this Board.
2. BSAC, op. cit., p. 19. The Constitution further gives
the local authority to recall its delegate by a two-thirds
vote of a meeting called for that purpose, if he does not
vote in the manner specified.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
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employee in seven locals, and, in.the other seven, he works
at the trade, while being &available on call in any piece
price dispute.
The latitude given this Price Expert varies from one
laocal to the next and. from case to case. Thoeugh he theo-
retically acts only "after consultation with his committee",1
inpractice, he handles most routine eases, at least, on his
own initiative. 2  At this level in the Union, Mr. Kerberg' s
conclusion most nearly applies:3 "effective power" tends to
"concentrate: at the top" and in the hands of the "tbureaucracy".
After all, the "Expert" knows the piece prices being paid
throughout the district, and he has had the most experience
in ttadjustingU prices found to be Moat of line". Since
many disputes call for rapid action, with decisions made
'on the spot", feasibility, if nothing else, demands that
he have authority to act in his local's behalf. Further,
routine local meetings are generally not well attended, and
so are subject to control. In a General Board meeting on
April 2, 1937, for example, the Unionts V~ice President raised
the question of lack of attendance at local meetings and
1. rbid., p. 24.
2. The extent to which Price Experts operate on their own
initiative varies greatly as between individuals. In one
case, .....the Job was taken only after agreement "to do what I
say, when I say. They can always get rid of me if they don't
like the results". In another case, the Expert is usually
"instructed" by his committee as to the position he must take
in a given dispute.
3. Herbera. ov. cit.. D. An7
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stated "that something must be done to arouse the interest
of members."l Even so, most of the Price Experts seem to
prefer to "have some of the boys along" on important cases,
probably for moral as well as consultative reasons.2  In no
local, of course, could the Expert dictate continuously un-
popular action, since his tenure is not secure against attack
from the local's Board of Directors, and since attendance at
meetings is generally improved when significant issues are at
stake.
In the shoe factory itself, the BSAC plan of organiza-
tion departed radically from that of the Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union: a "steward system" was started, similar to
that commonly found today in American industry's unionized
plants. Each craft in a given factory elects a representa-
tive,3 who, in turn, helps select a Department and a Chief
Steward. Non-wage grievances, then, are treated as "factory",
not "craft" problems; and the worker is provided with direct
representation in his disputes with management.
-Experience with this steward system varies from group
to group, even within the same factory: in some cases,
1. BSAC, Yemo of General Board Meetings, April 2, 1937.
2. This practice is sometimes labelled as "passing the
buck". Some management representatives claim that the
"democratic union angle"is often used as one way of getting
out of a tight spot. "You can never tell whether it's the
real thing or whether youtre just shadow-boxing", one of them
complained.
3. BSAC, op. cit., pp.22-23. Any steward, Craft, Department
or Chief, "may be recalled at anytime by a two-thirds vote of
those who elected them".
185
according to the management, "they keep the pot boiling all
the time", but, in others, "nobody wants the headaches".1
In general, though, the steward organization has apparently
taken effective responsibility for grievances centering
around shop problems. But further, though the original
intention may not have been for the stewards to "run the
room", this is, in effect, what has often happened. For
example, craft representatives may supervise or actually
assign the work to those on the particular production line2
or, in all cases, overtime or Saturday work may not be per-
formed in a factory without specific permission from the
Chief Steward.3  Thus, as a result of the "steward system",
1. Many of the manufacturers have doubted the value of the
steward system from the very beginning. At a conference on April
26, 1940, for example, a Manufacturers' Association committee
conferring with the BSAC on ways to improve Brockton's competi-
tive position suggested the "elimination of the steward system".
Brockton Enterprise, April 27, 19O40, p. 1.
2. The stewards, of course, act in accordance with rules
agreed on in the work group. Assignment of work takes on
considerable importance in many cases, since each man wants
to get his "fair share" of "easy shoes", where the piece rate
is relatively loose.
3. In a written contract signed by the Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation and the Union on August 21, 1947, this power of the
stewards was hedged to some extent by the manufacturers with
a clause stating managementts right to "require overtime work
(providing permission is granted by the Chief Steward and such
permission shall not be unreasonably withheld)". Associated
Shoe Industries of Southeastern Massachusetts, Inc. and
Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen, Contract, (dated
August 21, 1947), p. 14 (as printed for distribution by the
BSAC).
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Union representatives exercise positive control over several
important phases of factory operation.
This, in brief, is the organizational structure of the
Brotherhood. Altogether, there are about 300 "offices" at
the General and Local levels open to a membership of approxi-
mately 7,500 shoeworkers and 850 "Cut Sole" workers; in
addition, 14 "jobs" as craft stewards are performed in each
unionized shoe factory. Under these circumstances, those
who earn their living tat the bench" influence and partici-
pate in union affairs, even though routine local membership
meetings may be poorly attended. Now, this organization
may be analyzed from several specific points of view.
Internal Checks on Authorit
Any organization which pretends to be "democratic"
must provide more than a simple vehicle for expression of
the majority will. Those who differ with current majority
opinion or with individuals in authority must be given a
reasonable opportunity to express their objections and still
survive within the institution. The protection accorded
an individual BSAC member against the authority of those he
helps elect and the extent to which he may go in expressing
his difference of opinion will be discussed here.
The BSAC Constitution makes it the duty of members
"to obey all officers of the Local Units and the Brother-
hood" and "to refrain from unduly criticizing or abusing
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them while in the discharge of their official duties".1
Further, a member may be expelled when "there is a finding
that beyond a reasonable doubt he has been guilty of treason
to the Brotherhood or to the cause of Laborw.2  These
clauses are broad enough to cover almost any offense, so
that the significant question becomes one of interpretation
and of the right to appeal. At the factory level, the in-
dividual is protected from arbitrary action on the part of
stewards by provisions which allow him to prefer charges
before the Control Board. This body, after a hearing, may
remove any steward, if such a course of action is, in its
Judgment, necessary. Or, if local officials, for example,
fine a member, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Control
Board for a final Judgment on the case.3
On the question of expulsion from the union, the Con-
stitution provides that Tno member shall be expelled from
the Brotherhood except upon written charges made to the
Control Board.•i•4 In the spring of 1947, the General
1. BSAC, Constitution (as Amended by the Constitutional
Convention, May 1938), p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 33.
3. Ibid., p. 23. For example, on April 2, 1945, the
Control Board, after a hearing, upheld fines imposed by
the Lasteras' Board of Directors and on September 24, 1945
upheld an appeal from a fine levied by the Lasters.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
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Secretary-Treasurer, Harold C. Sears, was accused of using
"Gestapo" methods and of denying -free speech" within the
Union;1 but the case' to which his accusers made most
frequent reference illustrates the care with which "expul-
sion" has been used as a disciplinary measure. For several
months, a local weekly newspaper edited by a UMion member,
John Williams, had carried leading articles needling the
Union. in general and Sears in particular. For example,
the March 7, 1947 issue carries the headline, "B.S.A.C.
Financial Report Exposes Crumbling Union Due to Mismanage-
ment", speaks of a "treasury raid,, and refers to the
"moronic vilification campaign that he (Sears) and his
payrollers have undertaken to fight the rank and' file BSAC
members".2  The Price Expert of the Mixed Local, -who had
been personally attacked in one article, charged Williams
with "treason" to the Union, and the ease was tried before
the Control Board.
The accusation was first made at meeting held on
March 31 and, on April 7, Williams appeared before the
Board. His requests for a stenographer and for the
presence of non-members were denied, but he was granted
the "advice of an Attorney", the right to summon witnesses,
1. For example, see Brockton Union, April 25, 1947, p. 1.
2. Ibid., March 7, 1947, p. 1.
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and a one-week postponement of the trial. 1  On April 14,
"both sides of the case were heard and Board members asked
questions". A judgment was then deferred another week,
"until we receive information from our lawyer as to who is
responsible for what is published in any newspaper". 2  In
the April 21 meeting of the Control Board, Williams was
expelled from the Union by a vote of 19 to 9.3 Though
his statements about the Union and its officials had been
extreme, inaccurate, and misleading, he was given a fair
hearing and trial before a group elected by the membership.
Later in the year, the incumbent officials were
opposed in an election by candidates who openly favored
affiliation with the United Shoe Workers of America (CIO),
the cause for which Williams was fighting. These candi-
dates were defeated in an honest election, by a close vote.
They were not expelled from the Union, nor were any charges
made against them.4  In the operations of the Brotherhood,
then, the personal rule of Union Officials is checked, since
individuals have effective means of protection against the
1. BSAC, Memo of Control Board Meeting, April 7, 1947.
2. Ibid., April 14, 1947.
3. Ibid., April 21, 1947.
4. Opposition leaders might say, of course, that the
restraint stemmed from fear of reprisals in the form of
exposure to the membership and consequent open rebellion
against the BSAC.
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arbitrary exercise of authority. From the point of view
of "minority rights" as well as from that of "majority
rule", the Union must be adjudged "democratic".1
Industrial Versus Craft Unionism in Brockton
Shoeworkers in the Brockton district had belonged to
craft unions for at least thirty years previous to the in-
ception of the BSAC. Many skilled groups had, through that
period, built up a favored level of financial recompense,
working conditions, and, one suspects, social status. In
addition, perhaps the most objectionable single act of the
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union was the revocation of local
charters and subsequent government by a single "commission",
a "dictatorship" against which the Mutual Benefit Associa-
tions were directed. Custom, experience, and purpose,
then, all indicated for the Brotherhood a craft form of
basic organization. On the other hand, the strength of
the 1933 strike was felt to stem from united action on the
part of shoeworkers from all crafts and from all the towns
within the Brockton district. While the Boot and Shoe
1. One survey directed toward this question as related
to all American Labor Unions classified the 115 studied into
three groups: Unions in which the chief executive possessed
(1) routine power, (2) moderate power, and (3) considerable
power. Group one included 30 unions; group two, 34; and
group three, 51. The BSAC was classified in the first
•category. Philip Taft, "The Constitutional Power of the
Chief Officer in American Labor Unions", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, May 1948, pp. 459-471.
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organization had historically been built around skill-
groups, localized, town by town, the BSAC leaders could
logically feel that real progress lay in a common organiz-
tion for all shoeworkers throughout the area.
What could be done to recognize the craft background,
and, at the same time, provide for united action where that
might be necessary? The answer, as conceived by Brother-
hood leaders, was specific division of functions. Indi-
vidual piece price adjustment could best be handled by
those most familiar with the particular operation, but
general wage problems were to be considered as the concern
of the entire membership group. Though the local crafts
controlled acceptance or rejection of new members, once
in, each individual was accorded protection from various
possible abuses of authority. Perhaps the most clear-
cut break with tradition was the shop grievance machinery
described above, the assumption here being that such prob-
lems involved an industrial, not a craft frame of reference.
An italized section, entitled "Just A Word About Our
Constitution", shows that this craft versus industrial
dilemma of organization.was dealt with at a conscious
level:
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"While we are organized under the craft system,
we call to your attention the limitation of
craft authority as contained in Articles 12 and
13, where the shop crew and shop stewards may
act without craft action. Individual craft
authority is also limited in making prices by
virtue of the provisions to be found in Section
8 of Article 5 and Section 2 of Article 10.1"l
Further, some of the members apparently hoped that the
Brotherhood would evolve into more and more of an indus-
trial union;2 but this has not yet occurred. In the
Constitutional Convention of May 1938, an amendment was
introduced calling for reduction in the number of craft
locals in the shoe factories from fourteen to six. The
arguments presented disclose the essential potency of
craft allegiance in the Brockton district.
The suggestion that ,weak" locals should be taken
in by "strong", was answered with rejection of help from
any "big brother": "We are one of the smallest locals in
the Brotherhood", said one spokesman, "but I don't think
anybody here will say that we are weak. We have been
tried and found not wanting."3  The practicality of a
"Heeler making prices for an Edgetrimmer" was questioned,
even assuming these groups to be in the same local: "You
1. BSAC, Constitution (original), p. 30.
2. This impression stems from discussions with charter
members of the union.
3. BSAC, Minutes of the Constitutional Convention of
April-May, 1938, p. 16.
can't tell me they can cut it down to seven locals and
they will sit back and let one person make their prices;
we havent got that far along into Utopia".1 Delegate
Edmud, after rejecting some of the "time worn" arguments
against consolidation, expressed what was,. perhaps, the
core of the problem, as follows: "The only thing against
it, and I voted against it, is because we are not properly
educated to the fact that industrial unionism is the only
way we can ever become strong."2
But what sort of "educational" experiences have
Brockton shoeworkers had during the period following the
Brotherhood's organization in 1933? Initial activity,
of course, centered not only around a general wage in-
crease in the "NRA period", but, as well, on feeling out
the Union's strength and control in the factories. After
working arrangements within the shops had been more or less
established, though, the bulk of activity turned to prob-
lems on which the various crafts could work more or less
as individual units. On piece price adjustments of one
kind or another, for example,3 the local, not the general
1. Ibid., p. 15. The reference to "seven" locals
rather than six includes the "Rubber Sole and Heel" Local,
which has no members in the shoe factories.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. The problems involved in this type of adjustment will
be discussed more fully in a later chapter; consequently no
further comment will be made here.
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union, appeared to be the locus of accomplishment. In
the meantime, pressure on the general level of wages was
primarily for the "status quo" or for reductions. Under
these circumstances, operating emphasis fell, not so much
on the common goals of all district shoeworkers as on
individual craft objectives, an area where some locals,
at least, could improve their lot. Edueational experi-
ence, then, may have tended to strengthen rather than
destroy jurisdictional lines.
The dilemma of a craft or industrial union structure
has been clouded throughout the Brotherhood's existence by
the "one big union" question, first involving proposed
amalgamation with the United Shoe and Leather Workers and
then with the United Shoe Workers of America (CIO).
Although previous experience with a ldictatorshipt" un-
doubtedly hurt the cause of amalgamation in Brockton, a
substantial group apparently found "nothing wrong with the
one-big-union idea, just so long as we don1 t go back under
the Boot and Shoe." Leaders of the Brotherhood. held many
conferences with outside groupsI and, on a number of occa-
sions, funds were appropriated, by vote of the General Board,
for the support of organizing activities in other
1. For example, as early as December, 1933, the Control
Board voted to send "four observers" to the "amalgamation
convention in Boston." BSAC, Memo of Control Board Meeting,
December 11, 1933.
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localities.1  On February 1, 1937, the question of joining
forces with the "CIO" was placed before a referendum vote
of the entire membership. The result: 2,041 for joining
and 2,962 against, or about a 60-40 rejection of "amalgama-
tion".2  Again, in the period following World War II, the
nCI0" question has arisen, but this time the fight has been
more bitter. Though a specific referendum or an NLRB
representation election has not yet been held, the general
elections of August, 1947 indicate that the results of a
referendum would be close.3
Within the Brotherhood, then, the question of organi-
zational structure has been faced consciously, as a problem
both of internal operation and of outside affiliation. The
answer has been a sort of federation, with functions divided
between the general organization and the individual craft
1. At least $10,000.00 was contributed to the USWA
campaign to organize shoeworkers in the Lewiston-Auburn,
Maine area in 1937. This action was later severely criti-
cized, principally by the Brotherhood's former adviser, Frank
A. Goodwin, on the grounds that the Maine factories concen-
trated on women's shoes, while Brockton was primarily con-
cerned with non-union competition in the ments shoe industry.
Further, in the spring of 1940, a cooperative organizing drive
was conducted by the BSAC and the USWA. Brockton Enterprise,
April 27, 1940, p. 1.
2. BSAC, op. cit., February 1, 1937. The amalgamation issue
has consistently been clouded by references of the opposition
to the influence of those whom they called "North Shore Reds".
3. In the election, the General President won by 2,816 to
2,449; the General Vice-President by 2,808 to 2,407, and the
Secretary-Treasurer by 2,645 to 2,606. Brockton Enterprise,
August 23, 1947, p. 1.
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localities•! On February 1, 1937, the question of joining
forces with the "CIO" was placed before a referendum vote
of the entire membership. The result; 2,041 for joining
anrd 2.,962 against, or about a 60-40 rejection of tamalgama-
tiont. 2  Again, in the period following World War II, the
IrCtOG question has arisen, but this time the fight has been
more bitter. Though a specific referendum or an NLRB
representation election has not yet been held, the general
elections of August, 1947 indicate that the results of a
referendum would be close.3
Within the Brotherhood, then, the question of organi-
zational structure has been faced consciously, as a problem
both of internal operation and of outside affiliation. The
answer has been a sort of federation, with functions divided
between the general organization and the individual craft
1. At least $10 OG.00 was contributed to the USWA
campaign to organize shoeworkers in the Lewiston-Auburn,
Maine area in 1937. This action was later severely criti-
cized, principally by the Brotherhood's former adviser, Frank
A. Goodwin, -aon the grounds that the Maine factories •concen-
trated on women's shoes, while Brockton was primarily con-
cerned with non-union competition in the mentsa shoe industry.
Further, in the spring of 1940, a cooperative organizing drive
was conducte-d by the BSAC and.. the IUSWA.,,. Brackton Enterprise,
April 27, 1940, p. 1.
2. BSAC, op. cit., February 1, 1937. The amalgamation issue
has consistently been clouded by references of the opposition
to the influence of those whom they called "North Shore Reds".
3. In the election, the General President won by 2,816 to
2,449; the General Vice-President by 2,808 to 2,407, and the
Secretary-Treasurer by 2,645 to 2,606. Brockton Enterprise,
August 23, 19+47, p. 1.
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units. But, perhaps, at a subconscious level, overtones
of the slogan, "local autonomy?, have disposed people work-
ing in the Union to' give craft sovereignty the benefit of
the doubtwhen functional questions arosein an operating
context. This disposition, added to the importance of
functions specifically delegated to. the locals, may have
strengthened jurisdictional lines within the Union. Now
from this rfederal" type of organizational, structure might
be -. expected an extremely complex decision-making prozess.
Questions within any one factory, for example, might be
decided on a general policy level, by the stewards, or by
the individual action of fourteen different crafts, all
acting more or less independently of each other. The way
this process works in the field of wages may now be examined.
Internal Procedure in laking Wage Decisions
The responsibility for decisions in the wage field
has been indicated above as divided in this way: individual
piece rate adjustments are the concern of local units but
over-all wage questions must be decided on a general policy
level. Each local, as outlined previously, appoints a
Price Expert, whose actions, procedurally, vary from indi-
vidual to individual; in some cases, he moves largely on
his own initiative and, in others, he is in close contact
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with or may even be instructed by his local price committee.
But, as a general rule, neither the Price Expert nor this
committee originate questions of piece rate adjustment;
these demands usually come from the factories, after a
member or a group of members have decided that a particu-
lar rate should be changed.2  The Expert investigates the
grievance and, to the best of his ability, tries to "get
something" for the complainants. The piece price system,
then, is not really "administered", perhaps because of
technical complexity and because of dependence, case by
case, on conditions of work peculiar to each factory.
Consequently, the initiation of rate changes occurs essen-
tially in response to grievances rather than to a conscious
surveillance of the districtis rate structure.-'
Now, if the actions of any single craft had no effect
on the position of the others, the only question remaining
for discussion here would be that of procedure in general
wage movement cases. But the locals are not operating in
1. Detail and examples of individual piece rate problems
will be presented in a subsequent chapter. The question
here is simply one of internal procedure.
2. Those aspects of Brocktont s piece price structure which
tend to create grievances will be discussed in a subsequent
chapter. Of course, many of these grievances arise from
causes outside the rate structure, and only later become wage
questions.
3. This is not always the case, since the Price Experts,
at times, may embark on a program of "adjusting" or "equaliz-
ing" rates in all factories throughout the district.
198
isolation; consequently, a second procedural question is
raised: "How is the boundary line between general and
particular interests defined and administered?" These two
questiQns are discussed below in the order in which they
were, raised.
During the first few months of the Brotherhood's
operation, general wage questions and strategy were con-
sidered in- the Control Board and instructions to negotia-
tors were issued as result of those deliberations. This
was not a- preconceived procedure but, apparently, just a
recognition of the Control Boardts initial position as the
'rseat r of authority in the union. On December 11, 1933,
the Lasterts delegates reported that they twere instructed
by their Local to get a 25% increase immediately". 1  A
motion to that effect was carried, and, shortly thereafter,
several conferences were held between a committee from the
Manufacturerst Association and the full Control Board.
Apparently, the lack of direction and accomplishment in such
large meetings demonstrated to the Board the need for a
smaller bargaining committee to' represent the Union. At
any rate, the "delegate to the price committee (local) and
the General OfficialsM were designated as negotiators for
the expected increase. As the center of authority passed
1. BSAC, Memo of Control Board Meeting, December 11,
1933.
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gradually over to the General Board, the opinions of the
local Price Experts, as a group, came more and more to be
valued on all wage matters. On March 7, 1934, the de facto
procedure was recognized by formation of a General Price
Committee composed of the various Price Experts, to "act
on general price listst' .
As presently constituted, this General Price Committee
is obliged to "vote on all matters concerning general price
contracts" and to "appoint sub-committees to negotiate
general wage and price questions in the shoe industry".1
The General Board of Directors retains final authority on
such questions, but any wage contract "must be approved by
a two-thirds vote of all members of the General Price
Committee, whether present at a meeting or not"t . 2  Pro-
cedurally, then, to those outside the union, the Price
Committee appears as the point of origin for wage demands.
Within the union, demands can be brought before the Com-
mittee from any one of a number of sources. A Price Expert
may make a proposal on his own initiative, or upon instruc-
tions from his local. The question may be raised by one
of the General Officials (ex officio members of all com-
mittees), by the suggestion of some one from the General
Board, or by a specific vote of that body.
1. BSAC, Constitution (as amended by the Constitutional
Convention, May 1938), p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 25.
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In actual negotiations, the advice of the Unionts
Boston attorney has generally been sought. The Officials
have usually been among the principal spokesmen, but most
bargaining has been carried out in the presence of Price
Experts or of representatives from the General Board. Of
course, any settlement which is reached must be approved
by a two-thirds vote of the Price Committee and a majority
of the General Board as well. While members of both these
groups derive their authority from the same sources, the
craft locals, the differences in personnel and in the
proportions of a decisive vote can and have deadlocked
and delayed specific settlements. Altogether, then, the
Price Committee is the procedural center of wage activity
in the Brotherhood, though proposals may be brought in from
a number of sources, and general settlements must also be
approved by the Board of Directors.
The question of interpreting the meaning of "local
autonomy" in piece price questions has arisen on many
occasions, though it has not generally been dealt with
explicitly. Possibly the most troublesome manifestation
of the problem occurs in those instances where general
policy decisions call for adjustments by each craft indi-
vidually.1  For example, the Union has several times
1. A strike or slowdown by one craft group plainly
affects all others on the "production line", but discus-
sion of that particular form of the question will be
postponed until the following section.
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agreed to a "one price, list to be. substituted for, perhaps,
three formerly used to apply to the various grades of shoe
manufactured in a given factory. Such, a "policy" decision
can only be implemented by piece-meal negotiations, craft
by craft, since a standard "formula" will not apply fairly
to all jobs.1 Now, for one reason or another, some of
the Experts may reach an impasse with the manufacturer.
Should they be forced to accept what other Experts consider
a reasonable proposition? Should they be forced to arbi-
trate the issue? In the meantime, members of other locals
may be losing "shoes", which the new arrangement was calcu-
lated to attract.
As cases of this sort, have arisen, they have been
considered and resolved one by one rather than by a more
sweeping revision of operating methods. These individual
actions may be drawn out, with the basic interpretation
made more or less implicitly, rather than on an explicit
and conscious level. The resulting boundary line between
"local" and "general" areas of control has, perhaps quite
necessarily, become a sort of "no man's land", defined in
1. Sometimes expediency may dictate application of a
formula. For example frustration with individual dicker-
ing led to adoption of this notion in:.. 1935: "That (name
of firm) be granted a 51V labor cost on the Navy shoes to
be made there, and each expert is to accept the same per-
' cent reduction." BSAC, Memo of Price Committee Meeting,
February 16, 1935.
r202
rather sketchy fashion and often under the dictates of
expediency. Placed in the context of a Tdemocratic
union!!, then, operations near this "land" are subject to
twists of procedure and possible delays, which may be
difficult to predict.
The Brotherhood's Attitude Toward Strikes
The same question of interpretation arises within
the Union's strike policy, though here the Constitution
is more explicit. At the inception of the BSAC, specific
objection was expressed against the Boot and Shoe's "no
strike" contract and against the decisions of the Massa-
chusetts State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation.
These objections might conceivably have resulted in a
union,disposed to strike on the slightest pretext. Never-
theless, following victory in 1933, neither the entire
Brotherhood membership nor the group represented in bargain-
ing with the Manufacturers' Association have been called out
on strike; and, even in cases of a smaller scale, this
weapon has been used with restraint. The Brotherhood's
Constitution specifically defines the procedure to be
followed before strike action may be taken.
A preliminary statement recognizes "strikes as costly
and injurious to all concerned" and opines that they "should
203
not be resorted to except as a last resortt. i However,
as opposed to the policies of the Boot .and Shoe, strike
machinery is provided, along ,industrial" .lines, with
authority ..centered primarily around the factory organiza-
tion.. "The Brotherhood recognizes ...the Shop -Crew in any
factory, acting through- its-stewards, as .having the initial
authority eln all matters concerning lockouts o::r strikes"t..2
Before any, action can .be taken, though, the question at
issue must be •referred to the General Beard, -which may
or may not give the. crew :"moral and. financial .assistance".
Even without such approval and .assistance. however, t he.
workers in a given factory may. call a strike, Tbhy a two-
thirds vote of .said crew, as expressed in a meeting called
for the purpose".3
Earlier analysis showed that problems involving
individual piece rates are handled by the various craft
Locals,.. but .these loceals: have been given no authority to
demonstrate the strength ,.of their feelings on controver-
sial issues . The principal reason for this apparent
contradiction, placing responsibility where there is no
authority, is fairly clear. The feeling apparently
1. BSAC, Conatitution (original), p. 16.
2. Tbid., p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 17.
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exists that small groups in a factory should not be allowed
to take action which would affect all the others, without
getting specific approval from that shop crew. But,
despite Constitutional provisions, the very nature of the
case makes probable the so-called tillegal" strike.
Under these circumstances, the record of the BSAC
has been good. Though small groups in various factories
have, on a number of occasions, stopped work without
getting proper autho-rization, the General Officials,
orders from the General Board, and pressure from non-
participating workers have usually brought swift termina-
tion of the strike. Qn the other hand, the Union's
ability to control "hotheads" has varied with the level
of economic activity and with the determination of par-
ticular managements to stand firm in such situations.
In the period immediately following World War II, when
Brockton factories were operating at full blast, some of
the shoeworkers apparently felt that their demands were
not given proper and prompt consideration. In addition,
"gun at the hip" tactics, as some manufacturers called them,
worked in many cases.1  Nevertheless, most disputes, even
1. Pressure may also be put on by- craft groups without
resort to physical movement from the factory. In disputes
over the price to be paid on one particular style of shoe,
the craftsmen may Just leave those shoes "on the floor",
in the meantime working on the other styles. Alternately,
they may agree to "do" the shoes on the day rate, but work
at a reduced pace. These tactics are apparently very
difficult for the general union to control.
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in this period, were settled through patient negotiations
and, sometimes, only after fairly lengthy arbitration
proceedings. In two postwar instances, craft groups
struck on a district-wide basis; but, both times, the
General Board declared the strike to be illegal, though
in one case the strikers were brought back to their benches
only after partial attainment of their objectives.1
Some of Brocktons manufacturers have apparently felt
this postwar situation to be serious:
tTDo we think the competitive shoe centers of
the United States will sit idly by while we
indulge in a war of nerves consisting of
sanctional strikes, wild cat strikes, slow-
downs, sitdowns, threats, refusals to arbi-
trate, and complete disorganizationt'?2
However, others have stated in conversation that trone thing
you must say for this union and its members is, they dont
1. The Lasters Local struck on October 25, 1947 demanding
a general wage increase. They returned to work on October
29, after the Manufacturers' Association had made a tcompro-
mise offer r. The Union"s General Officers and General Board
declared the strike to be "unauthorized and unconstitutional."
Brockton Enterprise, October 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29, 1947. On
February 17, 1947, the Edgesetters Local took a one-week
"Ttvacation't. Once again, their action was opposed and de-
clared illegal by the General Board. The strikers returned
to work on February 25, 1947 without gaining their objectives:
the issue involved was submitted to arbitration, which was the
manufacturerst original proposal. Brockton Enterprise,
February 17 and 25, 1947.
2. The statement was made by B. Harrison Cort, president
of the Stacy-Adams Shoe Company of Brockton. Brockton
Enterprise, December 6, 1946, p. 6.
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like strikes". On balance, the record of the Union as
well as the Constitution's provisions indicate that work
stoppages have been used with restraint, even though the
internal allocation of functions has imposed a disciplinary
problem on the governing councils.
The Age of Brockton's Shoeworkers
The long term decline of employment opportunities in
the Brockton shoe industry might be expected to result in a
relatively old work force, an important element of context
in the decision-making process. Many of the Union'ts locals,
using their prerogative of control over new memberships,
have refused to take in new men, with present members un-
employed. Such understandable restrictions appear par-
ticularly in the skilled trades, where a '~green" hand re-
quires relatively more training before attaining acceptable
proficiency.. For example, the By-Laws of the Cutters'.
Local state that "No apprentices shall be allowed on shoe
or lining cutting wherever there are capable, recognized
shoe and lining cutters out of work". Further, manufac-
turers naturally prefer to hire experienced craftsmen where
possible, in. order to keep training costs at a minimum. 2
1. BSAC,. By-Laws of the Cutterst Local (as adopted April
18,. 1934) p.. 11.il
21•. Immediately following World War LI,1 when skilled shoe-
workers were scarce,, the Manufacturers initiated and got the
Union to . accept a veterans' training program. The plan was
rather coolly received by some locals, and now, with plenty
of workers available, advertisements for "help" are once again
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Under these circumstances, the high average age of Brockton
shoeworkers may be particularly pronounced in the skilled
Job classifications.
The evidence shows that these presumptions are correct.
A 1947 survey of the employees in nine member factories of
the Manufacturers' Association showed that the average age
was 50.2 years and that the distribution as between locals
was as follows:l
Cutters' Local 52 years
Skiverst Local 49 "
Stitchers' Local 47 "
Treers' Local 56 "
Edgetrimmers' Local 54 "
Edgesetters' Local 55 "
Vamperst Local 54 "
Heelers' Local 52 "
Goodyear Operatorst Local 57 "I
Lasters' Local 56 "
Mixed Local 45 "I
Dressers' and Packers'
Local 40 t
Finishers' Local 46 "
In this distribution, all the crafts consisting solely of
skilled workers (Edgetrimmers, Edgesetters, Vampers, Heelers,
1. Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern Massachusetts,
Inc., Brief in the Matter of Arbitration between Shoe. Manufac-
turer Members of Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern
Massachusetts, Inc. and Lasters' Local , Brotherhood of Shoe
and Allied Craftsmen, stipulation dated April 22, 1948, Exhibit
H, p. 17. No figures are available for either the Sole Leather
Local or the Cut Sole Local. Another observer has summarized
his findings as follows: "The age of shoe workers reported by
12 factories answering our questionnaire indicated that two-
thirds were over 45 years old, while for the United States in
1940, only one-third of the workers were over 45 years of age."
Survey of Homer Hoyt and Associates as quoted in the Brockton
Enterprise, May 27, 1948, p. 10.
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and. Goodyear Operators) are above the average, while those
with :the least skill (Mixed, and Dressers and Packers) are
below. 1  These ""high skill,,- small locals ha-ve the same
representatione on- the Union' s General. and. Control Boards
as" the larger- locals; consequently~, thesed.eision-making
Boards: operate even mere in••h e context of an. elderly con-
stituency than the high average- ag-eý might indicate:. Wi.th
this age distribution-E: as background,- then, BSALC eperations
maybe- summarized by analysis of the, nion, as a decision-
making ag.ency..
The Brotherhood As An Organization for Making Decisions
Efficient decision-making is not the only objective
of the BSAC organization. The Union was conceived and
is operating, for example, within the principles of rule
by the majority wish and of protection for the individual
from arbitrary action both at his work place and inside
his own organization. Consequently,, as~ the Brotherhood
has approached its problemsa, other consideratlons than
thamt of effi ciency in making decisions, have been regarded.
as important.. Nevertheless, since that particular phase
of the Union ts operations, with the attendant compromises,
1.6 The can;lusion :that. skill ed workers are older than
,the average is what might• natura ally be ezpeted. It
was- further substantiated,,, though,, by a pe~rsonal- survey
in one of the district's larger factories. Here the
median age was 4~8, but-the median for seven skilled jobs,
which together accounted for one-sixth of the work force,
was -60.
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is an essential factor in Brockton wage activity,, its
analysis is pertinent here.
Four conditions, drawn from the preceding description,
seem especially relevant to the process of decision-making
within the BSAC. First, the organization encompasses many,
more or less independent sources of authority. Although
responsibility for performance of the various functions has
been divided between the stewards, the craft locals, and the
general officials and Boards, these responsibilities overlap
in important respects; consequently, there is no immediate
and. assured locus of authority in many particular cases.
Especially if the problem is difficult politically,• the
"buck" may be passed from one group to, another: l or, even
where the majority of, say .. the General Board desire a
specific course of action, implementation of their decision
1. For example, the General Board, through a negotiating
committee,, spent about two years in working out a. written
contract with the Manufacturers' Association in thep•eriod
immediately following Warld War • II.. Lacking confiderce in
the acceptability of this contract. the General Board referred
it ("passed the buck") back to the locals. When the resul-
tant vote was indecisive,, the-. Board., under pressure of imminent
Taft-Hartley Aat restrictions and of aý rival Union, finally
went on record. in favor of the contract.
Again,. ji 1935, the Secretary-Treasurer of the union
appeared before the Price.Committee and "commented on what
has taken place in the past twoa weeks". Ree stated that "those
elected to make deeisions have so- far failed to, do so. It is
a .case of buck passing and from, now- on they will either make
decisions or have no organization left before very long".
BSAC, Memo of Price Committee Meeting, February 2, 1935.
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may be delayed or, possibly, blocked in the Price Committee1
or by individual locals.2
This situation may be augmented by a second condition:
the various sources of authority are groups, not individuals.
As a result, the resolution of differences requires group
compromise and acceptance, which inevitably introduces addi-
tional variables. For example, assuming individuals from
differing groups confer and agree on a course of action,
they must still persuade their respective colleagues that
such action is, indeed, advisable. Further, the mores
surrounding Brotherhood operations as well as previously
mentioned Constitutional provisions both predispose those
in "control" to hesitate in making any decision opposed
by significant groups within the Union.
Third, the Union Officials hold what are essentially
political jobs; they are dependent for their offices on the
1. Earlier reference has been made to the possibility of
a simple majority vote in the General Board being blocked
by lack of a two-thirds vote in the Price Committee.
2. The difficulty of insuring local adherence to general
agreements is shown by a report submitted to the Price
Committee on March 9, 1936 by the Union'ts Statistician.
The report stated in part as follows: ITAn analysis of the
Labor Cost of each Department shows that despite the vote
of this committee on March 6, 1935, some price experts
have not followed out the vote and had actually put in
much higher pricest'. Ibid., March 9, 1936.
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approval of those "under. them. Consequently, they must
consider possible courses of action not only in terms of
perceived "rights, and "wrongs., but in terms of salability
as well. Some of the Price. Experts, for example, have,
in conversation, stated their opposition to certain large
wage requests which have been made: "Whoever heard of a
30% increase; it's ridiulous.. But I voted against one
once and all I heard at the next local meeting was, 'Hey,
what kind of a guy are yeou? Don't you want us to get more
money?"' On the other hand, along with these impediments
placed in the way of the decision-making process, a great
many people become actively involved in administration of
the Brotherhood's affairs. The fact of such participation
may lay the ground work for at least grudging acceptance of
a final course of action, once the decision has been made.1
Thus, the union has made wage concessions and still survived
even with rival unions making an active bid for the member-
ship's favor. In contrast, similar concessions, granted
through the Boot and Shoe machinery, served as the spark
for rebellion within that organization.
1. Acceptance is probably weakest when procrastination
means, in effect, a decision not to decide. In such
cases, the principal result would seem to be frustration
of interested members with the Unionts method of operation.
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But a fourth condition, bearing on the decision-making
process from the outside, makes this measure of acceptance
less sure. Especially in the period following World War II,
the rivalry between the United Shoe Workers of America (CIO)
and the Brotherhood has become a significant factor inside
the BSAC. Thus, in the contract negotiations of 1947, much
of the opposition can be attributed to pro-USWA sentiments
rather than to objectionable contract clauses. Under these
circumstances, elaborate internal machinery may be less a
key to membership acceptance, and more a weapon in the hands
of a rival group. 1
Consideration of these four conditions makes quite
understandable several summary characteristics of the BSAC
decision-making process. The Union, unlike many business
enterprises, is not organized to make decisions on short
notice. Since so many individuals and groups must consider
proposed courses of action, the natural disposition is to
require a considerable length of time before such proposals
can be made effective. Now the very fact of a lengthy
period of consideration, combined with the possibility that
a request may even be "ttabled" indefinitely, is, in effect,
a type of decision, though perhaps not made on a conscious
level. Such a disposition to discuss rather than to decide
1. Incumbent Brotherhood officials have stated in
conversation their particular objections to these ,trule
or ruin" tactics.
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actually imparts a sort of negative bias to BSAC operations.
To the instances of explicit rejections of particular
proposals,, then, must be added implicit, but none the less
effective decisions against positive action. Finally,
the situations in- which.. the Union is most likely to act
decisively and explicitly are those involving an immediate
crisis. 3n such cases, the fact that procrastination is
really a decision may become so apparent as to force some
conscious resolution of the problem involved.1. Altogether
then, the democratic nature and the mijed•. structure of the
..Brotherhood result in an extremely complex and. often
implicit preocess of making decisions.
Summary
Forces conditioning particular decisions in the
Brockton district shoe industry have, here, been divided
into three types. Influences which arise from the indus-
try's economic characteristics and from the process of shoe
manufacture have already been described and summarized. Now
the historical and institutional factors operating within
the Brockton district may be reviewed.
1. For example, if a manufacturer places before the
union officials and his own employees convincing evidence
that he must close his factory by such and such a date
unless some specific concession is granted, he faces union
decision-makers with a crisis, in which they must take some
immediate positive action one way or another.
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1. Employment opportunities in the areats shoe
industry have been steadily declining for the past thirty
years. This decline may be attributed to the decreasing
number of firms operating in the district, to the smaller
number o.f pairs produced, and to. increased output per
worker. One result of this decline is a relatively old
present work force, with the high-age people particularly
concentrated in the skilled trades.
2. Along with a long-term decline in Job opportuni-
ties, Brockton shoeworkers have been faced with a seasonal
pattern of employment and payrolls, which is twice as severe
as that for the comparable ments dress shoe industry.
However, the average annual income of those employed was
maintained near the high World War I level throughout the
twenties. After a slump during the depression, incomes
regained part of the lost ground by the end of the thirties,
then doubled during World War II.
3. Although most firms in the district are owner-
operated and manufacture men's shoes, they vary greatly
as to size, quality of shoe produced, type of sales outlet,
and financial strength.
4. The majority of these firms belong to an Associa-
tion, where the chief purpose is effective dealing with the
district-wide union which represents their employees. Vary-
ing objectives as between firms, however, mean that the
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importance of Association activities has fluctuated over
time, depending on the relative strength of perceived
common and conflicting goals.
5. The Union in Brockton is local in nature and
was fm~e' in a period of reaction against autocratic
action taken by its predecessor, the Boot and Shoe Workerst
Union (AF of L). Consequently, this Brotherhood of Shoe
and Allied Craftsmen was conceived and is operated as a
Idemocratict organization.
6. Within the Union, Boards composed of active shoe-
workers provide an effective check on the actions of all
Union Officials. Structurally, the BSAC is a mixture of
craft and industrial unionism, with functions divided
between various Jurisdictional areas.
7. The nature and structure of the Brotherhood
result in an extremely complex, uncertain, and, at times,
implicit decision-making process. Though this process
undoubtedly helps gain acceptability for particular deci-
sions, in the post World War II period, acceptance has been
complicated by the activities of a rival union, the United
Shoe Workers of America (CIO).
Manufacturers and groups of employees in the Brockton
district, then, make their decisions not only within condi-
tions defined by outside economic and technical develop-
ments, but, as well, in a sea of local circumstances. Here,
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the many variables may be as uncontrollable, yet just as
restrictive as those completely removed in origin from the
Brockton scene. Within this context, now, individual deci-
sions may be examined. Attention is turned, first, to
general wage movements, then to the Brockton Grade System
and to the problems related to administration of piece rates
in the district.
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CHAPTER VI
GENERAL WAGE MOVEMENTS IN THE BROCKTON AREA
The history of general wage movements in the Brockton
area since the Brotherhood's appearance there in 1935 may
be roughly divided into four periods. The first,.in late
1933 and early 1934, centers around increases given at the
start of the NRA program, though also coincident with the
Brotherhood's initial membership drive. The second period
covers the year 1937, in which four general movements took
place: two increases in the first half of the year and two
reductions in the second half. Wage increases granted
during 1941 and 1942 are the focal point of a third period
of activity, and increases won after the War's conclusion
form a fourth group.1  All of the movements referred to
in these periods were generally applied throughout the
Brockton district, and, in each case, the focal point of
the decision was the bargain made between the Manufacturers'
Association and the Brotherhood. On the other hand, during
the years of 1935 and 1936 and of 1938, 1939, and 1940 a
great many wage adjustments were apparently made; but these
were executed primarily on a company-by-company and, some-
times, a craft-by-craft basis. Consequently, these
1. For a summary of the dates and amounts of these
general wage movements, see Table
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TABLE 15
GENERAL WAGE CHANGES IN THE BROCKTON DISTRICT
SHOE INDUSTRY
1934-1947
Date of Agreement
Feb. 19, 1954
Jan. 11, 1937
Mg. 9, 1937
Oct. 29, 1937
Nov.-Dee., 19371
May z, 1941
Jan. 22, 1942
Nov. 24, 1945
Dec. 18, 1946
Effective Date
Feb. 12, 1934
Feb. 15, 1937
ag. 15, 1957
Oct. 29, 1957
Nov.-Dec., 19371
May 5, 1941
June 30, 1941
Jan. 5, 1942
April 4, 1942
October 1, 1945
September 2, 1946
Amount of Change
+10%
+ 5%
5%
-5%
+ 5%.
+5%
+ 5%
+ 5%
+15% (law grades)
+10% (high grades)
+l0o per hour
1. The exact date varied as between companies.
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adjustments, though in some ways the equivalent of general
wage movements, may be appropriately described as part of
the administration of Brocktonts grade system.
In this chapter, attention will be devoted to the
four periods previously mentioned. The objective here is
explanation of how and why these particular general wage
movements occurred, and the method employed is, for the
most part, three-fold. In each period, significant events
relative to specific wage changes are' described in more or
less chronological order, along with the apparent reasoning
and perception of the principals involved. Then, a
summary is provided of what seem to be the most significant
wage determinants in each case. The information presented
is derived principally from three sources. For the periods
before the War, chief reliance is placed on the private
records and minutes of meetings made available by the Manu-
facturers't Association and the BSAC and on news items in
the Brockton Enterprise. Although participants in wage
negotiations have filled in certain background details on
these pre-war movements, their help has been especially
valuable in assessing post-war events. In many cases,
such sources of information must be held in confidence;
however, specific reference is made where that is possible.
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General Increases in 1933 and 1934
The first general increase negotiated by the Brother-
hood was put into effect on February 12, 1934; but the story
of that increase must start some time before that date. A
previous chapter has outlined the union organizational
struggle which culminated in rebellion against the Boot
and Shoe Workers' Union, AF of L and in formation of the
BSAC. This struggle has been described primarily as a
dispute over internal union government; nevertheless, wage
activity was almost inextricably mixed in with political
objectives.
Questions arbitrated by the Brockton locals of the
Boot and Shoe resulted in adverse decisions by the Massa-
chusetts State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation in
both 1931 and 1932. However, these reductions and the
time consumed by arbitration machinery did not satisfy the
Brockton Manufacturers. Their arguments and the tremendous
slump in the Brockton district's production of shoes in 1932
apparently convinced leaders of the Boot and Shoe that
drastic action was needed. In December, the parent union
revoked the charters of Brockton's locals and appointed a
"commission" of three as the governing group. This commis-
sion negotiated a new and lower grade set of piece prices
with the Manufacturers; but, in the meantime, a rival union
was being formed and many workers stopped paying their Boot
and Shoe union dues.
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However, Brockton's factories were operated under
closed shop contracts, so that workers refusing to pay
weekly dues (Wtaxation without representation,) were subject
to .discharge. The: Manufacturers- hesitated in applying this
disciplinary measure. In the meantime, country-wide accept-
ance was whipped up for the President's :..NRA codes of fair
competition. Brockton. Manufacturers were represented in
the drafting of the code for the shoe industry, and, on
August 14, 1933, Association factories began operation
under the Blue Eagle. In accordance. wiLth provisions of
the Code, factories reduced their schedule of operations
from 48, to 40 hours. The weekly pay of day workers was
not changed (a 20% increase in the hourly rate) and piece
prices were increased by 10%. The Manufacturers also
chose this occasion for the announcement that ttra
employees working in factories operating under contract
with the Boot and Shoe Workerst -Union must be members in
good standiAg of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Uniont.l
Nevertheless, consequent discharges touched off the
strike which ended with recognition of the Brotherhood
as representative of Brockton district shoeworkers.
1. Brockton. Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
Minutes of a Meeting, August 2., 1953.
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Probably the most important factor in the determina-
tion, of this increase was the NRA pattern. Brockton Manu-
facturers could be particularly enthusiastic about main-
tenance of Ifairff labor standards, since they felt them-
selves handicapped by the relatively low wage: levels
prevailing in other localities.1 Minutes of Association
meetings show them2 understandably concerned over their
relative position in the industry. In a discussion- on
June 7, 19 for example, the provisions on the mini mum-
wage were voted on favorabhly only after one participiant
argued that nWe have been guaranteed that whatever program
is adopted, that it- is going to apply everywhere. Every-
body, in the same boat; nobody is hurtlt. 1  On the other
hand, the increase was' certainly a convenient, though
apparenrtly ineffective weapoen in the local labor problem.
Though the Manufacturers at first seemed tmpleased. with
the Imuch changed nethod of handling price questions, 2
by the middle of June they discussed ,efforts to amalgamate
the Unions by certain factions, mainly interests foreign to
Brockton. ,3 On August 2, in the same meeting which voted
the 10% piece price increase, a committee was appointed to
1. Ibid., June 7, 1933.
2.. Ibid., June I, 1953.
3. Ibid. June 19 1933.
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confer with Boot and Shoe officials in, anM attempt to
"reduce th~e dues from 35. to 251 weekly"; and later,
these officials were urged to "-do something about.....
represen-tation of the employees, especially in the conduct
of Unio. Affairs 2 .
In any case, the im inence of a drastie change im
bargaining institutions might be alarming to manufacturers,
especially since contractual relationships with the Boot
and -Shoe had meant, for the most part, freedom.from ..strikes.
In ..this. insta nce,. 1wever, "independent unions" were appa-
rently associated in the. min-ds of Brockton shoe company
executives with the chaotic conditions reputedly exaisting
in Lynn shoe factories. Thus, the possibility of amal-
gamation, between the two employee organizations indicated
a prospect .of strikes by small groups, .irresponsible.
action, and general- instability of operations . In a
lengthy-meeting between Brotherhood officials. and members
of the Manufacturers t Assoeiation on October 6,. 193•, the
conditions prerequisite to ending the strike were fairly
well settled; but the ..nature .of the Manufacturers.1 questions
1. Ibid.,. August 2, 1933.
2. Ibid,., August 22, 19533.
3. In Chapter IV, this fear of the Manufacturers that
"independent uniens" meant conditions reputedly existing
on the North Shore was shown to have played a part in the
1923 strike in Brockton.
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about the new Union showed their concern over this
question of amalgamation:- "What was there in the state-
ment in the paper that this group here had been in
conference with a union from the, North Shore?,; "Is the
North Shore going to make our prices?-I  Although
Brotherhood officials- answered that they "did not think
the North Shore methods were adapted to our local needs
here", groups in the Union, with vociferous leadership
from .radicals" in the Lasters' Local, were continuously
,agitating" for amalgamatidn with other groups of shoe-
workers, ,outside" the Boot and Shoe.
Most of the Brockton district factories reopened
on October ninth, after the Brotherheood had been recog-
nized as a bargaining agent" and with the understanding
that Know and forever". no one Wwould be required to pay
dues to the Booeet and Shoe WorkersV Union" .2  However,
the W.L. Douglas Company, one of the districtt s largest,
was unwilling to operate on that basis. On -October 14,
this concern announced that it would continue to ,honor"
its contract with the Boot and Shoe. Employees were
offered a Wcash bonust in the amount of their dues to
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., October 6, 1935.
2. Ibid-. October 6,. 19.3.
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that organization, plus "an increase of 10% in wages to
all piece workers and 5% to all day workers,.1l The strike
continued at the Douglas Company, complete with:a temporary
restraining order limiting the pickets to two at each gate,
strike breakers, some violence, and, finally, state
troupers.2  The company stated its intention of moving to
Lowell. The Union called that idea "ridiculous" and held
a meeting of Douglas employees. According to a memorandum
in the Union files, a vote was taken with this result: ý858
for the Brotherhood, 3 for an open shop, and 2 for the Boot
and Shoe. On November 2, 193, the National Labor Board,
after nearly two months of deliberations, issued its
decision on the district-wide dispute: employees were to
1. W.L. Douglas Company,, Statement Issued October 14,1933, printed and distributed . in leaflet form. Aceording
to the Company' s . statement, honoring' their contract was
not the only reason for their position. The Boot and Shoe
provided its "contract factories-i with a "union stamp" which
the company claimed was of great value in selling shoes.
Though the solicited "unanimous expressions of alarm" of
store managers may be discounted, there was probably some
truth to the contention. At any rate, the Brotherhood soon
came out with a Nstamp, of its own and wrote letters to
AF of L officials asking them to stop supporting the Boot
and Shoe. product.
2. According to a statement in- the Union files and
presumably made to interested employees, "In the leading
car was Johnny Wilson, anr ex-prize fighter, whao. has been
held on a number of occasions, both in Boston and New York,
on various crimes from murder on down. He is not, and never
has been, a shoeworker. Why have the Douglas officials hired
him? Is it to make shoes or trouble in this peaceful city?"
This strike-breaking episode is still strongly impressed on
the minds of many 1947 officials of the BSAC.
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retwn to work with "no conditions upon them as prerequisites
to their being re-hired" 1 Since most of the strikers had
been at work for almost a month, the decision may have been
really direeted toward the Douglas, controversy . At any
rate, the Company finally gave up its battle for the Boot
and Shoe contraet. The factory reopened; but,... for the
moment, the Company was stuck with its 10% offer.
In the meantime, the Brotherhood was also occupied
with other problems.. One of the most pressing apparently,
was the- question of spreading theý limited work opportuni-
ties among all members.. A committee from. the Union met with
the Manufacturers'a Associat•o ona November 10. 1933:
"This committee requested that an eq ual divirsion
of what work there was be made by the manufac-
turers in dull periods,. stating that they- were
not interested in building up low earnings toholster wage increases;- and, if the work wasa
distributed, it would not be used as low earn-
ing evidence in price negotiations.. 2:
The Manufacturers a agreed, but with the understanding that
a nconcerted effort" would be made to acquaint the member-
ship with the conditions of the agreement. Despite the
1. National Labor Board. Decision In the Matter of
.Brockton Shee Ranufacturers '~ Association, Rbsp'ondent,
On the Complaint of the Brotherhood of Shoe and AlliedGCraftsmen. ... 22 ev.b. 1 93Craftsmen, Complaina••nt, Cease. #55 , No~vember 2, 193.
The decision provided for a subsequent vote "to choose
their representatives for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining with their employers-. ...
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., November 10, 193.
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fact that Brackton was currently in a "dull seasonY,
however, pressure for a general increase existed within
the Union, coming especially from the .amalgamationists".
The Douglas Company, meanwhile, requested the same treat-
ment on wages as was accorded to other manufacturers; but
Union leaders apparently did not want to let the Company
off the hook. Besides, Union members could wonder,
"didn't the Douglas offer of 10% show they could afford
it--and, if Douglas could pay, why couldnt the others?"
On December IlI, 1933,, the Control Board delegates from
the Lasters' Local came to the meeting "instructedn to
"get the 25% increase immediately" . A conference be-
tween a group from the Manufacturerst Association and the
full Control Board was held on December 21, but talk was
chiefly of the "let's put our cards on the table" and
"let's find out where the trouble spots are. variety.
Pushed on their attitude toward a general increase, the
Association spokesman said he would have to "report back"
to a meeting of the Manufacturers.2  The next day, accord-
ing to his statements in an Association meeting, several
of the Union leaders. "came down to see me., and they "wanted
to know if a blanket proposition could be made to stop this
i. BSAC, Memo of Control Board Meeting, December 11,
192. December 21J 9
2. Ibid., December 21, I955.
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agitation". They want to "get 10% and get it quick"*
However, his analysis of the situation was as follows:
"The discontent seems to be largely in two
or three factories and to a much less degree
in: other factories. The problem is pretty
well centered in two or three places, largely
because of the number of gra-des,. in•addition
to poor working conditions on the Job, so that
the earnings are not what they shoul.d be; or
exacting better quaality of workmanship than
the price calls for;,. and in. some cases, they
think it is a lack of management".
He summarized the Brotherhood's attitude with the state-
ment that ,they have got to do something to show results".1
In line with this analysis, the Association voted
to "turn down absolutely a flat percentage increase".
Their program called for Reach manufacturer to get an
understanding of what is wrong in his factory"; "Let the
stewards bring up the grievances and say what is wrong";
"Put responsibility on the stewards and it will sober them
off". 2 Union leaders apparently agreed to go ahead with
the proposal of improving job conditions in the factories;
but not as an alternative to a general wage increase. If
they had any doubts as to the sentiments of the rank and
file, these doubts were dispelled in Control Board meetings.
The usually passive Stitchers went on record in "opposition
I. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit.. December 22, 193.
2. Ibid, Ianuary 2, 1954.
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to any wage increase less than 25%.,1 and the Skivers'
Local sent in the suggestion that "the Control Board
forget about amendments for awhile and get down to matters
of more importance to the workers by doing something to
increase wages".2  The Unionts Secretary-Treasurer stated
his opinion that "the manufacturers are going to kick this
thing along" and suggested agreement on a "definite retro-
active date?.3  On January 2, 1934, Union officials
reported that the Manufacturers "ducked the retroactive
agreement", but admitted that the "price of shoes had
been increased by them",.4
On January 8, the Chief Steward at the Douglas
factory reported on a five-hour meeting between company
officials, the stewards, and ,,some Boot and Shoe members".
According to his report, "During the meeting, (the company
spokesman) said the company is being penalized by having
to pay 10 percent more than the other factories in this
district. He further said that, unless this discrimination
is removed, the company will be forced to buy 125 thousand
pairs of shoes outside." Following this report, one of
the Union officials gave his opinion at length:
1. BSAC, op. cit., December 28, 1935.
2. Ibid., January 22, 1934.
3. Ibid., December 28, 1934.
4. Ibid., January 2, 1934.
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"This is a concerted move by the manufacturers to
attempt to stop wage increases now in progress in
the factories. I am sure the manufacturers' are
prepared to increase wages and we should insist
on getting increases now, when the cost, of living
and prices on shoes are going up."
fHe quoted the statement sent out by the Douglas Company at
the time of their "voluntaryt 10% increase, noting their
"optimistic outlook" and "willingness to admit that the cost
of living has warranted an increase in wages".
".This increase was granted last fall as a bait to
get their workers ,to break with the Brotherhood
and go back under the Boot and Shoe. Now a few
of the workers feel the Brotherheod shoual volun-
tarily give up the increase the Boot and Shoe
claims to have gotten for the Douglas workers." 1l
Heanwhile, though the Brotherhood s: general officials
openly opposed Joining with the newly formed United Shoe
and Leather Workerst Union, agitation for amalgamation
continued, especially within the Lasterst Local. 2  On
1. Tlid., January 8, 1934.l
2. In a Control Board meeting-on January 15, the Lasters
offered a resolution that "we amalgamate with the United Shoe
and Leather Workers' Union". Much of the opposition to this
Union arose from the "Communist" issue--for example, see Shoe
Workers,' Protective Union, Bulletin No. 4.. An Appeal For
Unity: Evidence, December 8, 1934. This bulletin quotes
from a statement made by Brotherhood- officials and published
in the Haverhill Gazette, February 1, 1934: "the methods of
the self-appointed leaders of the IAmagamation are not what
we in Brockton care to subscribe to...The North Shore can
have their Zimmerman and Zeible and their method". The
bulletin sums up the Brotherhood's position this way: "they
wanted trade union unity of. shee workers. They did not want
to be used by political agitators to support anti-American
theories".
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January 15,. the Manufacturers met to work out their next
move in negotiations. The discussion centered chiefly
around three points.1  First was concern over the possi-
bility of amalgamation. Brotherhood leaders had apparently
brought this question out_ in the bargaining: "If the North
Shore unions establish themselves here, it will be worse than
it is with the Brotherhood'. Most of the Manufacturers
apparently agreed: "Wetve got to stop the radicals from
getting into Brockton"; "We must make a move in a hurry
that would weaken the strength of the radicals here and
support the reasonable fellows..: Second, the ,anufacturers
seemed concerned about their competitive position, especially
relative to non-Association factories within the Brockton
area.. We would all be willing to increase prices, but not
during this season. Wait till they organize the entire
Distriet." One member named three firms which had been
".brought up' to the Brockton rates; but another expressed
the opinion that wit isi wrong procedure for our Association
to be the goat. Will others in the district pay?"t Third,
the Manufacturers, apparently were unwilling to take another
strike. .For example, to the suggestion that 'we put the
increases on only where they are needed, since we cannot
increase prices and sell our shoes",. a member replied:
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturerst Association, Inc.,
op. cit., January 15, 1934.
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"I think 10% would iron out the situation. If your idea
can be ironed out, all very well, but we cannot afford to
go through another strike. We donrt want any trouble in
our shop. It will cost you more money in the end, unless
you do something now and make some satisfactory arrangement."
After some further regrets that the "Douglas Company
had put over a 10% increase", the Manufacturers decided to
stress the importance of equalizing rates throughout the
district and to agree on a retroactive date of February 1,
1934, if the Union could "bring up" the "outside" factories.1
At a bargaining conference in the evening of January 15,
"where we expected to meet 42 but they had a room full of
about 300 people", "we started a little backfire. We put
up to them that we were meeting a lot of resistance in
regard to selling shoes because customers were afraid we
might be unable to meet deliveries promptly, that there
might be trouble in this district". The Manufacturers
felt that their proposal t"went over in good shape".2
However, at a union meeting after the bargaining
conference, the Lasters once again expressed their dis-
satisfaction and the Goodyear Operators proposed that wall
1. This was probably the beginning of divisions within
the Association, since some of the "Associate Members"
would be losers in the equalization process.
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., January 22, 1934.
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the competitors of the Douglas Company pay the 10% increase"
and that "if the request is not granted, employees of said
competitors take necessary steps to enforce the demands". 1
No action was voted that night, but, meanwhile, there was
strong pressure from the Douglas crew. The stewards appeared
before the Control Board and argued that the company had
purchased shoes for its own stores before, and that there
was no reason to believe they would not do so again. On
January 17, 1934, the Union agreed. to discontinuance of the
10% on February 1, on two conditions: (1) Douglas would
comply. with any changes in rates agreed to by the Associa-
tion; and (2) Douglas would "keep the business in Brockton
of the cheaper grade of shoes for the Douglas stores that
they had planned to purchase outside of this city".~2  On
January 22, the question of amalgamation was debated again
by the Control Board. Frank A. Goodwin, the Brotherhood's
"advisort and a state politician of some prominence, placed
himself "above" threats that "If you dontt lay off amalga-
mation, they are going to do a job on you up on the North
Shore when you run for Governor". Despite his oratory,
however, the Board voted to "invite the coordinating com-
mittee to a meeting". 3
1. BSAC, op. cit., January 15, 1934.
2. BSAC and W.L. Douglas Company, Contract, January 17,
1934. (A signed copy is in the Union files.)
3. BSAC, op. cit., January 22, 1934.
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On January 29, a committee of five from the Brother-
hood met with the Manufacturers. Union representatives
argued that day workers had received a 20% increase when
the NRA code was adopted in the Brockton district. Some
of the piece workers, they claimed, could not make the day
rate; besides, they were entitled to the "same relative
increase": another 10%. Apparently, the makers of high
grade shoes were more anxious to settle than those in the
low grade field, where price competition was most severe.
At any rate, the Manufacturers finally offered 5% on the
4th and 5th grades and 10% on the 1st and 3rd, along with
additional comment on the difficulty of selling shoes and
a request that the retroactive date be moved to February 12.1
But, back at a meeting of the Control Board, delegates felt
that "we should not take less than the Douglas Company" paid,
retroactive to February 1. "If they wontt agree we'll
arbitrate". 2  A statement to that effect was given to the
papers. The Manufacturers talked the situation over in a
meeting on February 13, expressing their feeling that "you
cannot increase prices and hold the volume". However, the
consensus of opinion seemed to be that an immediate and
negotiated increase would "settle more unrest than anything
else you could do". Their negotiating committee was
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
on. cit., February 5, 1934.
2. BSAC, op. cit., February 5, 1934.
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instructed to find out what terms were acceptable to the
Brotherhood and told that "if we are obliged to go to arbi-
tration3, then any change should only take effect as of the
date of the decision.1
On February 15, the Brotherhood turned the Manufae-
turerst previqus .•proposal down again,, reiterating their
demand for the Douglas settlement (10% oan piece prices and
5% for day workers) retroactive to February 1. However,
in this meeting, the negotiating committees finally started
some serious trading. The Union official& indicated they
might d'op the 5% demand for day workers (about 15% of the
membership) , and accept a retroactive date of February 12.
The MRanufacturers seemed amenable to a 10% increase on
piecem prices: to "bring. them- up to the same 20% that. is
already in effect with the. day rates". The Brotherhood,-
they were assured, would make other district manufacturers
match the Associationt s offer.2  Apparently, both. parties-
were ready for a settlement. The Union had gotten the:
"Douglas 10%";I the Manufacturers wanted to, nstabilize
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,, .
cit., February 13, 193. This had been, the past practice
in cases arbitrated before the Massachusetts Board of Con-
ciliation and- Arbitration. In this case, of course, "time"
was a weapon used by the Manufacturers.
2. Ibid., February 1.6, 1934. The parties further agreed
that one of the low grade Manfactureers, who had been partic-
ularly insis-tent on a 5% increase, should be treated separate-
ly,. as a special case. This Manufaeturer later settled on the
same terms as the others, retroactive to the, same date.
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conditions and avoid a strike", The Control Board and the
Association members approved the compromise and the agreement
was finally signed on February 19, 1934.
Many questions, of course, remain unanswered. Why was
the Douglas Company so determined to continue with the Boot
and Shoe Workers' Union? If it had not been so disposed,
would there have been any increase? Would the rank and
file have been willing to strike if there had been no in-
crease? If the best offer had been 5%? Apparently, 10%
was satisfactory. Why not 11%? Why not 9%? Questions
like these often refer back to a host of personal motiva-
tions forever lost to "retrospective" research and possibly
beyond the reach of even a "participant-observer". However,
taking as data, for example, the "fact" that Douglas did
wish to retain the Boot and Shoe contract, certain important
determinants of this increase are apparent.
1. The Manufacturers did not want to give any increase
which would affect their costs substantially. They seemed
greatly concerned over their competitive position especially
relative to other companies in the district.1 All through
negotiations, the Brotherhood was urged to "bring up the
outside factories-.
1i, Although there is no way to be sure, this concern
over the position of other companies- in the district may
have been motivated by considerations other than cost.
Most of these Manufacturers were owner-operators, and
there may have been some personal concern lest they appear
to be the "goat".
I
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2. This consideration and their initial belief that
the Union's demands stemmed primarily from "trouble spots"
led to the Manufacturers' first "offer", selective improve-
ment of individual job earnings.
3. Subsequently, they realized the imminent possi-
bility of "amalgamation" between their employees and North
Shore groups, which they considered "radical'". If possible,
they wished to prevent such a movement.
4. As the proceedings dragged on, strike talk
developed. The Manufacturers apparently took this talk
seriously and did not like it. To many of the members,
at least, 10% seemed less costly than a strike.
5. Union leaders felt political pressure from three
directions. The rank and file membership apparently
expected their new organization to show some immediate
results. The Manufacturerst selective proposal might have
satisfied this pressure, but a more emphatic demonstration
was needed to impress the "rival union" group and to satisfy
their demands. In addition, the Douglas increase, "claimed"
by the organization which the BSAC overthrew, presented an
open challenge to Brotherhood leadership.
6. The Union group had to consider possible 'employ-
ment effects" from their action. The Manufacturers, ability
to pay was tested by the Douglas increase and by the fact
that shoe prices had risen. There is no doubt that the
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Union took this question seriously; witness the con ession
(temporary waiver of' the IO%• increase)- to : the Douglas
Company, where their fight had been most bitter. In this
case, the Union, in effect, separated ability to pay, in
general, from the specific threat made by the Douglas
Company.
7. No direct evidence of the work group's willing-
ness to strike exists; however, certain known factors would
seem to bear on that "propensity", Employment and payrolls
had been depressed for several years, and a six-week strike
had just ended. These were not the days of "18-1/2ý",
and, even so, a 10% increase is big enough to be really
meaningful. Under these circumstances, assuming that the
"amalgamationists" wanted to "kick over the traces", they
probably did not have the necessary "cause". In this sense,
the settlement met the political requirements for stability.
8. By the middle of February, both sides apparently
felt the need for an immediate settlement if possible.
Bargaining never reached the stage of a clearly-drawn
"fight situation"; consequently, a compromise was feasible.
9. The publicly stated "reason" for the increase,
"to bring the piece workers up to the same 20% that is
already in effect with the day rates", was more of an
"excuse" than a "cause", though this arithmetic and its
coincidence with the Douglas increase probably helped
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determine the exact terms of the settlement. By that time,
however, all the real- shouting" was over.
Wage Movements in 1937
The wage agreement signed early in 1934 was to "remain
in force" until August 1 of that year., with the stipulation
that, if either party desired a change, notification.should
be given by July 1. Although both parties proposed changes
not only in August of 1934, but during 1935 and 1936 as well,
this general agreement was continued, nominally at least,
throughout that period. Many wage "adjustmentst, mostly
down, were made during these years; however, the center of
negotiations shifted from the Association level to that of
company by company bargaining. :Since the principal point
of reference for these adjustments was the so-called nGrade
System", their discussion will be postponed ...until the
following chapter.. In the year of 1937, however,, four
general wage movements took place, three. of -.them directly
through As:sociation-Broth-erhood negotiations :and another
company by company, with almost every concern participating.
In this section, these four movements are described.
Throughout the years of the. Bro-therhood~ ts existence,
there has been interest within the organization in the idea
of "one big union", but particular aversion to any association
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with the Boot and Shoe. 1  The various independent organiza-
tions of shoeworkers had never been able to compromise their
differences; however, when John L. Lewis announced the forma-
tion of his ,CIO IT, enthusiasm for unity of all shoeworkers
was renewed. The General Board sent Lewis its tcongratiula-
tions" and, in the fall of 1936, meetings with other inter-
ested groups were held. In October, the Board even hired
a band for a CIO "demonstration"t in Brockton. Through 1935
and 1936, the Brotherhood had been continuously faced with
the necessity of granting reductions in wages, a circum-
stance generally attributed to the "cut-throat" competition
in the industry and to the lack of any generally applied
standards for labor, even within Massachusetts. As the
pro-CIO "Brotherhood Educational Committee"t put it,
"We make our prices. Yesl We have good able
experts and an able price committee. During the
past three years these men have worked hard to
secure better wages for workers. But wage com-
petition in nearby sections makes it impossible,
not only to secure increases, but we are forced
to accept decreases....Our experts may continue
their efforts, but, until the workers unite in
one solid Union, covering all the shoe centers,
their efforts will have no good results; there-
fore, we are advocating uniting under the C.I.0.? 2
1. This did not include aversion to the AF of L; in fact,
on January 28, 1935, the General Board authorized the
Unionts president to discuss "one big union" within the
AF of L, "but not under the Boot and Shoe".
2. Brotherhood Educational Committee, Leaflet entitled
"Shoe Workers of Brockton, Brotherhood, CIO or Frank
Goodwin?n, undated.
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The incumbent BSAC General Officials apparently agreed with
these sentiments, but the recently defeated Union president,
self-styled "father" of the Brotherhood, did not. At any
rate, a lively debate developed within the Union. When a
date was set for a referendum -vote of the membership, the
original "advisor", Frank A. Goodwin, returned to Brockton
and "warned" the workers that they were being "sold out to
the Reds". "Vote No" at the referendum if "you do not want
the North Shore Reds?? to take you over 'l
Meanwhile, real pressure for an increase in wages
emanated from the locals. Despite the fact that several
factories had recently moved away from Brockton, the General
Price Committee received written "resolves" on November 23,
1936, asking for increases in wages for "all workers in the
Old Colony District" as follows: Edgetrimmers, 10% to 15%;
Vampers, 15%; Finishers, 20%; Skivers, 20%; Heelers, 20%;
Edgesetters, 20%; Dressers and Packers, 25%; and Treers,
25%.2 Now, members of the Price Committee, in the perform-
ance of their duties, had probably.become more aware than
the average worker of the competitive pressures working on
shoe manufacturers and of the limits placed on the total
1. This advice was printed in leaflet form and signed
by "John Murphy, Ex-President".
2. BSAC, Minutes of a General Price Committee Meeting,
November 23, 1936.
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amount of labor cost. The largest concern in the district,
the Diamond Shoe Corporation, had shut its factory down in
June, demanding a lower labor cost' before it would reopen.
An fimpartial commi ssionw was. investigating- the. dispute;
but, in the. meantime, at least one-eighth of the Union's
members, Diamond employees, were "on the streets". At
any rate, the Price Committee passed a motion agreeing
"that an inerease in wages is necessary in some cases,
but not in general"lI they preferred to continue hahdling
matters on a company by company and craft.-by craft basis.2
However,. the Uniont a General Board disagreed and sent this
resolution to the Price Committee:
"We realize, of course., as you do, that there
have been many inequalities. existing in our
wage scale in the past. However, there is no
doubt in- themnds members of the  of the General
Board that, regardless. of these inequalities,
that all shoeworkers are. under-paid, and at
this time, it is the opinion of the Board that
all shoeworkers should- receive an- increase".
1. Ibid.
2. The Price Committeets resolution continued. with the
opinion that "Rskilledf". erafts had borne .a .disproportionate
share" of the deereases. Ifý. the: Price Experts,. most of
whom had worked or were working at' skilled jobs, felt that
the "costs" available to :labor-. were severely limited, then
a general increase to all workers simply meant that relative-
ly less was available for particular crafts. They may not
have been. soL much. nagalnst" a general.- increase.... therefore,
as they. were "for"- advances-on specif:le jobs.
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The Board, the Union' s. rank and.- file, policy-making group,
then "reiterated" its,. stand "favoring •,-a. general inerease
in wages%".1
.The Price Committee acquiesced and a meeting with the
Manufaceturersl Association was., requjsted. The request
stated. in part:
fT "his Organization has recognized and consis-
tently followed a program which had as its
purpose the maint aining. of business, in. this
district and, 'at the same time, providing
mo.re work for.. ourmembers.. During the past
fe.w years, -this policy- has meant, in: many
instances, a recession in wage rates. As you
-kno•w, many increases have been- granted. lately
in. other industries. Some shoe manufacturers
.havef also voluntarily raised waes .
This mildly worded statement was received by an. •ssocila-
tion which had been losing membership over the- past twos
years ani which was apparently not too well supported by
those who nominally remained wtithin: the, organization, For
example, in- a report summarizing activities during 1936,.
this plea was necessary :
"Two hours a month for each member to give to
the Association in the best interests of all
isl not debatable. . O -ae she~ild consider it a duLty
he owes to our Association to be present and show
an interest in what is- geing on. We should be more
liberal in our, exchange of ideas and helpfulness to
each, other--for the. goad. odf .the• Association. "3
1. BSAt,• ov.- cit., November 30-, 1936,. The resolution
was read to the Price Committee at this meeting.
2. Brockton Shoe Tranufacturers Association, Inc., o_.
c.it. DLeeemrber 7, 1936., The- letter was, dated December- 2,
and. was. read. at the next meeting, of' the -.anufacturers.-
3. Ibid., January 26, 1937.
244
Yevertheless, the nominal members rallied to the occasion,
and, in a well-attended meeting,s a committee was appointed
to "protest against the advisability of any increase- in
wagesff.1
This committee and a group from the Brotherhood met
on December 9, 1936. The Manufacturers rejected the idea
of a general increase, and both parties agreed to "a study
in each factory", since "the problems affecting individual
manufacturers were different than the problems affecting
manufacturers as a whole in the District-. 2  In the mean-
time, from the Boston Shoe Show held during the first week
in December, reports indicated heavy selling and higher
prices. The Haverhill Evening Gazette, for example, quoted
"show managers" as saying that "if the first day's buying
is an indication of the 1937 market, all previous sales
records will be smashed.n3  On December 7, "even" the Boot
and Shoe Workers:? Union was reported as seeking higher wage
rates.4
Although the General Price Committee voted to accept
the proposal made in the first bargaining session, they were
i. Ibid., December 7, 1936.
2. Ibid., BDecember 11, 1936.
3. Haverhill Evening Gazette, December 1, 1936.
4. Ibid,, December 7,, 1936. The Boot and Shoe Workers'
Union had recently organized many of the Haverhill shoe
factories.
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also insistent on immediate action. At a conference held
on December 23, two counter-proposals were made by the
Brotherhood negotiators: a 5% increase on piece prices and
an effective date of January 1, 1937 for all adjustments
made in accordance with the Manufacturers, original "plan".1
Association members voted to go no further than their
original proposal; however, between December 23 and 29,
this attitude changed. In a meeting on the latter date,
they accepted the idea of a 5% increase and switched their
efforts toward securing an effective date of March 1, 1937.
Their argument that nit would work an especial hardship on
Brockton manufacturers to have an increase become effective
at once" apparently made some sense to the General Price
Committee: "twe recognize that shoes are sold in advance
and prices cannot always be increased immediately". 2
After this meeting, the Manufacturers instructed their
negotiators to "use every effort" to make March 1 the
effective date, but, "if this was impossible, to use their
own best judgment". 3  Under these conditions, a compromise
was possible, and agreement was reached on an effective
date of February 15, 1937. On January 11, 1937, a contract
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturerst Association, Inc.,
op. cit., December 23, 1936.
2. Ibid., December 29, 1936.
3. Ibid.
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was signed stating simply that 5% was to be added to existing
piece prices, the increase to "remain in force" during the
coming season--until August 15, 1937.1
There is no detailed record of the arguments within
the Union and the Association, from which to deduce the most
important forces working on decision-makers during this wage
change. However, circumstantial evidence indicates that the
movement's inception, undoubtedly the result of pressure from
the rank and file, probably stemmed from the enthusiasm and
promise whipped up by the CIO organizational drive. Quite
clearly, though, the Union "bureaucracy" was not at first
disposed to press the issue, nor were the Manufacturers
willing to grant any increase. Both these attitudes changed,
but only after the Boston shoe show and, especially in the
case of the Manufacturers, after receipt of fairly clear
evidence that the coming season would be a good one. This
the Manufacturers must have had by the end of December, for
employment and payrolls in the Brockton shoe industry rose
sharply in both January and February of 1937, reflecting a
level of activity greater than any previously attained since
the Brotherhood's organization.2
1. BSAC and Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association,
Inc., Agreement, dated January 11, 1937. The contract
consisted of 10 lines, stating the amount of the increase,
the effective date, and the duration of the contract. Other
conditions of employment were worked out company by company
and defined, sometimes in writing but more often, simply
implied.
2. Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries,
Employment and Payroll Earnings in Manufacturing, for the
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However, the threat of organization by the CIO may have
meant more than just the conception of this increase. Al-
though the Brotherhoodts leaders favored "taffiliation", the
Manufacturers apparently did not. The BSACts first president,
the original "advisor", the "Red" issue, and the Boot and Shoe
experience with control by "outsiders" were all major factors
in a pre-referendum campaign. Affiliation was defeated in the
vote taken on January 28, 1937. The 5% may have helped make
workers feel that they did not need the CIO to win increases.
One cannot be sure that the Manufacturers had this possible
effect in mind;, but a year-end report had this to say on the
subject:
"During the past year, through efforts of our Asso-
ciation, we were fortunate enough to keep the C.I.0.
from organizing our workers; much work was done, and,
when a referendum vote was taken, the result was very
strong for remaining a B.S.A.C. member; eliminating
any connection with the C.I.0.,n
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc., opO. cit.,
January 27, 1938. The reasons why the Manufacturers should
resist movements toward participation by their employees in the
affairs of "one big union" are not at all clear. Presumably,
it would be to the advantage of organized centers to have non-
union sections of the industry brought under union control. They
may have felt a general organizational drive could not succeed;
they probably feared the CIO0s "strike methods"; or they may
have sincerely desired to avoid dealing with men who had the
reputation, at least, of being "Reds". On the other hand, though
they had to work through the local union, they had had the ex-
perience over the past three years of winning most of their
battles. The Manufacturers were still "on top", in that sense.
Presumably, any personal "needsfn they might have for dominance
in the local situation would be more difficult to satisfy if they
had had to "take orders" from John L. Lewis. Though such intro-
spective reasoning probably was not explicit, there is some evi-
dence that it did exist. Manufacturers comment today on this
period as follows: "We had some birds around here then who had
to win, no matter how much they lost".
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At any rate, the increase was granted and the refer-
endum had been held before negotiations.-in other nearby shoe
centers were completed. The returns came in during February:
the Boat and Shoe got 12-1/2% in Haverhill and, in Lynn, a
CIO stronghold, a 15% increase was granted. Perhaps, after
all,l the Brockton ManufacturersT had. been motivated simply by
the desire- to. keep their increase- down as low as possible.
Had they seen these larger changes coming anda signed up their
U±ion before such conditioning circumstances-- became a reality?
This question could only be answered through participation in
their deliberations at the. time; however, as early as February
2 (after the signing of the Brockton- contract and before the
results of North Shore negotiations were generally known) 1,
the Manufacturers: discussed tprice advances here and, in other
places.r1  A newspaper statement was read stating that "the
North Shore- wage decreases since1931 were approximately 50%,"
and- the comment: was. made that "our.s amounted to. only -a small
portion of this".. Nevertheless, the decision was made to
1. Information on wage changes, even in nearby sections
of the shoe industry was apparently both scarce and un-
reliable. As .Brockton Manufacturers knew from their own
experience, publicized: general wage movements by, no. means
told the whole story; consequently, most reliance was placed
on relative wholesale price quotations as an indication of
relative labor costs. Of course, North Shore factories
produced woments shoes and so were not competitive with
Brockton. Nevertheless, wage comparisons via the employee
.and union route., meant that manufacturers had to consider,
at least, North Shore wage activity. However, there was
not and is not any evidence: of a follower-leader pattern.
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"obtain knowledge of the earning power of our prices per
hour". This idea was again discussed in March, when the
Manufacturers seemed to feel that ,"We would have to meet a
request for a further increase in July".
Within the Brotherhood, as one would expect, there was
also talk of more increases. Despite some initial difficul-
ties, the Union made non-Association members pay the 5%, as
Association members had been assured they would. Except
for the seasonal slump in May, employment and payrolls in
Brockton were fairly well maintained. Individual locals
requested conferences with the Association, stressing the
original plan of selective increases. The General Board
voted to eliminate Saturday work, over protests that
.fBrockton district manufacturers should have an equal chance
with manufacturers whose schedule of hours is from 45 to 48,
and in some instances 54." However, Association members
resisted wage changes, maintaining that their contract
guaranteed stable rates until August 15. On June 28, the
Brotherhood notified the Association of Tcur desire to change
the present agreement", and, after an exchange of letters, a
conference was held on July 13.. The meeting, attended by
17 union representatives (before whom union leaders are
supposed to talk tough and make exaggerated claims), was
marked by a conciliatory tone. The General President
stated his "demand" as follows:
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"The Unions in their various Locals have
expressed a desire for a 15% increase, but
they realize that too large an increase
might halt or hinder an increase in the flow
of shoes to Brockton, and they desire that
the manufacturers give all the traffic will
stand. ttl
He gave as "reasons" for the request that the cost of living
had risen and that other sections had given more than 5%.
The Manufacturers stated their "appreciation"t of the way
the Union had carried out its past contract, but expressed
the opinion that an increase would be detrimental to the
"final gain of the operatives". They argued that other
sections, "in all probability", started from a lower labor
cost and were still "below ours". At this point, the
suggestion was made that "smaller committees" be appointed
to ",study the figures which both sides have to present..n2
Two days later, the Lasters' Local, always a vociferous
advocate of large increases, strikes, and amalgamation with
North Shore unions, presented to a committee from the Associa-
tion "certain prices which must be agreed to before the general
agreement". Apparently, "strong statements" of possible
contingencies were made, and one Union representative
"intimated that they would act independently if necessary".
Although the Manufacturers stated that "general price
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturerst Association, Inc.,
op. cit,, July 13, 1937.
2. Ibid.
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arrangements would have to come through the Brotherhood",
they may have been somewhat impressed by the threats.1
A meeting of the general negotiating committees on
July 19 bogged down in argument over specific piece price
and earnings comparisons and ended in a stalemate.2  Mean-
while, the Brotherhoodts election campaigns were getting hot.
John Murphy, the Brotherhood's first president, defeated for
office the previous year, publicly accused incumbent offi-
cials of "wasting" $15,000.00 of the workers' money in trying
to organize employees in the Lewiston-Auburn, Maine area,
where the principal product was woments, not men ts shoes.
He pointed out that this campaign was carried on coopera-
tively with the "CIO", despite the recent referendum vote
not to affiliate. Murphy's plea ended with this statement:
"It is time to quit talking about Chinese walls
and Maine workers, and to give a little attention
to the unemployed in this district, particularly
the Apt, Diamond Ladies' and Young Shoe workers,
all of whom are out of jobs because workers in
territory now or formerly under the jurisdiction
of the United are working on their shoes."3
These charges were answered with proof that the General
Board had sanctioned all expenditures, and Murphy was
specifically taken to task by the incumbent president,
as follows:
1. Ibid., July 15, 1937.
2. Ibid., July 19, 1937.
3. Brockton Enterprise, July 12, 1937.
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'
THe further states that business must be maintained
at any cost. This is where Murphy and I disagree.
When he was President of this organization, he
continually favored wage cuts and more factories
moved out of the district during his administration
than have since. I am in favor of preserving indus-
try, but not at any cost."l
In addition, however, the Manufacturers entered the public
press with a statement that their labor costs were relatively
high, and that, therefore, any increase would hurt business
in Brockton.2  The Union answered publicly that "Every time
the workers ask for an increase, the same arguments are ad-
vanced as were put forth in this statement." The BSAC case
was summarized this way:
?"The shoe workers in Brockton are not receiving
enough money for the work they perform or to
support their families in the way that they
should be supported. It is unfortunate that
we cannot argue for an increase in wages solely
from this point of view. Whether we like it or
not, we must take into consideration that the
workers here and in other districts are compet-
ing against one another, and until such time as
this unfair competition is eliminated, we will
continue to be the victims. We realize that
to drive our wage scale above what competition
will stand would be disastrous for all concerned.
However, we do think that an increase is warranted
and justified at this time. We are not asking any
more or as much in some cases as the outside dis-
tricts have already given.?3
On July 29, the Manufacturers met to consider the
situation. After some discussion of their beliefs that
no increase should be granted and that prospects for the
1. Ibid., August 3, 1937.
2. Ibid., July 24, 1937.
3. Ibid., July 26, 1937.
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coming season were not good, one participant asked "if any
of the members thought that they could get away without any
increase". The consensus of opinion on this matter of
feasibility was "not at present, as the election of the
Brotherhood is to be held very shortly"t. After strong
expressions in favor of a clause stating that "no preferen-
tial price list shall be granted to manufacturers not members
of our Association, unless our members are granted the same",
tbe negotiating committee was empowered to "make the best
terms possible, not over 5%.1 Brotherhood negotiators got
the 5% offer; but, in addition, a special concession was made
to the ever-threatening Lasters: Bed Machine Operators, who
had one of the most back-breaking jobs in the shoe factory,
were to get 10%.2 This arrangement was accepted by the
Uniont s General Price Committee and the General Board and
the contract was signed on August 9, to run until May 14,
1938.3  Included, was the "most favored nation" clause
so important to Association members.
For the rest of August the Union turned its efforts,
with some success, to the problem of making the "outside"
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturerst Association, Inc.,
op. cit., July 29, 1937.
2. There had recently been a change in the method of
performing this operation, which was resented by the
Lasters. However, technicalities of piece price adjust-
ment were probably more the "reasontt than the rtcauseT" of
this concession.
3. The contract was actually dated "August 16, 1937".
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factories meet the increases granted by the Association.
However, employment in Brockton's shoe industry declined
rather sharply in September and payrolls fell off in both
September and October. On September 28, one of the Union's
officials argued at a Price Committee Meeting that "the
cheap shoe manufacturers go along under the scale they are
now paying and not put any further wage increase on them".
No decision was made, so that, in effect, the low grade
concerns got their "relief". By the end of October, the
threat and reality of unemployment was causing great unrest
among the membership. On October 25, for example, the
Finishers' Local sent the following resolution to the
General Board:
"WHEREAS: Approximatelv 3.500 shoe workers have
WHEREAS:
WHEREAS:
BE IT
RESOLVED:
been thrown out of employment in the
Brockton District, and
The shoe industry seems to be in a state
of chaos due to the cut-throat competi-
tion going on in the industry, and
It is evident to all that we must be in
a competitive position if we wish to
continue making shoes, now therefore
That we, the members of the Finishers
Local of the Brotherhood of Shoe & Allied
Craftsmen in meeting assembled on October
15, 1937, go on record to notify the
General Board that we are in favor of offer-
ing to any and all manufacturers in the-
District a price low enough for them to bring
back the business that has been lost to this
District" .1
1. This resolution is in the union files. Two other
"resolves" were included: (1) it is "not our intention to
induce manufacturers to move from organized union territory
by offering them a lower wage scale"; and (2) a vote in favor
of a national organization of shoeworkers and, strict economy
in the local use of funds, in order to build up an organizing
fund.
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Earlier, the Association Manufacturers had complained to
the Union about non-payment of the August 15 increase by
unionized non-Association firms in the district; and, on
October 29, in a meeting held at the suggestion of the
Association, the Union's General Officers agreed that
"it is doubtful if (the last increase) was wise" and they
stated that "although the signatures were on the dotted
line, they did not intend to hold this District to the
fulfillment of same if it is detrimental".1  Later that
same day, the Price Committee voted to "return to the
prices in effect previous to August 15".2
On November 4, a meeting with the Association was
held in which the Union spokesman stated that any manu-
facturer who could "give average competitive conditions"
would be granted "prices that were competitive"2.3 Employ-
ment and payrolls in Brockton hit a new low during November.
Subsequently, though the Union refused to "let go"t the
"February 5%" in direct negotiations with the Association,
this concession was granted on the cheaper grade of shoes.
Negotiations shifted once again to a company by company
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., October 27, 1937.
2. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
October 29, 1937.
3. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., November 3, 1937.
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basis, and, for concerns both in and out of the Association,
the February increase was "waived" on all except the highest
price lines. I
The year 1937, then, was, in effect, a stand off,
insofar as general wage movements were concerned. The
Bed Machine Operators retained their 5% advantage, and
rates on the highest priced lines of shoes, which, by this
time, represented only a small proportion of the total
volume in the Brockton district, were 5% higher than at
the yearts start. However, there were more out and out
general wage movements in Brockton during 1937 than in any
other year from 1955 through 1947. Some of the more impor-
tant determinants of these wage changes may now be summar-
ized.
1. In every case, the Manufacturers were out to
limit any increase in wages or to secure a reduction. In
discussion, even among themselves, the fear of losing
orders because of increased costs seemed to be the principal
motivating factor.
2. The Manufacturers did not want the CIO to repre-
sent their workers. The timing of the initial 5% may have
been influenced by this desire. In general, they acted
quite consciously on the assumption that a union is a
I. In December, rates on the North Shore were also
reduced to their 1936 level.
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political institution, which must be dealt with accordingly.
In granting the second 5%, they recognized from the first
the imminence of "another increase" as a result of "in-
creases in other sections", and they were resigned to the
potentialities of a union election campaign, as they
finally decided to "make the best terms possible..
3. In comparing their position with that of competi-
tors, the Manufacturers used as a principal guide their
own ability to meet prices in the product market. Their
own experience taught them that generally known wage
changes as totaled up from 1933 to 1937 presented only a
partial account of all wage activity. One principal point
of comparison, however, was the treatment accorded by the
Brotherhood to non-Association factories in the District,
with whom Association companies were often in direct
competition.
4. In all the negotiations, the Union was affected
by consideration of the "employment effect" of any actions
which might be taken. The Price Committee did not press
for the first 5% until the prospects of a good season were
indicated. In presenting demands for the August increase,
the approach was moderate, despite the fact that other
nearby shoe unions had recently received a larger increase
than they had. The reductions were granted by the Union
clearly because of the sudden drop in production, though
258
an attempt was made to discriminate between the ability
of various grades to carry extra increments of labor cost.
The Union discarded recently agreed-on contractual obliga-
tions, since it was felt that these ?'might be detrimental".
5. In the union election campaign, the winner had,
it is true, favored ,preserving industry, but not at any
cost"; however, some significance may be attached to the
fact that "reasonableness", the inclination to take the
"employment effect" into account, was a key political issue
in the campaign.
6. The Union as well as the Manufacturers relied
primarily on the volume of business and the prices of shoes
as a guide to the advisability of pressing a wage demand.
Although the Union Officials had seen many cost and profit
(or, in most cases, loss) figures as a part of the indi-
vidual adjustment of grade prices,l that information was
not publicly or continuously available, as a standard for
judgment. 2
1. The attempts made by the Union to adjust the labor
cost at various factories will be discussed in the follow-
ing chapter on the Grade System. Here, the fact may be
noted that a position of statistician-economist was filled
from 1934-1941 by a man who drew a higher salary than the
Union's General Officials.
2. These owner-operated concerns are required to file
only a brief and uninformative balance sheet with the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Corporations. Since the
war, profit and loss statements have been available for
a few of the larger companies.
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Pre-War General Wage Movements
General wage changes in the immediate pre-war period
were of two principal types: (1) increases on the so-
called "civilian" wage rates, and (2) negotiation of
specific piece price lists to be used by manufacturers
in bidding on particular government orders. With the
enactment of draft legislation and the expansion of the
armed services, Army and Navy contracts became increas-
ingly available; consequently, there was a great amount
of that second type of wage change. Here two examples of
these changes are used to illustrate, on the one hand, the
possible effects on Union decisions of a perceived oppor-
tunity to increase employment, and, on the other, the way
in which minimum wage provisions can become the vehicle
for an increase in all piece rates. In addition, one of
the general increases on ncivilian" piece prices is dis-
cussed, along with some of the significant aspects of other
general wage activity during the 1940-1942 period.
Before turning to specific wage negotiations, the
initial method of Army and Navy procurement may be outlined.
This procedure consisted, from the Brockton point of view,
of three parts: (1) announcement by one of the Services
that bids on a specified quantity of shoes, to be con-
structed according to designated standards, were wanted;
(2) negotiation between interested manufacturers and the
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Union on the price list appropriate for that order; and
(3) public opening of the bids, so that all knew which
firms tried to get the contract and what price each one
quoted. Under these circumstances, some opportunity was
afforded for direct comparison of Brockton's competitive
position in relation to other firms in the industry.
Brockton's first important government contract was
won in the fall of 1940, generally a bad year for the
district. Total production had dropped below ten million
pairs for the first time since 1932; and, though one new
mens shoe manufacturer moved into the area, the only
remaining factory of the Diamond Shoe Corporation, formerly
the largest employer in the district, was closed indefi-
nitely. During the first six months of the year, the
government purchased about 800,000 pairs of shoes; how-
ever, over half of these were won by the International
Shoe Company. None of this business came to Brockton;
in fact, manufacturers there did not even bother to bid,
in most instances.
Early in the year, with considerable fanfare, the
Manufacturers' Association was "reorganized"t, complete
with a new President, a new name, and some additional
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members.1  In may, "cooperation" meetings were held with
the Brotherhood. Though the Union would not agree to
specific suggestions made by the Manufacturers, both
parties publicly and privately expressed their interest
in "volume production and higher payrolls" for Brockton.
Attention was focused on the government orders. When bids
for 277,000 pairs of Navy shoes were opened on August 1a,
1940, all of Brockton's participating firms were found to
have bid too high to get a share of the contract. One of
the manufacturers felt compelled to make a statement to
the press explaining his position. He claimed to have
"secured the price lists" used by firms already making
service shoes and to have "submitted these lists to BSAC
officials". The Brotherhood, he said, gave him a "labor
cost five cents higher per pair than that being paid in
1. The Association was still predominantly composed
of concerns making relatively high grade shoes and located
in the City of Brockton. Several important, unionized
companies in the district stayed out. The organization was
presumably strengthened by provisions in the Constitution
stating that all piece price changes should be cleared
through the Association. The full-time executive was given
the title of "President", instead of nSecretary", and the
position was filled with a man who had some independent
prestige, a "former Mayor, formet shoeworker, and former
manufacturer".
2. Manufacturers suggested the elimination of "stints?,
of the steward system, and rf extra personnel in the fac-
tories. Brockton Enterprise, April 27, 1940. The Union
claimed there were no stinrts, that the steward system pro-
tected the worker, and that the manufacturers, in hitting at
the "stagger system",, were trying to "get rid of the old-
timers". Brockton Entexrprise, May 2, 1940.
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other shoe centers making navy shoes". This extra labor
cost and "overcaution, in his "figures" were the reasons
given for failure to get part of the contract.1
The Brotherhood, in an answer to these statements,
reviewed its position on this and other government con-
tracts in the local newspaper. Earlier expression of a
willingness to meet "competitive conditions" with "com-
petitive prices" were recalled; and, on the matter of
army contracts, the Union stated that the low bidder in
Brockton was 355 too high on the "first" order and 12ý
too high on the next one.
'"When the third order was going to be given
out, Mr.(name) informed us that he was going
to bid on this order sure, but he did not have
much hope as the labor cost was three or four
cents too high. Whereupon, we told him to figure
the shoes, and, if he found that the three or four
cents difference on the labor cost was the only
thing which prevented him from figuring low enough
to get the contract, we would not be found wanting,
but would concede the three or four cents as our
part in the cooperative effort to bring these shoes
here. Mr.(name) never informed us what his figure
was on this order, but he did not offer any bid."2
1. Brockton Enterprise, August 15, 1940.
2. Brockton Enterprise, August 20, 1940, p. 14. Manu-
facturers could justifiably feel uncertain of the Union
spokesman's ability to deliver on this promise. Decisive
action could be blocked by five negative votes in the
Price Committee, for example; or a lengthy period of
"consideration and debate" could cost the manufacturer
money. In this case, the "gain" may not have been
considered worth the "gamblen.
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Several weeks earlier one of the manufacturers had stated
that Brockton firms were suffering from the "creeping
paralysis of overhead costs". The Union seized on this
phrase and the admission of "overcautionn, then pointed
out the fact that the principal complainant in the Navy-
order dispute had bid 240 per pair too high to get this
contract. Since this manufacturer's estimate of his labor
cost disadvantage was only 50 per pair, the Brotherhood
concluded:
"We believe the duty of the manufacturers of
this district is to put their own houses in
order instead of blaming the Brotherhood for
their inability to get more shoe business.,l
Previously, the City's Mayor had held conferences
with the parties, trying to bring about low bids for
government contracts; and he had been on well-publicized
trips to Washington, attempting to get "equal distribution
of the orders" and protesting against the possibility of
prison-made shoes. Against this backdrop, the Brotherhood
prepared a price list for a prospective one-million pair
Army order. On August 20, the date on which their "answer"
in the navy-shoe dispute appeared in the press, Union
Officials announced that they had "available a price list
which is comparable item for item with prices now being
paid by the largest manufacturer of service shoes in the
1. Ibid.
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country".1 The complete story of this price list cannot
be discerned from the Union's records; however, these
facts, along with the conditions described above, do appear
to reflect the pressure under which Union Gfficers were
working: (1) a price list had been obtained by the Union
from a large manufacturer of government shoes; (2) on
February 26, 1940, the Price Committee had appointed "a
committee of 3, with the General Officers and Statisti-
cian" to "meet for the good and welfare of the B.S.A.C. ,2
and (3) after long deliberations, this committeets sugges-
tions, which tended to centralize responsibility on price
questions in the hands of the Statistician, were adopted
by the Price Committee.3
These facts indicate that Union Officials, though
they "blamed" the Manufacturers for Brocktonts inability
to get contracts, were anxious to clear themselves from
the charge of keeping business out of the district. An
1. Brockton Enterprise, August 20, 1940.
2. BSAC, Memo of a Price Committee Meeting, February
26, 1940.
3. Ibid., August 19, 1940. Five rules were adopted. These
rules created a department within the Union, with the Price
Statistician as its head, which was to collect all piece prices
and piece price changes, as agreed to by the various locals.
In addition, the motion was carried that "all price experts be
made responsible to the Price Statistician for the carr ing out
of the agreements voted by the General Price Committee.' Members
of the General Board raised some valid "Constitutional? ques-
tions about this arrangement. Since Tamendments" were offered
to the locals, the "rules" probably represented a sort of moral
law to members of the Price Committee, rather than absolutely
binding restrictions on individual freedom of action.
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effort was made to prepare "competitiven' prices, and,
within the Union, to put the function of price-making on
a more orderly basis. Just how low was the price list
submitted to those Brockton Manufacturers interested in
this large Army order? The bids were opened on August
27. One district firm quoted a price of $2.41 per pair,
another $2.45, and a third, $2.48; all these bids were
lower than any other submitted, including those of the
International Shoe Company, Brown Shoe Company, and General
Shoe Corporation, three of the largest concerns in the
industry.1  Apparently, the Union's price list was low
enough to be "competitive", with a few cents to spare.
The total labor cost involved was only 37.30, about 41
under the lowest "civilian" price list for a similar type
of shoe. If the results of the secret-ballot election
held a few days after these bids were opened is any indi-
cation of the feelings of the rank and file, this action
must be judged a "political" success. On August 30, all
the Union's incumbent General Officials were re-elected
by "landslide" margins.2
In these last negotiations, the objective of Union
Officials was clearly to "bringt these shoes to Brockton,
1. Brockton Enterprise, August 27, 1940, p. 1. Inter-
national bid 82.51, Brown, $2.515, and General, 92.54.
2. Ibid., August 31, 1940, p. 1.
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or, at least, to escape any blame for failure in that
cause. They had felt pressure both from the "public"
and from the Manufacturers; in addition, their action was
apparently politically acceptable to the rank and file.
This case, then, illustrates the potency of a shortrun
"'employment effect" in a situation where unemployment
exists and where such an "effect" can be generally per-
ceived.
Immediately following the successful bids on this
contract, however, Union thinking turned to a larger labor
cost for subsequent orders. One aspect of the ensuing
negotiations, which may be indicated briefly, was the way
in which Federal minimum wage legislation became a vehicle
for a general increase in wages. In March of 1940, the
minimum for the shoe industry had been raised to 35$ per
hour. A significant number of the piece rates included
in the 37.3$ labor cost failed to yield this minimum,
thus, in effect, increasing the actual labor cost to the
Manufacturers, who had to pay "make up". When the Union
asked for a raise on the next Army order in a conference
held on October 11, 1940, the Manufacturers suggested
that "we take 2$ and distribute it to the weak spots".
The Union spokesmen stated that the 2$ was "theirs" and
that they preferred to distribute it "equally" to all the
workers; furthermore, they argued, the Manufacturers could
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give 44 and still "get the shoes". Both sides then agreed
on an offer by the Manufacturers of 44, 24 distributed to
the "weak spotsn and 24 "equally".1  In what one Union
Official later described in conversation as the "battle
of the century", the various craft groups fought over
"where" the 24 should be applied, a dispute which, one
suspects, caused many borderline operators to fall below
the minimum. Meanwhile, the Manufacturers had gone ahead
in bidding for service contracts. On November 1, a meeting
was called by the Manufacturers to discuss the "distribu-
tion of the additional 44". They argued that this matter
should get "immediate attention" ,to eliminate the ruinous
making up of minimums and to get the shoes moving so that
penalties for not getting contracts finished on time could
be avoided." The Union, on the other hand, simply tacked
another 24 on the proposed increase and stated that they
felt the 44 should be distributed "equally". The meeting
ended with no agreement, after Union Officials had been
accused of "ignoring the low spots when considering the
distribution of the increase on the basis that the manu-
facturers would have to make up the minimums anyway.,2
1. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers'
Association, Minutes of a Meeting, October 11, 1940.
2. Ibid., November 1, 1940.
268
After several other fruitless meetings during
November, the Manufacturers, talking the matter over by
themselves, seemed to feel that a 60 increase would "create
a favorable reaction to the manufacturers and unfavorable
to the Union were it refused"t. 1  In a conference on
December 6, they proposed a 60 increase, with 40 to be
used to "even up the price lists". The Union agreed to
a maximum increase of 6$, but wanted 4$ distributed equally
to "all crafts", the other 20 to be "used by the manufac-
turers to even up". This was where the matter stood at
the meeting's conclusion. 2  Letters were exchanged between
the parties during the next two weeks, but the time element
was working against the Manufacturers. They were apparently
paying a tremendous amount of minimum make-up, and the shoes
were moving slowly through the factories. On December 19,
the Manufacturers met and discussed the "obvious danger of
delaying a decision"t (the Union had threatened to put all
workers on "day rates" ) and decided to "agree to the
1. Ibid., November 29, 1940.
2. Ibid., December 6, 1940.
3. These day rates were not minimum guarantees, but just
points of reference sometimes referred to in settling indi-
vidual piece rate questions. The Union's threat was to
"refuse to work on the Army shoes except on the day rate".
Since these shoes were already contracted for, the Manufac-
turers would almost have had to accept that proposition,
even though slow work would run up their costs.
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proposal of the Union, even though there might be another
penny needed to fix up some low spots." This same day,
however, the Herman Shoe Company, a non-union competitor
located in a small town about 30 miles from Brockton,
announced a 20% increase on Army shoes.1  The Union
claimed that the increase was based on the same labor
cost as that used in Brockton, and asked the Manufacturers
"how the officials could go before their Committee and
justify acceptance of any lessn". Finally, agreement was
reached on a 20% increase (slightly over 7$ per pair),
but with 3$ of the total to be "distributed by the Manu-
f actur ers .
Although other factors 2 undoubtedly help explain the
Union's more aggressive attitude in these negotiations
and the Manufacturers' willingness to grant an increase,
the role played by minimum wage provisions seems particu-
larly significant. The Manufacturers offered an increase
to bolster "weak spots", knowing that they were paying this
money in the form of minimum make-ups anyway. The Union,
on the other hand, argued that the increase be distributed
"equallyn, which meant that the payment of make-up would
1. This company was organized by the Brotherhood
early in 1942.
2. For example, the Army was offering contracts for
more and more shoes. In addition, of course, the pressure
created by the Herman Company increase previously mentioned
probably influenced the speed and terms of the final agree-
ment.
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continue. Thus, the minimum wage, through pressure on
manufacturing costs, provided a vehicle for negotiation
of a general increase on this 1"Army" piece price list.
The Army orders, which increased employment and pay-
rolls in Brockton ts lower grade factories during the latter
part of 1940, did not affect the business of companies
which continued to make the higher grade civilian shoes.
For these concerns, depressed conditions prevailed through-
out the year 1940. By the beginning of 1941, however,
most signs pointed to an improved season ahead. In a
meeting held on February 25, 1941, the Manufacturers took
cognizance of possible developments in the labor relations
and wage fields. Specific note was taken of the changing
attitude of the rank and file shoeworker, attributed jointly
to the "long and discouraging period of short time work and
small earnings" and to the complaint that "every other craft
was receiving benefits of high wages from Government con-
tracts except the shoeworkers". After comment on the
flunduly officious and arbitrary stewardsil, the suggestion
was made that grievances be "immediately adjusted when it
is agreed that the complaint is justified". One partici-
pant summed up the situation as follows:
271
"There can be no doubt left in anyone's mind
that the Unions are strong and that the
members are demanding that their leaders
take active steps to adjust their complaints". 1
Additional concern was expressed over the attitude of ",do
this or else" and the Manufacturers decided to work for
a contract "including arbitration of differences with the
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration."2
On March 25, more or less as expected, the Brother-
hood asked for a 10% increase on all civilian price lists.
Quite probably, this request resulted from conferences
with other shoe unions, as well as from better business
prospects and the example of raises in other industries.
At least, the Brotherhood had been conferring with the
United Shoe Workers of America (CIO) on the conditions of
affiliation, and could announce, on April 18, that "If
the manufacturers believe that we are instigating any
increases ahead of other unions they are mistaken, be-
cause we have been in conference with independent unions
in Marlboro, Milford, Webster, Hudson and Lewiston, which
are taking similar action in requesting a 10% increaser,.3
I. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers,
Association, op. cit., February 25, 1941.
2. Ibid.
3. Brockton Enterprise, April 18, 1941, p. 11.
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At any rate, a bargaining conference was held on
March 27, in which the Union argued that "the shoeworkers
were insisting on increases according to the trend in other
industries". The Manufacturers agreed that the "trend was
toward an increase", but questioned ,,the present as the
proper time". Two members went further and threatened
to close up their factories if an increase were granted
immediately. Several conferences were held early in
April, but no real progress toward a settlement was made.
However, in a private meeting of Association members on
April 15, members reported that they had "heard from the
middle west that some of the factories in that section
had granted a 5% increase'". The previous day, the Endicott-
Johnson Corporation had announced a 5% increase and the J. F.
McElwain Company had granted a similar adjustment late in
1940. After some discussion of the rrtrendv, the Manufac-
turers decided to offer a 5% increase, effective July 1.2
This offer the General Board and General Price Committee
nunanimously" rejected in a joint meeting on April 17,
reiterating their demand for 10%. Union Officials were
reported as saying that the "time has come for action rather
than quibbling". 3
1. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturerst
Association, op. cit., March 27, 1941.
2. Ibid., April 15, 1941.
3. Brockton Enterprise, April 18, 1941.
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The Manufacturers discussed the situation on
April 22. Most members ,tconceded that increases were
to be expected but that the time element was a very impor-
tant factor". One of the leading company spokesmen
argued that "if it was generally believed that the 10%
was to come eventually, it would be wiser to offer it,
if coupled with a reasonable time to start." Thereupon
the Manufacturers voted to grant 10%, effective July 1.
As an alternative, they proposed arbitration of the effec-
tive date by the State Board. 1  In a bargaining conference
held the next day, Brotherhood officials would settle for
nothing less than an "immediate 10%". The Manufacturers
argued that they could not make immediate adjustments
with their customers, "because of commitments made to
deliver shoes at the prices for which the orders were
taken, which is a contractual obligation"T. 2 In a meeting
on April 28, the Union ts General Board voted to "accept
the 10%," but to grant the Manufacturers an effective date
of May 5.3 By this time, however, members of the General
Board were apparently getting impatient. When a letter
from the Association received on May 1 suggested an
1. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers?
Association, op. cit., April 22, 1941.
2. Ibid., April 23, 1941.
3. BSAC, Memo of a General Board Meeting, April 28, 1941.
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effective date of June 30, the Board "instructed" the
General Officials to "tell them that the Union wants 5%
starting Monday, May 5, 1941, and 5% June 30, 1941, or
there will be no work on Monday, May 5, 1941"1.1 The
next day the Manufacturers "acceded to this proposition
on the basis of their desire to continue industrial peace
in the Districti".2
In the course of these negotiations, improved busi-
ness prospects and the "trend" of increases in the shoe
industry and elsewhere were important considerations in-
fluencing both the Unionts demands and the acceptability
of these demands to the Manufacturers. During the remainder
of 1941 and early 1942 these considerations remained effec-
tive. The Brotherhood requested further increases on both
military and civilian price lists; but, in the two most
important cases, the Manufacturers refused to make "volun-
tary" adjustments. They emphasized, in private and public,
the necessity for maintaining Brockton's competitive posi-
tion;3 however, they did agree to arbitrate the issues.
1. Ibid., May 1, 1941.
2. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturerst
Association, Letter to the BSAC, dated May 2, 1941.
3. For example, in a letter to the Brotherhood which was
printed in the Brockton Enterprise, one shoe manufacturer
stated that "It is generally recognized that we here in this
district are now paying the highest labor cost on army shoes
in the whole country". Brockton Enterprise, October 20, 1941,
p. s.
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On January 22, 1942, the State Board granted a 10%
increase on civilian shoes;1 and, effective March 16,
a 10% increase on Army shoes was granted by a Federal
arbitrator. 2  Very little information is available as
to the ultimate determinants of these two wage adjust-
iments,, or on the reasons why the parties were willing to
arbitrate these issues. Quite possibly, however, the
"'national emergency" was the controlling factor in this
disposition to settle differences by arbitration rather
than strikes. At least, in retrospect, this is the
"reason" stated most often by both Manufacturers and
Union Officials.
About the pre-war wage changes which have been des-
cribed here, though, some summary statements may be made.
1. At the start of the period, wage activity took
place in the context of unemployment and a short work week
for those who did have Jobs. This context, along with some
public pressure, seems to have been a particularly important
determinant of the Union's original, low price list for Army
shoes.
1. Brockton Enterprise, January 22, 1942, p. 1.
This increase was divided, with 5% effective on January
3 and the other 5% on April 4.
2. Brockton Union, March 6, 1942, p. 1.
3. This is especially true on cases decided by the
State Board, since that body simply hands down a ruling,
with no supporting reasoning or discussion.
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2. Some of the piece rates included in this list
proved too low to yield the minimum wage. The Manufac-
turers, who had to pay "make-up", were willing to make
selective increases in these rates. However, once a
commitment to a specified number of cents had been made,
the Union would agree only to an "equal" distribution of
the raise. In this way, the minimum wage provided the
mechanism, at least, for a general increase in all piece
prices on the original Army list, though other factors,
notably the action of a nearby non-union firm, were
probably equally important.
3. Not until the prospects for civilian shoe busi-
ness improved did the Union request an increase in these
prices. However, by the time negotiations had reached
a critical stage, employment and payrolls had recovered
spectacularly, and the Union had become much more insistent.
4. The request for a 10% increase on civilian shoes
was part of a more or less coordinated attempt on the part
of many shoe unions to raise the wages of their membership.
In this connection, the Union "politicians" preferred to
justify their actions by pointing to what had been done in
other localities, rather than build themselves up as twage
leaders".
5. The Manufacturers, as always, resisted attempts,
to increase wages, but finally gave in before what they
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interpreted as an almost irresistible "trend". Even so,
the more decisive local consideration may have been the
improved business conditions, which put "blood" in the
"turnip",
6. After the Manufacturers had conceded the amount
of the increase, they worked to postpone the effective
date as much as possible. The exact terms of the agree-
ment, 5% on May 5 and 5% on June 30, represented a com-
promise on this question of timing. Apparently, the
argument of "advanced commitments" carried some weight
with Union decision-makers.
7. Throughout all these negotiations, both parties
resorted to public statement of their views frequently.
These may have been appeals for the loyalty of rank and
file shoeworkers; however, especially in cases involving
government contracts, the parties may have felt an increas-
ing need for public approval of their actions.
Post-War Wage Movements
During the period between 1942 and 1945, general
wage activity in the Brockton district, as elsewhere, was
centered around the various "fringen benefits available
from War Labor Board arbitrators. The Brotherhood gained
the customary provisions for vacations with pay, though
this adjustment was strongly resisted by the Manufacturers
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on the grounds that their post-war competitive position
would be jeopardized. Some workers benefited from re-
visions of individual piece rates; but the 33% increase
in weekly wages between 1942 and 19451 is attributable
principally to the great increase in the volume of produc-
tion. Throughout this period, however, the Lasters espe-
cially had proposed general increases, and the General
Board had at least made the gesture of formally protesting
the "15% standard as set by the Little Steel Formulan.2
When the War finally did end in the late summer of 1945,
price controls and a semblance of wage controls remained
in effect. Nevertheless, on August 29, 1945, the Price
Expert from the Lasters' Local came to the Price Committee
meeting instructed to request a 30% wage increase3 and
abolition of the lowest grade price lists for the manu-
facture of civilian shoes. On grounds that Tcontrols
1. See Chapter IV, Footnote 1.
2. BSAC, Memo of a General Board Meeting, March 22,
1943.
3. Although the problem of reconversion-unemployment
and the threat of declining purchasing power were widely
discussed in the press, the CIO's 30% demand did not
come until the middle of September, when the UAW served
that notice on the automobile industry.
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are still on", this proposition was rejected by an 11 to
3 vote;l1 however, action was started on revision of wage
rates in the lowest grade factories, where special down-
ward revisions made in 1939, 1940, and early 1941 had never
been fully recovered. No direct action on general wage
demands was taken immediately; rather the Brotherhood's
attorney was asked to "find out ways and means of ascer-
taining the proper method to adjust the prices in all of
the factories in the district". 2  During the remainder
of September, negotiations were held with the three princi-
pal low-grade manufacturers, and, under the threat that
"workers would be put on by the day if no agreement was
reached", an offer of a 10% increase and "adjustment of
low spots" was made.3
Meanwhile, the Lasters were complaining about "lack
of leadership" and threatening to break off from the other
crafts to join the CIO. On September 29, a non-union
company in Middleboro (about 20 miles from Brockton) granted
a "voluntary" 10% increase.4  Finally, on October 1, in a
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
August 29, 1945. Additional personal motivations may have
influenced this vote. Several Price Experts actively re-
sented what they termed as attempts by the Lasters "to run
the union". Further, the Lasters were once again starting
the campaign for affiliation with the CIO, and pro-BSAC
officials may have hoped to prevent the Lasters from getting
the credit for a prospective wage increase.
2. BSAC, on. cit., September 12, 1945.
3. Ibid., September 27, 1945.
280
country-wide atmosphere of large demands and strike threats,
the General Price Committee voted to "notify the Manufac-
turers, Association and independent manufacturers that we
wish a 25% increase for all piece and day workers and that
all manufacturers be put in the correct gradest".. By this
time, however, the Lasters' Price Expert had been instructed
"not to attend any more General Price Committee meetings", 2
though delegates from that Local did appear before the
General Board to explain that they "did not like the atti-
tude of Price Committee toward their Price Expert whenever
he presented a proposition".3  No further action was taken
by the Board or the General Officials, however, and the
Lasters proceeded to act as though they were an independent
group. On October 19, they met with representatives.of
the Manufacturers' Association, where they were told that
requests for general increases would be negotiated only
through representatives of all the crafts in the Brother-
hood. After the "bargaining session" was over, one of the
Manufacturers proposed a "general increase to all crafts so
as to take the wind out of the Lasters." Members repre-
senting high grade factories argued that a "flat percentage
1. BSAC, op. cit., October 1, 1945.
2. BSAC, Memo of a General Board Meeting, October 1,
1945. This fact was reported to the Board by the Unionts
President.
3. Ibid., October 8, 1945.
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increase" would mean a greater number of cents on their
labor cost, putting them in a precarious position relative
to product-price ceilings. Finally, a graduated proposal
was agreed on, with 15% offered on the 5th grade and below,
7% on the 4th grade, and nothing on the 1st grade.1  This
proposal was forwarded to the Brotherhood.
That evening, however, the Lasters held a well-attended
mass meeting and, after a "hot" argument, voted an "ulti-
matumn: the Manufacturers would meet their demand for a 25%
increase by Sunday night (October 21) or there would be no
Lasters at work on Monday morning. 2  The Brotherhood's
Secretary-Treasurer stated publicly on Saturday that an
offer had been made by the Manufacturers and that any strike
action by the Lasters would be "unauthorized and unconstitu-
tional". He declared that "Up to this moment the leaders
of the Lasterst Local have persistently refused to recognize
the Constitution and have ignored the Price Committee and
the General Board and seem bent on running the organization
to suit themselves at the expense of every other union
member?"; and he appealed to "every laster" to "return to
work on Monday morning". 3  On Sunday night, the Lasters
1. Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers'
Association, op. cit., October 19, 1945.
2. Brockton Enterprise, October 20, 1945, p. 1.
3. Ibid.
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held another mass meeting, at which the Local's officials
requested and obtained a postponement of the strike until
Wednesday. As the Price Expert explained, ,What we have
done may be illegal, nevertheless, it has been done. The
picture looks very bright...and I do not believe that we
will have to resort to a strikeT'. He reported that some
of the companies had already agreed to the Lasters' terms
and concluded with this statement, which "brought cheers
from the assemblage": "If some manufacturers don't come
across, we will crack them anyhow". 1
By the time Wednesday evening had rolled around, the
Brotherhood's General Board had turned down the Manufac-
turert s proposal, but further negotiations had produced no
agreeable alternative. At a mass meeting of the Lasters,
the Local's President reported that the General Board was
"leaving the pay increase issue drag along and that in
three or four months the manufacturers would have enough
shoes so that they would only offer a 7% increase". 2
After a considerable discussion during which one member
who argued for moderation was "driven from the hall by
1. Brockton Enterprise, October 22, 1945, p. 7.
2. Ibid., October 25, 1945, p. 8.
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catcalls"l, the Local voted to strike the next day. Al-
though "resounding cheers" greeted the suggestion that
"we break away from the Brotherhood and get other backing",
the strike chairman, the next day, stated that "we have no
intention of breaking with the Brotherhood in favor of the
CIO" and he asked the "BSAC to back us now".2
The strike was "100% effective" in the Lasting Rooms
of Brocktons shoe plants. Although most of the other
crafts continued to work, the factories could run only a
few days without the help of any single major group of
operators. By this time, however, the wage demand had
settled down to a "flat 15%", which the lower-grade Manu-
fac~turers had already agreed to pay. Within the Associa-
tion group, which had been joined in this crisis by most
of the other unionized Manufacturers, the question, then,
was one of committing one group to a course of action
previously adopted by another. Out of this conflict of
1. Ibid., p. 12. This member pleaded that the Lasters
not vote to strike in "this hall, because the papers will
say to-morrow that the Lithuanians caused the trouble again.
During 1918, the shoeworkers voted in this hall to strike,
again in 1923 they voted while in this hall to strike, a
third time in 1933 they voted in this same place to strike,"
and now in 1945, they vote to strike again. Because of this
the Lithuanians will get the blame. We of the North End have
invested our money to bring shoe concerns to Brockton and
the people of the entire city have benefited, so we do not
want any trouble".
2. Ibid., p. 8.
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interests, the "offer" was raised. In addition to a
15% increase on the fifth grade, the lowest grade, the
sixth, was to be abolished, the day hands were to get
10%, and the minimum wage established at 60 per hour.
Further, this was to be only a "temporary settlement,
pending a definite wage policy of the federal government".1
In a bargaining conference on October 25, Brotherhood
negotiators and the Lasters' representatives both accepted
these terms tentatively, and, the following day, the
Lasters agreed to return to work.2  However, the General
Board voted to stick by the Union negotiator's proposal:
a 15% increase for all shoeworkers.
During the following week, several large bargaining
conferences were held, although, according to reports, the
"two lawyers did all the talking".3  The "key" compromise
was apparently suggested by the Union's attorney: a 12-1/2ý
hourly increase. This proposal seemed shrewdly designed to
1. Brockton Enterprise, October 26, 1945, p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 1.
3. Ibid., November 15, 1945, p. 8. On November 5, 1945,
after the General Board had voted to stick with their 15%
demand but before the 12-1/2ý compromise offer was made,
the State Board of Arbitration granted Boot and Shoe Workers'
Union members at Knipe Bros., Inc. in Haverhill (North Shore)
a 15% increase. There is no direct evidence that this award
became a point of reference in Brockton negotiations. Never-
theless, as an indication of what the USWA would get from
North Shore shoe companies and of what might well result from
arbitration, the award probably did reenforce the BSAC demand
for a 15% increase.
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satisfy both the Union's desire that everyone should get
the same treatment and the high-grade Manufacturers' claim
of a discriminatory burden on their labor cost. At last,
at about 1 o'clock in the morning of November 10 and after
ten hours of negotiation the previous afternoon and evening,
agreement seemed near. When one of the Union representa-
tives brought out an original demand which had almost been
lost in the shuffle, provision for the adjustment of "low
spots", 1 everyone was too tired to argue. The Manufac-
turers agreed and the Union's Price Committee voted 10-4
to accept the 12-1/20 terms. The General Officials signed
the "contract".2  Negotiations were over..
However, groups within the Union, led by the Lasters,
felt that ,"12-1/2ý was less than what the 5th grade manu-
facturers had already offered". The highly paid Edgesetters
and Edgetrimmers, who usually finished their day's work
before the nominal quitting time, had voted against the
settlement. Then, suddenly, a new complication arose: only
the General Board was empowered to authorize general price
agreements; the action of the Officials in signing the con-
tract was unconstitutionall Equipped with appeals to the
skilled workers and to those employed in low-grade factories
1. The clause finally included in the agreement stated
that "low spots are to be adjusted on the basis of earnings".
The clause will .be referred to further in the Chapter covering
individual piece price adjustment.
2. Brockton Enterprise, November 10, 1945, p. 1.
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and with the issue of "Constitutionality", dissident
gr.oups swept the General Board with. them, and the. "agree-
ment"@ was repudiated.1  The General Officials were in-
structed to re-open negotiations.2  Though the Attorney
for the Manufacturers declared the: Ragreement" to be a
rlegal document?", 3 new conferences were. held in an atmos-
phere enlivened by "hints" from the Lasters that they
•
tmight take a vacationn.. During the ensuing negotia-
tions,. Union representatives accepted the idea which had
already been recognized by the cents per hour proposal:
a 15% wage increase would, in view of the price ceilings,
impose too great a labor cost change on the high-grade
factories. Finally, through the efforts of lower-grade
Manufacturers as well as Union representatives, 10% was
offered on the 1st and 3rd grades and 15% on the 4th and
5th. This time, after acceptance by the General Price
Committee and the General Board,, the signatures of the
Union Officers made the agreement official.5
i. Ibid., November 14, 1945, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., November 15, 1945., p..8.
5. Ibid., November 24, 1945, p. 1. The delegates from
the Lasters' Local voted in favor of the agreement only
after approval had been obtained in a mass meeting of the
Lasters.
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Throughout this period of negotiation, the current
and prospective sales of Brockton shoe companies were limited
only by their ability to produce. Although ceiling prices
(instead of price competition) meant that increased costs
could not readily be passed on to the consumer, such flexi-
bilities as the grade of shoe produced and the quality of
materials used provided indirect means of maintaining margins.1
There is no escaping the fact, of course, that Brockton Manu-
facturers did feel the wage-price "squeeze" of which they
complained during negotiations. Analysis of individual
company costs shows that, in most cases, "labor as a percent
of sales" rose sharply during the first half of 1946; however,
the volume of sales was extremely high. Under these circum-
stances, narrow margins were certainly preferable to a pro-
tracted strike, during which competitors cleaned up the
"gravy". In addition, Brockton Manufacturers were not the
only ones facing wage demands during this period; even in the
shoe industry, national and independent unions were demanding
higher pay. Though the Brockton settlement preceded most
other adjustments made by shoe concerns, Manufacturers there
1. This could easily be explained to retailers, who were
in no position to be "fussy" anyway, by reference to the
extreme difficulties experienced by manufacturers in obtain-
ing adequate supplies of leather. Of course, high grade
manufacturers, especially, had to be careful that their
reputation for "quality" was not impaired unduly.
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knew that most men's shoe companies in Massachusetts had,
agreed to follow the Brockton pattern.1
At any rate, negotiations were concluded without any
general stoppage of work; further, provision was made in
the agreement for the arbitration of wage disputes which
might arise within the contract period of one year. The
issue of a general increase in wages could be reopened,
under the terms of the contract, upon either of two pre-
texts: (1) the removal of price controls, and (2) an
increase in the cost of living, as measured by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. In the latter case, the issue could
not be raised until six months after the contract date of
December 3, 1945.
The Association, meanwhile, was again reorganized
into a unit joined by most of the district ts unionized
Manufacturers. With the new members taking the active
lead, a professional labor relations man was hired from
the Federal Conciliation Service. Under his guidance,
Association committees started negotiations with the
1. Most contracts now in effect between independent
unions in Massachusetts and ments shoe manufacturers
outside the Brockton district explicitly make any general
wage movement contingent on Brockton area bargains. Out-
side Massachusetts, the McElwain Company granted 15% on
November 26, 1945; the General Shoe Corporation, 7-1/2ý
on December 1, 1945; the Endicott-Johnson Corporation, 15ýin May 1946; the International Shoe Company, 8 in December
1945; and the Brown Shoe Company, 10% in December 1945. The
USWA, in negotiations on the North Shore of Massachusetts,
won a 15% increase in January 1946.
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various Union Price Experts, who were trying to "straighten
out" individual piece prices in accordance with the "low
spot" clause in the wage agreement. At the end of the six
month period, however, attention within the Union started
to shift toward the question of a general increase in wages.
On June 18, the General Board suggested that the Price
Committee take steps in this direction, but the latter
group declined on the grounds that the cost of living had
not increased appreciably.1
However, when Congress allowed price controls to lapse,
demands were immediately made for a "revision in wages". 2
Several conferences were held; but, when controls were re-
instituted, the parties agreed to postpone further action.
In a joint statement issued on August 7, 1946, it was recog-
nized that "with re-enactment of OPA, the selling price of
shoes has been established at those levels prevailing on
June 30, 1946; and, therefore, with no general increase
allowed in the price of shoes manufactured by the Associa-
tion members, there can be no corresponding increase in
wages".3  The new price control legislation did provide
1. BSAC, Memo of General Price Committee Meetings,
June 24, 1945.
2. The request was made in a letter dated July 15, 1946.
The Lasters, as usual, made a demand themselves, but agree-
ment was later reached that their action was "out of order".
3. Brockton Enterprise, August 7, 1946, p. 9.
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for selective decontrol of individual commodities; however,
even before leather and shoe prices were released, wage
demands were made on the grounds that the "cost of living"
was rising.1
After a month of sporadic conferences, the parties
were nowhere near agreement. The Union negotiator had
stated that the "30% demand was not serious" and that 15%
would probably settle the matter. The Manufacturers,
painfully aware of the potentialities connected with "low
spot" adjustments, argued for a "nominal" percentage in-
crease and another "figure" to be placed at an arbitrator's
disposal for allocation to low spots. The contract speci-
fied arbitration of such differences, and the Association
suggested taking the matter to a Federal Board. 2  To this
proposal, the Price Committee would not agree, contending
that these men were "Spicer's old buddies". 3  He would
"know all the ropes", they argued, and, consequently, the
Union would never have a chance. As a counter proposal,
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
September 5, 1946.
2. Possibly motivating this suggestion was the knowledge
that the federal Conciliation Service used the "job evalua-
tion" and "time study" techniques which the Manufacturers
were anxious to introduce in Brockton. Whether they could
have tied the question of "general increaset" to the adjust-
ment of individual piece rates is debatable.
3. The Association's new fTExecutive-Secretarytt was
Mr. Walter Spicer.
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they "demanded" that the question be taken to the State
Board of Arbitration.
Meanwhile, the USWA had reached an impasse in nego-
tiations with North Shore shoe concerns and the dispute
had been taken to the State Board. This issue was similar,
in that the USWA wage clause stated that their contract
could be opened if the cost of living increased by five
percent. On November 6, the Board awarded a 0l per hour
increase to North Shore shoeworkers, and, two days later,
the Brockton Manufacturers offered the same increase to
the Brotherhood, with additional provision for 3ý adjust-
ments for each five point change (whatever the direction)
in the BLS cost of living index. 1  The Manufacturers
,agreed", as an alternative, to accept the Union t s pro-
posal of arbitration by the State Board. The Union rejected
the Association 's wage offer; however, previous contentions
made it difficult to refuse the arbitration alternative.
The Union based rejection of the wage offer on the
grounds that "it has always been the custom" to place in-
creases on a percentage basis. Two factors seem particularly
pertinent to this disposition against cents per hour settle-
ments: (1) since the skilled crafts had the greatest repre-
sentation on the General Board in proportion to their numbers,
1. Brockton Enterprise, November 8, 1946, pp. 1 and 6.
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the majority of BSAC locals favored percentage increases,
even though more individual members would benefit from a
cents per hour settlement; and (2) many of the skilled
workers finished their "day's work" in six to seven hours
and so would have to "wait around in the factory" to get
the full amount of "their"i increase. The Manufacturers,
on the other hand, were looking for possible ways to hit
back at the so-called "stint"; and, in addition, Associa-
tion members specializing in high-grade shoe production
could protect their labor cost with a cents per hour settle-
ment.
Other factors which influenced the Brotherhood's
rejection of the Manufacturers' offer were: (1) the fear
that the cost of living would go down, instead of up, in
which case they would be forced to accept reductions; (2)
the desire to "hold off for more in order to kill off the
CIO in Brockton'T; and (3) the desire not to accept a role
as a passive follower of the CIO pattern. However, the
Brotherhood, because of its previous ,demands,,, was more
or less forced to go to the State Board of Arbitration.
There, despite the fact that the cost of living index had
increased by 14% (or about 15w) during the period in
question, the inevitable 10 award was made.1
1. The contract specified that the wage question could be
reopened if the cost of living increased. During the period
from December 15, 1945 to September 15, 1946, the BLS index
rose from 129.9 to 146.0, and, by October 15, 1946 to 148.6
points. The Union, of course, argued for the latter date,
while the CIO decision was made when figures were available
- - 1 - ~ r -4' ý - e-4 0 - 4- -- '1- -
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The Brotherhood's leaders were dissatisfied with this
settlement, not simply because of the rival union situation,
but more because of the greater increase in the cost of
living and the cents per hour form of the award. Their
feeling first took shape in the form of new requests for
adjustments of individual piece prices; however, the ques-
tion of a general increase in wages soon came up for con-
sideration. In February 1947, the CIO negotiated another
2.5ý for shoeworkers in the North Shore factories, and the
Lasters immediately requested the General Price Committee
to "get the same increase" in Brockton.1  In the meantime,
the cost of living had continued up, with the movement of
food prices, immediately apparent at the "housewife level",
a leading factor in the advance., During the spring and
early summer of 1947, the CIO campaign to "take over" the
Brotherhood was intensified, reaching a climax in the BSAC
elections held late in August. The Brotherhood, unencum-
bered by a definite contract termination date, made demands
on the Manufacturers several times; (one just before the
elections) but, despite all these nTcompelling" circumstances,
no general wage changes occurred.
The explanation seems to lie in two factors: (1) Brother-
hood leaders were forced to undermine their bargaining position
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
February 24, 1947.
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with "boasts" made in the rival union controversy, and (2)
the level of employment and payrolls in the Brockton dis-
trict started to decline and the general "atmosphere" became
depressive. Figures released periodically by the BLS showed
that the hourly earnings of Brockton shoeworkers were among
the highest in the industry; and a widely circulated tabu-
lation of general increases since January 1941 showed that
the Brockton total exceeded that of any other shoemaking
locality.1 These "facts", stressed by the Association in
any bargaining conferences, were otherwise welcomed by
Brotherhood leaders. Standing alone, these fboasts" might
not have affected negotiations; but, combined with falling
payrolls and a depressive atmosphere, they put the Unionts
leaders in a difficult bargaining position. After the first
quarter of 1947, Brockton payrolls and employment were well
below the comparable periods in 1946, despite the 10 per
1. For instance, see U.S.B.L.S., Average Weekly Hours and
Average Hourly Earnings in the Boot and Shoe Industry for
Selected States and Metropolitan Areas, May 1947. This report
does not treat the Brockton area separately, but compilations
made by the Division of Statistics, Massachusetts Department of
Labor and Industries shows that average hourly earnings in May
were $1.16 in the Brockton district. This rate was exceeded
only by that found by the= BLS in California and in the Chicago
metropolitan area. The compilation of relative wage changes
was accepted and referred to by both management and Union offi-
cials; however, it contained a mathematical error which was
never corrected. This error made a difference of three per-
centage points, and, while this would still have left Brockton
among the leaders, the total there would not have been the
highest in the country. I have not been able to discover who
originally compiled these figures.
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hour increase. The Association had been running a series
of advertisements in the local newspaper stressing the
serious implications of Brockton's "competitive positiont:
IHigh Wages Buy No- Bread If the Job Itself Folds Upt;l
"New England Down--St. Louis Up ?.2  When buying was light
at the- spring ,shoe fair" in New York City',. the Association
advertisement pointed to "Handwriting on the WallMd,3 a
statement re-enforced two days later by the: report that un-
employment in Brockton had reached a ttpeak since depression
days .,
Meanwhile, negotiations were in progress between the
Association and the Brotherhood on a formal written contract
to replace the simple wage agreement and the unwritten under-
standing on other conditions. of employment.. 5  The Manufac-
turers were particularly anxious to get such a contract,
mainly because of the consequent provisions for arbitration
1. Brockton Enterprise, May 14, 1947, p. 2.
2. Ibid., July 9, 1947, p. 2.
3. Ibid., June 6, 1947, p. 2.
. Ibid., June 11, 1947, p. 1. This statement was made
by the director of the Massachusetts Division of Employment
Security in Brockton.
5. Full written contracts defining seniority rights, union
security and so on had been signed in the past with a few
individual manufacturers, but, with most companies and with
the- Association, agreements contained no more than a wage.
change stipulation, with other conditions of employment only
roughly defined and understood.
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over "rights"; however, the Union's General Board, still
conscious of their experience with the Boot and Shoe con-
tract, approached the question warily. Their disposition
to hesitate was changed, though, by two considerations.
First, passage of the "Taft-Hartley" Act placed a deadline
on contracts providing for the "closed shop"; and second,
a contract would postpone an NLRB representation election
between the Brotherhood and the USWA for at least a year.
These two considerations brought the issue to a head, and,
the day before the "Taft-Hartley" deadline, August 23, 1947,
the General Board decided in favor of the contract by an 8
to 7 vote.1  Despite the fact that the Union had recently
requested a wage increase "to compensate for the rise in the
cost of living", and despite the widely publicized (though
not so widely followed) national patterns of 18-1/2ý and
15ý per hour, no increase accompanied the new contract. 2
Though the contract provided for no change in wage
rates3 during the year following its adoption, the Union's
1. The fourteen "shoe factory" locals split 7 to 7 on this
issue, thus the vote of the Cut Sole Local was decisive. The
question of legality was raised, most strongly by the pro-CIO
Lasters, but the contract became operationally effective anyway.
2. The charge has been made that the signing of this contract
was motivated more by concern for "survival" of the Union and
of jobs for BSAC Officials than by concern for the Brockton Shoe-
workers. There is no question but that the hope of shutting out
the USWA (CIO) strongly motivated the contract's most active
supporters. However, the contract, by itself, would not have
precluded a wage increase, if the local economic environment
had been more favorable.
3. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
October 27, 1947.
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Officials felt that they could somehow get around this pro-
vision. However, a subsequent request was turned down by
the Association, though it was agreed that the question could
be opened if Ita general increase is given throughout the shoe
industry".1  No such ,patterntR has developed, however, and,
with the Union's attention devoted to a long and unsuccessful
strike to prevent a "reduction" at one of the districtts lead-
ing companies, the question of a general wage change during
the contracrts one-year duration seems a dead issue.
Throughout these three periods of negotiation, the first
leading up to a 15% increase, the second to the 100 per hour
increase, and the third resulting in no change, the general
level of economic activity was extremely high, with prices,
physical production, and national income advancing ftom high
to record levels. In Brockton, however, boom conditions
prevailed only until early 1947. For the rest of that year,
and for the first half of 1948, the area's shoe industry
experienced a sharp slump in production and payrolls and a
depressive atmosphere prevailed. The important determinants
of the general wage changes occurring within this economic
environment are summarized below.
1. In the negotiations immediately following termination
of the War, the amount which the Manufacturers could grant was
1. Adjustments could, of course, be made in the case of
"new or changed operations".
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limited by the existence of price controls. Further, a
flat percentage increase was strongly resisted by the higher-
grade companies, who felt that the result, in cents per pair,
would be ruinous for them.
2. When the negotiations started, however, they were
conducted between the Union and lower-grade Manufacturers,
so that a 10% offer had been made before demands were even
served on other unionized firms in the Brockton area. This
offer was subsequently raised to 15%.
3. The Union was in a strong strike position, since
payrolls had been high, business prospects were good, and
the factories were tfull of shoesf . However, the actions
and threats of the "unreasonable" Lasters, possibly moti-
vated by their CIO leanings, were the immediate force propel-
ling offers by the Manufacturers.
4. The Unionts determination to get the same increase
in all factories was thwarted by the strong objections of
high-grade Manufacturers, a situation which led to a "cents-
per-hour" compromise proposal. This offer by the Union was,
in effect, a recognition of merit in the contentions of high-
grade Manufacturers, and subsequently led to the split settle-
ment of 15% for the 4th and 5th grades and 10% for the 1st and
3rd.
5. In making this agreement, the Manufacturers could
feel confident that their competitors were facing similar
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demands and would probably be forced to grant a similar
increase.
6. The terms of this settlement conditioned the
next one in that they provided for (I) the conditions on
which the wage question could be reopened, and (2) arbitra-
tion in the case of inability to agree.
7. Through chance, the Union maneuvered itself into
a position where it had to accept arbitration by a board
whose decision was a foregone and unsatisfactory conclusion.
8. The possibility of a further increase was obviated
by a drop in local business activity. Under these circum-
stances, though the Union continually made "demands n , the
Manufacturers could turn them down without incurring much
risk of strike action.
9. The Brotherhood's position was further weakened
by a "rival union" problem which led initially to "boastsn
about BSAC attainments, thus undermining the Union's bargain-
ing position. Subsequently, this "rival union"t threat plus
pressure from the "Taft-Hartley" Act led to the signing of a
contract which became the vehicle for postponement of a
general wage change for one year.
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Summary
Although conclusions on wage determinants are more
appropriate after exposition of all phases of wage activity,
a few preliminary observations may serve as a summary here.
Further, those observations may, perhaps, be most useful if
they are compared with conclusions reached in a recent study
of Trade Union Wage Policy by Arthur M. Ross. In this study,
as stated by the author, "the central proposition, then, is
that a trade union is a political agency operating in an
economic environment". 1  From this proposition flow others:
(1) wage bargaining is essentially a "pressure game", 2 with
economic considerations relevant only insofar as they affect
the relative strength of negotiators, that is, at the "second
remove";3 (2) union decisions are made with the "paramount
objective of ,building the union'"; 4 and (3) the quantity
axis of the wage bargain, generally disregarded by union
negotiators, is an unsatisfactory criterion of union "re-
sponsibility" because it is "unpredictable before the fact
and undecipherable after the fact,. 5  Ross feels that
1. Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, University
of California Press, 1948, p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
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unemployment may affect wage bargains, but only as a tool
in the hands of the employer, not as a pressure acting on
union leaders.
The evidence presented in this chapter and in Chapter
five tends to confirm the conclusion that the actions of
union officials are taken in a political environment, and
that, consequently,, the principal point of orientation is
satisfying the membership rather than, for example, maximiz-
ing the employerts total wage bill. In this context,
collective bargaining is primarily a "pressure game", not
an analytical exercise. The focal points of pressure in
Brockton wage negotiations, have often been the actions and
threats of a dissident and "unreasonable"t group within the
union on the one hand, and, on the other,,, the actuality or
prospect of settlements by a "rival union". Both Brother-
hood Officials and the employers have reacted to this
pressure with wage demands and concessions, respectively;
and, in one instance at least, the Union may have agreed
to a "no wage change" contract partially as insurance of
institutional survival. However, outside patternshave not
been blindly followed. The employers have been the principal
guardians of Brocktonts "competitive position" in that they
have consistently applied the brakes to general wage move-
ments; consequently, their position has been wholly negative
:-cs•.
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from the Union point of view. No proposed increase has
ever been readily accepted by Association members.
In contrast to Ross' conclusions, however, the
evidence here indicates that unemployment, the quantity
axis of wage decisions, has been an effective pressure
within the Union. Of course, the threat or actuality of
unemployment has been a bargaining tool in the hands of
employers; however, it has also been a political force
acting on Union leaders. As several of them have ex-
plained in conversation, "half a loaf is better than no
loaf at all". Perhaps this observation applies peculiarly
to the shoe industry, where firms may shut down temporarily
or move permanently without the difficulties encountered
with other types of equipment and structures of cost;
nevertheless, in this case at least, Union negotiators
have been forced to take the "employment effect" of their
decisions into account. Particularly in preparation for
bidding on Army orders in 1940, the Union adjusted wage
rates in an effort to increase the volume of employment
in Brockton.
From the employer point of view, the principal moti-
vating force seems to have been economic: the greater any
increase in wages, the smaller the margins of profit.1
1. The assumption involved in such a proposition is, of
course, that they have no way of reducing labor costs other
than a general reduction in piece rates. Production systems
and other conditions within the factory have generally been
regarded as "fixed". This assumption will be discussed
~-Y1-_Y----l----YI-l-·-
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However, Brockton shoe manufacturers have not been operat-
ing in a high profit business, not in circumstances where
they could control product prices. Ability (or inability)
to sell their goods in the product market has been the
chief eriterion of "competitive position', although, in
wage negotiations, increases granted in other shoe centers
have been regarded as partial evidence that they could move
with some safety. Their own experience with unpublicized
adjustments, which will be described in the next chapter,
taught them, though, not to rely on known general wage
movements as a sufficient test of a competitor's position.
... *
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CHAPTER VII
THE BROCKTON "GRADE SYSTEM"
"Piece prices in the Brockton district dontt bear a
relationship to anything--except the historical maze through
which they came." This statement, expressing the exaspera-
tion of one prominent manufacturer in the area, is directed
especially toward the lack of any ,,objectiven job ratings
and work standards as criteria for establishing and adminis-
tering piece prices. Indicated, is a rather chaotic scene,
in which each "price" is telling a totally different story
and from which no explanatory generalizations can be drawn.
In some respects this may be a faithful representation:
price A is low because Joe, a member of a relatively weak
craft local, had a fight over a girl with John, the foreman;
and price B is high because both the superintendent and the
union agent each happened to be passing around their first
box of cigars on the day the rate was "determined". How-
ever capricious may have been the determinants in the initial
1. During a single noon-hour, members of one factory
organization described five such "explanations" which had
recently turned up in their respective departments, and
they indicated that many similar cases could be related
for the asking. The problems and "methods" of individual
piece rate setting in the Brockton district will be dis-
cussed in the following chapter. Here those rates will be
approached from the point of view of their relationship to
the total labor cost on individual shoes and in individual
companies.
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establishment of some individual "prices", though, the
"historical maze" included, as well, at least one effec-
tive "determinant? of the intra-district rate structure.
This general point of reference for Brockton's piece
prices is most dramatically illustrated by observation of
a single worker within one factory. He performs an iden-
tical operation on three successive "racks" of shoes;
however, each "rack" is marked with a different, colored
tag, and the eoupons which he clips from those tags carry
different piece prices. Why should the same worker in
the same factory be paid one rate for work done on the
green tag shoes and another for the same Job on the "rack"
carrying pink identification? The answer to this question,
acknowledged as correct by manufacturers, union officials,
and workers, is that the market price of these shoes is
different. As the Shoe Workers' Journal stated with
resignation in 1928, "As long as shoes are sold at different
price levels, they will be made at varying [labor] costs". 1
Brockton's way of providing that variation has, historically,
been through flat percentage differentials between piece
prices paid for similar operations on shoes selling in the
various abrackets". In this way, by what is known as the
1. Norton, op. cit., p. 150, quoting from the Boot and
Shoe Workerts Union, Shoe Workerst Journal, July 28, 1928,
p. 17.
306
"'Grade System", a companyts labor cost is linked to the
product-price, which, then, becomes a central point of
reference in the determination of piece rates.
The idea of progressively lower piece rates with
lower grades of shoe is perfectly compatible, in a general
way, with constant hourly earnings. The study of labor
productivity conducted by the BLS in 1945 shows clearly
that man-hour requirements vary directly with the grade
of shoe produced;1 however, the variation may be attributed
to a combination of three factors: (1) differences in the
number- of' operations performed; (2) more lenient work
standards on lower grade shoes; and (3) more efficient
production scheduling on the lower grade shoes. In most
of Brocktonts "grade factories", 2 these sources of man-
hour savings have not been fully utilized. The number of
operations may not vary significantly between grades, and,
especially within one factory, work standards tend to become
the same on all the shoes produced. Further, the fact that
Brockton Manufacturers have often been forced to accept
small orders in a variety of grades had meant "job lot"
1. BLS, Trends in Man-Hours Expended Per Unit, Selected
Footwear 1939-1945, March 1948, p. 42. See also the
discussion in Chapter II of this thesis.
2. The term "grade factorytT has been used locally to
refer to factories where more than one grade of shoe is
produced.
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production scheduling, rather than the "mass production"
conditions which spell efficient utilization of the labor
force. Consequently, while the Grade System can be justi-
fied in part by reference to job requirements, the primary
orientation of the system in Brockton has been toward the
variations in product prices.1
This chapter, which will deal with relationships
between the Brotherhood and individual companies,2 revolves
around that "Grade System"; and the discussion which follows
will fall into these topical classifications: (1) the
"system", as established when the BSAC supplanted the
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union in Brockton; (2) the atti-
tude of the Brotherhood toward the "system" and the conse-
quent action which has been taken; (3) the attitude of the
Uanufacturers toward the "system"; (4) the function which
the "grades" have performed as a medium for dealings be-
tween the Brotherhood and the Manufacturers; and (5) the
administrative problems which are almost automatically
1. The fact that the pressure behind the Grade System
has come from product prices may be one reason why the
labor force is not utilized more efficiently. Thus, if a
lower labor cost is obtained as a necessary adjustment to
lower product prices, much of the incentive for improved
working conditions is lost: the piece rates are fixed by
shoe prices rather than factory operations.
2. This relationship is here distinguished from that
of Association (or district-wide)-Brotherhood dealings,
on the one hand, and from the relationships between indi-
vidual crafts and the manufacturers, on the other.
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created by the "systemtt itself, and by the "administrative"
methods which have been adopted.
The "System" As Established Before 1933
The most important influence leading to the establish-
ment of grades in the Brockton district has been the great
shift down in the price preferences of footwear consumers.
This tendency was almost steadily in progress during the two
decades between World Wars; and, though temporarily halted
during World War II and the subsequent two years of high shoe
demand, it has once again been in evidence during 1945.1
Resulting in a smaller and smaller potential market for higher-
priced lines, the tendency has shown up in Brockton in terms of
a constantly dwindling volume of business. In turn, lack of
production has placed great pressure on the established level
of piece prices, with the Grade System representing an adapta-
tion to that pressure. As such, the very existence of the
grades at the heart of Brockton's piece price structure illus-
trates the fact that the volume of production and wage rates
have been forcibly connected with each other during the dis-
trict's shoemaking history.
Within the district, the idea of graded piece price
lists is at least as old as the records of the Brockton Shoe
Manufacturers' Association. As early as 1904, in a letter
1. See Charts 1 and 2, Chapter II.
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to the president of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, four
grades of shoes were suggested, with lines of demarcation
drawn according to the retail price. The suggestion was
made as a remedy to the "problem of firms leaving the city"
and coupled with cautions on the "freedom of our non-union
competitors".1  Although the district did have experience
with "grade prices" before World War I, only two "lists"
were in effect at the conclusion of those hostilities; and
the great percentage of production was apparently on the
higher, "Brockton graden.2  During the twenties, the
Brockton locals of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union as
well as the parent organization steadfastly opposed "wage
reductions"; but, as Norton has found, the General Offi-
cials "eventually maintained that the establishment of
lower wage rates with lower quality of workmanship for
lower grades was not a reduction in wages".3
Despite declining employment and pressure from both
the parent Union and the Manufacturers, however, it was not
until 1926 that the Brockton locals negotiated prices for a
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Minutes of
a Meeting, January 21, 1904. The letter, a result of this
meeting, was dated January 22.
2. The "2nd grade" was apparently never very widely used
and has since been discarded altogether. Although there is
no direct evidence relative to the disappearance of this
grade, the probability is that it was replaced by the 3rd
grade, which carried a lower labor cost and, gradually, the
same specifications as to selling price.
r 3. Norton, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
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"3rd grade"; and the 4th grade "list", which became effec-
tive in 1927, was obtained by interested Association members
only through a decision of the State Board of Arbitration.1
In late 1930, the Manufacturers again approached Brockton
locals with a ,,grade" proposition. Certain aspects of the
discussions which ensued reveal the nature of these grades
as they were originally established.2  First, the immediate
problem to which the proposition was addressed was a decline
in production on established lines of shoes, a condition
facing Brockton in the fall of 1930. Second, the proposal
was directly linked with a specific retail price.
t
"Last year we tried to sell all the shoes that
we could, but it is getting more and more of the
$5.00 shoes and less and less of the $7.00 and
$6.00. Now our salesmen tell us that we have got
to have some $4.00 shoes if we are to keep this
factory going. We have got to have a [labor] price
where we can make $4.00 shoes in volume??.3
Finally, along with the reduced piece prices, the Union
representatives had been led to expect better conditions of
work, a higher volume of production, and lower standards of
quality, so that earnings would not necessarily be reduced.
1. Ibid., p. 156.
2. The minutes of conferences with union officials appear
in the records of the Association. Although statements made
during negotiations often cannot be taken at their face value,
the discussion in this case at least discloses the sort of
conditions which surrounded the establishment of Brockton's
" grades".
3. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, op. cit.,
November 17, 1930.
S311
Apparently, these conditions did not materialize to
the same extent in all factories, thus this "selling point"
became the basis for objections from the Brockton locals'
membership and officials:
"To you gentlemen who are going to ask us to
give you something so that you can compete
with the factories that you are now trying to
compete with, I want to ask you gentlemen if
this proposition goes through by the Cutters,
are you going to give us something so that we
can compete with our competitors? Mr. (name)
of the (Company A) gives their Cutters that
chance to compete with Cutters in outside towns.
At the (Companies B, C, and D) have we got to cut
a shoe that is going to retail for $4.00 the same
as we have got to cut a shoe that is to retail at
$5.00?"1
And, referring to the "$5.00 list", a Union representative
argued:
"It was said conditions differed on that particular
shoe at that particular time. We are going to
separate factories, etc., and do more of them. That
has all gone by the wayside; they are getting the
top grade workmanship".
At any rate, with these and other objections stated as
reasons, the Brockton locals refused to grant Association
members a "'$4.00 list?. This decision, which was not made
explicitly but, rather, through delaying tactics, was one of
the major arguments used by the Manufacturers to persuade the
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union Officials that "drastic action"?
was needed. After the charters of Brockton locals were
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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revoked and the "commission" form of government had been
adopted, it will be recalled, the lower grade price list
was quickly "negotiated" and put into effect. When the
Brotherhood came into existence, then, the grade system
and operation by Association factories on ist, 3rd, 4th,
and 5th grade piece prices were accomplished facts. Most
factories used one or two "lists", while a few made shoes
in as many as three grades. In addition, though, the
Brotherhood organized firms in the area, which had been
outside the jurisdiction of the old Brockton locals, and
which operated on piece prices even lower than the "estab-
lished" fifth grade.
Altogether, then, the Brotherhood was faced initially
with four "established. lists of piece prices and, below
those, with prices set more or less unilaterally by "cheap-
shoe" manufacturers. These differences, which resulted in
varying labor costs, were based on the "ability to pay" of
a specified retail selling price and were negotiated as an
adaption to the dwindling production of shoes in the Brockton
district. The "grades" were seen by Boot and Shoe Officials
as a palatable alternative to the unacceptable "wage reduc-
tion" and were "sold" with promises of increased volume,
improved working conditions, and lower quality standards.
Despite this "sugar-coating", the establishment of new
grades was resisted by Brockton Locals, so that the 4th
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grade was obtained only after arbitration and the 5th
forced through by a dictatorial parent union.
The Brotherhood's Attitude Toward I"Gradest"
The Brotherhood's Officials have never looked with
favor on the Grade System. As a hangover from the regime
of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, this method of deter-
mining piece prices would have been almost automatically
stigmatized; however, in this case, that natural tendency
was buttressed by considerations which made the system
objectionable for its own sake. First of all, to workers
who perform the same task but receive various piece prices,
depending on the color of the tag accompanying the shoes,
the system seems inherently wrong, and causes, according
to the Price Experts, endless grievances and continuous
dissatisfaction. In some cases, furthermore, basic dis-
content is aggravated by the fact that the "same" task
may actually be more difficult when performed on poorer
quality materials than on the higher grades.1 These
objections are, of course, most apparent where more than
one set of piece prices is used in a single.'factory; but,
even in factories operating on one "list" only, these lower
piece prices may not be accompanied by more lenient standards
of workmanship. If, at first, you are allowed to "scoot"
i. For examples, see Chapter III.
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the shoes, Union Officials claim, it is not long before the
boss is around saying that continued sales depend on "main-
taining" the workmanship for which Brockton is famous. For
these reasons, then, Brockton shoeworkers and Union Offi-
cials may refer to grades as "nothing but a wage reduction,
called by another name."
In addition, use of several sets of piece prices in the
same factory provides the basis for suspicion that the company
is "cheating on grades". The situation may certainly appear
tempting to a manufacturer who is hard pressed to "figure"
his shoes at a profit: the worker and the union stewards
have no sure way of knowing the selling prices of the shoes
they "make", and the manufacturer can obtain a lower labor
cost by marking the rack with Ipink" rather than tgreen'"
identification. This practice, referred to as "switching
tags", may not be common in the district, but there seems
to be no question that the workers and the Union have been
"cheated" on more than one occasion.* This actuality and
the undoubted temptations which the Grade System presents
create suspicion even where there is no fraud and help make
the system a "sore spot" with the Brotherhood.
1. The Unionts Price Committee has been almost continu-
ously faced with problems connected with policing the Grade
System. Union Officials cite cases where they "know" that
tags were switched, and most of the Manufacturers in the
district are equally sure that the subterfuge was used, but
"not in my factory".
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Suspicion has as a corollary the fact that production
within the district has tended to shift to the lower grades.
External conditions as well as the circumstances under which
the various price lists were established make that eventuali-
ty quite understandable; however, one of the appeals used in
"selling" new grades has been.the prospect of "holding what
you have". The volume derived from the "$4.00 list", then,
was to be added to that which could still be obtained at
higher prices. With the passage of time, though, individual
companies tended to drop grades from the "top" as they were
added to the "bottom". Although the fact that the various
shoe price grooves do not represent separate competitive
compartments means that the lower grades do provide effec-
tive competition for the higher, Union Officials still
resent the disappearance of opportunities for work on the
top piece prices.
With all these objections (Just as prevalent in 1934
as in 1947) added to the natural resentment against any
system associated with the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union,
the Brotherhood could be expected to advocate a change in
the system. This was indeed the Union's initial reaction;
however, BSAC activities have subsequently gone through
two other stages: (1) an attempt to make the best of a
distasteful situation by administering piece prices accord-
ing to selling prices; and (2) opportunistic action, in
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which the Grade System was not strictly adhered to as a
criterion of piece prices.
The Unionts initial desire was to "use an hourly or
weekly rate as a basis to establish a piece price!".1  The-
proposed procedure consisted of four steps: (1) the stewards
were to "bring in" the average hourly and weekly wage over
a four week period on each job under their jurisdiction,
and (2) descriptions of the "conditions" surrounding those
jobs; (3) the Price Experts were then to establish one set
of day rates; and (4) piece rates were to be set so that
the average operator could earn 15% above the day rate.2
Union Officials expected that variations in the conditions
of work would mean that they would come out with three
levels of labor cost, though they felt that there should
be only one set of piece prices in any single factory.
When this proposal was taken up with the Association in
the spring of 1934, those Manufacturers agreed to "study"
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
April 28, 1934. A motion to this effect was carried by
a vote of the committee.
2. Ibid. The proposal was not refined in an operational
sense. There was no discussion, for example, of how to
determine the day rates other than the statement that "those
that are now too low should be raised", and the only refer-
ence to "method" in establishing work standards was that
"there are some hogs who will have to be taken care of".
There is no reason to believe, however, that Union Officials
were not perfectly sincere in their desire to base piece
prices on job content.
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it; but, in a private discussion of the matter, their
attitudes seemed hesitant to unfavorable. Most concern
was expressed for the protection of their labor costs,
which, they feared, might be raised by adoption of the
Unionts proposal. As evidence of the ultimate unworka-
bility of changing the system, they recalled previous
efforts in conjunction with Boot and Shoe officials. The
conclusion then seemed equally applicable in 1934: "your
prices should be made according to grades in order to sell
your shoes". 1
Association members were not blind, of course, to the
elements of injustice inherent in the Grade System. As one
manufacturer stated: "You should pay for the work the way
it is done. If I am fussy, I should pay for it." 2 However,
if total labor costs were to remain generally unchanged,
additions to some prices would necessitate reductions in
others. One member reported that he had asked Union Offi-
cials "if it means taking off in one place and putting it
on in another, is the strength of your organization such
that it could be handled?"3  Though he got an affirmative
answer, realistic doubt was expressed as to the political
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., May 1, 1934.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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feasibility of such a move. Nevertheless, the Unionts
plan apparently did put pressure on Association factories,
even though it was not in effect there: "the Brotherhood
obtained a high price by their method in an outside factory
and immediately quoted that price for Brockton manufac-
turers, stating that, if outside factories could pay it,
there was no reason why Brockton manufacturers should not".
The Association's response to this pressure, however, was
not in terms of controlling the "plan" through its adop-
tion; rather, "it was brought forth that the advantage of
an outside location had changed measurably, and outside
manufacturers needed the, Association as well as we needed
them". 1
As the spring of 1934 became the summer, the issue
of revising rate-setting criteria became merged and sub-
ordinated to that of a possible general increase in wages.
When the Association refused to consider such a request and
when the General Officials reported that they could do no
better than an extension of present price lists, the General
Price Committee voted to let "each local price committee
meet with the manufacturers and settle their own prices,.2
This was done, and, in a series of lengthy meetings the
various locals used every conceivable argument in an attempt
1. Ibid.
2. BSAC, op. cit., July 5, 1934.
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to win some concession. The only inch" which the Associa-
tion negotiators gave was the promise to improve "conditionsy,
where that was possible, but they refused to change their
piece prices in any respect. The reasons for this attitude
and the pressure behind it were expressed again and again
in this way:
"In Brockton, we had to get into grades to
compete with the outside districts that are
making a shoe at a cost away below ours.....
In order to sell the shoep we have got to
keep the prices we have".L
"We cannot raise prices. We are not going to
do it. If it is forced upon us, some will go
outside of this town.n"2
"We are as helpless as you are. Our labor today
is the highest in the country. If we try to
sell shoes based on this high cost, they laugh
at us. If we have to go elsewhere, we can't help
it. I don't like to say it, but it is so; things
are very serious."3
Union representatives had reason to believe that these
were not empty statements. Two firms had moved from the
district recently and others outside the Association threat-
ened'to follow if their costs were.increased. The Union' s
own Statistician advised that "if the Brockton district is
to get volume orders on cheap shoes, a way must be found to
compete with outside firms".4 To this 1934 demonstration
1. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., June 19, 1934.
2. Ibid., June 21, 1934.
3. Ibid., June 22, 1934.
4. BSAC, op. cit., June 13, 1934.
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that their piece rates were tied to the selling price of
the product, a similar experience early in 1935 was added.
During this latter period, however, the Union was forced
to establish even lower piece rates in an attempt to attract
"cheap" shoes to. Brockton. As a result, instead of trying
to revise the Grade System, the Union's Officials turned
their attention to administering this apparently necessary,
though unsatisfactory basis for determining pie.ce rates.
They set up what were referred to as "Bracket Limits";
thus, under this plan, one price list was to apply to shoes
wholesaling at $1.70 to $2.05 and retailing at $3.00 to
$3.49, another list to shoes wholesaling at $2.06 to $2.69
and retailing at $3.50 to $4.49, and so on. Although the
Association as a group never agreed to retail price as a
criterion of labor cost, arguing that they did not control
the shoe.s beyond the factory door, the wholesale brackets
were accepted.
These brackets were no sooner established, however,
when various Manufacturers requested the Union to "allow
higher cost of materials to carry the price of shoes over
the grade limits without increasing payment of labor in
accordance with the Bracket System"'. The request was
denied in this instance, on the advice of the Union's
Statistician. He argued that such a proposal made a joke
of the Grade System. After lower labor costs had been
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granted in order to permit lower selling prices, then the
Manufacturers wished to raise their prices back up again
with no readjustment in labor cost. "If there is to be
a Grade System, there must be fixed bracket limits to
determine when each grade of piece prices shall apply". 1
In addition to any feelings that they were being
"chiselled", though, Union Officials were concerned with
keeping the selling prices charged by Brockton Manufac-
turers as low as possible. Earlier a Union representa-
tive had objected to an Association proposal on the grounds
that "the manufacturers could not operate and make a real
$3.00 seller on the list as proposed by the manufacturerst; 2
and, of course, once a set of piece rates was established,
the Union's interest in the volume of production created,
at the same time, an interest in low product prices.3
Despite the best of intentions, however, the Union
was never able to administer the Grade System in a rigid
form. Especially during the periods of 1935-1936 and
1. BSAC, op. cit., September 18, 1935.
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers? Association, Inc.,
op. cit., December 14, 1934.
3. This interest was clearly demonstrated during the
1940 and 1941 bidding for Army shoe contracts when the
Union, on two occasions of definite record and probably
others which are not recorded, stipulated that a certain
labor cost could be used by the Manufacturers only if
their bid was below a specified figure.
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1938-1940, one company after another forced concessions
of some sort through the Union.1 As the Grade System
became more and more a vehicle for company by company
bargaining and less and less of a strictly administered.
method of setting piece rates, two specific types of com-
promise with the "system" developed. The first of these
was the so-called none price list" to cover all grades made
in a single factory. Such a list was negotiated with three
companies, the typical case running in about this way:2
1. The Company had three different price lists
to cover the various grades of shoes manufac-
tured; however, the total volume of production
'  was only sufficient to keep the factory running
at half-time.
2. The Company had an opportunity to get a large
order from a "volume buyer", such as Sears
Roebuck or Montgomery Ward, but the price tag
on that order was very low. Consequently, to
get the order, the Company needed a lower labor
cost than that represented by the lowest grade
then being manufactured at the factory.
3. The idea of a fourth price list in a single
factory was considered by Union Officials as
too hard to police, and further, they felt that
the rank and file would oppose an additional
complication in the piece price structure. The
1. These concessions were usually in the form of bargains
exchanging lower piece prices for greater volume. They will
be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this
chapter.
2. The cases were not exactly parallel but did follow a
similar pattern, with the essential element being the pros-
pect of additional business during very dull times in the
Brockton district. The facts of-these cases were gathered
from Union records and discussions with Union and company
representatives active in the. negotiations.
I .
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Manufacturer, .if he could protect his labor
cost, was anxious to get away from the paper
work and price restrictions entailed by a
multiplicity of grades.
"W " - - .1 - -. . . .- - - -.. 4-. . .4*• • • • • _-L
4. -from nese motivations, ne parties workeu out
a single set of piece prices, based on an average
of the four grades, with each grade weighted
according to its relative volume importance in
the factory.
Although the resultant contract contained restrictions
governing the proportion of total volume in various retail
price ranges, these restrictions were not and, perhaps,
could not be effectively enforced. When, in one company,
the "volumen orders were lost, the former "lines" of shoes
were produced, but on the new set of lower piece prices.
Asked why the Union did not force the company to return to
the former price lists, a Union Official answered that "we
knew the company would go out of business if we did, and
business was scarce around here in 1940".
This "one-pricet compromise with the Grade System,
though it cannot be called a success from the Union point
of view, at least represented a "break" with the idea of
separate piece rates for various selling-price brackets.
This "break", added to the Unionts original preference for
piece rates set with reference to job conditions and a pre-
determined earnings expectancy, provided the background for
i
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a further departure from the Grade System.1 In 1939, an
experienced shoe merchandising concern became interested
in operation of its own factory. When Union Officials found
out about this, they approached the firm in an effort to
"bring that business to Brockton". This concern had pur-
chased a large percentage of their shoes from Brockton dis-
trict manufacturers and were tsold" on the shoemaking ability
of the district's workers; but the Company placed two impor-
tant restrictions on its entry into Brockton: (1) a specific
labor cost which was down close to that obtainable from the
Union's lowest grade price list; and (2) no stipulations as
to the selling price of the shoes manufactured. In return,
the Company's representative promised that all operators in
his factory would be given the opportunity to earn an hourly
wage in excess of the Union's established day rates, and
that these operators would be provided with steady work,
week after week, the year round. This he proposed to accom-
plish by equipping, planning, and managing his factory in
the most efficient way possible.
Over a period of several months, a price list was
negotiated, with the Company representative laying emphasis
on two points: he personally promised satisfactory earnings,
1. The information presented here is based on discussions
with a prominent company official and with sixteen Union
officers who have dealt with the Company at one time or
another during the past eight years.
r "325
and he stressed the importance of determining prices with
reference to conditions in his factory, rather than by
comparison with those already established in the district.
Since the factory was not yet. in operation, Union Officials,
faced with "Hobson's choice", could only take him at his
word in preference to loss of his business. However, after
eight years of experience, the Union's representatives are
unanimous in saying that all the promises have been kept:
I"I'll take his word to anyone else's bond, and win every
time". The Price Experts report that the earnings are
good, the people are satisfied, and the factory runs "full"
all year long. "What more could you ask?" The Company's
owners have evidenced their satisfaction with the arrange-
ment by opening another factory in the district. From many
points of view, then, this departure from the Grade System
has been a success.
1. The success of this "wage" arrangement can be at-
tributed to several factors: (1) the ability of the firm
to sell its merchandise; (2) the selling policy of the firm,
which places emphasis on the simplest styles, thus creating
l"mass production" conditions in the factory; (3) the fact
that the expected volume of production has been exceeded,
thus providing an ample supply of "shoes" for each operator;
and (4) the fact that external conditions prevailing since
establishment of the factory have placed operations in the
context of "increases," rather than -reductionst' . However
important all these ,physical"r facts may be, though, the
arrangement could not have been successful without the posi-
tive concern evidenced by the Company in the problems and
welfare of both the Union and the employees. As one Price
Expert has commented, TIf something is wrong in his factory,
a price, a condition, or anything else, he wants to make it
right. You dontt have to threaten him or strike him, or
listen to a sob story about his competitors. When youtre
dealing with a guy like that, youtre going to try to be fair
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The Union continued with its "opportunistict adminis-
tration of the Grade System in the period following World
War II, except that, during 1945 and 1946 at least, the
direction of pressure has been reversed. Although the
Union ts efforts to abolish the low 6th grade were partially
frustrated by negotiation of a "Special 5th", several indi-
vidual crafts have been able to eliminate lower grade prices.
In this period, subject to all kinds of pressure on indi-
vidual piece prices, the Association manufacturers have
become advocates of "job evaluation and time study", and
the Union has stressed the rising prices for shoes in general-
ly unsuccessful requests for "regrading".
However, by the beginning of 1948, employment and pay-
rolls in the Brockton shoe industry had slumped badly. One
company announced its intention of bringing out a new line
of shoes; a consulting firm hired to find out "what's wrong
with BrocktonT announced that the district had to get into
"cheap T shoe production; and the Brotherhood stated its
willingness to negotiate a special price list for manufac-
turers who could provide the proper "conditionst". Although
a strong rival union promptly screamed, "Shoe Workers Beware;
BSAC officials are cooking up a scheme to reduce your wages",1
there was no denying the truth of the Association advertise-
ment stating that the "Handwriting is on the Wall".
1. Brockton Enterprise, June 22, 1948. The statement
was contained in a paid advertisement signed by the Area
Director for the United Shoe Workers of America (CIO).
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Through these periods of frustration 
with attempts
to change the Grade System and then to adhere strictly
to specified bracket limits the Brotherhood Officials have
always felt the system to be inherently wrong, since it is
often so strikingly inconsistent with job requirements.
The pressures of lower shoe prices and of a reduced volume
of production in the Brockton district, however, have
forced the Union to accept grades as "a necessary evil"
and even to pursue an n"opportunistic"t course of action,
in which the system has been a point of reference for
dealings on a company-by-company basis. Though, at the
end of War, the grades provided a vehicle for piece price
increases in some cases, the indications in 1948 are that
the "pre-war" pressure of low volume on established lines
is once again forcing the Brotherhood's course of action.
The Manufacturers' Attitude Toward Grades
The attitudes and actions taken by Manufacturers
toward the Grade System have been indicated in the preced-
ing section, and, here, those indications will be supple-
imented and summarized. First of all, the Manufacturers are
well aware of the objectionable aspects of the Grade System
and are generally sympathetic with the Union contention
that piece rates "should" be more closely related to job
requirements. The grievances and the distrust which the
L ;.,
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system generates are problems for the Manufacturers as well
as for the workers and the Brotherhood. Further, the fact
that work does not vary as between grades creates a special
difficulty for successful factory operation. As one Manu-
facturer expressed it, "A worker cannot be expected to use
one pace on the first rack of shoes and another on the next;
he is the same worker all day long. The result is that your
workmanship is either too good for the cheap line or too
poor for the expensive shoes--or both".1
Their activity in support of this general attitude has
taken several forms. The Y"one-price" lists which have been
negotiated in a few cases, of course, do simplify the piece
price structure and remove from it the most striking in-
consistency with job requirements, payment of different
rates for the same work within the same factory. Such an
arrangement, though, does not solve the problem of getting
differentiated workmanship on the various grades of shoe
produced. This could be accomplished only by the estab-
lishment of separate factories for each grade, a solution
which most Brockton manufacturers are too small to adopt.
They have, however, made proposals for the correction of
those piece prices which have proved too low to yield a
1. In the "cut-throat" shoe industry, rival salesmen
may use as an argument the contention that a competitor
has "cheapened'" his high-grade shoes by introducing a
lower-priced line.
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satisfactory level of earnings. Probably motivated in
part by the minimum make-up pay which these rates have
entailed and by the drag which low rates place on man-hour
output,l these proposals have been made as alternatives to
general wage increases. The Union, in those situations,
has pressed for the largest possible general increase and
argued that the "low spots" should be taken care of as a
separate issue; consequently, specific provision for indi-
Svidual adjustments has typically been blocked. 3
1. Piece rates low enough to necessitate payment of
minimum make-up, of ceourse, have the added disadvantage
of removing any incentive which the piece rate system may
.provide. Further, if the production of individual operators
falls, additional workers must be hired to keep production
flowing.; and, if these workers are considered permanent
employees, they constitute a block to future increases in
output per man-hour.,
2. As noted previously, the Price Experts have sometimes
preferred individual adjustments to a general increase in
wages. While those adjustments would probably have resulted
in a more satisfactory piece rate structure (and would have
made the Job of Price Expert more meaningful), they have been
opposed in the General Board by the more appealing argument
that ,,all shoeworkers are underpaidw. In addition, a general
increase would "net" the union membership more money than
equivalent individual rate adjustments, since minimum make-up
was being paid anyway, and would continue where rates were not
raised sufficiently.
3. One exception to this general statement was provided by
the wage agreement dated December 3, 1945, which stated that
f"low spots' were to be "adjusted on- the basis of earnings"'
The "free for all" which followed with application of this
loose statement has been one important pressure behind the
Association's later stand, favoring job evaluation and time
study as methods for determining "proper" wage relationships.
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Despite their reservations, though, the Grade System
has offered the Manufacturers a means of obtaining what has
seemed eminently necessary, a lower labor cost. As Norton
has pointed out, "Since the Brockton manufacturers could not
obtain any permanent reductions in wage rates on the so-called
Brockton grade, they attempted to obtain a lower wage scale
for a lower grade of shoe".1  Adopted as more acceptable
than a wage reduction, the grades (like a union make-work
rule) have now become entrenched as a necessary part of
Brocktons piece rate and labor cost structure. Many
manufacturers have come to depend on the "system" and have,
in fact, built their business on the prospect of the differ-
entiated labor cost which it has made available. As a
result, most of them have favored the "system"., feeling that,
right or wrong, it provides a way to sell their shoes.
However well the Manufacturers may have liked the differen-
tiated labor cost, though, they have done their best to dis-
sociate the grades from restrictions on product-price.
Although retail price has clearly been the principal
point of reference in establishment of lower and lower grades
(what is needed is a labor cost that will let "us" make a
"$5.00 seller", a "$4.00 seller", or a "$3.00 seller"), the
retail price has never been accepted as the determinant of
1. Norton, op. cit., p. 156.
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the appropriate piece rate list. Arguing that they have
no control over their wholesale outlets, the Manufacturers
have gone no further than "price at the factory". Even
this criterion of piece rates has been subject to upward
pressure from the Manufacturers, especially in periods of
rising leather costs. Although the Union has resisted this
pressure with the argument that "if there is to be a Grade
System, there must be fixed bracket limits", that resistance
has inevitably been ineffective in the face of the spec-
tacular post-war advance in the cost of leather.1  As a
result, the situation, as it stands in 1948, is chaotic:
wholesale shoe prices are generally double their pre-war
level, no specific "brackets" define the grades for purposes
of determining labor costs, and the Manufacturers have
successfully thwarted Union attempts to reintroduce any
new "labor cost"-product price relationships.
Altogether, then, the Manufacturers' approach to the
Grade System may be summarized in the following way. First,
they recognize that the system's striking inconsistencies
with job requirements create dissatisfaction, and they bear
1. Another pressure which has pushed at established
wholesale price limits has been the production of fancy
shoes. Under some circumstances, these shoes sold to the
customer at prices reflecting the additional labor and
material which the complicated patterns entailed. In these
cases, the Union has generally agreed to a piece rate list
in line with the price of the base (simple) shoe and has
allowed "extras" to carry the price of fancy shoes over the
bracket limits.
332
4- ý n
WXbrLLLL Un of.. somes thPu' IU ie medium of minimum
make-up payments. Second, they have several times proposed
individual rate adjustments, but. the proposals have generally
been made as alternatives to a general wage increase. In
this form, :,action has been blocked by the Union's more pres-
sing need to serve the interests of all members, in prefer-
ence to the objective of a "better" piece rate structure.
Third, despite their reservations about the Grade System,
most manufacturers have favored continuance of differentiated
labor costs as the only expedient by which they could meet
price competition in the product market. Fourth, they have,
however, attempted to dissociate the system from rigid
product price "brackets". In this endeavor, they were not
generally successful during the thirties, when shoe price
fluctuations were relatively mild. However, skyrocketing
leather costs in the post-war period have made the old
."brackets" inapplicable and the Union has not been able to
establish new price restrictions. Under these circumstances,
there really is no "system" at all, just a variety of piece
price lists more or less. attached to individual companies in
the Brockton district.
The Function of the Grade System
The Grade System was started and has continued to exist
as an adaptation to the declining volume of business available
on established lines of shoes. Thus, the very existence of
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the differentiated labor costs which the "system" implies
provides a striking example of the importance of the
"quantity axis" in Brockton wage bargains. Furthermore,
the grades have functioned as the mechanism through which
the Brotherhood and individual manufacturers have worked
out their season-to-season and year-to-year problems--as a
sort of modus vivendi for the Brockton district. The sorts
of adjustment for which the Grade System has proved an
appropriate mechanism may be classified into three general
types: (1) a means for making general wage reductions
without giving the appearance of having done so; (2) a
means for discriminating between the "ability to pay" of
the various price-grades of shoes; and (3) a means for
discriminating between the "ability (or willingness) to
pay" of various companies. In each of these types of
adjustment, the primary orientation has been towards
increasing the volume of production by changing piece
rates (labor costs) in particular factories.
By the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935, the
NRA code for the shoe industry had proved ineffective as
a means of stopping price and wage reductions. Brockton
Manufacturers, who had granted wage increases in February
1934 and had resisted requests for further increases in
August of that year, found that the "tables" had been
pretty well turned. Late in September 1934, Union
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representatives had been forced to argue for T'no wage
cuts" in these terms:
"They [the manufacturers] are using the old
threadbare threats that, if you do not take
cuts, they will lose business and you will
have no work. There may be some truth in
their contention, but, if you do take a cut
in your already starvation wage, then compet-
ing manufacturers in other parts of the country
will cut their employees, and then you will be
forced to take another cut, and there will be
no end to this chiselling procedure...We may
as well hold what we have, because things will
get worse if we take a cut, and something favor-
able may break if we present a united frontl!.1
By January 1935, however, nothing favorable had
broken. Haverhill and Salem shoeworkers had granted
reductions of 12-1/24, and, though the Brockton Associa-
tion had made no specific request for a wage decrease,
this statement, proposed by the UnionTs "advisern, was
"discussed and approved" in a meeting of the General
Price Committee:
"'Up to now, we have been able to hold your wage
scales higher than anywhere in the country,
but now, owing to the failure of the Code and
the ruthless competition among shoeworkers
throughout the country, you are called on to
make a decision at once. In self preservation
you must meet the competition of other workers
in the making of shoes selling for $5.55 or less
at retail or drive business out of this district.
At least 3,000 of your members are now loafing,
and that army is rapidly increasing. You can
stop the loss of business and get new business
if you do the only sensible thing that should be
done. The increase we forced from the manufacturers
1. BSAC, Statement by Frank A. Goodwin, September 28, 1934.
A copy of this statement is in the Union files.
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a year ago was granted on the expectation
that the retail price of shoes would increase
and that the NRA would restore prosperity.
This expectation has failed to materialize,
because the retail price of shoes went down
and the NRA has not brought prosperity in the
shoe business. Whether or not you shall make
some equitable adjustment among piece workers,
depends on you. This is a vital question
pressing for immediate settlement, and I advise
you to act at once."1
Three days later the Price Committee held a meeting to
which the Manufacturers of the lowest grade of shoes were
invited. One of these men reported that evening at an
Association meeting as follows:
"'The general feeling was quite a surprise to
me. I had asked for no conference and had
made no request to them.....After several
recesses, their committee of Stewards and
Price Experts proposed to recommend a 10%
cut on all piece hands to become effective
a week from today....They are sold on the
idea that an emergency exists and that they
have got to meet it."2
Discussing the possibilities which this situation
presented, the Manufacturers expressed doubt as to whether
a general reduction in wages would be of much help to them:
"10% won't help long. It will affect other
Districts; they will'.try to get 10% off.....
I can't see it,. when you talk of percentages;
I think it is very dangerous."'3
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
January 18, 1935.
2. Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., January 21, 1935.
3. Ibid.
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Although the Association did decide to request a 10% reduc-
tion in wages, this request was not pressed.
Meanwhile, the Union voted to "rearrange the Price
Lists on the various grades in the best interests of all
the workers,...that no reduction or readjustment be made
on the 1st and 3rd grades, ....and that all adjustments be
made with each manufacturer separately and be contingent
on his signing a closed shop agreement".1  As a result,
between the first of February and the last of March, all
the price lists except those applying to the highest grades
of shoes were readjusted in one way or another: $3.00 manu-
facturers (6th grade) were given a 10% reduction, factories
making "$5.00 shoes" were allowed to use the "$4.00 list??,
Company A negotiated a "Special List" for a new line, and
so on. In this way, through the mechanism of the Grade
System, the Brockton district adjusted piece prices to meet
the problem of declining volume of production, without
granting a general "twage cut". Further, the Union was able
to treat each price classification of shoes separately, dis-
criminating between the high grades, which, they thought,
did not T"needft a decrease, and the lower grades, which did.
In similar fashion, more or less selective reductions
were granted by the Brotherhood during late 1937 and early
1. BSAC, op. eit., January 21, 1935. The General Price
Committee voted to recommend that action to the General
Board.
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1938. While denying "relief" to the Manufacturerst Associa-
tion as a group, the Union did make concessions to individual
companies, including those in the Association. These con-
cessions first took the form of piece rate "adjustments" (a
flat percentage reduction on the lowest grades and "regrading"
on the others) in return for a specific production guarantee.
For example, a motion carried in the General Price Committee
on December 17, 1937 provided that:
"we grant the (Company A) 10% off the present
piece prices with the exception of Bed Machine
Operators, and, if the production does not reach
140,000 pairs in the next six months, one half
of the reduction that was granted shall be paid
back to the workers. 95% of this volume shall
be for shoes leaving the factory no higher than
$2.10".1
Although the Brotherhood denied more requests for "adjust-
ments" than were granted, similar wage-employment bargains
were made with at least five companies during December 1937,
and, by the spring of 1938, almost every concern in the
district had received labor cost relief of some kind. 2  At
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
December 17, 1937.
2. No specific volume guarantee is recorded for these 1938
adjustments in the memos of Union committee meetings. Chances
are, however, that oral assurances of maintained volume played
a part in the "regradingU process. As one company after another
presented its "proposition," to the Union, the typical pattern
was initial refusal, and then acceptance of the proposition a
few weeks later. Though this may have been nothing more than
a bargaining tactic designed, at the same time, for maintenance
of a "fighting pose" by the Union, the limited evidence on this
point suggests that the shop crews, expressing themselves
through the stewards, may have applied considerable pressure in
favor of the readjustments.
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the same time, no publicized general wage movement occurred;
in fact, the Union specifically denied the Associationt s
request for a decrease in piece rates.
During both the 1935 and the 1937-1938 periods of
de facto general wage reductions accomplished through the
medium of the Grade System, the Brotherhood was able to make
the adjustments which seemed most appropriate to the "ability
to pay" of each grade classification. During the years
following these two periods of de facto reductions, further
company by company arrangements were made through the Grade
Systemt s mechanism. In these cases, the central point of
reference was inevitably either the ability or willingness
of a particular concern to pay agreed-upon piece prices for
a part or all of its present or prospective volume. Several
instances are on record in which the Union agreed to "submit
a (stated) labor costt in return for a specific guarantee of
daily production. For example, on September 26, 1938 Union
Officials signed a preliminary agreement providing, in part,
as follows:
"l. The Company agrees that from the period of
November 15th, 1938 until April 30, 1939,
they shall produce 140 dozen pairs of shoes
daily for a period of five days each week.
It is understood that the production of $5.00
shoes shall not exceed 40 dozen pairs daily
during this period.
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"2. In consideration of the above commitments
on the part of the Company, it is agreed
by the Union that they shall furnish the
Company with a new price list to apply to
$5.00 shoes, this price list not to exceed
60ý per pair on a plain black oxford,
commonly referred to as a base shoe.nl
In other cases, larger concerns have simply stated
to the Union, in effect, "We are selling X number of shoes
at Y price and buying these shoes from. another manufacturer
for Z. We would be willing and able to make them in Brockton
if you grant a 'competitive' labor cost." Twice, the Union
made extensive and independent investigations as to the level
of labor costs which could properly be considered "competi-
tive" and found, in each case, that Brockton rates were higher
than most others.2  Generally, though, there was little doubt
that the Company meant what was said and that the only way to
1. BSAC, op. cit., September 29, 1938. The Company agreed
to accept the stated terms and the Union Officials agreed to
recommend them to the Price Committee. Although the proposi-
tion was voted on favorably by the Committee on September 29,
it was not until November 29 that the Price Experts all came
into "line"' on individual piece prices. In the meantime,
of course, two weeks of guaranteed production had been lost.
In the period' between July I and December 31, 1938, at least
three companies made similar wage-employment bargains.
2. Since employers were the only source of really accurate
cost information during this period, Union investigators were
forced to rely on their cooperation. Such cooperation was not
always forthcoming, and, further, whatever information was
obtained could easily have been inaccurate. Possibly the most
significant point here is just the fact that the Union tried
to get laborý cost data with which to compare Brockton rates.
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"bring those shoes to Brockton" was to agree on a labor cost
for the particular "line" in question.1
While, with some concerns, the Union adjusted to
"willingness" to pay, with others, a similar adjustment
was necessary in the light of "ability" to pay. Particu-
larly, Brotherhood Officials have been anxious to avoid
taking positive action which would appear as the "reason"
for closed factory doors. Thus, even in relatively pros-
perous July 1941, the Price Committee accepted a situation
described to them as follows:
1. Another version of this procedure has occurred when a
Manufacturer has needed help in obtaining or retaining a
particular retail account. Union Officials have shied away
from concessions of this nature wherever possible, but have
sometimes been forced to make the requisite "special" price
lists. Their feeling on the matter is expressed in their
proposals for "reconstruction'" of the NRA shoe code, particu-
larly in rCase 5":
"John Ward Shoe, merchandised by the Melville Corp.,
has always been classed and advertised as a $6, $7,
and $8, shoe, but recently the price was dropped to
$5.50. The company advertises these as the same shoe
as formerly sold for the higher prices, with the same
stock and workmanship.
"Immediately this price program was put into effect,
the manufacturer came to the Union for a cut in wages.
The Union refused to cut wages. In arguing for a wage
cut, the manufacturer stated that, if the costs were
not lowered, another manufacturer in the middle west
would get the business. This is a common practice in
the industry to threaten loss of orders to force a
wage cut."
BSAC, Brief in Support of Labor's Proposals That the Shoe
Code Should Be Reconstructed. Submitted October 22, 1934
(copy in Union files).
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"Having, in-mind their labor cost of $11.35 a pair
and to which has been added 10% June 30th to make
it $1.485, your committee feels that, until such
time as the [Company] sees fit to put their own
house in order, it would be too bad to put any
further obstacles in the way of their staying in
business. If the 5th grade tag is withdrawn at
this time, it is just possible it would mean the
closing up of this plant, and after all, if the
help are making reasonable earnings, that is our
main concern."-
In this case, as in several others, a low grade price list
had been granted solely on the basis of selling price, when
the conditions of work were not remotely suited to production
in the appropriate price classification. When the firm could
not make good on its side of the bargain (wholesale price),
the Union was faced with the unenviable choice of leaving
the piece rates undisturbed or forcing the firm out of
business.
In the period from 1933 to 1948, the Brotherhoodts
record includes only one general "wage cut"; however, the
1Manufacturers and the Union have found another mechanism
for adjusting to the reality of unemployment and the threat
of further losses in the volume of production. This mechan-
ism, the Grade System, has been, then, the vehicle for de
facto general wage reductions, which, however, could not be
readily used as points of reference for action in other
districts. In addition, the "system" has made it possible
for the Union to discriminate both as between grades and
as between individual companies.
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Price Committee Meeting,
July 14, 1941.
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Problems of Administering the Grade System
The nature of the Grade System and the function which
the "system" has performed, however, both create administra-
tive problems for the parties to Brocktont s wage bargains.
First of all, the idea of equalizing labor costs (piece
rates) for factories producing in the same product-price
classifications implies- that these factories provide at
least roughly comparable "conditions" of work. Conse-
quently, administration of the "system" involves applica-
tion of at least two standards for judgment, product-price
and general factory organization, which may often yield
different answers. This contradietory situation would
make the grades difficult to. administer in any case, but
the problem has been further complicated by the function
which the "system" has performed.
As the mechanism through which the Union has adjusted,
on a company-by-company basis, to the wage-production prob-
lems which have arisen with almost every concern in the
district, the grades have been tailored and. amended so many
times that no real "syste". can. truthfully be said to exist.
Thus, "special" price lists, t.one-price"t lists, and relaxa-
tion of product-price standards: have:. compromised the,Grade
System, while, in one case, the piece rates represent almost
a complete denial of any connection between labor costs and.
selling prices. During the depressed times which plagued
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thne Brockton shoe inaustry- in the thirties anda Lm late I947'
and early 1948, these inconsistencies have boxed the Union
into one tight spot after another. Like the beau whose lady
admirers suddenly meet and compare notes, the Brotherhood
has tried to deal with one company at a time but has been
caught up in an inevitable- "total situation.t, A well-
publicized example of the undercurrent flowing almost con-
stantly beneath the surface occurred only recently.
In the fall of 1948., the Regal Shoe Company, one- of
the largest and best-known concerns- in the district, demand-
ed from the Union the ,fsame labor scale given to Knapp
Brothers,.l When the Brotherhood refused this request, a
six-month work-stoppage endued (a 'strike according to the
Company, a lockout according to the Union). The Company
stated its case as follows:
I l. All Regal shoes retail for one price--
$8.95--coast to coast.
"2. Seven other shoe factories in the Brockton
area, making shoes retailing from $10 to
$18, have a lower piece rate scale than
Regal. For instance,, we quote from the
Weekly Bulletin of Leather: and. Shoe News,
January 3, 19J48, page 17, rIn one of the
most important retail stores of Sears Roebuck
were noticed some well-made dress shoes for
men, price--$12.95 and $13.85. We inquired
the name o.f the maker and the reply was "Knapp
Bros.""
1. Letter from the Regal Shoe Company to the BSAC, dated
November 10, 1947. The letter is in the Union files and
was later made public by the Company.
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13. Regal has been and still is ready to pay
the Knapp piece rates or the piece rates
established at the Packard factory within
the last three months. These rates are
economically sound and necessary to preserve
the jobs of Whitman and Brockton shoeworkers
against outside competition."i
Although inconsistent administration of the Grade System
probably did not "cause" the Regal Shoe Company's attempt
to obtain a lower labor cost, those inconsistencies provided
the Company with a very appealing "case". As the anti-
Brotherhood Brockton Union crowed: "Making fish of one shoe
manufacturer and fowl of another is about to become costly
to the BSAC".2 The Brotherhood pointed out, in defense,
that Regal had not raised prices as much as other shoe manu-
facturers and argued: "If these factories now have the
decency to go up in the price of their shoes to meet the
high cost of materials, rather than to degrade themselves
by taking it out of labor by cutting wages, Mr. Daly should
be ashamed of himself by mentioning them in the same breath
1. Brockton Enterprise, February 13, 1948. This was a
paid advertisement signed by the Company's president,
John J. Daly. Early in the dispute, Daly had presented
this "case" directly to the Regal workers and had even
left, for their inspection, several pairs of "Knapp shoes",
asking them to "note the workmanship on these shoes and see
how much better it is than the shoes we are getting in this
factory". Ibid., December 17, 1947.
2. Brockton Union, December 17, 1947.
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with the Regal,. 1  At the same time, though, the Union
adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude throughout
this "strike", an attitude at least partially movitated
by its need to appear in a consistent role, willing to
treat all Manufacturers (and Union members) in the same
way. Although the dispute, which seemed destined to end
with removal of the Company's manufacturing capacity to
another location, was nwon" suddenly for the Company by a
sweeping State court injunction,2 then, the case illus-
trates the problem posed by more or less expedient use of
the Grade System.
1. Brockton Enterprise, February 19, 1948. This state-
ment appeared in an advertisement sponsored by the Brother-
hood. The position taken here is the reverse of that favored
by the Brotherhood during the thirties: manufacturers were
obligated to keep the price of their shoes down to the
,"brackett" limits. The context, however, had changed: the
Union had lost control over product-prices and the relatively
low price was the tool of a reduction in wages rather than of
maintaining volume at established piece rates. If the "goal"
is pitched, then, at the level of "tmaintaining wages", the
two positions can be perfectly consistent with one another.
2. The decision read, in part, as follows: "Let a pre-
liminary injunction issue restraining the respondents from
boycotting the products of the complainant, and from engaging
in or conducting any picketing of the Whitman factory, or any
premises of the Regal Shoe Co., and enjoining the respondents
from preventing or attempting to prevent, any person from
entering said factory or entering or remaining in the employ
of said company, and from molesting, intimidating or threaten-
ing any such persons, or from supporting in any manner the
continuation of the strike against the complainant". Brockton
Enterprise, June 10, 1948. The basis for such a sweeping in-
junction was the finding of "illegal purpose.,' Judge
Beaudreau found that the Union, in refusing to arbitrate issues
while T"strike-breakers," were employed at the. factory, was, in
effect, striking for the "Union shop" and that, therefore,
"illegal and unlawful acts have been committed".,
3/46
The resultant inconsistencies, of course, may become
the means for raising piece rates as well as for lowering
them, depending on which party commands the balance of
bargaining power. While depressed times place the Union
always on the defensive, periods of high-level activity in
the Brockton shoe industry give the Brotherhood a chance to
press for increases, especially on individual piece rates.
These opportunities, however, have been infrequent and short-
lived; in fact, the Union has never been able to effect the
general program of "regrading"t which was proposed, for
example, in 1945 and 1946. On the other hand, several well-
organized crafts have been able to raise their piece rates,
either by the "equalization"t process or by elimination of
the lower grade rates. Since this form of wage activity
falls more naturally into the discussion of individual piece
rate adjustment, though, the more detailed treatment will be
postponed until the following chapter.
Whether or not the decision had legal merit, inter-
vention by the courts in behalf of the Company seems in-
herently unfair in this case. Throughout the dispute, the
Union (and not the Company) had been willing to negotiate
or arbitrate the issues involved, despite the Company's
originally announced intention of running an "open shop!".
When the Company tried to operate with strike-breakers and
any of the former crew who were willing to return to work,
the factory was picketed, to be sure, but this activity
was marked by the complete lack of any violence.
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Summary
The Grade System, which lies at the heart of
Brockton's piece rate structure, has been forced into
being by the pressure of lower product prices and the
consequent declining volume on Brockton's established
"lines" of shoes. Under these circumstances, the differ-
entiated labor costs which the "system" yields have been
based principally on the selling price of the shoes manu-
factured, although the promise of improved job conditions
has accompanied the institution of each lower grade. The
idea of flat differentials in piece rates, however, is
inherently inconsistent with job requirements, a condition
which is most obvious when several "price lists" are used
in a single factory. The justice of grievances which in-
evitably result is recognized by both the Union and the
Manufacturers; however, little effort was made to rectify
the inconsistencies during the thirties: the Manufacturers
were not willing to make adjustments when their labor costs
were otherwise stationary and the Union was not willing to
sacrifice the size of a general wage increase to the goal
of a "bettern piece rate system.
The Union's activities with respect to the Grade
System have moved through three stages. Initial resent-
ment against this "reduction by another name" led to an
attempt to discard the tasystemn in favor of piece rates
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based on actual Job conditions. This program was frus-
trated by the realization that labor eests (and therefore
iece rates) were inevitabl 
linked to roduct 
rices
consequently, Brotherhood officials tried to- make the best
of a bad situation by administering the asystem" in accord-
ance with well-defined. "bracket limits". Rigid application
of these limits was never accomplished, however, and a
spectacular rise in leather costs led to a complete break-
down of the old "brackets" in the post-war period. Such
a breakdown had long been desired by the Manufacturers,. who
had accepted the Union's selling price restrictions only as
a necessary expedient.,
As the Union drifted into an "apportunistic" adminis-
tration of the Grade System,. the "system" became the vehicle
for adjustments to the ability or willingness to pay of
various individual companies. The result was a number of
compromises such as the Ttone-pricet list, "special" price
lists, and the basing of rates on earning capacity in a
particular factory. In addition, the "system" has func-
tioned as a sort of modus vivendi for the Brockton district:
the means for general wage movements without appearance as
such, and a way to discriminate between the "trelief" needs
of the various grade classifications. Such a function,
added to the contradictions of job requirements inherent in
the Grade System, have made the problem of administration
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difficult. Special arrangements made with one company
have tended to spill over into the entire district, with
inconsistencies providing a weapon for change in any given
rate or set of rates. Such a weapon can, of course, cut
both ways, but the prevalence of depressed conditions in
the Brockton shoe industry has generally meant movement
in a downward direction.
Within this area of wage activity, the basic force
has been the rising importance of lower-priced shoes. This
force has meant to the Manufacturers the need for lower
labor costs and to the Union the need for a greater volume
of production. The Grade System, with all its faults,
has been the means for satisfying these essential needs.
As one manufacturer remarked, "It is just one of those
things: you can tt live with it and you cant t live without
it t.
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CHAPTER VIII
PIECE RATE ADJUSTMENTS IN BROCKTON
The structure and movement of individual piece rates
are important phases of wage activity in the Brockton shoe
industry. Quantitatively, the determination of these rates
probably consumes more time and effort than any other area
of activity, and further, the changes that are made can have
significant labor cost effects as well. Qualitatively, the
rate-setting process has often been the most meaningful
aspect of unionism, especially for members of the tightly-
organized craft groups. Consequently, this chapter will
be devoted to discussion of piece rate adjustments in the
Brockton district, with the objective of explaining the
developments which have taken place.
This discussion and explanation fall naturally into
five sections, with the subject matter divided in the follow-
ing way: (1) the general nature of Brockton's piece rate
system; (2) the Union approach to that system; (3) the methods
used for setting and changing piece prices; (4) developments
within the rate structure during the post-war period; and
(5) the influence of shoe-machine development on the rate
structure.
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The Nature of Brockton's Piece Rate Structure
Professor Slichter has found that "TThe satisfactory
operation of piecework from the standpoint of the workers
requires (1) that the unit of output or accomplishment be
definable with precision, and (2) that conditions of work
be maintained with substantial uniformity over periods of
time".1 Both these requirements for satisfactory operation
refer primarily to the physical conditions into which the
method of wage payment is introduced. Presumably, in such
cases, differentials in piece prices would be oriented
toward differences in job requirements. Discussion of the
Grade System as an important determinant of piece rates in
the Brockton shoe industry, however, has shown that differ-
entials between the "same" job on various grades of shoes
are not oriented toward differences in job requirements,
but rather, toward the "ability to pay" of each selling-
price classification. Further, even for a particular job
on the same grade of shoe, the relationship between the
task performed and the rate of pay is not uniform, since
the unit of output is not always the same and since the
conditions of work are subject to variation.
Present-day piece rates in Brockton are essentially
"yhand-me-downs", which have their origins, in many cases,
1. Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
Management, Brookings, 1941, p. 287.
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in the period before World War I. During this period, the
shoes produced were of relatively simple and fairly well
standardized styles; consequently, both the "un-it of output"
and the Irconditions of workf" were more nearly uniform.. Under
these circumstances, a. system of raverageIr piece prices was
apparently accepted in the district. As additional styles
and more rigid standards of appearance became popular, how-
ever, these Ttaverages" gradually drew a.wider and wider range
of variation into the task. which a given operator might per-
form. Since. these new 1 Job.% requirements t1 handicapped, the
workers, the basis for controversy was laid. In sch contro-
versies, Union Officials have generally adopted the position
that the rates referred to a "base" (simple) shoe and that
operators should be paid "extras" for any additional work
required of them. Despite the fact that a number of these
"extras" were granted. before World War II, the Manufacturers,
on te-otheher hand, have argued that the prices were set to
cover the "average run of conditions in the plant; and that
the f"easytt shoes compensated for the "hard" ones. This
controversy has never been settled explicitly.
As a result, most piece rates in the Brockton district
have no administrative point of reference at all. They are
not based on either a particular style of shoe or on a
specific product-mix; the "prices," simply exist in the
various factories for jobs defined in the loosest sense
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only. Incomplete definition is the case with respect to
the "elements" of the task performed as well as to the
proportions of "easy" and Thard" shoes. For example, one
relatively simple job is usually designated as "Tack Inner-
soles--X cents per 12 pair". Though the parties to any
change in this rate probably understood the conditions of
"work as there performed", no written record exists of
(a) how far the operator goes to get his "rack"; (b) how
many tacks he is to put in; (c) where the tacks are to be
placed; (d) how far he must push a completed "trackrt; and
so on. Consequently, when a grievance develops, inaccu-
rate memories or changed personnel have no way to check
the more exact nature of most jobs in Brockton's shoe
factories.
Loosely-defined piece rates, however,, are not at all
unusual in the shoe industry, though there is some evidence
that larger manufacturers, especially, have been trying to
introduce more "scientific" methods during the post-war
period.l Actually, the problem cannot be passed off with
the statement that job "elements" and the proportions of
the product mix should be defined with some precision, for
the essence of the problem is not so much definition, as it
1. This observation is made as a result of personal
conversations with appropriate persons in all the larger
men's shoe manufacturing companies in the United States.
354
is control over those "conditions". In factories where a
standardized shoe is manufactured day in and day out, such
control is almost automatically accomplished;1 but, where
the shoes go through in a variety of styles, produced for
relatively small orders and with a fluctuating daily volume,
the manufacturer may not really have control over the condi-
tions of work in his factory.2  This is frequently the case
in the many small shoe companies which predominate in the
industry.
In the Brockton district, as well, the job-lot, manu-
facturing process means that many operations are really not
suited to the piece rate method of wage payment--the "unit
1. Even with a completely standardized output from the
stylistic point of view, variability would not be eliminated
from all operations because of unavoidable differences be-
tween any two pieces of leather. In this strict sense, any
piece rate system is bound to be based on "average" condi-
tions of some sort. In this latter case, though, the range
of variation summarized by the "average" would be quite narrow.
2. In speaking of application of more "scientific" rate
setting procedures to the industry, one observer aptly remarked
in conversation, "Where it is possible, it is not badly needed;
and, where it is most needed, it would be almost impossible to
introduce and maintain". Perhaps, standards for administrative
judgment could be defined, even in smaller factories, but that
theoretical possibility would probably not be practical where
variations in working conditions are too great. Even with
reference to the problems of a large company, its industrial
engineer stated that "we have to watch our perspective pretty
carefully. After all, we are not in business to make piece
prices; wefre here to manufacture shoes".
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of output" is not definable with "precision" and working
conditions are not "-maintained with substantial uniformity
over periods of time". Why, then, is the method still
accepted? Though the inertia acquired by any "traditional"
system of wage payment probably explains, in large measure,
the acceptance of piece rates in Brockton today,1 the system
does, however, satisfy one extremely important need: the
assurance of a predictable labor cost. This need is, of
course, felt most directly by the Manufacturers, as they
"figure" shoes for specific sales; however, the Union and
the workers, too, have an interest in enabling the employers
to bid successfully. Beyond occasional statements that "the
worker has overhead too", there is no evidence of BSAC oppo-
sition: to piece rates; in fact, the Union is really organized
around. the premise that the system will continue in effect.
The function of the local craft units and the jobs of the
fourteen Price Experts would lose much of their significance
or, perhaps, disappear altogether, if time rates of pay were
1i. Slichter has generalized that "There is some tendency
for workers to prefer the system of wage payment under which
they work and to which, in consequence, they are adjusted?".
He further states that "The number of cases where unions
compel employers to use a method of payment which they would
not voluntarily adopt is small". Slichter, op. cit., pp. 2841
and 310. Of some fifty union and management officials in
the Brockton shoe industry with whom discussions were held,
not one individual seemed even to consider discarding the
k piece rate system.
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instituted. The Brotherhood, then, has a certain insti-
tutional vested interest in continuance of the piece rate
system.
In the Brockton district, then, the prevailing and
accepted method of wage payment is "by the piece", even
though many of the operations, as performed in district
factories, might more appropriately be placed on an hourly-
rate basis. The piece prices which are in effect today are
essentially: "historical", in the sense that they represent
the sum total of pressures applied over a long period of
time rather than the reflection of well-defined, adminis-
trative standards for Judgment. The Job-lot process of
shoe manufacturing prevalent in most Brockton factories
creates wide variation in both the "unit of output" and
working conditions there, variations which are difficult
to control. In this complicated situation, piece rates
do not refer to any specific product mix, nor are the
"elements" of particular operations recorded and agreed
on specifically. The general nature of Brockton's piece
rate system, then, can only be described as "loose" and
"i nexact".
The Union Approach To the Piece Rate System
This section will deal with two aspects of the
Brotherhood's approach to the wage payment system in
Brockton: organizational arrangements through which the
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Union deals with the system and reactions to the inexact
nature of the piece rates. In Chapter V, the BSAC has
been described as a multi-craft unit, with fourteen local
unions, each having jurisdiction over the piece rates paid
to its particular membership group. Although general wage
questions are presumably outside the scope of activities of
any single local, the line between matters affecting the
entire membership and an "adjustment" of interest to only
one craft is extremely difficult to draw. Consequently,
what may seem to be a relatively minor function may assume
great importance and become, in fact, a principal focus of
attention for the membership. Further, the total amount
of labor cost available is generally limited and, in certain
cases, is explicitly defined as an exact number of cents.
Under these circumstances, any concession gained by one
group, apparently from the employer, is really taken at
the expense of all the other union members.
The size, cohesiveness, and work-skills of the craft
groups vary widely. On the one hand, for example, the
highly skilled Edgetrimmers have organized only one opera-
tion, so that a single piece price represents for them a
strong common goal. Each man in the Local performs the
same work, their total number is under 150, and their
"share" amounts to only about 3% of the total labor cost.
On the other hand, the Mixed Local includes over 800 people,
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working on some 25 miscellaneous jobs, many of which are
relatively unskilled; and the Stitchers number almost 1800,
mostly women, who perform approximately 40 operations. As
a result, both purposefulness and bargaining position can
vary widely from one craft group to the next.
With this complicated organizational structure, the
BSAC does not really approach the piece rate system as one
Union at all. Actually, the problems inherent in Brockton's
inexact method of wage payment are handled by fourteen differ-
ent units, each acting more or less independently of the
others. Further, though these independent Unions presumably
use their varied bargaining strength against the employers,
they are also the agencies through which Brotherhood members
compete for shares in the limited economic welfare which is
available.1
With fourteen different groups as centers of activity,
varied treatment of the problems created by an inexact set
of piece prices might normally be expected. The results
which different crafts have attained for their members are
varied, indeed; however, there are two types of reaction
which appear quite generally, not only in the Brockton case,
1. Referring to a proposal that his Local reduce some of
their high rates so that others might get a "fair" share,
one of the Price Experts remarked: "When anyone wants you
to give them something that you've already got, tell them
that this is the modern prayer: God bless me, my wife, my
son John, his wife--us four--no more. Amen".
but in other piece rate industries: as well. 1 The first
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is the attempt by craft Unions to protect operators from
extreme variations in the earning power of their rates;
and the second, recognizingi thard". and "reasy" shoes as a
reality, ; is the effort toa protect members against each
other--to see that each.worker gets his share of the
Seasy" sho-es. Both types of reaction., of course,. give
rise to working rules, sometimes explicit and sometimes
implicit., which may often make factory qperation mor.e
costly and less flexible.
Protection against variations. in the earning power
of piece rates is provided by the Union in two general
way-s: (1) by the imposition of financial penalties on the
employer,, and (2) through specific and implicit, rules
which define certain aspects of working conditions and.
limit the extent of job requirements, The agreement
which every BSAC local has with-, the manufacturers rela-
tive to, payment for work., on.sample" shoes exemplifies
the sort of problem: to whch., financial. penalties, may be
addressed. Each season, firms must prepare "samples"
of all the shoes in their line for display purposes.
1. For many examples of the nProblems: and Policies
Created by Pie cework", see Slichter, op. cit.,, pp. 311-
.4.
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These shoes go through the factory in small lots, often
one pair: at a time, and, naturally, the best of workman-
ship is desired on them.. The necessity for machine ad-
justments in many cases and for special care throughout
the factory is met by the Localswith provision for tt'price
and one half" on this type of. work.
Similar in. nature is the problem of .compensating
operators for the extra work entailed by, small lots. (less
than twelve pairs) produce.d for regular orders; however,
the large volume of such orders in some factories and in
some periods complicates this. issue. Though no one seri-
ously denies that these "broken sizes" handicap many of
the operators, the Manufacturers have, argued that high
penalty rates often make it impossible for them: to take-
certain types of orders. Especially in. depressed times,
.the contention that "we meust be allowed to to akewhatever
business we can geti' apparently rings true enough so that
restrictions may be "temporarily"' relaxed and, where the
bargaining position is weakest, not reimposed promptly.*
1. An example of the sort of argiment which•arises from
juxtaposition of extra work requirements on small lots and
the necessity, in a "buyer'sr. market, to offer those shoes
width no premium price, occurred in 1934:
Union Representative: On the question of small lots,
we get six pair lots on one- kind; and a four pair lot of
another kind. There are so few of a kind that many times
we cant t make anything onG them.
Manufacturers' Representative: This is not the manu-
facturer's fault. He is trying to sell all the shoes he can.
Whether he.. sells them in four pair lots or six pair lots,
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As a result, the application of penalty rates to production
in small lots is uneven, with the strongest locals securing
the best protection for their members.,
The use of rules to define working conditions in the
factories also varies from one local to the next. Perhaps
the most extensive list of "conditions, is that insisted
upon by the Cutters' Local for their "prima donasl, the
t"Qutside Cutters". For example, the following provisions
are made: "Not more than three men on a set, of .patterns;
Not more than- five men on a set of dies; Broken or damaged
leather, black or colored kid and kangaroo shall be cut by
the piece or day at the option of the Cutter; On Scotch
grain, barmore, thistle, and all similar embossed or printed
leathers, Cutters shall not be required to replace pieces
thrown out for brandst?; and so on. 2  Similar definitions of
he has got to sell them at the same price....The manufac-
turer is not making a dollar today.
U. R. : I don't see why the operator should be penal-
ized.
M. R. : The manufacturer has to sell anything he can
s ell.
U. R. : Do the operators have to arrange that? That
is their business. We have to look out for ourselves.,
H. RM .: We try to sell all we can. The manufacturer
is in trouble, I tell you.
Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, Inc.,
op. cit., June 22, 1934.
1. The Price Experts in several of the Locals also argue
that these penalty rates provide an important incentive for
the Manufacturer to provide good working conditions.
2. These "conditions" were taken from a written agreement
signed by a representative of the Cutterst Local and one of
the district's Manufacturers.
working conditions and limitations on job requirements are
used throughout the factory, but they apply principally to
the most skilled and best organized crafts.
On the other hand, protection of individual workers
from each other is provided throughout the factory, for
equal division of the "hard" and "easy" shoes, between the
workers concerned, is the unwritten rule wherever that
problem arises. The exact method of division varies from
one work group to the next and is usually under the direc-
tion of their own craft steward. The same principle of
equity is also generally applied when the total amount of
work available is not sufficient to keep all members of the
crew busy for a full work week.
As a result of these various working rules, proposed
and policed by the Craft Stewards, factory operations are
controlled to a large extent by a variety of more or less
independent work groups. These circumstances, combined
with the fact that the level of production has been chronic-
ally "subnormal" in Brockton district factories, have pro-
vided a natural setting for restrictions on the output of
individual workers. Although the BSAC General Board went
,,on record" in 1937 t• winform the locals that the stinting
of work is detrimental to the best interest of the BSAC"
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and ruled "that the stints be immediately abolished,,1 it
would be surprising indeed if such a practice were abolished
by decree, especially since the conditions which lead to
"stints" have remained oppressively present.
All of these rules, penalties, and limitations, which
naturally arise as Union reactions to an imperfect piece
rate system, seem, in effect, to reorient the objective
of factory operation. The Manufacturers, feeling that
their piece rates are fixed in the short run, take only a
haphazard interest in improving working conditions. Gradu-
ally, as the foremen do less and less and the Stewards more
and more, the factory changes hands, in a sense, and is run
by some fourteen or more uncoordinated groups. The objec-
tive of these groups is not so much efficient operation as
it is protection of the operators from various threats which
the wage payment system and other conditions of production
may impose on them. Thus, the piece prices, which satisfy
the Manufacturerts need for a fixed labor cost in the short
run, create, in turn, needs which various work-groups can
satisfy only at the expense of efficient factory operation.
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Board Meeting, October 18,
1937. The resolution was passed as part of a program "to
better conditions in the shoe industry in the area to hold
the present business and induce manufacturers to move here".
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The Administration of Piece Prices
The Unionts approach to the piece rate system has
been described as, in reality, fourteen independent
approaches, and the reactions of the various work-groups
in terms of factory regulations has already been indicated.
In this section, the methods by which the rates, themselves,
are established and changed will be examined. The adminis-
tration of the piece rate system in Brockton is accomplished
almost entirely through the mechanism of grievance procedure.
Up until August of 1947, there was no formal Union-Management
agreement on the steps involved in this procedure; however,
a grievance process has long been defined within the Union
organization. From the first, Brotherhood Officials have
insisted that piece prices be settled by the Price Experts
only, in preference to "first step'? attempts to reach agree-
ment through the various Craft Stewards. There are a
variety of reasons behind such insistence, but the following
three are probably the most important. First, the Expert's
knowledge of rates and conditions throughout the district
should enable him to provide "ammunition'" in any single
grievance--ammunition which would not be available to those
familiar with only one factory. Second, centralized admin-
istration is an obvious prerequisite to effective policing
of the district rate structure; and third, creation of a
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dependence by individual members on Union Officials helps
to satisfy the Brotherhood's institutional needs.
As a result, piece rate. grievances are referred first
to the appropriate Price Expert, who. then attempts to
satisfy the complainant in. whatever way he can. Such a
procedure automatically throws the burden of proof (or
the burden of forcing a change) on the Union; and, since.
a positive position is generally the most difficult to
defend,I the Price Experts operate consistently with an
initial disadvantage. On the other hand, though, the fact
that Union Officials can, in effeet, try and re-try their
cases with first one firm and then another gives them what
is probably a compensatingi advantage. In fact, this
,grievance, method (as contrasted with more rigid tech-
niques) of administering an inexact piece rate system may
result in some tendency for- wages to creep slowly upward.
Any new rate. or, changed condition: which results in a rela-
tively high earnings potential tends to stand without
challenge; whereas, those which result in earnings. belaw
their previous level are subject, at least, to question.
I. Like the ,,innocent" man who must be proved guilty,
the piece rate in existence, must be "proved"n incorrect.
How much easier would the Union's problem be, if the tables
were turned and Manufacturers were obliged to demonstrate
the correctness of their rates. This statement is not made
as a proposal, but just as a notation that the ,grievance"
method of administering a wage payment system automatically
gives the complainant (usually the Union) the most difficult
side of the case.
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In the ensuing arguments: over the: merits of any
grievance (and the Manufacturers almost never give in
without a struggle), two criteria of "justice" seem to
be accorded predominant consideration by the parties, in
their oral statements at least. The first of these,
already indicated, is the standard of maiaintained earnings.
Theoretically, Manufacturers and Union officials will agree
that the rates should enable an individual operator to earn
a steady return* but they disagree on the length of time
over which'those earnings should be measured. The chronic-
ally unsettled nature of this controversy, whether the
rates refer to an "average" shoe or- a mbase, shoe, means
that this apparent criteria really settles very few dis-
putes. It does, however, provide the nexcuset, at least,
for endless requests by the Union for -extras" to compen-
sate for particular hardships. which may occur. Even if
this standard were an effective determinant. in the estab-
lishment and change of piece rates, though, the result
would not necessarily be "Just"; for such a standard can
be. no better than% the status a gu from: which it starts.
Since Brockton'ts rates: are, imperfect, from the- standpoint
of job requirements to begin with, a "'maintenance of earn-
ings" formula for adjustments would only cumulate and re-
enforce the errors of the past.
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Reliance on piece rate earnings as a sole criterion
of the rate is subject to other qualifications, especially
relevant to this Brockton situation. First, chronic under
employment has lead to "equal division of the worktt and,
one suspects, to "stints" on many operations; consequently,
what the rate "does" yield and what it "could" yield may be
quite different.1  Second, somewhat related to the first
qualification, earnings on a particular job may often be
maneuvered in order to provide the "proof" of a position
already determined. Finally, an "unstinted" level of
earnings is the product of a particular operator or opera-
tors. If this individual or group happens to be excep-
tionally fast or exceptionally slow, the rate set on per-
formance either "captures" their speed for the Manufacturer
1. The Manufacturers have several times tried to estab-
lish the point that low earnings resulting from "equal
division of work" should not be used as "evidence" that
the rates were too low-. As under employment has been
more or less chronic, however, differentiation between
actual and potential earnings has been blurred and made
difficult.
2. Restrictions on output are, of course, the usual
method by which operators may maneuver earnings. However,
manufacturers can also manipulate earnings in short periods
by, for example, changes in work schedules and in the
volume: of production.
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or gives away more than the mythical "average man" should
I
earn.
The second criterion generally referred to in piece
rate grievances is the comparison with ,prices" paid in
the past and in other factories for similar work. Brock-
ton's Grade System gives to such comparisons an exceptional
point of merit: if piece rates are based on selling prices,
then all Manufacturers should be able to pay what anyone
does pay. This has been a particularly potent issue for
the Price Experts, especially during periods when Associa-
tion activity was at a low ebb, and the opportunity for
"whipsawingt ' the Manufacturers was most inviting. The
theory of equal piece rates in all factories making the
same grade of shoe breaks down, however, over the essen-
tial non-comparability of working conditions; thus, while
this standard may be "used" by the parties, 2 it cannot
become a consistently applied point of reference for the
establishment and change of piece rates.
1. A "scientific" time study presumably "levels", all work
performances, thereby reducing each one to the same common
denominator: the "average" man working with an "average"
expenditure of effort. The assumptions involved in that
"leveling" procedure are, in my opinion, open to serious
question. Whether or not the method is valid, however, the
parties to Brocktonts piece rate disputes make no attempt
whatever to use it.
2. The standard does not always work for the Union, for
Manufacturers whose "conditions" are "out of linen may use
it as a buffer against a higher rate.
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With no accepted criterion by which to judge rates
of pay in the Brockton shoe industry, the determining
factor has become, in reality, bargaining position or,
more- crudely, force. Just as. there is "nothing like some
short time or a few weeks loaf to change gun-at-the-hip
operators into reasonable: men"v, there are also occasions
when "you need. a few days: of vacation or a few shoes on
the floor to make those Manufacturers. stop stalling and
start giving you. what you're entitled to".
The maneuvering for bargaining position is illus-
trated by the Price Experts' attempts to have operators
t"go on by the day" -or, even better, ttby"t their. average
hourly earnings, when a rate is indispute or when a new
shoe necessitates the establishment of a new rate. By
this maneuver, the strongest locals have been able to
place the Manufacturer in a very weak. position, for slow
work on a guaranteed hourly rate can make even an exorbi-
tant piece price seem cheap.. by comparison. On the other
hand, when the Manufacturer has the power and fortitude
to refuse to "do" the shoes if they must be done "by the
day', he may be able to force the Local to accept a low
rate, at least on trial. Especially when the volume of
work is light,, the trial rate is likely to last through
the production "runt". Further, a necessary small
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adjustment may still leave the Manufacturer with a rela-
tively favorable price.
During World War II and in the post-war period,
resort to arbitration has partially taken the place of
pressure tactics, giving more determinative weight to the
criteria of "maintained earnings" and of "comparative
rates". Nevertheless, during the thirties and, despite
the use of arbitration procedure, even more recently, the
bargaining position of the work group and Manufacturer
affected has been a basic force determining the level of
new and changed rates. As a result, the piece prices
have, like the "Grade System", been a source of adjust-
ments to economic circumstances, over and above general
movements in wages.1  Although existing rates cannot
generally be cut (except through the Grade System adjust-
ments outlined in the previous chapter), depressed times
enable the Manufacturers to eliminate many "extrast and
establish lower fprices", as constantly changing styles
work their way through the factories. At the same time,
some of the costly and restrictive working rules may be
I. A somewhat similar adjustment can also occur in
time-rate industries via changes in the daily or weekly
output of individual workmen--at least that seems to be
the theory of those who feel that Ia little unemployment
is a good thingn.
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relaxed.1  On the other hand, during the relatively in-
frequent periods of high employment, the reverse has been
true, many "extras" have been added to the rate structure
and conditions of work have been more precisely defined.
In such ups and downs, however, all crafts do not share
equally, for the most tightly organized groups can help
themselves most in good times and can retain more of their
gains when business activity falls to lower levels.
Post-War Developments Within the Rate Structure
The types of pressures to which Brockton's piece
rates respond are illustrated by the developments in the
period following World War II. This period was at first
characterized by an almost unprecedented demand for Brock-
ton's shoes and then, beginning about the middle of 1947,
by a return to the chronic under employment which was
typical of the pre-war years. In addition, three other
influences have brought out most dramatically the inade-
quacies of the piece rate structure: (1) the change-over
from simple wartime styling to the "fasterTy shoes in
demand right after the war; (2) wartime practices which
remained to haunt peacetime operations; and (3) the loose
1. Peculiarly, when the shoe business is experiencing
a 'buyer's market", the small orders, unsteady volume,
and variable styles, which make protective rules most
necessary, are most prevalent. Thus, when the rules are
most needed, they are most relaxed; and, when they are
least needed, they are most rigid.
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provision in the December 1945 wage agreement for "adjust-
ment of low spots on the basis of earnings".
During the years from 1942 through 1945, Brockton's
shoe factories were short of workers in all crafts, re-
flecting the increase in local production, the relative
attractiveness of the pay in war-born industries, and the
manpower called into the Armed Services. Though Brock-
ton's old and skilled craftsmen provided, perhaps, a
steadier work force than that enjoyed by most industries
and localities, labor was scarce enough so that Manufac-
turers could ill afford to lose any single individual.1
Individual piece rates were, of course, fairly difficult
to raise in the face of War Labor Board restrictions, so
that this means of attracting and holding labor was not
generally available. As a result of the manpower shortage,
however, simplified work requirements were seldom, if ever,
combined with a reduction in piece rates, lower standards
of workmanship became quite general, and, on some opera-
tions, Manufacturers were forced to t"wink" at the omission
of work steps, allowing workers to "Tscoot" the shoes.
1. There was apparently some labor "tpirating", with
under-the-table bonuses used to attract workers in crafts
where shortages were particularly acute. The situation was
bad enough so that the Manufacturers' Association asked its
members to use "caution" in newspaper advertising, particu-
larly for "major operativestt. "These ads do more harm than
good by causing unrest and independence among these opera-
tives." Southeastern Massachusetts Shoe Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation, Inc., Letter to All Manufacturers, dated November 17,
1942.
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These practices, adopted as reactions to the wartime
labor shortage, cost money and resentment in the post-war
period, as the examples which follow will show. The opera-
tion of attaching the innersole to the last normally re-
quires the insertion of five tacks, done one at a time.
During the war, the shortage of tacks forced most Manufac-
turers to reduce the number used per shoe to three; however,
no change was made in the piece rate. When, after the war
was over, the Manufacturers wished to return to a five-tack
basis, the operators refused to do the "extran work unless
they got a raise in their rate. Similarly, the job of
edgetrimming high-grade shoes included the preliminary step
of wetting the edges. Use of an oiled sole during the war
made this step unnecessary, though the piece price was not
adjusted. Afterwards, when the operators were told that
they must wet the edges, they stated that the added work
would only be done at a higher price.2
1. This problem of switching back to a "five-tackU basis
was faced by shoe manufacturers all over the country; and,
in fact, the more general problem of overcoming expedient
wartime practices was a fairly typical one.
2. In this particular case, the Manufacturers were able
to bring the matter to arbitration, and, by a decision
rendered on October 14, 1947, they ,wont the argument.
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The. most costly post-war dispute over an individual
piece rate. occurred between the Association and the Edge-
setters' Local. This controversy got its start in several
medium-grade factories where, during the War, the Edge-
setters had been, allowed to skip over two important. steps
in their operation. As described in a previous chapter,
the job consists of first applying a liquid and then- "iron-
ing" it into the. sole, a process done once (none setn) on
cheaper shoes and twice (ntwo setin) on shoes of the higher
grades. Under the pressure of a shortage of Edgesetters
and a high level of demand for shoes, certain Manufacturers
in. the district apparently "winked" while the operators
applied "one set" and collected the piece rate for - " two
sets".' Even though the individuals concerned knew that
they were "getting away with something", the "cut" entailed
in a return to the full requirements of the job caused
resentment and, on September 9, 1946, a wage demand.2
After the Edgesetters Local had been further disap-
pointed by the 10, per hour general increase awarded by the
1. Once the glossy "set" has been applied, it is very
difficult to tell whether the edge has been set once or
twice.. The difference does show up, of course, as the
shoe is worn.
2. The demand was for varied increases in the ,two set"
rates., according to the grade of shoe produced. The percent-
age-was greatest in the lower grades, where the practice
referred to above was most prevalent.
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State Board of Arbitration on December 18, 1946, the demand
was made again in stronger terms. This time the Edge-
setters based their request on one of the many technical
flaws in Brockton's piece rate structure: the ntwo set"
rate averaged only 31% greater than the "one set" rate, while
the job requirements were about double. That "reason. seemed
more logical than the previous contention that the earnings
of Edgesetters in certain plants constituted a "low spot";
however, it involved a flat increase in all the district's
factories. As a result, when.the Local voted to take a
"vacationn, the Manufacturers, with a common cause of great
importance to them all,I uniformly refused to give ground.
This firm stand plus reiteration of the offer of arbitration
made the Edgesetters' position both untenable before the
other Locals and unlikely to result in any positive gain to
themselves. Under this pressure, their "vacation,,, which
closed most of the factories in the district during the
active, pre-Easter production run, was ended after one
week, with agreement on a settlement through arbitration.
This "victory" for the Association, later made ",com-
plete, by a favorable award, came, then, after a costly
1. The demand was not only directed at all the Manufac-
turers, but also was interpreted (probably correctly) by
them as leading inevitably to further demands from all the
other crafts.
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strike and at the expense of considerable bitterness on
the part of the Edgesetters. Though the stated "reason,,
for the operator's position grew out of Brockton's "ir-
rational" rate structure, the controversy reflects more
accurately the difficulties which an extreme labor shortage
in one period can cause for the period immediately follow-
ing. But the loose practices which characterized the war
years were not the only source of pressure on Brockton s
rate structure during 1946 and early 1947. An earlier
chapter has described how frustration and fatigue in nego-
tiations led to a clause in the December 1945 wage agreement
which read as follows: "The low spots in each plant are to
be adjusted on basis of earnings". That clause, which had
no further point of orientation, in effect declared for the
BSAC Locals an "open seasonn on all piece rates. None of
them hung back.
The attack of the various Locals on the rate struc-
ture was given direction and impetus by the change in the
product mix shortly after the Warts end. Military shoes
had been very simple insofar as style was concerned, and
the number and intricacy of the styles for civilians during
the War were restricted by the government in order to con-
serve material. Termination of military orders and relaxa-
tion of style controls meant to the factories and to the
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operators a sudden switch from simplicity and standardiza-
tion to relative complexity and fairly wide variety. If
Brockton's rates were supposed to cover "average" condi-
tions, this switch served to focus attention on the range
around that average and the essential inadequacy of such
loosely defined job requirements. Workers were asked,
in effect, to do a more difficult job for the same rate
of pay. This situation, combined with the loose pro-
vision for "low spot" adjustment and a high level of
demand for Brockton's shoes and, therefore, shoeworkers,
led inevitably to innumerable requests for "extras".
The importance of these "extras,, in terms of labor
cost depends, of course, upon the styles called for by
shoe buyers; however, a representative of the Manufac-
turers has put the average impact of these and other
"low spot" adjustments at about 6%, being somewhat more
on the lower grades and less on the higher grades. As a
result of this costly struggle, the Manufacturers listened
receptively to the new Executive-Secretary of their Asso-
ciation when he proposed "job evaluation n and "time study,
as the basis for a revised set of piece rates. At the
time of this proposal, however, the inconsistencies in
the Brockton rate structure were providing a rich source
of increases on individual rates. With many Union members
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gaining thereby, and with the-, Price. Experts enhancing
their own prestige in this proc..esis,., the Locals were- by
no. means ready for 1,rationalization" of the wage strac-
ture. I While the Association. program was not accepted,
though, it did provide .the Manufacturers, with a sort of
moral refuge, from responsibility for Brockton.,s. piece
prices,,. and,, at the. same time, with an argument against
changes in individual rates:. "It. is submitted that in-
equities, as may be inherent in wage rates, can be properly
eliminated on a basis of. an. overall job. evaluation program
and not in. piecemeal tinkering with. job structure by this
Panel".2
As the level of production in Brockton dropped
sharply late in 1947 and through the first half of 1948,
Manufacturers talked less and less of "tjob evaluation'?
* 1. The Brotherhood did, try "job evaluation. in a. rubber
processing plant which they had organized before the War.
Along with adoption of the :.program, though., they lost a.
Local to an AF of L affiliate. This experience, of course,
predisposed BSAC officials against. job evaluationI;, how-
ever, the controlling factor in the Union's opposition to
such a. program in the shoe factories seemed toe be the fact
that an inconsistent rate structure was providing a means
for sati-sfying Union needs.
S2. Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern Massachu-
setts, Inc., Brief for the Companies, presented before a
tri-partite, arbitration, board on August 20, 1947: in a
dispute with the Edgesetters' Local, BSAC. This argument
was used. in discussions with UTnion Officials and-,Y. particu-
larly, before arbitrators.
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and began to stress the Welimination of all these unnec-
essary extras". While no immediatei adjustments were
possible, the number of requests for further -extras"
dwindled sharply and some Manufacturers were able to make
small stylistic alteratios, which enabled them to by-
pass some of the penalty rates. In the more immediate
post-war period., though, Brockton, s loose piece rate
structure, teamed- with wartime practices, with a switch
from simple to more complex production conditions, and
with a high level of demand for shoeworkers, had resulted
in a large number of upward adjustments. Thus, Brockton's
piece prices, like the Grade System, have provided a.
significant source of wage adjustment,, over and above
general movements in wages.
The Influence of Shoe-Machine Development
The process of shoe manufacturing has been described
earlier as consisting of well over one hundred operations,
performed, for the most part, on non-automatic machinery.
This has been the fact for the last fifty years; however,
technological improvements sufficient to raise by 40% the
output per man hour on a medium grade ments dress shoe,
for instance, have been effected between 1923 and 1956.
A previous chapter has told of the general nature of
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these improvements: (1) changes which simplify the job of
an individual operator, usually by machine imitations of
former hand motions, and (2) changes which have generally
left the operator's effect on the shoe unchanged. This
type of technological improvement has influenced the wage
structure in Brockton and elsewhere, the influence being
generally greater, the older the shoe center involved.
There are four central tendencies which have made
the level of earnings higher or the standard of output
lower when changes have been made on established opera-
tions. First, since piece rates have not been closely
related to job requirements, small changes which simplify
an operation have not automatically resulted in a lower
rate. This would probably be the tendency even if there
were no union organization; but, here the workers have
long been organized into small craft units, which guard
the rates on particular jobs with great jealousy. Second,
even where machine improvements have been most drastic,
the fact that the "new" method has performed the same task
as the "old" method has given the incumbent operators a
vested interest and a sort of moral right to work on the
"new" job. This feeling, similar in nature to seniority
rules, that established workers have a "rightT, to whatever
jobs exist in a given factory may be controlling even
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where sweeping technological changes are introduced; but,
since the "new" shoemaking Jobs have been readily identi-
fiable with the "old" ones, that "right" has been almost
undeniable. Third, well-organized craftsmen have main-
tained effectively that their earnings should not be re-
duced as a result of acceptance of new machinery, even
though much of their former skill has been eliminated
from the job. Finally,' older workmen have not readily
accepted new machinery. The elimination of skilled job
content and the reduction in the number of operators
needed to produce a relatively fixed volume of shoes
have both represented threats to their security. The
natural result, even neglecting organized attempts to
limit output, has been a lower production standard (and
higher piece rate) than might otherwise prevail. Conse-
quently, the pressures at work during the introduction of
a given technological change tend to push the earnings
expectancy upward and the level of production down below
the potential capacity of the new. machine.
The influence of technological change of this type.
may partially account for the relatively great spread
between high and low hourly rates in the wage structure.
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of older shoe centers and, more particularly, in Brockton. 1
Thus, if the rates on certain Jobs have been held constant
in the face of changing Job requirements, the spread between
these Jobs. and the minimum rates will increase as time goes
on--the spread being greater in old shoe centers than in
newly developed areas. Some examples of changes which have
occurred in the job content of the higher-paid occupations
should illustrate the way in which technological developments
can affect wage rates on individual operations. The job of
the Edgetrimmers is in point. These skilled craftsmen, who
have only their eye for a guide, are charged with shaping
the edge of the sole by means of a rapidly revolving blade.
Their performance is affected critically by two character-
istics of the machinery they use: (1) the vibration, and
(2) the efficiency of the cutting edge. Substitution of
the electric motor for the belt drive and increases in the
revolutions per minute, little by little, have speeded this
operation up, though proper performance still requires a
skilled workman. But these technological improvements,
which bulk large in the aggregate, have been small enough
1. In a 1945 survey of the shoe industry's wage structure,
BLS findings show the range in Brockton between the high and
low jobs to be 964, as against the United States average of
724, and, in the more recently developed Midwestern and South-
eastern regions, 50 and 79ý, respectively. USBLS, Wage
Structure, Footwear, 1945, mimeographed, October, 1946.
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at any one time so that the Edgetrimmers have been able to
defend their original rate successfully.
Similarly,. the skilled operation of sewing the welt
to the innerseole was once done on a machine which the
operator started and stopped by a hand-operated wheel. No
change in the rate was made after a,:,knee-pressure activator
was installed on the machine.. Today,, both the Edgetrimmers
and the Welters in Brockton earn a high rate of pay. While
other factors help explain these rates, the "creeping" type
of technological change which has occurred on these opera-
tions is: an important determinant of their position in the
wage structure.
A more dramatic example of the way technological
change can affect wage relationships in an old shoe center
is provided by the average hourly earnings of Hand Cutters,
as opposed to Machine Cutters in the Brockton district, As
the examination of wage structure in Chapter III has. shown,
in all sections of the country except one, Hand Cutters earn
a higher rate than Machine. Cutters, a relationship which
makes sense in terms of the skills required on the Jobs.
In New England and in Brockton, however, their position is
emphatically reversed.1  This situation, which makes no
1. -Outside of New England,, hand cutting is not done exten-
sively and so the operation has become a sort of specialty--
a fact which may account for the extremely high rates recorded
in some sections of the country. However, the reverse relation-
ship in Brockton and in New England is too pronounced to be off-
set by the exaggeration resulting from some incomparability
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sense at a given moment of time, is quite understandable
when viewed historically.
The machine process, which stamps out the required
shapes of upper leather, has, since the early 1900ts,
gradually supplanted the use of a knife to cut painstakingly
around a given pattern.1  As the machines were brought into
the Brockton district, the Cutters' Union2 insisted first
that the hourly rate be the same whether the work was done
by hand or by machine, and second, that the piece prices
for the "new" method be relatively high. As the Union and
the Manufacturers bargained over this point, both parties
were apparently oriented in their thinking to the "old"
process, the Manufacturers trying to save on their former
labor cost, and the Cutters trying to preserve their share
of the money paid out to the work force. As a result,
machine piece prices were established as a fixed proportion
of the prices agreed on for hand cutting. But, the time
between jobs. Of eighteen shoe occupations surveyed by the
BLS in 1945, Hand Cutters were 4 ranks below Machine Cutters
in New England and 8 ranks below in Brockton. For a further
discussion of the rates on these two jobs, see the section on
the structure of wages in Chapter III.
1. Although the machine process now predominates in the
industry, hand cutting is still more practical where the
number of pairs to be cut in a given style is small.
2. The Cutters' Union then was affiliated with the Boot
and Shoe Workers? Union, AF of L.
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required to cut by hand varies significantly with the
intricacy of the pattern used; whereas this factor makes
no difference when the upper leather is stamped out by
machine. Consequently, as fancier styles of men's footwear
were introduced, the fixed proportion between hand and
machine piece prices proved very favorable to Machine
Cutters.1  Thus, along with the introduction of a techno-
logical change, the Brockton district worked itself into a
wage relationship which now, at least, appears to be quite
illogical.
More recently, a machine designed to "wipe in" the
toe of the shoe around the last has presented a wage prob-
lem, not only in the Brockton district, but in organized
and unorganized shoe factories throughout the country.
This operation, performed for over three decades on a so-
called "Bed Machine", has been one of the most tiring jobs
in the shoe manufacturing process and one of the most highly
paid. The operators in Brockton were an aggressive group
and an old group, averaging almost 60 years of age.2  The
1. On the lower grades, hand and machine prices are no
longer linked together in a fixed relationship, the latter
now being based on the number of pieces to be cut. However,
the change-over was made after the other system had been in
effect for about eight years; consequently, the influence of
hand piece prices was not eliminated entirely.
2. The average age in the Laster's Local in 1946 was 56,
according to survey made by the Manufacturerst Association.
There is no sure way of estimating the average for Bed Machine
Operators, though they do make up about 25% of the Local; how-
ever, a tabulation at one of the district's largest factories
showed their average age to be 60.
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new machine, which threatened "their" job and presented a
really tragic human problem, removed or changed many of the
former skills and eliminated almost all of the backache
connected with the job. In addition, the estimated rate of
production would leave about half of these old workmen with-
out jobs. As a natural consequence, the Bed Machine Opera-
tors opposed the new machine, consenting to try it out only
if guaranteed their former average hourly earnings. Over
a trial period of about a year, production, so the Manufac-
turers claim, was "pegged", so that the operators turned
out "the same" number of shoes as they had on the old equip-
ment. When the Association started negotiations for a piece
price, the assumption was immediately made that operators on
the new machine "shouldT be able to make their former rate.1
The Association spokesman argued that the Automatic Toe
Laster reduced the operator's work load by "better than
fifty percent" and offered to pay 54.5% of the former piece
prices. This offer was later raised to 56.5%; but repre-
sentatives of the Lasters' Local were not really interested
in these negotiations: they would agree only to the piece
prices as established on the old machine.
1. The Association originally offered to guarantee each
displaced Bed Machine Operator a new job which would yield
the earnings attained at his former occupation. In view
of the old age group involved and the general decline in
Brockton shoe production, this offer was really not practical
and was shortly withdrawn.
The Association offered to call in outside "experts"
and to obtain technical opinion from the Conciliation
Service; finally, arbitration of the issue was proposed.
Meanwhile, the Bed Machine Operators, fighting quite natur-
ally for the survival of their jobs, argued and procrastinat-
ed, but would never agree to any of the proposals that were
made. However, after the first written contract between the
Brotherhood and the Association was signed, over the protests
of the Lasters' Local, the Union's General Board was pre-
vailed upon to order arbitration of this issue. The Lasters
refused to appear at the hearing and would not present any
evidence in their own behalf. Nevertheless, the arbitrator
heard the Association's arguments, and, after some personal
investigation, ruled that the piece prices on the new machine
were to be 61% of the old rates.1 After a short strike and
under the threat of losing their vacation pay, the Bed Machine
Operators agreed to give these prices "a fair trial?; however,
by the end of August, 1948, they had requested further confer-
ences with the Association, claiming that the results of the
trial period showed their former contentions to be correct.
1. This figure was justified by the arbitrator on the
basis of averaging the outcome of adjustments made in other
localities. His action in hearing the case, when no Union
representative was present may seem questionable; however,
this was the wish of the Union's General Board, the most
responsible policy-making group.
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Whether or not they gain any further adjustment, though,
they may have already obtained prices favorable enough to
allow earnings at least as high as those obtained on the
old Bed Machine.
In this case, as in the others, then, the new rates
have been oriented primarily toward the former job--toward
solving immediate human problems rather than toward the more
"tobjectiven criteria of job requirements. Thus, these tech-
nological developments, which always leave the "new"' opera-
tion readily identifiable with the "old" one, have, them-
selves, been an important determinant of the wage structure
in Brocktont s a shoe factories. In general, they have
loosened any relationship which might have existed between
piece rates and job requirements. Further, since the full
impact of the development is so difficult to bargain into
the rates, these technological changes have also provided
an overall upward bias to the wage level.
Summary
The adjustment of piece rates in the Brockton district
is an important phase of wage activity and has become one
of the principal functions which the Union performs for its
membership. The rates themselves, however, are not pre-
cisely defined in terms of job requirements; in fact, the
manufacturing process performed in many of the Brockton
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factories is really not suited to the piece rate method of
wage payment: the unit of output is not uniform and the
conditions of work vary from one period to the next. Though
simple inertia accounts, in part, for continued use of the
system, these piece rates do satisfy important, present-day
needs. First, they provide the Manufacturers with a rela-
tively fixed labor cost, which enables him to "figuren his
shoes with considerable precision. Second, they satisfy
institutional needs of the Brotherhood, for the craft form
of that organization is really built upon the assumption of
a piece rate system of wage payment.
The Union, then, approaches these inexact rates not
as one unit but as fourteen largely autonomous groups--
groups which vary widely in strength and in ability to win
concessions from employers. Since the total amount of
labor cost is often severely limited, though, these Craft
Unions are also the mechanism through which Brockton's shoe-
workers compete with each other for shares in the available
economic welfare. As these Crafts have dealt with the
working conditions surrounding this loose piece rate system,
they have developed throughout the factory a variety of
implicit and explicit rules, designed to protect the group
from the inexact rates and to protect individuals from each
other. In administering these rules, the Stewards have,
in a sense, assumed control of their departments; thus
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the goal of factory operation has been shifted away from
efficient performance toward various forms of protection
for the work group.
Administration of the rates has been conducted almost
entirely through the Union's grievance procedure, rather
than through the application of any planned criteria. In
the ensuing disputes, two possible standards have been used
by the parties, in their oral statements at least; however,
neither of them has been consistently applied and, in fact,
they present conflicting adjustments in many cases: the
standard of "maintained earnings" refers primarily to job
requirements and that of "comparable rates" disregards job
requirements in its orientation toward the Grade System.
As a result, piece rate adjustments have responded primarily
to bargaining position--a factor which varies (1) with the
level of business activity in the Brockton district and
(2) with the strength of particular craft groups.
The adjustments which occurred in the immediate post-
war years illustrate what can happen under such circum-
stances. During the War, with the labor supply tight and
the piece rates frozen, work requirements on many operations
were loosened, especially when process changes might have,
but did not result in lower rates. Further, the abrupt
change from a simple and standardized product to a more
stylish and wider variety of shoes showed up the inadequacy
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of "average" piece rates, when the "average" includes too
wide a range of job difficulty. Given an extremely loose
contractual provision for the adjustment of "low spotsl",
the craft locals were able to win a large number of conces-
sions on individual rates. Caught in this uncontrollable
situation, the Manufacturers became the advocates of a
?trationalized" wage structure. The Union, on the other
hand, rather naturally opposed such a program. As the.
level of activity in the Brockton district dropped off
sharply in the middle of 1947 and through the first half
of 1948, however, the Union requests for individual ad-
justments declined noticeably, and, the Manufacturers turned
their attention away from the "rationalized" wage structure
to the "elimination of all these unnecessary extras".
The importance of bargaining power as a determinant
of piece rates is further illustrated by the adjustments
which have been made to technological improvements in shoe
machinery. The changes have typically been small in scope
and have been of such a nature that the "new" process is
readily identifiable with the "old" one. As a result, it
has been necessary to gain for the new machine the acceptance
of the displaced work group, thus presenting that group with
a strong initial position with reference to the new piece
rate. Consequently, that rate has been oriented more toward
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the old one and toward the problem of introducing the
machine than it has been toward the requirements of the
new job.
That particular type of technological change, then,
has introduced an upward "creep"' into the wage structure
of an old production center which has traditionally used
the piece rate method of wage payment. However, the fact
that individual rate adjustments (or lack of adjustment to
more difficult job requirements) respond essentially to
bargaining position means that these rates are, in fact,
the source of some general movement of wages. Thus, like
the Grade System, Brockton' s piece prices have provided a
way in which the district has adjusted to circumstances not
fully recognized in explicit across-the-board wage movements.
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CHAPTER IX
'THE MANUFACTURER AND UNION APPROACHES TO WAGE ACTIVITY
In the preceding chapters, two categories of evidence
and analysis have been presented: conditioning influences
which have limited the range of possibilities in Brockton
area wage activity, and specific reactions of the parties
to particular situations and problems. The important condi-
tioning forces have been divided into the following groups:
(1) the economic characteristics of the shoe industry, espe-
cially the extent to which vigorous competition is focused
on labor costs; (2) the nature and development of the shoe
manufacturing process; and, (3) the nature and growth of the
management and union institutions which face each other at
the Brockton bargaining table. Within the frame of refer-
ence thus defined,., three principal areas of wage actions
have been examined: (1) general wage movements, (2)' adjust-
ments made through the mechanism of the Grade System, and
(3) adjustments in individual piece rates.
Now, this evidence and analysis: must be drawn together
and summarized in more general form. In the chapter follow-
ing this one, the summary will take the shape of major conclu-
sions which grow out of the data. Wherever possible, these
conclusions will be compared with generalizations or hypo-
theses advanced by others. In this chapter, summary material
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will be presented in the form of the approaches to wage
activity adopted by the bargaining groups in Brockton. The
Manufacturers' approach to wage activity will be examined
first, followed by that of the Brotherhood.
The Manufacturers Approach Wage Activity
On January 22, 1906, the Brockton Shoe Manufacturers'
Association sent a letter to the Cutters' Union denying the
Localts request for an eight-hour day. Though they expressed
"sympathy with the general desire for a reasonably short
working day", they stated that a reduction in hours was not
feasible since "practically all the shoe manufacturers in
other states of the Union still operate their factories on
the 10-hour basis". 1  Since that time, the particular issues
have changed but the general theme has remained always the
same: "we would like to grant the request but the wage
scales (or practices) of our competitors make it impossible".
Thus, the pressure of vigorous competition from non-union
firms has forced Brockton Manufacturers to resist the efforts
of local unions to obtain wage and working condition advan-
tages for the shoeworkers. This section will examine that
opposition and, more generally, the approach of the Manufac-
turers to wage activity, with the subject matter following
1. Brockton Enterprise, January 23, 1906.
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roughly in this order: (1) the goals of the Manufacturers
in their wage actions; (2) the ways in which they have re-
acted in attempting to attain those goals, and the pressures
they have felt in that process; (3) the results of those re-
actions; and (4) their assessment of the situation.
The principal objective behind the Manufacturers' op-
position to Union efforts has been the desire to hold labor
costs at a minimum, a desire given especial impetus in this
case by two factors. First, almost all the Brockton shoe
companies are small, closely-held concerns, in which the
owner typically makes the major operating decisions. Under
these circumstances, cost-increasing concessions made to
labor or foregone opportunities for decreases come almost
directly out of the decision maker's personal pocket.
Second, and possibly most important, the industry is com-
petitive enough so that product-prices are determined essen-
tially by the market and are, for the most part, out of the
control of any individual seller. Since shoe prices were
the focal point of fierce competition throughout the thir-
ties, the Brockton Manufacturer was constantly under pres-
sure to keep his costs under close rein, else he would not
be able to sell his shoes.. Further, this pressure has been
of an immediate nature, since shoes are sold to relatively
small orders, subject to seasonal renewal or cancellation.
396
In arguing against Union demands, the Manufacturers
have generally relied on an appeal to the stringency of
their competitive position, as illustrated by the quotation
at the beginning of this section. They have not, however,
been able to support by precise and verifiable data their
contention that labor costs are relatively high in the
Brockton district, since they do not have such information
readily available to them.1  In fact, their only index of
relative labor costs has been their own ability (or inability)
to market shoes at a profit, an index which has been most
convincing to the Union when production was cut back and
employment was low. Actually, the meager evidence which
is publicly available indicates that Brockton labor costs
have been comparatively high;2 but "unknown" factors such
1. In the competitive shoe industry, firms are naturally
reluctant to disclose to each other their cost position,
and generally do not do so. Even within the Manufacturerst
Association in Brockton that kind of information is guarded
rather jealously.
2. For example, the OPA Economic Data Analysis Branch
(op. tit., p. 3) has published figures covering 12 large
concerns, for which direct labor as a percent of wholesale
price in 1942 was 18.34% for shoes selling under $3.00 and
18.51% for shoes selling over $3.00; and, in that year the
Nunn-Bush Shoe Company paid direct labor 20% of wholesale
value on high-grade shoes and 18% on the lower grade (Murray
W. Latimer, Report to the President by the Advisory Board
on Guaranteed Wages, January 31, 1947, p. 344). In the same
period, seven Brockton companies for which reliable data were
available to me averaged 21.7%, though one of them averaged
only 17.3%. There was no marked tendency for the average
on high grade shoes to differ from that of the lower grades.
A survey made by the Manufacturers' Association showed that,
for all member companies in 1940, the average was 24.62%.
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as the relative complexity and number of styles of shoe
manufactured and the items included within the term "direct
labor" make this conclusion somewhat tenuous. Personal
investigation and exposure to "confidential" data, though,
does confirm the fact that labor costs tend to be generally
but not uniformly higher in the Brockton district than in
most other competing localities.1
The behavior patterns developed by Brockton shoe
manufacturers as reactions to their labor cost motivation
have been fairly uniform for some types of situations, but
quite varied for others. Almost without exception, the
lanufacturers recognize the Union as an agency which re-
sponds to political pressures and, while they object strenu-
ously to that fact, they deal with the Union accordingly.
For example, the Manufacturers have felt, in the past,
that they would be "better off" bargaining with the Brother-
hood than they would with a "North Shore" group or, later,
the "CIO". As a result, they have been willing to time
and alter general wage decisions in order to support the
objective--or corollary goals such as "take the wind out
of the radicals" and "settle this unrest?". Further, at
1. This investigation was by no means extensive enough
to be conclusive; however, some data were obtained in all
the major shoe-producing areas and an attempt was made to
control the style factor by collection of costs for a
,
TbaselT shoe as well for factories as a whole. In general,
the differential between the labor costs of Brockton Manu-
facturers and their competitors was most marked when the
competing factories were located in rural areas.
398
the level of general wage decisions, the Manufacturers have
recognized their improved position in the "pressure game"
of collective bargaining when they are, themselves, organ-
ized in an Association. This behavior of sticking to-
gether has, in fact, been most apparent when the district
was faced with a serious general wage demand--often linked
with an explosive political situation within the Union.
The Association has also provided one means for deal.-
ing with the Union at the level of individual adjustments,
especially during periods, like that immediately following
World War II, when various craft groups have threatened
to "whipsaw" the Manufacturers unmercifully... Individual
rates, however, have more. typically been handled by. each
Manufacturer singly, partly because each plant. presents its
own peculiar problems and because the .secret" Grade System
adjustments involve individual rates, but also because these
Manufacturers simply prefer, as- one of them put it, "to keep
the other guy' s finger out of my pie". In working out these
problems with the Union, the approach of the Manufacturers
varies widely and, in some cases, from craft to craft, this
being the level at which the clash or congeniality of person-
alities plays its most potent determinative role. The most
typical behavior here is simply to deny any request made by
a Price Expert, usually on the grounds that "competition"
is too severe; however, the denial is sometimes made in a
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conciliatory manner and, at other times and to other Price
Experts, with considerable venom and heat. On the other
extreme, a few Manufacturers have adopted a more positive
approach: "if something is wrong, I am as anxious to correct
it as you are".
There seems to be a tendency for these various patterns
to become more and more confining to the individuals con-
cerned, at least the Union officials have definitely "typed"
the Manufacturers and vice versa. Especially when a Manu-
facturer has been cast in the role of the "tough s.o.b.",
he may find that role virtually impossible to change. Not
only may he find it emotionally necessary to "win" his
battles with the Union representatives, but they, in turn,
come to distrust any apparent change in his behavior as
just another device to "chisel" the workers. In at least
one case, the antagonisms that resulted became the real
reasons for the removal of a firm from the Brockton dis-
trict. To paraphrase this Manufacturer:
"At every opportunity, I was baiting them and
they were baiting me--to the point where our
costs rose too far and our personal relationships
became unbearably bitter. Factory operations were
tangled and inflexible. As I look back on it, I
think it would have been difficult or impossible
for me to overcome my "past", no matter what I did.
Here, I had some trouble getting started, but at
least I could start with a relatively clean slate--
and try not to make the mistakes I made in Brockton".
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This is really tantamount to saying that union-
management relationships in Brockton have developed a
certain amount of "momentum", which have made these rela-
tionships more likely to continue their course unaltered
than to change. Though this may not be a valid general
hypothesis, there are at least two factors which would
seem to lend it support. First, adherence to a behavior
pattern with which an individual has had experience lends
an element of predictability to the effect of that behav-
ior; and where the effect is at all satisfactory, such
predictability may seem more desirable than the risks of
a new strategy. For example, Brockton's advocates of
undiscriminating resistance to Union demands seem to feel
that the Union would simply exploit any change in that
behavior. The established approach to negotiations is
made more rigid, in this case, by the pressure of outside
forces, particularly the immediate need to restrict labor
costs as much as possible. Second, as has been mentioned
above, the preconceptions of each party as to the other's
typical behavior lead each one to interpret the actions
and statements made in any given situation as a part of
that preconceived pattern, with deviations discounted as
unreliable. In this way, the reactions of the Union and
of the Manufacturer tend to frustrate any change in the
nature of their relationship.
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At any rate, this rigidity in patterns of behavior,
combined with other factors, has led to uninspired factory
operations. A previous chapter has related the way in
which the application of working rules by the Union tends
to reorient the goal of the manufacturing process from
efficient production toward protection for various work
groups. Also noted was (1) the lack of any close con-
nection between rates of pay and job requirements and (2)
the resistance on the part of the Union to changes in the
rate when a particular job was changed. These factors,
operating in the context of pressure to restrict short-
run costs, have resulted in a negative attitude on the part
of many Manufacturers toward the conditions of work in their
factories. Feeling that they can obtain no consequent
concessions on piece rates, these Manufacturers react,
almost, with a "factory be damned" attitude--very much like
cutting off your nose to spite your face. This is the sort
of situation, moreover, which leads from bad to worse; for,
as the factories of their competitors become relatively
more efficient, the pressure on short-run costs becomes
greater and greater, thus further restricting the freedom
of action of Brockton Manufacturers.
But efficient factory operation is not simply a matter
of internal conduct; external conditions, particularly the
type of orders received, play an influential, determinative
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role. Two or three of the Manufacturers, recognizing this
fact, have stated in conversation that "the most important
phase of my wage policy is my merchandising policy". In
restricting sales to "volume" orders in simple styles or
by otherwise standardizing the product, they have automatic-
ally made almost every job in the factory a little easier,
justifying thereby lower piece rates and a lower total
labor cost. This alternative, however, is not open to
every one, for the number of "volume" accounts is limited.
Further, the multitude of small retailers must be served
and they often want a more highly styled "line" of shoes
than is carried by the larger chain stores. While this
is the type of outlet most suitable to the typical Brockton
manufacturing process, these stores cannot escape intense
price competition, as attested by the increase in the
proportion of business done by the chains between 1929
and 1939.1 As a result, the selling price of the Brockton
Manufacturers' "joblot" product has been subjected to pres-
sure from a mass-produced shoe, forcing the Manufacturer
to appeal for a "competitive" labor cost. But, since he
did not break cleanly with his accustomed sales outlets,
1. In the years between 1929 and 1939, the shoe chains
increased their proportion of the total sales from 38.0%
to 49.7%, while the independent retail stores' proportion
fell from 53.5% to 41.2%. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, 16th Census of the United States, 1940,
Census of Business: 1939, Volume 1, Retail Trade, Part 1,
p. 63.
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he has been unable to offer, in return, truly "competitive"
working conditions.1
1. Throughout this discussion, the inference has been that
Brockton's shoe factories are less efficient than those in
other shoe-producing areas. There are no data available with
which to support this conclusion, though it is the opinion of
the Union Officials and the Manufacturers. The conclusion is
supported by the fact that, with three principal exceptions,Brockton Manufacturers do not place emphasis on the goal of
efficient factory operations. Further, in a survey of Man-
hours expended per pair of shoes for the years 1939-1945, the
BLS found a relatively favorable trend in New England ments
shoe factories and attributed the improvement to "the effect
of the war in encouraging more efficient production practices".
The encouragement was provided principally, according to the
survey, by the high level of production and by the restrictions
placed on the number and complexity of styles which could be
made, factors which affected New England more than they did
"western shoe companies". To state this conclusion the other
way around, relative efficiency in New England improved most
because the inefficiency was there to begin with. It is fur-
ther worth noting that the conditions which made for low out-
put per man-hour, a large number of complex styles and a low
level of capacity utilization, have returned to Brockton fac-
tories, at least, now that the war is over. USBLS, Trends in
Man-Hours Expended Per Unit, Selected Footwear, 1939-1945,
March 1948, p. 34.
The BLS findings do not, of course, refer specifically
to Brockton. In the course of my own research, I have collect-
ed figures on man-hour requirements per pair of shoes from six
Brockton companies. These figures probably represent a biased
sample, for the concerns which collect data relative to their
operations are most likely to have skillful management. Even
for these six companies, moreover, the figures cannot be used
with confidence, since the data on "man-hours" were not com-
piled from the basic records, but were computed, in most cases,from a small sample of the period covered. For what these
figures are worth, however, they show that, in one factory,the man-hours per pair were 11% lower than the BLS average
for the appropriate price classification. In the other five
factories, the man-hours were greater than the average by15% to 25%.
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The inflexibilities within the factory and the
pressures of outside conditions, then, really total up
to a major wage decision; for, the more operations become
relatively costly, the more Manufacturers become tied to
the small sales accounts and the factory rules which make
for an inefficient manufacturing process and for a rigid
structure of wages. The Manufacturers place the blame for
this situation most generally at the Union ts door, with the
complaints directed particularly toward the organizational
structure of the Brotherhood.
The existence of fourteen craft groups within each
factory, and, within the Brotherhood, of fourteen Locals,
each acting independently of the others on many issues,
frustrates the Manufacturers in three principal ways.
First, such a multiplicity of decision-makers, operating
in the context of a t"democratic"t organization, means that
the chances for disagreement are high: the greater the
number of individuals who must agree to a particular course
of action, the greater the probability that someone will
disagree. Consequently, the Manufacturers feel, the
consideration of any proposal is a slow and tedious pro-
cess with the result uncertain: "you are always shadow-
boxing, never getting anything done". Second, the frac-
tionalization of the work force into craft units and the
lack of centralized authority in the hands of one or a
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few men orients Union thought and efforts principally
toward the problems of small groups rather than those of
the factory as a whole. With relative rates jealously
guarded, then, any general adjustment in labor costs, for
example, must be placed on a flat percentage basis, even
though some rates may be acknowledged as fout of line".
Finally, the Manufacturers feel that the Union's organiza-
tional structure "sets up fourteen politicians, all trying
to justify their existence to the membership". The resul-
tant large number of grievances, they complain, keeps the
factory in a constant turmoil and places an inordinately
heavy burden on the time of owner-operators, who habitually
direct all phases of their business.
This criticism of the Brotherhood has been stated in
more general terms by one of the leading Manufacturers.
He feels that the delays and uncertainties of the BSAC
decision-making process are characteristic of-any "demo-
cratic" group, though the Brotherhood's extremely complex
organizational structure may magnify them in this case.
The Union's leaders, he states, cannot "decide" and take
action until the rank and file are properly prepared for
such action. "Our experience with the Boot and Shoe
Workers' Union shows what can happen, even when the leaders
make the right decision. The result, however, may often
be that the selling season is over before the need for
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labor-cost concessions has been fully realized--and by
then many orders have been lost".
Altogether, then, the approach of the Manufacturers
to wage activity may be summarized by the following points.
1. The principal objective in their wage actions
has been the restriction of their labor costs to as low a
level as possible. This objective has been mixed, however,
with goals which have grown out of personal relationships
between individual Manufacturers and Union agents, goals
which have played their most important determinative role
at the level of individual rate adjustments.
2. In seeking to attain their objectives, the Manu-
facturers have reacted to the following pressures:
(a) The political influences operating within the
Brotherhood organization--the rival union
problem, the unrest created by "radicalsTt--
have been dealt with at the level of general
wage movements, with concessions being timed
to support the group favored by the Manufac-
turers.
(b) The necessity for dealing with a district-wide
organization of employees has placed pressure
on the Manufacturers to form an Association
of their own, as a means for increasing their
bargaining effectiveness.
407
(c) The differences between factories and the
confidential nature of individual piece rates
have inclined the Manufacturers to deal with
Union agents individually rather than collec-
tively at this level. Here, the pressures of
personal likes and dislikes have been built up
into fairly rigid relationships between the
various people concerned.
(d) The nature of these relationships, added to
other rigidities derived from the Uniont s form
of organization and BSAC reactions to the in-
exact piece rate system, have combined to dis-
courage efforts in the direction of improved
factory operations--further discouraged, in
this case, by the type of sales outlets served
by Brockton Manufacturers.
3. The operation of these forces has made the attain-
ment of the Manufacturerst basic objective progressively
more difficult. Inflexibility has become characteristic of
the district; and, with inflexibility, have come relatively
inefficient factory operations, correspondingly high costs,
and more emphasis on the merchandising policy which leads
to a job-lot production process. In this situation, the
Manufacturers have seen, as their major alternative, a
general reduction in wage rates.
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4. In assessing their situation, the Manufacturers
most generally place the blame on the Brotherhood, direct-
ing particular attention toward the form of that organiza-
tion. In the past, at least, the Manufacturers have per-
ceived little or nothing which they, themselves, could do
to improve what they recognize as unsatisfactory conditions.
The Brotherhood Approaches Wage Activity
In this section, as in the previous one, the discus-
sion will fall roughly into the following categories: (1)
the objectives of Union wage activity; (2) the pressures
which Brotherhood. officials have felt and their reactions
to those pressures; (3) the results of those reactions;
and (4) the Union's assessment of the Brockton problems.
The atmosphere in which the Brotherhood was founded
dictated to the leaders certain organizational objectives,
objectives relating primarily to the procedures through
which the Union was to operate. First of all, as a re-
action against the autocratic methods used by the Boot and
Shoe Workers' Union, the new organization was to work in a
"democratic' way, responsive to the wishes of rank and file
shoeworkers. Provisions were made for frequent election
of officials by a secret ballot, for strict limitations on
their authority to act, and for a General Board of "bench
workers" to supervise the affairs of the Union. Second,
the Brotherhood was set up as a federation of semi-
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autonomous craft units, each having jurisdiction over the
piece price adjustments affecting members of the craft.
As a result of this "federal" type of organizational struc-
ture, two levels of Brotherhood objectives must be defined:
those of the general Union and those of the various craft
groups.
In his book entitled Trade Union Wage Policy, Arthur
Ross states that the principal objectives of union wage
activity are (1) institutional survival and growth, (2)
the personal ambitions of decision-makers, and (3) the
gaining of benefits for the rank and file.1  Conceding
that the union leader must convince the members that union
activity is beneficial to them, he rejects, however, the
rigid concept of the union as a "monopolistic seller of
labor governed by a maximization principle".2  Ross'
concepts of what are and what are not the objectives of
union activity are generally, though not exactly, applicable
to the behavior of the BSAC. In this case, however, the
restrictions on the powers of officials and the provisions
for control by the rank and file give prominence to the
goal of benefits for the membership, whether the unit in-
volved is one of the craft groups or the organization as a
whole.
1. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, pp. 26-27.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
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At the level of the various craft unions, this goal
breaks essentially into:two sections. First, the Price
Experts, in protecting their own position and that of the
Local, have worked to satisfy grievances.and to obtain
from the Manufacturers the. highest piece prices possible
on, "their" operations. In this endeavor, the Price Experts
have not generally concerned themselves with the possible
effect on employment of any • concessions they might win or
of any actions. they might take; for they have felt that
an adjustment on an individual rate is tool small to affect
the quantity of shoes sold by a given company. As Ross
would put it, they make a "wage' bargain,. not: a "wage-
employments- bargain, Second, each- craft,, in working for
its., ovwn benefit., has guarded against encroachments on its
position relative to all the: other crafts. As: a previous.
chapter has. indicated,, the total amount of economic welfare
available to workers in a particular factory is limited and
has often been bargained out to a definite labor cost. Under
these circumstances, a relative gain by one- group must even-
tually result in losses by other groups.1  In this. sense,
then, the objectives of individual craft units within the
Brotherhood mayr actually be in conflict.
1. Combined with a "system" of loosely defined piece
rates, these craft- jealousies account in large part- for
the rigidities in individual piece rates, no matter what
changes are made in specific job requirements.
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At the level of general Brotherhood activity, the
competing interests of craft groups have created the rule
of thumb of equal treatment to each: all crafts suffer to
the same degree when concessions are made and benefit to
the same degree when increases are obtained. In general
wage movements, which have been predominantly increases,
however, the voting strength of small groups of skilled
workers has meant the definition of "equal treatment!! in
percentage terms, rather than cents per hour. It is at
the level of general wage movements, moreover, that the
institutional and personal objectives stressed by Ross
have been most important. Brotherhood officials, in
protecting their own position as well as that of the Union,
have been forced to show that they, and their "set up?,
could "win" as good or better concessions from the employers
as could the Union groups and leaders operating in the North
Shore woments shoe industry. Especially when the factional
struggle within the Brotherhood has been most threatening,
it has become the point of reference of general wage activity.
Even so, however, Brotherhood officials have not disregarded
the possible effect on employment of a wage increase which
they might obtain, though they have preferred to let the
Manufacturers say "no", rather than say it themselves. On
the other hand, when the factional dispute has not been so
pressing, Brotherhood officials and Price Experts have, on
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two occasions at least, negotiated for general increases
only after being pushed by the Union's General Board.
As Brotherhood officials have worked for improvement
in the general level of wages, then, they have been subject
to the following principal pressures. First, the facts
of competition between craft groups and of the voting
strength of skilled workers have influenced the nature of
these movements: "equal" treatment of all workers, though
on a percentage basis. Second, the statements and actions
of rival leaders, rival unions, and Tradicals" within the
Brotherhood have created pressure for general wage move-
ments, pressure acting primarily through the medium of
"ninstitutional" and -"personal" objectives. Finally, the
rank and file Brotherhood members, as represented by the
delegates- to the Union's General Board, have, in effect,
forced somewhat unwilling officials into pressing for wage
increases which the officials felt were ill-advised. In
these particular cases the leaders were more fearful
(possibly for longer-run institutional and personal
reasons) of an adverse effect on employment than were the
rank and file.
The weight of evidence indicates, however, that both
the rank and file and the officials of the Brotherhood have
been greatly concerned over the volume of work available in
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the Brockton district. In their public statements,
Union leaders have characterized themselves in a role of
"reasonableness!!, stating on many occasions a recognition
that "cneompetition" limits the advisability of winning wage
increases. As quoted in Chapter VI:
"The shoeworkers in Brockton are not receiving
enough money for the work they perform or to
support their families in the way that they
should be supported. It is unfortunate that
we cannot argue for an increase in wages solely
from this point of view. Whether we like it or
not, we must take into consideration that the
workers here and in other districts are compet-
ing against one another, and until such time as
this unfair competition is eliminated, we will
continue to be the victims. We realize that to
drive our wage scale above what competition will
stand would be disastrous for all concernedl. 2
Although pressure from the rank and file has, upon occa-
sion, forced the leadership to seek additional conces-
sions, evidence from the Union records indicates that, at
other times, the membership has shown more concern for
getting "shoes" into Brockton. The resolution sent to
the General Board from the Finishers' Local late in 1937
illustrates this concern: "We are in favor of offering to
1. Some indication of the Brotherhood's interest in
creating additional job opportunities in Brockton may be
gained from the fact that the Union contributed $2,500.00
to the Brockton Industrial Fund in 1938. The money was
presumably to be used as one means of attracting industry
to the City. BSAC, Memo of a General Board Meeting,
February 7, 1938.
2. Brockton Enterprise, July 26, 1937.
414
any and all manufacturers in the District a price low
enough for them to bring back the business that has been
lost to this District".
In this case, the pressure came from a group which
cut across factory lines; however, rank and file concern
over volume has more generally been expressed through the
stewards at individual factories, as they pleaded for some
sort of "special" arrangement. These arrangements, made
through the mechanism of the Grade System as explained in
Chapter VII, have been the result of a conscious effort
to affect the volume of work, and, in some cases, have
been explicit wage-employment bargains, with a specified
labor cost and a guaranteed rate of production. In making
these bargains, Union officials have tried to separate
,1new" business, accepted, in a sense, at a lower labor
cost, from established sales accounts, where laborts
price was maintained at a higher level. In the same way,
an attempt was made to treat companies individually rather
than as a group, making concessions on a case by case basis
in accordance with either inability or unwillingness to
" pay .
1. BSAC, Memo of a General Board fmeeting, October 25,
1937.
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These actions correspond very closely to the theo-
retical model of the ,,monopolist", discriminating between
markets in his pursuit of maximum profits; in fact, the
whole mechanism of the Grade System was really introduced
as a way of "holding what you have" but, at the same time,
of going after additional business at a differentiated
price. In this sense, then, the Brotherhood has been
concerned with a "maximization" problem. Further, in
the concessions which have been made as a consequence,
one of the important motivating pressures has been the
desire of the rank and file for action which would in-
crease the volume of work: that is, the "cause," of
increased employment, though at a lower rate of pay,
has at times, been more potent politically than easier
promises of great gains in the wage rate.
The threatened and actual losses of business which
have impelled the Brotherhood to face the problem of un-
employment have been caused, in large part, by low-wage
competition from unorganized or partially organized areas.
The serious nature of this non-union competition has been
recognized by the Union's leaders as well as by the rank
and file; and, as a consequence, pressure has been gener-
ated within the Brotherhood for organizational work. The
results have been intermittent campaigns for new members
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carried on by the BSAC independently and in conjunction
with the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO--and, in
addition, an almost constant factional dispute in Brockton
over the question of amalgamation into the CIO group.
'These campaigns, as well as those of other shoe
unions, however, have never been very successful, so that,
in 1939, only one-third of the employees in the shoe indus-
try were covered by union agreements. Though the percen-
tage grew rather dramatically during the war years--in
1945 63% of the workers were employed in unionized plants--
many of the union organizations were of a strictly local
character.2 The reasons for such resistance to unioniza-
tion on the part of shoeworkers are probably directly
related to the excessive number of shoeworkers and to the
mobility of shoe companies. Writing late in November of
1934, the Shoe Workers' Protective Union, an organization
which tried to unify shoeworkers, stated the case clearly
in a bulletin entitled "An Appeal for Unity: Failure".
This statement is of sufficient general validity for- the
following decade that it is quoted extensively below.
I. U.S.B.L.S., Earnings and Hours in Shoe and Allied
Industries During the Ist Quarter of 1939, p. 26.
2. U.S.B.L.S., Wage .Structures, Footwear, 1945, p. 3.
417
"In general when the shoe workers speak of
organizing the unorganized, they are thinking
and speaking in terms of pure self defense.
The workers in the organized centers, when they
speak of organizing the unorganized areas mean
that they want prices and hours in these open
shop districts brought up to the level or close
to the level prevailing in their own communities.
By doing this, the organized workers believe that
THEIR manufacturers will have no inducement to move
their business and will be placed on an equal footing
(as far as labor costs and labor conditions are con-
cerned) with all other manufacturers. In short, by
organizing the unorganized, the organized workers
believe that they will protect themselves.
The unorganized workers also think in terms of self-
defense. They, too, want to work. They want to keep
their firms--whether one firm or a few or many firms--
and too often they look with suspicion upon organizers
who came to them with the message of unionism, believ-
ing that these organizers are mainly interested NOT in
the unorganized workers but in creating conditions so
that THE ORGANIZED workers will reap a benefit. The
open shop firms, Chambers of Commerce, etc., play upon
this feelingI and the actions of the organized workers
and their representatives have only too often given
color to this sort of propaganda. On the other hand,
the unorganized want organization to protect them-
selves from the oppression of unscrupulous firms who
are taking advantage of their helplessness as unorgan-
ized, individual workers to reap unfair profits for
themselves (and to work general harm to the entire
industry) by driving prices of both labor and product
1. The statement of the International Shoe Company made just
before a strike deadline in 1947 illustrates this point. Part
of the company's shoe factories are organized by the United Shoe
Workers of America (CIO), part by the Boot and Shoe Workers'
Union (AFofL), and part are unorganized. The USWA had set a
strike deadline for all of the company's plants which it had
organized. The company stated to its employees that, if the
strike is called, "the ultimate result will be that many shoes
now supplied through our factories will be produced by companies
in other sections of the country. This appears to be the real
intention of the union, a majority of whose members are in plants
which for several months have suffered for lack of business."
Boston Post, September 30, 1947, p. 4.
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below the natural level which they would normally
find under FAIR competition and FAIR competitive
conditions. The unorganized workers want to im-
prove their wages and conditions and shorten hours
BUT NOT TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR FIRMS WILL MOVE
either to organized centers or elsewhere. They do
not want a union with no factories and no jobs.
And so, they are often sceptical of union organiz-
ers".1
The feeling that shoeworkers are elusively difficult
to organize into "one big union", made more or less explicit
by the "Protective", has never been more than implicit in the
Brotherhood's case. Perhaps stemming from the bitter experi-
ence with the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, Brockton shoe-
workers have agreed "in principle" with the idea of "one big
union", but, when the question of amalgamation has arisen
specifically, not with "this" union or not at "this" time.
This essential confusion has, perhaps, prevented the BSAC,
as an organization, from facing on a conscious level and with
a long-run point of view the question, "Since unionization of
the industry seems impossible for us, what can we do to hold
our jobs and our wages?" Instead, the long-run program has
implicitly been assumed to be "organization of the industry",
despite the publicly unexpressed feeling that such a goal
seemed out of reach.
As a result, the problem of maintaining the volume of
business in Brockton has been treated by the Union as a
1. Shoe Workers' Protective Union, Bulletin No. 3,
November 24, 1934, "An Appeal for Unity: Failure".
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series of immediate and different problems: ?!Company A
has been operating at half-time for the past two months
and has an opportunity to get a new account which would
double its volume--if the appropriate labor cost is granted".
In this way, under pressure from the shop crew and the shop
stewards as well as from the Manufacturer, the Brotherhood
has made adjustments in piece prices, hoping to keep the
arrangements made at one factory separate from the others
but, inevitably, being caught in a total situation which
demanded comparable treatment all around.
In assessing Brockton's declining volume of shoe
business and shoemaking jobs, Brotherhood Officials have
generally placed the blame on either or both of these two
factors: (1) the nature of the industry, especially the
?"unfair", cut-throat competition characteristic of the
product market, and (2) the inadequacies of Brockton Manu-
facturers in the struggle to keep their production methods
"modern" and their factory conditions "competitive".
Perhaps the most precise statement of the Unionts grie-
vances against the shoe industry is contained in a Brief
supporting various proposals for the revision of the Shoe
Code under the NRA. Here are cited a number of practices
"which for years have been eating the heart and profit
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out of the shoe industry".1
The practices referred to were principally methods
by which those who purchase shoes from the excessive number
of Manufacturers were able to depress product prices and,
as a consequence, the wages of shoeworkers. In addition to
simple threats of loss of business unless prices (and there-
fore costs in this low profit industry) were reduced, large
buyers especially were attacked for methodically "squeezing"
out overhead and for exploiting the p'ractice of "selling
across the board". For ,example, the Brotherhood cited the
following case, as an illustration of the latter practice:
"Shoes are figured from what is called the 'base
shoe' upward. This base shoe is a plain shoe
with no wing tip, perforation, foxing nor other
part that is called an 'extra'. A price is set
on this plain or 'base shoe' at $2.00. Other
shoes are built up from this shoe with additions
such as wing tips, perforation, fancy foxings,
stitched heel seats, all entailing extra material
and labor. An average price that figures $2.30
or $2.40 with the base shoe is all averaged at
about $2.15. The first manufacturer (1) finds no
loss from this average price, but the buyer (2)
wants more of a certain fancy shoe so he goes to
(1) and asks for more built-up shoes at $2.15.
(1) says they cost him more than that and refuses
to sell at that price so (2) goes to another manu-
facturer (3) and shows him the order duplicate with
this shoe quoted at $2.15. (3) wants the business
and cannot figure it so he goes to his workers, who
are on part time, and they take a wage reduction to
get the added volume of business",.2
1. BSAC, Brief in Support of Labor's Proposals That the
Shoe Code Should Be Reconstructed, submitted October 22, 1934.
2. Ibi d ., Case 3.
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While Brotherhood leaders have thus sympathized with
and understood the problems of the Manufacturer, they have
not felt that the Manufacturer himself was free from blame
for Brockton's declining job opportunities. To the charge
that BSAC price lists are not "competitive", Union Officials
have answered that "conditions of work" in Brockton factories
are not "competitive" either. Referring to competition from
the larger producers of men's shoes, the Brotherhood has
stated:
"Their system of manufacturing is an entirely
different process from that employed by Brockton
manufacturers. Their system is based on quantity
and not quality. The Brockton district is and
always has been based on quality and it is ob-
viously unfair to class the aforementioned firms
as competitors. If this is what Mr. Cort wants
and is willing to change his system of production,
we are sure the BSAC will be receptive.?1l
In this way, Brotherhood leaders have stated their feeling
that labor cost comparisons with the shoe industryts mass
production factories are not applicable to Brockton. Along
with such statements, they usually add, as they did in this
case, that the Union would meet "competitive" conditions with
"competitive" prices.2
1. Brockton Enterprise, December 12, 1946, p. 41.
2. Many Brockton Manufacturers question the sincerity of
this statement. They point out that the Brockton shoeworker
is relatively old, averaging about 52 years of age and that,
therefore, he could not adjust to the rapid work pace of the
mass production factory.
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Altogether, then, the Brotherhoodts approach to wage
activity' may be summarized in the following way:
1. The classification of union objectives, as pro-
posed by Ross, seems generally applicable to this case.:.
Brotherhood actions have sprung from the objectives of (a)
institutional survival, (b) personal ambitions, and (c)
additional benefits for the rank and file. In this case,
however, the conditions under which the Union was formed
dictated certain provisions for internal government which
have limited action purely for objectives (a) and (b) and
tended to focus attention on objective (c).
2. The structure of the Union is such that fourteen
craft groups operate on a semi-autonomous basis within the
general Brotherhood. In such a situation, the objectives
of each craft have been essentially selfish: higher piece
rates for "my" group and effective competition with the
other worker groups for the limited economic welfare avail-
able. These craft jealousies may account, in large part,
for the rigidity of Brockton's piece rates.,
3. At the level of general wage movements, Union
Officials have apparently felt the following sorts.of
pressure:
a. Pressure to treat each shoeworker "equally"
has meant, operationally, equal percentage increases, since
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skilled crafts have proportionately great voting strength
on the General Board of Directors.
b. Personal and institutional objectives have
been most effective at this level, since rival unions and
factions within the Brotherhood have tended to use general
wage comparisons as a principal point of reference.
c. Even at this level, however, BSAC officials
have hesitated to press for general increases, fearing
consequent unemployment; and, on two occasions, they have
taken action only after being pushed by the General Board.
4. At other less prosperous moments during the 1930's,
the most compelling pressure behind Union actions has appa-
rently been that of actual or threatened unemployment. To
this pressure the Union has responded with differentiated
wage adjustments, made through the mechanism of the Grade
System. These bargains have, in many cases, been explicit
wage-employment bargains.
5. The Brotherhood's greatest wage problem has been
that created by the competition of non-union manufacturers
with the factories located in Brockton. Sporadic attempts
have been made to organize these competitors, but those
attempts have not been generally successful. Nevertheless,
"organizing the unorganized" has been seen by Brotherhood
officials as their only long-run solution for Brockton' s
competitive problems.
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6. With no workable long-run program, though, the
Brotherhood has become involved in a more or less piecemeal
approach to wage activity, an approach which, in solving
"today's" problems, has only created more problems for
"tomorrow".
7. In assessing Brockton's loss of shoe business,
Brotherhood leaders have generally blamed two factors:
(1) the nunfair" competition in the industry, fostered by
pressure from large shoe buyers, and (2) the inability of
Brockton's Manufacturers to offer "competitive" working
conditions. Like the Manufacturers, they have not seen
change in their own organization as a means of solving
their problems.
Summary
Several summary statements about the approach of the
parties to Brockton area wage activity may now be made.
1. The objectives of the Brotherhood have been
different from those of the Manufacturers. While these
differences have not precluded the existence of a common
ground for settlement of individual controversies, they
have, however, been dominant enough to make Brockton wage
activity appear as a struggle between the parties rather
than an effort toward a mutually acceptable goal.
2. Both parties have recognized and dealt with a
need to create politically stable settlements, which would
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decrease the potency of the "radicals" and the threats of
rival unions. Such settlements have served the institu-
tional needs of the BSAC and personal goals of Union leaders,
and, as well, have provided the basis for continued manufac-
turing operations and for the accrual of benefits to the rank
and file. The focal point of these political arrangements
has generally been movement in the general level of wage
rates.
3. The fact that the parties have needed to make
political settlements has not made their economic circum-
stances any less real. These circumstances, judged primarily
in terms of employment levels in Brockton, have been dealt
with through the mechanism of the Grade System and on a more
or less confidential basis.
4. While the Grade System has provided a modus vivendi
for the district, the basic conflict in objectives, as well
as the local institutions and history, have given to the
district a strikingly negative attitude toward any sort of
change. The jealousies between the various craft groups, the
restricted behavior patterns of individuals, and the type of
sales outlet served by the Manufacturers all tend to confine
the nature of wage activity--from manufacturing methods to
general wage bargaining--within rather narrowly defined limits.
5. Both the Union and the Manufacturers recognize the
depressed level of business activity in Brockton as a vital
426
problem; however, each throws the blame for this problem
on the other or on outside factors, thus making change
through introspection unlikely. Perhaps, after all, there
really is no satisfactory solution. The shoe industry is
fiercely competitive--even in 1948--and the wages paid
average among the lowest in our industrial classifications.
Thus, the root of Brockton's problems may lie in those
characteristics of the shoe industry which dictate the
fierce competition and the low wage levels. Nevertheless,
to the extent that partial solutions are possible, neither
the Brotherhood nor the Manufacturers have seemed especially
disposed, in the past at least, to work together in a con-
structive manner. Instead, more like Alphonse and Gaston,
they prefer to bow, but never to take the first step.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
Wage activity in the Brockton district has now been
described and summarized in the form of the approaches of
the union and management groups to their wage problems.
This question, however, remains to be answered: nWhat
conclusions, drawn from this data, may be stated in more
general form, as useful points of comparison with findings
derived from other situations?" In this chapter, six such
generalizations will be presented and discussed.
1. The important forces conditioning wages in a
given situation cannot usually be determined from the
study of general wage movements alone.
War Labor Board "formulas" applied during World War
II and the wide publicity given to "rounds" of general wage
increases in the post-war period of full employment have
provided a justifiable basis for great interest in the
determinants of these general wage movements. Certainly,
the general movements that have occurred, to a greater or
less extent, in almost every industry both before the War
as well as since, are an important part of the total wage
activity in those industries. Further, to the extent that
"patternst effectively determine the wage bargains made
throughout the economy, an understanding of how these
428
"patternstt get their start and how they spread is essential
to understanding of the economy's operation. On the other
hand, there is no reason to assume that general wage move-
ments represent the sum-total of wage activity and to base,
therefore, the analysis of wage-determining forces simply
on observations made at this level. Such an assumption and
analysis is apparently quite tempting.
For example, in a recent study entitled Trade Union.
Wage Policy., Arthur M. Ross seems, at least, to make this
assumption. Ross directs his attention toward the deter-
minants of union wage policy, which, he suggests, are not
to be found in the "slogans of the labor movement" or in
"formal arguments and documents", but rather, in the "operat-
ing decisions" made "when the chips are down". He seems to
examine, however, only those decisions in which general wage
movements are involved; for these are the questions which he
poses as crucial:1
"Should the wage provision of the agreement be
re-opened? What should be the union's initial
demand? Should the employer's initial offer
be accepted?...Should the union consent to
arbitrate? Should a strike be called?"
In the case of the Brockton ments shoe industry, how-
ever, significant aspects of wage activity have taken place
outside the context of general wage changes. Through the
1. Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, p. 11.
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mechanism of "graded!, lists of piece prices, it will be
recalled, the principals in Brockton wage activity have
adjusted to the economic circumstances in which they have
found themselves. At this level, then, as well as at
that of general wage movements, wage determining forces are
to be found. Are "adjusting mechanisms" outside the con-
text of general wage movements simply insignificant excep-
tions in American industry? There are indications that the
answer is, nNo". For instance, Slichter has written as
follows:1
"Piecework may help unions and union employers
to adjust themselves to changed business and
market conditions. For example, during a
business depression or under formidable non-
union competition a union employer who thought
it desirable to bring out a cheaper line of
goods would have less difficulty in securing
concessions from the union if the workers were
on piecework than if they were on a time basis.
In either case, concessions are politically
difficult for union leaders to grant. If pay-
ment is by the hour, concessions in labor costs
can be made by the union only by reductions in
the hourly rate of pay. If payment is by the
piece, the union can make concessions by consent-
ing to lower piece rates, which may be yielding
very high earnings, or by accepting, for new opera-
tions, piece rates which are quite favorable to
the employer."
In the building trades, lackadaisical enforcement of the
"union scale" was apparently commonplace during the
thirties. In other industries, the use, of merit rating
1. Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial
Management, Brookings, 1941, p. 292.
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systems or the adjustment of work loads may be important
areas of wage activity, reflecting different pressures
from those apparent at the level of general wage movements.1
Finally, programs of union-management cooperation are often
motivated, initially at least, by a need to adjust costs to
lower levels, when this is not possible through general
reductions in wage rates.
2. General wage movements, on the other hand,
may be the principal point of reference for satis-
faction of the "political. pressures" which emanate
from the fractionalized nature of the American labor
movement, from rivalries within particular unions,
and from comparisons with the achievements of "other"
employee groups.
This point Ross brings out most clearly in his
analysis of the pressures at work on union leaders as they
make "operating decisions" relative to general wage move-
ments,. This approach seems, in fact, to be the most
fruitful for explanation of the origin and spread of wage
patterns through important sectors of American industry.
The approach contains within it, of course, an explanation
of the way in which the general "economic climate" is
translated into action on the general wage "frontT".
1. Even Ross mentions (in a footnote) that "in some
industries it is common for union members to work below
the scale by secret agreement with the employer". Ross,
op. cit., p. 14 (Footnote No. 21).
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The evidence gained from examination of the general
wage movements in the Brockton shoe industry tends to illus-
trate this point. Again and again, in the settlements that
were made, wage changes were directed toward an unstable
political situation. Common objectives seemed to be,
"settle this unrest", "take the wind out of the radicals
and support the reasonable fellows", and "keep the North
Shore Reds (or later the CIO) out of Brockton".
3. Even at the level of general wage movements,
though, the possible effect upon output and employ-
ment of any given settlement may be an important,
determinative pressure in the bargaining process.
Brockton employers and the Brotherhood have both
recognized that the actions of competing shoe centers and
companies limited the size of any settlements which might
be made in the district. Consciousness of the possible
"employment effect" of general wage settlements has been
most apparent when the "rival union" situation was rela-
tively quiescent and when the problem of unemployment was
most pressing. Clearly, for example, the Union's objec-
tive in presenting the extremely low price list in prepara-
tion for Army bids in 1940 was motivated by a desire to
bring the jobs which those orders represented to Brockton.
Similarly, the objective of retaining jobs was the principal
pressure behind the "giving back" of an earlier 5% increase
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in October 1937, despite a contract covering the ensuing
five months. In at least two instances, however, Union
Officials have been more moderate in their demands on the
Manufacturers than the members of the General Board of
Directors, composed of workers who spend full time at the
bench, deemed desirable.
4. When all of the areas of wage activity are
considered, however, the employment side of the
wage bargain may become a dominant, motivating
force--such that the Union may consciously try to
adjust the level of employment through changes in
wages.
The Brotherhood, using the mechanism of the Grade
System, has frequently tried to affect the volume of work
available by making wage changes. In many cases, explicit
wage-employment bargains have been made, in which the Union
granted a specific labor-cost concession in return for a
guaranteed rate of production from the company. In fact,
the existence of the Grade System, itself, is evidence of
efforts made over a long period of years to attract low-
priced shoe business to Brockton by offering to "do" the
shoes at a differentiated labor cost.
With this conclusion and the preceding one, Ross does
not agree. He has taken the position that the "wage bargain
must almost always be made without consideration of its
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employment effect",l and he has summarized his argument as
follows: "The volume of employment associated with a given
wage rate is unpredictable before the fact, and the effect
of a given rate upon employment is undecipherable after the
fact. The employment effect cannot normally be the subject
of rational calculation and prediction at the time the bar-
gain is made, and union officials are in no position to
assume responsibility for it".2  Any exceptions to this
rule, he relegates to the role of an "exceptional case!3
(sort of like the "imperfections" for which he ridicules
exponents of the "marginal productivity doctrine!?). Reynolds
also feels that wage changes and the level of employment are
unrelated in the short run, though his conclusion is stated
in a little different form from that of Ross: ., it seems
reasonable to expect that the direct effect of a wage change
in a particular firm on output and employment in that firm
will usually be very close to zeron.4  Dunlop, on the other
hand, has distinguished a number of cases in which there has
been a "noncyclical relation between wage rates and
1. Ross, op. cit., p. 94.
2. Ibid., p. 80.
3. Ibid.
4. Lloyd G. Reynolds, "Toward a Short-Run Theory of
Wages"t, American Economic Review, June 1948, p. 308.
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employment",1 and Slichter has described the efforts of some
unions to use wage rate changes as a means of fighting tech-
nological unemployment or threats of non-union competition.2
There is no doubt, furthermore, that the experience of
the Brockton shoe industry runs counter to the expectations
of both Ross and Reynolds, but the question is, "Does this
experience simply reflect exceptional circumstances?" In
answering this question, the distinction made by Gordon
should be useful. He distinguishes between "the tjob shop'
type of business, which quotes on individual orders to par-
ticular specifications and produces only after the sale is
made, and the type of business which is geared to continu-
ous production of one or more products, for which production
plans are made and prices are quoted in advance of sales". 3
Gordon then points out that tIn the case of the job shop
quoting on individual orders, marginal calculations are
likely to be more important",.4  If this is true, then wage
changes in individual firms could be expected to affect the
level of employment in those firms.
1. John T. Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions,
Macmillan, 1944, pp. 61-66.
2. Slichter, ep. cit., pp. 228-210 and pp. 345-369.
3. R. A. Gordon, "Short-Period Price Determination in
Theory and Practice,,, American Economic Review, June 1948,p. 282.
4- Ibid., p. 285.
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The shoe industry seems to fit this "job shop," des-
cription, for here most firms manufacture for particular
orders and to the buyer's specifications. In addition,
a competitive product market allows individual firms to
adopt independent courses of action, which, in this case,
are facilitated by the incompleteness of union organization.
Are these "job shop" and "-competitive" conditions so rare
in American industry that they may be neglected? Though
Gordon classified the "continuous production" type of
business as the "more important one in practice,l1 he
apparently thought the "job shop" businesses important
enough to mention as a significant case.
It is probably impossible to classify all American
business into "continuous production" or "job shop"' cate-
gories; however, "job shop" conditions exist in such di-
verse industries as men t s and women's clothing, independent
foundry operation, and the manufacture of specialized ma-
chinery, to name a few. Efforts have been made, on the
other hand, to classify industries according to the concen-
tration of economic power and. consequent degree of competi-
tion in each one. Out of T275 categories included in the
Census of Manufactures for 1935", in "49 manufacturing
1. Ibid., p. 282.
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industries...the index of concentration was relatively
low"l--that is, the four largest firms in the industry
produced less than twenty-five percent of the industry's
output and the eight largest, less than one-third. While
these statements cannot be regarded as conclusive, they do
give evidence, at least, that many American industries are
characterized by "job shop" production conditions and com-
petitive product markets. Research on wage activity in
these industries, then, may find an "employment effect"
associated with wage changes. If such a finding is made,
associations between employment and wage changes in indi-
vidual firms cannot be relegated to the role-of the
"exceptional case".
5. Unemployment or underemployment may become
an effective determinant of wage activity through
the creation of a demand' by the rank and file for
action which will increase the volume of work.
During the period from 1933 to 1947, pressure for
"shoes" was frequently placed on Brotherhood leaders by
the rank and file. This pressure sometimes originated
with craft groups, but, more often, it originated with
the shop crews in factories where employment problems
1. TNEC, Competition and Monopoly in American
Industry, Monograph No. 21, 1941, pp. 28-29.
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were most acute. Thus, the "causen of increased employ-
ment has become politically more potent than easier promises
of wage increases.
With this conclusion, too, Ross disagrees. He does
admit that unemployment may become a problem for a union,
but he views this problem in the following terms:1
"Thus, it is the employer rather than the
unemployed or potentially unemployed worker
who forces the decision in the normal case.
From the standpoint of the union, the purpose
of agreeing to the cut is to maintain the
bargaining relationship on as satisfactory a
basis as possible. What appears as a danger
is not that employment will fall off but that
the employer will become hostile. It is the
loss of friendly relationships, bargaining
units, and collective agreements, rather than
the loss of jobs, which is most to be avoided".
Ross' conclusions do seem applicable to one phase of the
Brockton experience: that of the actions of the Boot and
Shoe Workers' Union in Brockton previous to 1933. Here,
the Union practically cut itself off from the membership
in order to maintain "friendly relationships", but the
result was disastrous for that Union. Since the Brother-
hood's organization, wage reductions granted as a means of
attracting additional business into the district have been
responses to rank and file pressure, rather than the uni-
lateral action of the Union's leaders.
1. Ross, op. cit., p. 15.
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In this connection, however, the Brotherhood, as a
result of the extremely democratic nature of the organiza-
tion, has faced a problem of "inaction" on a number of
occasions. This disposition to "discuss" rather than
"Tdecide" when the question was particularly delicate has
been given additional impetus by the craft form of union
organization. Thus, the principal goal of some craft
representatives has sometimes been "protection for my
group" rather than the "best interests of all the workers
concerned". Perhaps as a result of patience with delays
and disagreements, though, the Brotherhood has survived
trying times, whereas its predecessor union did not.
6. Small technological changes in piece-work
industries tend to be captured by the workers
directly concerned with the change, thus altering
the intra-plant wage structure.
A number of examples were cited in Chapter VIII,
describing the piece-rate system in Brockton. This con-
clusion corresponds, roughly, to one stated in more general
form by Dunlop: "Piece work or incentive rates permit a
more regular and immediate capture of the gains of produc-
tivity than a day-rate wage payment system".1 In Brockton,
1. John T. Dunlop, "Productivity and the Wage Structure",
Income, Employment and Public Policy, Essays in Honor of
Alvin H. Hansen, Norton, 1948, p. 351. He expands on this
point as follows (pp. 344-5): "Unequal rates of technical
change may, however, in time substantially alter job
A~/
the tendency for the immediately-affected worker to share
disproportionately in the gains from technological change
was noted, as well, when the change in job content was
relatively great, involving a completely new machine and
a greatly changed Job content. This seems to have taken
place since (1) workers on the old job have asserted a prior
claim to the new one and (2). bargaining on the new rate has
consequently taken as a point of reference the rate. on the
old job.
In conclusion, a comment on the objectives of union
activity, as evidenced in this case, may be in order. The
classification proposed by Ross--union behavior as motivated
by needs for (a) institutional survival, (b) personal
achievement on the part of the leaders, and (c) increased
benefits for the rank and file--seems to fit, in a general
way, the Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen. Perhaps
the most relevant question, though, concerns the relative
potency of these objectives, rather than their mere exis-
tence. On this question, the Brockton experience provides
some evidence, for the Brotherhood supplanted an organiza-
tion which placed the interests of institutional survival
and personal ambition above the wishes of the rank and file.
relationships. In the garment industry, for example, over
a number of years, as the result of a series of minor
technical changes, the position of the presser (paid by
the piece) has been improved relatively to the cutter (paid
by the hour) so that he now earns more per hour on the
average".
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As a consequence, the Brotherhood has been characterized
by democratic procedures, designed to assure the member-
ship of an organization responsive to its demands. As
such, union activity in the Brockton district has survived
the most taxing circumstances. Perhaps, then, vigilant
emphasis on the interests of the rank and file, despite
conflict with short-run institutional and personal needs,
is the means for truly stable trade union operations.
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